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






THE
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VOLUME IX



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The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors William W. Fenn, Kirsopp Lake, Frederic Palmer, and James H. Ropes.

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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME IX

JANUARY, 1916

NUMBER 1

THOMAS KELLY CHEYNE

CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The appearance of the last product of Dr. Cheyne's pen¹ offers occasion to review briefly his work, and to estimate it as far as is now possible, bearing in mind that the significance of a scholar's work is not always clearly visible till some time after he has ceased to be active.

Cheyne was born in London, Sept. 18, 1841, and died in Oxford, Feb. 16, 1915. He was educated at Merchant Taylor's School and at Worcester College, Oxford, was ordained in 1864, became Oriel Professor of Interpretation of Scripture at Oxford with Canonry of Rochester attached in 1886, and Fellow of Balliol College in 1868. His life was devoted mainly to the critical study of the Old Testament, though he did not neglect the New Testament, and sometimes passed into the larger field of general religious history. His width of interests and the fertility of his mind are illustrated by the large number of articles that he contributed to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* and to the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, of which latter work he became general editor on Robertson Smith's death in 1894.

His Old Testament study seems to have had a very intimate relation to his literary and religious life. I was

¹ *The Reconciliation of Races and Religion*. Thomas Kelly Cheyne. A. & C. Black, London. Pp. x, 214. 6s.

told by Professor Robertson Smith that at an early period in his career Cheyne fell into a state of perplexity and doubt, and seemed at one time to be on the point of giving up all interest in religion. From this depressing state he emerged through his critical studies, probably because these led him to separate the kernel from the shell, and to rest in the spiritual conceptions of the Bible. However this may be, his devotion to the Old Testament remained throughout his life, and he became one of the most influential English expounders of the new critical views.

He entered on his life-work at a favorable moment. For two hundred years eminent English thinkers had favored and to some extent practised a certain freedom in dealing with Biblical material, especially by laying stress on its higher side; there had been, however, no definite conflict of opinions on this subject before the nineteenth century. The theory of Astruc and the works of certain Continental scholars (especially De Wette, Ewald, Kuenen, Wellhausen, and Renan) had become known in England,² and gave an impetus to research. The result was a conflict in the ecclesiastical world. The first clash occurred in a Nonconformist body. Professor Samuel Davidson, of the Lancashire Independent College, had undertaken to edit a new edition of Horne's *Introduction* and was asked to rewrite the volume dealing with the Old Testament. His treatment of the Old Testament, which was freely critical, was pronounced dangerous by the Committee of the College with such emphasis that he resigned his position (1856). In the Church of England, while the Tractarian movement concerned itself little with Biblical criticism, its anxiety being to maintain what it held to be the purity

² In America also they were not unknown. It will be remembered that the translation of De Wette's *Introduction* by Theodore Parker and Frederick Frothingham appeared in Boston in 1843-48.

and authority of the Church, a storm was raised by the publication of *Essays and Reviews* (1860); one of the contributors was condemned in the Court of Arches but sustained by the Privy Council. Finally came on the Colenso case. Bishop Colenso was declared deposed by the Bishop of Capetown for his volume on the Pentateuch, and was reinstated by the Privy Council. This put an end to ecclesiastical prosecution in England for what was called critical heresy; liberty of Biblical research was established (1865). A few years later in Scotland Robertson Smith was removed from his chair in the Free Church College at Aberdeen for articles in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; but this action proved ineffective—freedom came to be recognized generally in Scotland.

Such was the atmosphere in which Cheyne began his Old Testament work. It was his commentary on Isaiah, the third edition of which appeared in 1884, that first established him as a scholar of importance. The variety of his learning, the vital character of his style, and his frankness and courage in the expression of opinion, gradually commended the work to a wide circle of readers, and his ideas, though they called forth opposition, were accepted by a considerable body of students in England and elsewhere. In later years he modified some of the critical views expressed in the commentary, but continued to hold his main conception of the constitution of the Book of Isaiah; so, for example, in his edition of the revised Hebrew text which was published in 1899 in the *Sacred Books of the Old Testament*. Some other prophetic writings (Hosea, Micah, Jeremiah) he treated in a similar critical manner. In 1888 his volume on the Psalter appeared under the title *The Book of Psalms or The Praises of Israel*, and secured immediate recognition by its fine religious spirit, the incisiveness and directness of its style, and its freedom of thought. Other works which

revealed his geniality were *The Hallowing of Criticism* (1888), *Aids to the Devout Study of Criticism* (1892), and *Founders of Old Testament Criticism* (1893). His little volume, *Jewish Religious Life after the Exile* (in the series *American Lectures on the History of Religions*, 1898), though popular in style is helpful to other than general readers. He was one of the first to bring out clearly the value of the Book of Chronicles for the history of Jewish religious ideas in the period in which it was written (the third century B.C., according to Cheyne).

His helpful Old Testament criticism was brought prematurely to a close by his adoption of the theory (due largely to Winckler) that the main part of the records concerning the early history of Israel refer to a district in southern Judah called in Hebrew by a name (*misr*) which usually means Egypt. This district is connected with the Kenites, from whom, it is widely held, the Hebrews derived their initial cult of Yahweh; and the name of one of the clans of the region, Jerahmeel, by its similarity in form to Israel and other Old Testament names, suggested to Cheyne that it gives us the central point of the Israelite development. Thereupon in a series of volumes (*Critica Biblica*, etc.) he proceeded to rewrite the early history, substituting the name Jerahmeel for a great number of the names in the Hebrew text, undeterred by difficulties confronting such substitution. Though this procedure was generally condemned by scholars, Cheyne held on to it to the last. This unfortunate surrender to a baseless hypothesis was and is deplored by his friends as a mere waste of fine critical power. But it is generally felt that this lacuna in his critical work must not blind us to the value of the contributions he has made to Biblical science.

His latest literary output (in the volume mentioned at the head of this notice) is probably to be regarded not as a quite new departure, but rather as the formulation

of ideas that had been long held by him more or less consciously. Though he had surmounted his early doubt, he seems never to have been in full sympathy with the Church creeds. His various writings show an increasing divergence from prevailing opinions; he was seeking what he thought or hoped to prove a larger scope and a purer atmosphere, and he fell in readily with certain Oriental conceptions and systems that had been making their way gradually in the Western world. He became a member of a Brahmanist Society, and was in intimate relations with the founder of the Bahaist Movement and with his son. He held that peace among nations could be secured only through religious union. Each of the great religions of the present day, he thought, might learn from the others, and a common faith would make all men brothers. Though he affirmed the superiority of the founder of Christianity to all other religious teachers, he seems to have been especially attracted by Bahau'llah and his formulation of religious truth—"one God, and he a God of love." This is by no means a new idea, but it seemed to Cheyne to acquire a new vital energy as preached by the Bahaists, and in his latest volume he supports it with enthusiasm. He does not discuss the details of the hoped-for movement towards universal peace; he does not, for example, consider whether history shows that social fusion and religious unification have always gone hand-in-hand. But whatever the difficulties in his theory and the obstacles to the fulfilment of his hope, the reader cannot fail to be impressed by his religious breadth and the nobility of his purpose.

In considering Cheyne's work as a scholar we must bear in mind the variety of his interests and his diverse intellectual tendencies. He was an omnivorous reader in his own special subjects without losing his hold on general literature—he was, for example, a student of

Dante. He seized on new discoveries in ancient history and used them with effect for the illustration of his own researches. He was attracted by new theories, especially when they attached themselves to generally accepted facts; and his vivid imagination sometimes so clothed these theories with life that they seduced him into precarious generalizations and into unfortunate special pleading. His sympathy with broad ideas was strong, yet it sometimes led him to hasty conclusions which easily became a hindrance rather than a help to progress. He was a simple-minded man, holding to his own views with naïve tenacity, aware of the existence of other views, but seemingly not looking on them as things that claimed his serious consideration. Opposing opinions he treated with kindness, never, so far as I have observed, speaking of their authors with bitterness or even sarcastically. His prevailing tone toward his literary opponents was one of gentle wonder and regret that they could fail to see data and inferences as he saw them.

In Cheyne's long career we have to recognize valuable contributions to Biblical criticism and exegesis made in his earlier books, and to honor him for his devotion to all that he believed to make for the discovery of truth and the well-being of men.

CONFUCIANISM, AN APPRECIATION

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From the time when I began to make a study of Confucianism, it has been my growing conviction that no antagonism should exist between Confucianism and Christianity. The two religions, like two persons, should be friends; and as two persons, who are friends, differ in mien, physique, temperament, thought, manner, and occupation, so these two religions, while differing in many characteristics, ceremonies, and the consciousness as to what is right and what is wrong, should be friendly to each other and helpful to each other, through agreement in those spiritual ideas which are essential and fundamental, through the reverential realization of the common source of all truth and goodness, and through aspirations after higher things, an enlarged vision, and future perfection, which these religions, along with the best in all lands, expect ere long to see fulfilled.

Even where these two religions differ, they may still dwell together in the spirit of concord. We may not look for uniformity or complete agreement; we may look for harmony and mutual regard. Confucius, in one of his terse sayings, has said, "The Princely Man is harmonious but does not agree with others; the Mean Man tries to be like others, but is not harmonious." It is a misconception to think that Confucianism and Christianity are the same; it is an equal misconception to think that the two are antagonistic. The least that we should pray for is that the two, while differing from each other, shall be tolerant of each other. The most we can pray for is that the two shall at last unite in the unity of God and in personal determination to do, as Christ enjoined, the will of God.

The first reason for expressing appreciation of Confucianism is because it lays emphasis on the duties of right living, which are of essential and universal application. The moral nature of man, the rule of conscience, the moral virtues as developed from justice and benevolence, are the foundation principles on which rises the sublime structure of Confucian teaching. The virtues taught under various terms and in manifold forms of expression relate so directly and clearly to the present life, to human obligation, and to actual deeds, that many have assumed that Confucianism is only a system of ethics. If so, we must acknowledge that it is high ethics, and that no people have been so saturated with ethical ideas as have the Chinese. It is the moral element that makes significant the ancient civilization of China.

The soil from which spring forth all virtues is the moral nature of man. The orthodox theory of Confucianism, entirely compatible with the orthodox theory of Christianity, is that all men are thus endowed with this moral nature, a law written in the heart, a conscience to discern between right and wrong, a heavenly rule, the voice of God within. If the orthodox Confucianist and the orthodox Christian differ in their interpretation, it is as to the other theory of what is called "original sin" and "total depravity." That men have an aptitude to sin, and that it is hard to get them to do right, will be acknowledged by both Confucianist and Christian, but they separate when they begin to theorize as to whether or not all men are born *in* sin and *with* sin, and whether sin is hereditary, to be traced back to the first man.

Mencius has spoken most clearly on this particular doctrine, differing from other theories which prevailed in his day. He said:

"The feeling of commiseration belongs to all men; so does that of shame and dislike, and that of reverence and respect, and that of approving and disapproving. The feeling of commiseration

implies the principle of benevolence; that of shame and dislike, the principle of righteousness; that of reverence and respect, the principle of propriety; and that of approving and disapproving, the principle of knowledge. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and knowledge, are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them; and a different view is simply from want of reflection. Hence it is said, 'Seek and you will find them. Neglect and you will lose them.' Men differ from one another in regard to them—some as much again as others, some five times as much, and some to an incalculable amount. It is because they cannot carry out fully their natural powers. It is said in the *Book of Poetry*, 'Heaven in producing mankind, gave them their various faculties and relations with their specific laws. These are the invariable rules of nature for all to hold, and all love this admirable virtue.'

"Confucius said, 'The maker of this ode knew indeed the principle of our nature!' We may thus see that every faculty and relation must have its law, and since there are invariable rules for all to hold, they consequently love this admirable virtue."

From the quotation which Mencius makes from the *Book of Poetry*, we learn that Confucian teachings are not only ethical but religious. We are taught that the moral nature of man is the production of Heaven or God. This is the very first sentence in the *Doctrine of the Mean*: "What Heaven has conferred or ordained is called (moral) nature; to comply with this nature is called the path (of duty); to cultivate or put in order this path is called instruction (a system of teaching, a religion)." So the Sung philosopher and commentator, Chu-fu-tsze, has declared in this connection that "men and the world of matter have each received from Heaven an endowment of supreme law."

Possessed of this moral inheritance from God, all the duties of men are summed up in the one comprehensive word, called Virtue. China's ancient teachers ring the changes on this word; over and over again men are exhorted to cultivate virtue. Sometimes, as in the *Great Learning*, the injunction is cultivation of one's

personality, or what is commonly called the training of character. One of Confucius' maxims is, "The Princely Man cherishes virtue; the Mean Man cherishes comfort." Again he says, "When virtue is not cultivated; when learning is not discussed; when righteousness is learned but not practised; and when that which is not good cannot be changed; this is my solicitude." The first sentence in the *Great Learning* says that "the way of the Great Learning may be summed up in three things: cultivating illustrious virtue, renovating the people, and resting in the highest goodness."

Virtue, by which the moral nature of man is denominated, has many characteristics, but is summed up in the five cardinal virtues—humanity, righteousness, propriety, knowledge, and fidelity. The first two are used the most by both Confucius and Mencius. The first, as a Chinese character, means love as between man and man, and may be called charity or brotherly love. This too is characterized in many ways as is charity in the Christian Scriptures. Thus when Confucius was asked by one of his disciples what it was, he replied, "To be able to practise five things under the heavens constitutes charity." And being asked what they were, he added: "Respect, large-heartedness, fidelity, earnestness, and kindness. If you are respectful, you will not be insulted; if you are large-hearted, you will win all; if you are faithful, men will repose trust in you; if you are earnest, you will accomplish much; if you are kind, you will be able to employ the services of others." This is much like the teaching of the Apostle Paul, where he says, "Put on charity, which is the bond, the girdle, of perfectness."

And as with the great Apostle righteousness is taught equally with brotherly love, so with Confucius and Mencius. The latter says: "Brotherly love is the heart of man; righteousness is the path for man to follow. How lamentable, if men neglect the path and do not

pursue it; if they lose their heart and do not know how to find it again." Confucius says, "The Princely Man in the world does not set his mind either for or against anything, but what is right, that he will follow."

The Chinese Classics are in fact saturated with these teachings, exhortations, commands, for living an upright life and performing all the duties which Heaven prescribes, as revealed in an enlightened conscience and as applicable to all the conditions of life. The Chinese people too have been thus saturated with these high and worthy sentiments, and from childhood, in the school or out of the school, have been impressed with human obligation, as directed in deep reverence to God and in fidelity to man.

A second reason for appreciating Confucianism is because its great principles, while applicable to all life, apply in particular to the social, the political, and the educational departments of life. The five cardinal virtues relate to what is called the five social or human relations—ruler and his ministers, husband and wife, parent and child, brother and brother, friend and friend. These relations are in our Christian phraseology spiritualized, or widened to far beyond the limits of one's own family-circle. Thus the spirit that should exist between parent and child is that which should exist between public officers or rulers and the people.

Similarly, all moral teachings are made to apply to all who exercise authority. The moral science of Confucianism is in the first place social science or sociology, and in the second place political science or national well-being. The political science of Confucianism gives us light less on forms of government than on the duties to virtue, which rest on officers of the government from the highest to the lowest. In the Confucian sense, political reform means, first of all, moral reform, the reformation of the individual. Numberless citations could be

made but only a few are needed, and these, I may remark, are known even to the illiterate of China as well as to the learned *literati*.

The Classic of the *Great Learning* may be called a handbook on the science of morals and politics linked together. It deals with the supreme obligations of the Supreme Ruler of a nation, but it is a treatise which each child, rich or poor, all over the land, has, in past years at least, been required to memorize. It shows the duty of rulers to train their individual characters, and it shows how closely the prosperity of a nation is linked with the righteous character and conduct of the ruler and officials.

This teaching of the *Great Learning* by one of the disciples of Confucius corroborates the earlier teachings of the *Book of Odes* and the *Book of History*, three to four thousand years ago. In one of the Odes by the Duke of Chou to the Ministers of the Chou dynasty in praise of King Wen and in lamentation for the downfall of the dynasty of Shang or Yin, we have these words:

“Ever think of your ancestor,
Cultivating your virtue,
Always striving to accord with the will (of Heaven).
So shall you be seeking for much happiness.
Before Yin lost the multitudes,
(Its kings) were the assessors of God.
Look to Yin as a beacon;
The great appointment is not easily (preserved).

“The appointment is not easily (preserved).
Do not cause your own extinction.
Display and make bright your righteousness and name,
And look at (the fate of) Yin in the light of Heaven.
The doings of High Heaven,
Have neither sound nor smell.
Take your pattern from king Wen,
And the myriad regions will repose confidence in you.”

In another Ode occur these words:

“God said to king Wen,
‘I am pleased with your intelligent virtue,
Not loudly proclaimed nor portrayed,
Without extravagance or changeableness,
Without consciousness of effort on your part,
In accordance with the pattern of God.’”

The whole history beginning with the ancient rulers, Yao and Shun, down to Yü the Great, founder of the Hsia dynasty in 2205 B.C., on to T'ang, founder of the Shang, in 1766 B.C., on to King Wu, founder of the Chou dynasty in 1122 B.C., is a history full of warning, admonition, and exhortation, with examples of upright reformers and statesmen to follow and cherish, and with the example of bad rulers to shun and abhor. The story is told in the *Book of Odes* and the *Book of History*. In *Spring and Autumn* Confucius tells of later events, a sad record of disorder, confusion, lawlessness, and wickedness, one kingdom quarreling with another, and one ruler overthrown by another. Everywhere and through all these centuries confirmation is given to the declaration of Solomon, “Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people.”

The *Analects*, the *Great Learning*, and Mencius carry on the same teaching—that righteousness and benevolence are the essentials of government. These are the questions which concern the Sages of Confucianism as they expound the science of politics, and not the multitude of questions with which Western political science loves to enlighten the world.

Ancient learning as distinct from the new learning is also inseparably bound up in the moral and religious principles of Confucianism. Ethics and the substratum of religion enter into a knowledge of history, sociology, finance, political science, *belles-lettres*, poetry, etiquette, and music; while modern and Western learning has little

to say of God, and overlooks the common duties of human relations. I appreciate for this reason what Confucianism has wrought in the past, and dread the effects of the new learning on the student class of today.

A third ground of appreciation is the remarkable fact that Confucianism makes supreme and all-important the root or origin of things. In looking at Confucianism from the superficial point of view, in its aspects of ceremonialism, rules of etiquette, methods of governing, land taxation, the worship of spirits, and even in its moral maxims, there is good chance for criticism as well as for admiration. When we search for its inner worth, for the kernel of eternal truth, for basic principles, all criticism vanishes and admiration alone remains. This search for first causes, this delving down to the root of the tree of knowledge and the tree of righteousness, is the most vital of all the teachings which Confucianism offers to China and also to religious thinkers throughout the world.

Early in the *Analects* of Confucius occur these words: "The Princely Man gives attention to the root of things; when the root is secure, there spring up all kinds of truth; filial piety and fraternal regard, these are the root of benevolent action." In the *Great Learning* we have the simple statement: "All things have a root, and they have branches; all deeds have a beginning and an end." The writer then traces back the process of pacifying the Empire to the good order of the State, to the regulation of the family, to the cultivation of the individual, to the rectifying of the heart, to the sincerity of the thoughts, and finally to the highest attainment of knowledge, and this extreme knowledge is found in investigating all things, in the spirit of research. He then throws in the sentence that "from the Emperor down to the mass of the people, all should make the cultivation of individual character the root."

Later on, in the same book, when dealing with the great problem of making the nation rich and prosperous, the writer traces the following stages in the development back to the original cause:

“On this account the ruler will first take pains about his own virtue. Possessing virtue will give him the people. Possessing the people will give him the territory. Possessing the territory will give him its wealth. Possessing the wealth, he will have resources for expenditure. Virtue is the root; wealth is the result.”

Similarly, the very first sentence in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, as we have said, shows how all religion or instruction is preceded by the path of duty or doctrine, and this by Heaven's law in the soul, or man's moral nature, and this by Heaven or God, from whom every law, principle, and religion have come. In all the Classics we are taught again and again that God is the great First Cause, and on Him we are all dependent. The philosophers of the Sung period revelled in such discussions, but always reverentially, and the *Book of Changes* with the notes of Confucius form the basis of their philosophy.

The philosopher, Chu-fu-tsze, gives an elaborate explanation of the origin of the universe, which is more that of gradual evolution than of distinct creation. Man, the material world, heaven and earth, are all preceded by a formless, chaotic condition, and this in turn is preceded by two principles, the one termed Ruling Principle (li), and the other a Vivifying Principle (ch'i). They are two, and yet so joined that the one cannot exist without the other. The one is lifeless; the other full of life. The Ruling Principle needs the Vivifying Principle to secure results, while the Vivifying Principle in turn depends on the Ruling Principle for the way its power shall be exerted and exhibited.

"Being asked whether the Ruling Principle really existed before heaven and earth, he said before heaven and earth there was most certainly just this Ruling Principle. The Principle existing, heaven and earth existed. If this Principle did not exist, there would have been no heaven or earth, no man or things. The Ruling Principle existing, then the Vivifying Principle exists, flows forth, pervades, and germinates all the material world. Being asked if it was the Ruling Principle which germinated all things, he replied that when the Ruling Principle exists, the Vivifying Principle exists, flows forth, pervades, and germinates. The Ruling Principle as such is without form or body."

The next problem is the origin of these two Principles. In some respects it looks as if there were nothing beyond or before, but that the two Principles were the First Cause. This is not, however, the real teaching of this Chinese thinker. He traces them, as well as heaven and earth, to the Absolute, the Great Extreme, called *T'ai Chi*. He says:

"Being asked whether the Absolute is the chaotic mass before heaven and earth came into being, or the general name for the Ruling Principle of heaven and earth and all the material world, he replied that the Absolute is the Ruling Principle of heaven and earth and all things. As to that which is within heaven and earth, the Absolute is in the midst of heaven and earth. As to that which is within all things, the Absolute is inherent in all."

Chu-fu-tsze in his abstract speculation advances to another great thought, and that is that first of all there was the Infinite, called the *Wu Chi*, but that the Infinite was the Absolute, and the Absolute the Infinite, just like a circle in the ancient diagram. The one side is the incomprehensible, the mysterious, the invisible; the other side represents through the Ruling and Vivifying Principles a vast manifestation, unfolded in heaven and earth, all matter and man. He says:

"The Absolute, the Great Extreme, derives its name from the idea of the highest pivot. The sages called it the Absolute, meaning

thereby the root of heaven, earth, and all things. Hence it was that Chou-tsze termed it the Infinite, and so expressed the Mysterious without sound or fragrance. . . . The Absolute is just the extreme point, beyond which no one can go—most high, most magnificent, most subtle, most spiritual, surpassing all.”

By thus examining the doctrines taught by the Sung philosophers and based on the old, mystical teachings of the *Book of Changes*, one should be convinced that Confucianism is a religion as well as a system of ethics. Confucianism cannot be limited to the sayings of Confucius, still less to his ethical sayings. The Classics which he compiled are saturated with religious ideas. All righteous conduct and a virtuous heart draw their life from above. All are dependent on God.

A fourth ground of appreciation is the fact that the men who gave utterance to all these good teachings lived good lives. They practised righteousness who preached it. They were not only teachers, but good men and holy men. From Yao and Shun down to Confucius, every one who taught wise and good sayings was an earnest and practical reformer. The lives of these men carried more weight than their words. In a turbulent age, Confucius was moved to leave his class-room and go out into society and the life of different kingdoms, exhorting the common people and, still more, kings and officers, to abandon wickedness and establish just laws and right ideas. As James Freeman Clarke has said, “Many beautiful and noble things are related concerning the character of Confucius—of his courage in the midst of danger, of his humility in the highest position of honor. His writings and life have given the law to Chinese thought. He is the patron saint of that great Empire.” The seventy-two disciples of Confucius were chosen more for their love of goodness than for mental attainments. Mencius, his chief apostle, is thus reckoned among the Holy Men; his

character was as great as his intellect. So, too, the noted commentators of the T'ang and Sung periods, and those less known in the last dynasty, have given strength to their writings by the sincerity of their lives. Cant, hypocrisy, fine words but bad living, have characterized none of these leaders, but only men of less calibre and especially the *litterati* of later years. But as Christianity is not to be judged by the hypocrisies of Christians, so Confucianism should not be condemned for the lack of virtue, truth, and sincerity among mere students of the ancient Classics. For four thousand years the noted teachers of thought found in the Confucian system have been men who practised what they preached, and for this they are worthy of honor.

A fifth reason for appreciating Confucianism is because it is adapted to the common people as well as to the learned. The usual name of Confucianism implies that it is a religion of the learned. To be a Chinese scholar a thorough knowledge of the Classics has been deemed a necessity. Confucianism is thus not only a system of ethics with spiritual truths but a method of learning. Chinese education has meant a training in the literary excellencies of the Classics, whether the moral and religious ideas were always accepted or not. Thus up to the present, the *litterati* have been dependent on the Confucian Classics. Many such are inclined to make Confucianism only a learning and not a system of ethics. They even go so far as to declare it is not a religion at all. Confucius has been dethroned from his lofty place as a messenger of Heaven and a preacher of righteousness. He has been made only an essayist, a *littérateur*. When Confucianism is thus narrowed, it will not be long before, in the face of modern science and the new learning, it is rejected altogether.

As a matter of history, the educated men of China in the past, but not in the present, have been close stu-

dents of Confucianism. Its ideas have been acceptable, its rites have been observed. The life of the learned has been moulded by Confucianism, which in common phraseology has been called the Great Religion.

The life of the common people has also been moulded by Confucianism. In fact the mind of the Chinese is Confucian. The great underlying, all-important principles of Confucianism have become known to all, the illiterate as well as the learned. Certain phrases embodying the germ thought of Confucianism are on the lips of ignorant women, the country peasant, and the little child. Confucianism should be called not only a religion of the learned, but the Religion of China. Its vital teachings clearly expressed have permeated the whole nation. They are adapted to high and low, to ruler and people, and therein show their divine inspiration and origin in Heaven.

These five reasons should convince every one that for a Christian to appreciate Confucianism is not senseless or base, but reasonable and sound. The position is both liberal and orthodox. The one great criticism passed today on Confucianism is that it has no vitality, no dynamic power, and, being a human teaching, can have none. It is true that it seems to be decadent, that its good points are being discarded, and that it is fast becoming mere ceremonialism, a worship of Confucius, a cult, and not a life or even a system of religion or ethics. To my mind this is to be regretted. It is equally clear that the criticism contains a fallacy. If Confucianism as a religion has lost its power, it should not be forgotten that many branches of the Christian Church in the past, and also today, have been decadent, retaining the form, but losing the life, of a spiritual religion. The only way for Confucianism or Christianity or any other religion to have life-giving power is to resume connection with the one living and true God, rely more on His spiritual presence

than on systems and forms, rites and creeds, and believe with a new assurance of faith that God is All and in all, and that man, while His offspring, can do no good apart from Him. This truth, as well as the criticism itself, applies equally to Christian and Confucianist.

ETHICS IN MODERN BUSINESS

JOHN F. MOORS

BOSTON

[This is the first of a series of articles on the ethical standards prevalent in different occupations.—ED.]

Though the object of business is money-making, its essence is service. Facts in support of this conception face us on every hand. For example, follow through the day the most typical of all citizens, the suburbanite. A cook serves him with breakfast, his town with a sidewalk, an eager boy with a newspaper, an engineer with safe conduct to the city. "Bag carried, sir?" is his welcome there. Thereafter both necessities and luxuries are everywhere thrust upon him—collars, fish, custard pies, vacuum cleaners, pyramids of oranges and of apples vigorously shone on anonymous trousers. A street car takes him to his office-building, an elevator to his office, cleaned for him in the cheerless hours of darkness by a woman on hands and knees. Throughout the day a stenographer and office-boy do his bidding. At lunch a restaurant serves him. When evening comes, superabundant theatres seek to entertain him. No socialist, however ardent, can conceive greater eagerness to serve. The very streets are congested with people bent on serving one another. The activities produced by charitable agencies are in volume as nothing by comparison. There is, however, a stern condition. The recipient of this service must pay for it. With rare exceptions, ability to pay can come only from the recompenses of service. The service of business is reciprocal.

The conception of business as service becomes peculiarly significant when we contrast business with specula-

tion. The essence of speculation is to make money without service. Like the amateur fisherman, the searcher for gold mines, the tramp, and the thief, the speculator seeks wealth without normal sacrifices in the form of effort. All alike, as a rule, get only their deserts. The farmer, the merchant, the manufacturer, and all the commercial parasites of these basic producers and distributors—butchers, bakers, and candlestick-makers—give equivalents for what they get, logically, at least, getting more the more they give. Under this individualistic system of seeking to get through giving, the productive powers of the world have grown prodigiously. The pure speculator's contributions are so slight that his own rewards are mostly dust and ashes and his part in business progress is almost negligible. The wonderful inventions of our age, the new economies in production and distribution, the construction of plant after plant, are the results of efforts to get wealth through giving better or cheaper service. Human progress itself, or what we have long called progress, is bound up in this conception. The familiar phrase, "What is a man worth?" comes somewhere near to meaning, "What has he given to his fellow-men?" The vast and conscious gifts of Rockefeller and Carnegie to colleges, foundations, and causes of recognized public merit, have been far less than their enormously money-making gifts, unintended as gifts, of oil and iron.

The business world is thronged with lenders and borrowers. Of these the lender is by tradition the more highly regarded. He sits in state and has substance; he judges borrowers, and often refuses their applications. Banks, prudent and discriminating, typify lenders. The borrower, because a borrower, admits lack of substance and his need of the substance of others. He often comes dangerously near to being a suppliant, and the contracts to which he binds himself

have tragic possibilities almost unknown to lenders. Yet the borrower is the active force in the community. He conceives and develops enterprises. The lender, because a lender, admits that he is a drone; that, having no enterprises of his own, he is ready to participate, usually without voice in the management, in the enterprises of others. Often too borrowers are far richer than lenders. The great railroad systems of the country owe millions to small investors once called by Dennis Kearney "bloated bondholders." And the banks themselves borrow of their depositors more than their total loans.

The business of giving, getting, borrowing, and lending is a delicate structure. Into it the State has more and more entered by the enactment of new laws, the creation of regulating commissions, and an ominous increase in taxes. Particularly in the case of the railroads, government, both state and national, seems to have endeavored to protect "the plain people" from "the big interests." But whereas railroads were once dominated by men of wealth—Vanderbilt, Gould, Huntington, Forbes, Harri-man—only James J. Hill of this type of railroad magnate is still alive and active. Even Messrs. Moore and Reid seem finally to have been ousted from control of the Rock Island Co. Railroad presidents are now hired experts, not large capitalists. Railroad bondholders and stockholders, the latter only technically partners in the business and in spirit as much lenders as bondholders, are the saving classes in the community. Noteworthy attempts are now being made by the Atchison and the Southern railway managers to induce the stockholders in these companies to be less lethargic. As both bondholders and stockholders are in most cases essentially lenders, enterprise does not spring from them and the participation of government in their business tends still further to retard development. Prior to 1893

profits from railroad extensions, largely through graft, were so great that such extensions were overdone. Later, Mr. Hill asserted that a billion dollars a year would be needed for railroad extension. Today such extensions have practically ceased. The prospect of getting in the railroad business has become so slight that money is no longer given for this purpose. Railroad investments were long deemed both safer and more satisfactory than industrial investments. Today the reverse is true.

Responsibility for modern corporations is supposed to reside in boards of directors. It seems axiomatic that it is the duty of directors to direct. If disaster comes, directors are held peculiarly accountable. The popular conception of the shortcomings of directors has been expressed by the broken-backed and now happily defunct Commission on Industrial Relations, as follows: "The typical director of large corporations is not only totally ignorant of the actual operations of such corporations, whose property he seldom, if ever, visits, but feels and exercises no responsibility for anything beyond the financial condition and the selection of executive officials." Yet directors get only \$5, \$10, or possibly \$20 a month. In return for whatever time, thought, and experience they give, they receive less than an office boy. Formerly, when rich men were more largely than now in control of corporations, self-interest tended to make them alert. Now a conscientious director tries to combine altruism with business—a dangerous combination. And while ignorance and absenteeism on his part are to be deplored, it is always a misfortune when he goes beyond general supervision and usurps the executive duties of adequately paid officials.

Two temptations have peculiarly beset directors: first, the opportunity to make clandestine profits through foreknowledge; second, the opportunity to make such profits by dealing as directors with themselves as in-

dividuals. Marketing their own lands through building railroads to them, "consenting" to serve on reorganization committees and charging secretly and excessively for their services, selling themselves the bonds of the companies entrusted to them, participating in profitable underwriting syndicates, have in the past been among the temptations. The fact that in most large corporations stockholders are only investors or in spirit money-lenders and take no real part in the management, increases greatly the liability of directors to fall into the above-mentioned temptations. Conscientious directors are pitifully paid for their services and responsibilities, while the unscrupulous are often much more overpaid than stockholders ever discover.

The end of the last and the beginning of the present century marked the climax in the production of multi-millionaires through the creation of the so-called trusts. Practically a decade earlier the Sherman anti-trust act had been passed. Practically another decade was to pass before this law was to become even measurably effective. The riot of quickly gathered wealth in the years 1899, 1900, 1901, and 1902 might lead a few prudent people to foresee a calamitous day of reckoning, but to the masses a new era had begun in which inordinately rich men seemed destined to be the leaders and standard-bearers of the American people. The following table of big combinations created in these four years shows how extraordinarily the anti-trust laws were then disregarded:

1899	1900	1901	1902
Amalgamated Copper	Armour & Co.	Allis-Chalmers	International Har-
American Agricultural	Crucible Steel	American Can	vester
Chemical	National Sugar Refin-	American Locomotive	International Mercan-
American Beet Sugar	ery	Associated Merchants	tile Marine
American Car and	Wagner Co. merged	Eastern Kodak	International Nickel
Foundry	with Pullman Co.	Pennsylvania Steel	Lackawanna Steel
American Pneumatic		Pittsburg Steel	Mass. Gas
Service		U. S. Steel	Railway Steel Spring

1899	1900	1901	1902
American Shipbuilding		U. S. Reduction & Refining	Texas Co. Vulcan Detinning
American Smelting and Refining			
American Woolen			
American Writing Paper			
Borden's Condensed Milk			
International Steam Pump			
National Carbon			
National Enameling and Stamping			
National Fire Proofing			
Pittsburg Coal			
Pressed Steel Car			
Republic Iron & Steel			
Rubber Goods Manufacturing			
Standard Oil			
Union Bag & Paper			
United Fruit			
United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry			

The climax of the era of combinations came near the end of McKinley's term of office and the beginning of Roosevelt's. After years of hard times McKinley was elected in 1896 on a "full dinner-pail" platform. The big combinations were a logical outcome. It was not until some time after President Taft had taken office in 1909 that any specific, comprehensive, and effective campaign was waged against combinations in restraint of trade. Various suits then brought are still in the courts.

Moral retribution without government interference had, however, begun much more promptly. The moving spirit in the most nefarious of the flotations—that of the Amalgamated Copper Co.—had been Henry H. Rogers, the masterful head of the Standard Oil group of financiers, after John D. Rockefeller had substituted golf for business. Rogers and his silent associate, William Rocke-

feller, had always had abundant available cash when the straits of others, natural or skilfully enforced, had furnished opportunities to buy securities at bargain prices. To the public, incited to speculation by flaming advertisements of prospective profits and racked by market collapses, Henry H. Rogers appeared a veritable bogey-man. But in 1907, thanks to an overweening conviction that he could, single-handed, build and finance a large railroad, this financial magician had to hold out his own hand, asking the public—the poor, blundering, often pinched public—to contribute to his personal needs. Then in quick succession paralysis and death overmastered him.

Almost as powerful as the awe-inspiring Rogers was the wizard of railroad combinations, Edward H. Harriman. While other men were asserting that all the railroads of the country were about to be merged in a single huge system, he was advancing far toward making this prophecy a reality. Yet long before the government had torn his railroads asunder, cancer took him. Even the overshadowing figure of all the multi-millionaires in their brief careers, the late J. P. Morgan, went, at the zenith of his power, like Napoleon, to Moscow. In the great railroad reorganizations of the 90's his had been the last and best word on conservative financing. The lesson that excessive floating debts should be avoided seemed then, under his guidance, to have been learned forever. As late as 1907 his personality dominated the financial world. But when he died, he left behind him the New York, New Haven, and Hartford and the Boston and Maine railroads nearly swamped by floating debts, and the New York Central railroad so burdened by them that it had to pay 6% for 20 years to refund \$100,000,000 of short-term notes. His master-stroke, the creation of the United States Steel Corporation, the so-called "good trust," was the turning-point. The success of this in-

dustrial giant seemed to justify imprudent finance. Though for part of the property acquired he is understood to have paid Mr. Carnegie \$100,000,000 more than the latter's asking price a short time before, and though for the rest he took highly-watered stocks, he diluted the combination still further, paid himself and others colossal underwriting commissions, and yet made the corporation prosper. But when the following year he bought English steamship lines without regard to price and created the International Mercantile Marine Co., his imprudence led first to disappointment and then to disaster. And soon afterward the purchase of railroads and trolley companies by the New Haven railroad with his sanction at extravagant prices, cost that company very dearly. So reckless had he become that, following the success of the Steel Corporation, he urged the British Parliament to allow him to build underground railways in London, to compete with other Americans building similarly, though the business has never been sufficient, without his competition, to give these other Americans any income on their investment. Only good luck in this instance saved him from another disaster.

It might be expected that the multi-millionaires who became partly a national institution, partly a national joke, and partly a national menace, would leave behind them spendthrift heirs. Cheering refutations of such an expectation are John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Mrs. E. H. Harriman, Mrs. Russell Sage, Miss Helen Gould, and the present J. P. Morgan.

Another apparent axiom of business is that monopoly is an evil. Yet why should two men do one man's work? If they must share one man's pay a needed job may go undone. A city which seeks two gas companies will probably have none, for capital at reasonable rates cannot be obtained unless monopoly is assured. As a

result, monopoly of local public utilities under government regulation is customary. Once railroads seemed similarly protected by a natural monopoly. They could be duplicated only at prohibitive cost; their terminals seemed to be real estate of incomparable value. They too have been more and more regulated by the State. The communities served, however, assuming that monopoly is an outrage, have encouraged competition. Comparatively cheap trolley competitors have sprung up everywhere, followed now by "jitneys" and other automobiles, for which states, cities, and towns have furnished streets practically free of expense. Railroads and trolley lines, burdened with both regulation and competition, have, especially in the east, suffered miserably. Both have been denied the hope of expecting profit through the growth of the communities served. While they have had repeatedly to face increased wages and exactions for the safety and convenience of the public, low rates and fares have been forced on them. Thousands of saving people, who meant to invest prudently, have as a consequence been bitterly disappointed.

The "unearned increment" is an economic outlaw. Looking back, it seems to have made uninteresting people fat with wealth for which they have given no equivalent. Looking forward, however, faith and hope, approved by scripture, are found to be a necessary attribute of unearned increments. From a business point of view, what can be more stimulating than the development of enterprises through correct and therefore profitable forecasts of the future? Nothing in business is more impressive than the energy to improve through the hope of exceptional rewards. Every year old appliances and standards are becoming obsolete because inventive genius has supplanted them with better devices. New machinery, new methods of communication, even

new accounting systems, have come into existence primarily through the hope of getting much through giving much.

The laws framed to compel business men to be virtuous have too often forced the semblance rather than the reality. They seem, nevertheless, to represent a more sensitive moral consciousness than formerly prevailed. More and more it is realized that trustees and directors cannot represent safely in a transaction themselves both as principals and as men entrusted with the welfare of others, the danger being manifest that they will fail to serve either one master or the other. The disclosures in connection with the Equitable Life Assurance Co. some years ago made plain that directors of a railroad could not properly as such sell to themselves the bonds of that railroad and then turn them over at a profit to an insurance company also under their charge. The time was when they might contend that through their knowledge of the bonds the insurance company was protected from loss, while the railroad company had reason to welcome the money which they paid for its bonds. Nevertheless, the master whom they were liable to serve first was themselves. Their profit might indeed become a determining factor both in the manufacture and distribution of the securities. If the railroad company wanted to sell bonds and the insurance company to buy them, should not the two companies bargain together directly and thus escape a middleman's profit? Often the expectation of such profits must have led railroad directors to vote for bond issues which it would have been safer not to have issued.

In the sale of securities municipalities, notwithstanding suspicions of corruption, perhaps because of such suspicions, have been far in advance of private corporations. Imagine the mayor of any American city forming a syndicate, with himself a participant, to buy, without

advertising for other bids, an issue of that city's bonds! Always bids for municipal bond issues are publicly invited and almost always such bids are forthcoming. There is little doubt that bonds of large and prosperous private corporations might be similarly sold. Yet over and over again favored bankers, whose partners have been directors, have been allotted attractive bond issues at prices almost sure to show a profit and enabling such bankers to give their business friends a chance to participate. Profitable underwritings have been similarly allotted on what seems a system of favoritism.

The justification for such a system lies, if there is any adequate justification, in the comparative certainty of getting money whenever needed. Almost every big railroad of the country had a decade ago some banking firm represented on its board of directors. Such exceptional railroads as the St. Louis and San Francisco, which "shopped about" among bankers, were held to be in a friendless and hence in a vulnerable position. The New York Central, the New York, New Haven, and Hartford, and the Boston and Maine railroads protected themselves by a regular contract for the sale of bonds and notes with J. P. Morgan & Co., which firm was represented on the boards of directors. The Union Pacific and the Pennsylvania railroads similarly depended on Kuhn, Loeb & Co. There have since then been wholesale resignations of such bankers from directorships. Many business men are convinced that thereby various important boards of directors have been unfortunately weakened. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that, quite apart from questions of price and profits, the New York Central, New Haven, and Boston and Maine railroads were led into unsound financial positions through the ease with which they could secure money under their contracts with the Morgan bankers. There also can be no doubt that in earlier days of their

strength they could have secured ample funds for their legitimate needs by asking for public bids.

Difficulties, however, arise in the case of corporations neither particularly strong nor well-known. Then banker friends, represented on boards of directors, may be friends indeed. All the members of a certain banking house resigned as directors of a certain none-too-strong corporation, that no question of their dealing with themselves might arise. They were besought to return. Had they not placed the securities of this corporation with hundreds of investors who needed their watchful care? Were they to leave these dependent investors in the lurch? They returned. The company sorely needed money. None others would supply it. They offered to buy the company's securities on condition that other bankers should be offered a chance to bid on them, and, when their bid—the only bid—was considered, they retired temporarily that the other directors might pass on the bid, without influence from them. They supplied the company with money when they would have much preferred not to do so. In spite of these precautions, they were on dangerous ground. Business is not sounder but less sound when it is not conducted on a business basis, and the descent is easy from these self-imposed standards of virtue to practices once common but now, to a great extent, happily outgrown. Gradually private syndicate profits are being superseded by public bids. The change is not yet far advanced but the tendency is good.

Though the service given by business men has had and should have mostly a selfish origin, rectitude is far more common than the reverse. All investments are based on trust in others, and in a great majority of cases such trust is not misplaced. Contracts are as often made orally as by elaborate written documents. Though law-courts are congested, most controversies are settled pri-

vately. Sharp practices and downright dishonesty are scandalous mostly because they are so rare. Persons not in business often shock business men by their disregard for obligations which business traditions have made sacred.

In the business world of getting income through service the stock-broker may not deserve to rank high. Too often he serves vice, as truly as the saloon-keeper. He often lives, perhaps fattens, on speculation the very essence of which is that it is not service. Brokers themselves have tried to distinguish between the legitimate and the illegitimate in their business, and years ago thought that they had found the distinction in the delivery or the non-delivery of actual securities. The "bucket-shop," *i.e.* the office where stock gambling was reduced to its lowest terms, the customer betting against the keeper of the shop as to fluctuations, was classed by members of the stock exchanges as illegitimate. But their own services, in so far as they serve speculators, may possess only attenuated usefulness. Yet stock exchange members, though much of their business may be notoriously useless and even dangerous, are singularly scrupulous, within the limits of their own game, both to their customers and to each other. They may deceive each other, within the rules. They may pretend that they want to buy when they really want to sell and *vice versa*. They may conceal the size of their orders. Such deception is like that of the tennis player who does not declare to his opponent just where he intends to return the ball. But no stock exchange broker would consciously cheat nor would he fail to live up to his oral contracts, no matter how large may be the sums at stake. He would no more do so than he would cheat at cards or call his opponent's tennis ball "out" when in fact it was "in."

It must, however, be admitted that this scrupulousness, within the rules, results from its being necessary. Other-

wise the stock exchanges could not perform their functions. And the conscientious governors of the exchanges have had great difficulty in precluding "washed sales," "matched orders," and other deceptive tactics. In other words, the rules of the game and the standards prevailing at any particular time are in brokerage more effective deterrents than philosophical analyses as to the inherent nature of transactions.

More impressive than the sportsmanlike business ethics of brokers and persons well known socially is the almost universal determination of small business men to preserve their good names. Even though a thousand John Smiths exist in a community, each indifferent to the others, each will protect his fraction of the name as if it were a priceless treasure. The investor is not alone in trusting. All lenders, all merchants selling on credit, trust. To be trusted and not to repay, to acknowledge bankruptcy, is so abhorrent to business men that some of them to escape this ignominy fall into worse predicaments. Complacent onlookers, who have been spared the searching temptations of impending insolvency, can hardly understand the financial nightmares which have preceded criminal expedients not always recognized as such by those guilty of them. Business crimes may be akin to heroism—unsound, it is true, illogical, and usually disastrous, but at times strangely resembling virtue.

The virtues which are real are those which are treasured in the hearts of men. The abolition or concealment of external evils and more circumspect habits mark only slight progress. All true progress must be internal and is inevitably slow. The ethics of the business world would be far less interesting if they were obvious or were easy to acquire or to change for the better without long and often severe suffering.

To stimulate industry by justice between giving and getting, borrowing and lending, and not to discourage

it, means not only fairness but patient study and rare wisdom. Even harder is it to measure the progress toward good or evil in the whole vast extension of modern industry. The forces of nature are now utilized as never before, the amount of production is unprecedented, millions of people exist where formerly there were thousands. Yet it is not clear that men and women in factories doing forever the same limited, monotonous tasks or the rich people forever separated from them are happier or more advanced in successful civilization than were the simple, self-reliant, and mostly homogeneous Yankee farmers before they were embattled for freedom and fired the shot heard round the world. Other generations have gone astray through worshipping false gods, and it may be that our worship of Mammon has led to size rather than to true progress. In all the two thousand years since the peaceful night

Wherein the prince of light
His reign of peace upon the earth began,

there has never before been so much discontent, dissension, and hatred as now. The Commission on Industrial Relations would have us believe that faulty distribution is at the root of our evils. Such a suggestion in truth hardly scratches the surface of our gigantic business problems of today. We can understand and solve the details far better than we can perceive whither the whole mighty army of industrial workers is in its blindness really marching.

HEBREW PSALMODY ¹

JOHN P. PETERS

NEW YORK

Professor Kent has undertaken to provide English-reading students of the Old Testament with a complete library of hand-books for the study of the contents of that great collection of Hebrew writings, which shall be of scientific value; not necessarily presenting new and original research by the author, but representing the best results of modern scholarship. The present volume, the fifth in this series, deals with the lyric poetry of the Old Testament, including songs of lamentation, songs of love and marriage, and a variety of oracles, triumphal odes, and national songs. All of these together, however, constitute but one-fifth of the total sum of Hebrew lyric poetry here dealt with, four-fifths consisting of the Psalms. It is especially Professor Kent's treatment of that collection of hymns, constituting not merely far the greater part of Hebrew lyric poetry quantitatively but also far the greater part of it qualitatively, which I propose to discuss in this article. As Kent says in his preface, the Psalms "are the real heart of the Old Testament. In them the innermost soul of the Jewish race is laid bare." Not only this; they are "the link that binds the Old to the New Testament." They have played as large a part in Christian as in Jewish worship. They have been translated for Christian use in all kinds of forms into almost every tongue, and an enormous literature has grown up about them. From the modern standpoint, however, they "have been to a

¹ The Songs, Hymns, and Prayers of the Old Testament (The Students' Old Testament). Charles Foster Kent, Ph.D., Litt.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914. Pp. xxii, 305. \$2.75.

certain extent neglected." Certainly there has been no approximate consensus of opinion arrived at concerning the origin of the Psalter and its various collections of Psalms, its growth, the purpose, use, date, and place of composition of its hymns collectively and individually, such as has been reached in the case of Hebrew laws and codes of law. "The present generation, however, is beginning to experience the joy of rediscovering them"; a reference to the numerous volumes on the Psalms recently published, especially in English the commentaries of Cheyne and Briggs, and this present work.

What new material have we on which to base this new study of the Psalms? Kent mentions "the recovery of the ancient Egyptian, Sumerian, and Babylonian hymns," which "has broadened our horizon by at least two millenniums"; "the rediscovery of the genius of Hebrew rhythm," which "has placed in the hands of the modern translator a most valuable aid in recovering the original text"; and "the discovery of Hebrew, Greek, and other texts, far older than those followed by the translators of the classic Authorized Version of the Bible," which "has made it possible to substitute in most cases original readings for uncertain conjectures."

This last statement is misleading, if not absolutely false. In Hebrew we still have for all practical purposes but one text, the so-called Masoretic, plus the Samaritan text for the Pentateuch. For the Greek we are a little better off, but there have been no text discoveries of serious importance even here. Numerous text emendations of Old Testament passages have been proposed, as a result, not of the discovery of new manuscripts, but of text-critical study and comparison of the Hebrew and the versions. Some of these emendations, shrewdly made, have met with general acceptance; more are still most "uncertain conjectures." For, unfortunately, text-criticism of the Old Testament has

been, especially on the part of most "modern" scholars, largely a matter of guess-work, the reforming of the text, not on the basis of objective but of subjective evidence: as, that the critic cannot understand what is written, and therefore it is an error; or that what is written does not conform to the critic's conception of what the author should have written, and therefore must be changed. It is this sort of discovery which has given us some of the "original readings" to which Kent refers.

It should be said that this unscientific method of treatment of the text of the Old Testament is a natural reaction against the even more unscientific treatment formerly in vogue of the traditional Hebrew text as sacrosanct; and indeed we are in general in a period of reaction in Old Testament criticism. So long bound by a false tradition, the present tendency is to contradict that tradition at every point. Former opinions are discredited as such. Because formerly Hebrew writings were over-dated, so now they must all be proved late. If formerly they were accounted units, now they must be divided; if ascribed to a given author, his authorship is axiomatically denied. It is a period of unrest and upheaval, where anyone may find and found a new theory, and each newest notion is the best because the last. And all this is especially true of the criticism of the Psalms, because they have been to a certain extent neglected, Cheyne's work being the extreme representative of this method and of these ideas as applied to the Psalter.

"The rediscovery of the genius of Hebrew rhythm," to which Kent refers, goes back to Bishop Lowth's work of 1753. Since that date there have been no real discoveries, but merely the fuller application of Lowth's principles. This has been of some help in the textual criticism of the Psalter, but has been greatly overworked

by recent writers, notably Briggs in his Commentary. As Kent points out (p. 8), Hebrew poetry remained elastic and irregular both in its rhythm and its strophic structure, and those who have sought to reduce it to rule have found themselves forced by their theories "to delete many words and sentences which are clearly original and to disregard the logical connection of the thought and the literary unity of the whole." "The original text" recovered by such methods is too often a most "uncertain conjecture."

So far as textual criticism of the Psalms is concerned, Kent to the contrary, we have really made very little progress in later years. The text from which we must translate the Psalms is substantially the same today as that from which they were translated in "the classic Authorized Version of the Bible." The great improvements in our potential critical apparatus for the translation and interpretation of the Psalms are of other sorts, only one of which is mentioned by Kent—"the recovery of the ancient Egyptian, Sumerian, and Babylonian hymns." (Why not also the Indian Vedas, and the Persian Gâthas?) But having thus emphasized in his preface the importance of these hymns in Psalm-study, he makes no more actual use of them than Cheyne and Briggs had done before him. Disregarding the lesson taught by those and all other collections of ritual and liturgical hymns ancient and modern, he proceeds to treat the Psalms as occasional poems, lyrics composed for this and for that event, the same false method which gave us so many of the headings of our Psalms, and led to their ascription to David.

For an occasional poem an author must be sought, and as tradition ascribed the origin of Temple psalmody to David, so the individual Psalms came to be ascribed to him as their author. But if David wrote them, for what occasion did he write them? So the Bible story

was searched, and the effort made to attach each Psalm to some event of David's life: "when Nathan the prophet came unto him, after he had gone in to Bathsheba" (51); "when Doeg the Edomite came and told Saul, and said unto him, David is come to the house of Ahimelech" (52). Today, very properly, no historical value is attached to these headings as such. Unfortunately, however, while rejecting these particular headings, commentators have made new ones of their own by pursuing precisely the same false method of attributing the individual Psalms to this or that event in the history of the Hebrews, either as contained in the Bible or as reconstructed by them, or to this or that period or individual. So Kent, following this futile method, but reacting against the old traditions and the old dates, assigns to events of the Maccabæan period about as many Psalms as were once ascribed to events in the life of David.

Professor Kemper Fullerton, of Oberlin College, pointed out some years ago, in an admirable little series of studies in the Psalter published in the *Biblical World*, the fallacy of this method of procedure, and laid down a few sane principles, of which I would cite the following:

"As a hymn book, the Psalter is a book of devotional poetry. In such poetry the religious interest is apt to dominate over the artistic interest." Accordingly the Psalter must be studied from the devotional and more specifically the liturgical standpoint.

"Like all other hymn books, it has been subjected to repeated and extensive redaction;" which he illustrates by the history of some of the most popular hymns in our modern hymn books, like "All Hail the Power of Jesus' Name," showing how they have been changed for denominational purposes, to fit new periods or special occasions, or to adapt the special and occasional to

general use, so that out of poems have been formed hymns; and all this in a century and a quarter of use.

"Hymns are usually more concerned with inner experiences than with outward conditions. Their allusions to contemporary history are, with rare exceptions, incidental." To prove which he takes up and analyzes, among others, hymns of Luther, Watts, and Wesley, showing how impracticable it is in most cases to date them, either from general content or individual reference.

Although Kent suggests in his Introduction that the Psalter was intended for ritual use and is a liturgical and devotional song book, he practically ignores this in his treatment of the Psalms themselves. In commenting on the Song of Songs, he very properly disregards the older interpretations of half a century ago, which attempted to make that collection of love songs a sort of episodic drama in which is recorded the love and the virtue of a Shulamite maiden, who rejects the advances of the mighty Solomon in favor of her shepherd lover, recognizing that the references to Solomon are typical merely. The groom and the bride in love songs are the king and the queen, the poorest shepherd maiden queening it for the nonce, with her bridegroom as her mighty king. So the references which were once ascribed to Solomon in the songs of that collection are interpreted as having no reference to a special king or to any king, but as being the common use of love songs, then as now. But when he comes to deal with the forty-fifth Psalm, which is designated by its heading in the Psalter as a love song, he is obsessed with the tradition of the old method and proceeds to describe it as a "Hebrew court song," "evidently written on the occasion of a royal marriage." "The poem is introduced by an elaborate exordium, which is doubtless typical of Hebrew court usages." (Why will certain

writers, when they are stating some presumption or guess of their own, always attempt to buttress it by such words as "evidently" or "doubtless," which they only use because it is not evident and because it is very much in doubt?) Then he proceeds: "The atmosphere of this Psalm is evidently that of the joyous days before the Babylonian exile." (Does he suppose that love songs are normally penitential?) And then, under the obsession alluded to, he attempts to identify it with some particular occasion. "Although this hymn may later have been sung at a royal marriage, there is little doubt that a definite theme and occasion were originally in the poet's mind." Accordingly he adopts Briggs's suggestion that the king was "Jehu the warrior, who unsheathed his sword in behalf of the true worship of Jehovah, who with his own right hand pierced the heart of his foes and by a series of bold acts established himself on the throne of northern Israel." This is precisely the principle of identification of date and author followed by the earliest commentators, whose comments, as noted above, are now discarded by all. Whatever may have been the original occasion of its composition, as it has come down to us this Psalm is a ritual love song, in which the allusions to the king are no more personal than the allusions to Solomon in the Song of Songs.

Can we date the Psalms? A method of dating pursued by commentators in general is the linguistic method. The words used in a given book or writing are tabulated and compared with the words used in other books. This is a valid method in general, but to make it really practical one must have a certain amount of securely dated material from which to start and literature sufficient to give a fairly large vocabulary. These conditions are only partly present in the Old Testament. The literature is small, and it has been so worked over in succeeding periods that it is difficult to assign fixed

dates to any large part of it. In the case of the Psalter these conditions are intensified. The vocabulary is very small and abounds in stock phrases, part of a technical ritual hymn use; and, more than any other book of the Bible, the Psalter has been written and rewritten, adapted and recast over and over again. We use today in our church services chants and hymns of very various periods, some old, some new; but all have been so rewritten, adapted, and modernized that from a mere study of their words it would be impossible to determine their original literary connection. Liturgical and devotional poetry is both the most ancient and the most modern in its form. With all the conservatism of liturgical use, we still adapt our hymns to modern comprehension in their words and phraseology. So it was with the Psalms, and hence here particularly the argument from language must be used with the greatest restraint.

The tendency of later critics has been to use the linguistic argument only for the latest and most modern element in the Psalms, overlooking the quaint old ritual terms and phrases which linger here and there, or deleting or correcting them because they are no longer intelligible. Kent notes that the Sumerian hymns were sung in Babylonian and Assyrian temples for a period of two thousand years. (He might have added that translations of those hymns were made into later Babylonian and Assyrian, and that these also were used for liturgical and devotional purposes.) He points out further that from a comparison of the use of other peoples it is a fair presumption that the Hebrews also, from the earliest days, made use in their temples of ritual Psalms, and that we have in fact in the pre-exilic writings abundant allusions to such ritual psalmody. But, having stated these facts, he then goes on to ascribe Hebrew psalmody, practically entire, to the period after the Exile, and chiefly to the period from 400 to 150 B.C.

It would indeed be strange had the Hebrew people, having an ancient temple psalmody, differed so radically from all other peoples as to throw away after the Exile all that ancient devotional and liturgical material, and make an entirely new psalmody. Now, in point of fact, we find numbers even of the latest Psalms based on or using ritual phraseology which we can identify as such from pre-exilic writings. So the phrase *Hallelujah*, so common in the later Psalms, is one of the most ancient ritual phrases of the Hebrew people, containing the peculiar divine name of the Hebrews in its most ancient form. This was the *tehillah*, or cry uttered at the moment of performance of the sacrifice, and from this cry the Psalms as a whole received their name *tehillim*, a word which suggests at once that the Psalter was primarily a collection of hymns for use in connection with the temple sacrifices. Sometimes we can specify the particular sacrifice for which a Psalm was intended. So Jeremiah has preserved for us the ritual phrase used in his time at the thank-offering sacrifice: "Thanks be to Yahaweh, for He is good and His mercy endureth forever," which is the basis of a number of later Psalms. Some of the Psalms are provided with headings which indicate their ritual use, some of which are early, as shown by their present unintelligibility, while others are later in form but early in principle. Such headings are of great value as suggesting to the commentator how to look in the Psalm itself for indications of the purpose for which it was composed or to which it was adapted in the ritual services of the temple. Here and there rubrics have been preserved, generally in rudiment, which are of even greater value in the same direction.

In point of fact the Psalms ought to be studied in connection with Hebrew ritual as preserved to us in the sacrificial and other codes in the Pentateuch, or in allusions in the other writings of the Old Testament. Kent has

sought to study them in connection with historical events, and thought that he could classify them as of this or that period, according as they are grave or gay, triumphant or despondent. As already stated, he has made no use of the material to be derived from a study of the hymns of other peoples, and especially of the Sumerian-Babylonian hymns. If he has any suggestions to make touching these hymns in any way, it seems to be that in the Captivity the Jews must have been tremendously impressed with the ritual of the Babylonian temples and led to imitate it. A study of the Book of Genesis shows us that this was not the method in which the ancient mythology of the Euphratean basin affected Hebrew thought, and presumably what is true of the relations of Babylonian and Hebrew mythology is true also in principle of the relations of Babylonian and Hebrew psalmody. We find certain ritual phrases in both, not borrowed but common, such as, to cite but one, "*How long?*" and we find certain similar liturgies. The Babylonian penitential psalms are liturgies to be used in connection with the sacrifices to be offered to secure remission of sin for an individual suffering calamity. The calamity is sent by the deity because of sin, although in fact the sufferer may not know what sin he has committed to arouse the divine wrath. The calamity or sickness may be the consequence of a "secret sin," that is, an unwitting sin.

The Babylonians had a sacrificial ritual for this class of sufferers, of which the penitential Psalms were the liturgical accompaniment. Similarly the Hebrews had a ritual for this class of sacrifice, as expounded in Leviticus, Chapters 4-6, which of course had its liturgical accompaniment of psalmody; and as that class of liturgical literature among the Babylonians was both ancient and large, so from the size and contents of the Hebrew sacrificial ritual we should expect the similar Hebrew

liturgical literature to be. In point of fact, one of the largest categories in Hebrew psalmody, if not the largest, is the penitential Psalms. Sometimes these are designated as such by their headings, as in the case of Psalms 88 and 102; generally not. Some of them are in the later books, others are among the earliest hymns of the Psalter. By comparison with the Babylonian liturgy and ritual, of which latter we have abundant representations on seals and tablets, we can trace the liturgical use behind these Hebrew penitential Psalms also, such as the sixth, twenty-second, and fifty-first, which are beautiful specimens of the genus: the priest holding the penitent suppliant by the hand, the alternating lamentations of great woe, declarations of faith or innocence, and earnest supplications for relief put in the suppliant's mouth; the gift and the sacrifice; then the declaration of deliverance and triumph. And here is just what Kent has not done, in which he is not alone or original; he has not studied the Psalms in connection with religious ceremonial, to which study the old Sumerian and Babylonian psalmody offered a key.

Again, it would be a strange thing, in view of the history of Hebrew literature in general, if we found in the Psalter no traces of Israelite practices and Israelite shrines. In Hebrew narrative and Hebrew legislation we have a great amount of material from the northern kingdom, and our earliest prophetic writings come from the same source. The Book of Deuteronomy, and consequently the reforms connected with that book, show marked traces of Israelite influence and even of Israelite origin. So, to instance but one point, the mountains of the Blessing and the Curse are not mountains of Judah, but mountains of Israel, by the shrine of Joseph. Now there is one peculiarity which modern critics have noted as peculiar to the Israelite narrative—the use of Elohim instead of Yahaweh for God. But

there are two books of Psalms, the second (42-72) and the third (73-89), in which similarly Elohim is the regular designation of God instead of Yahaweh. (Kent perversely changes the text in his translations, substituting *Jehovah* for *Elohim*.) Why should we not follow the same rule here which is followed in the analysis of the Pentateuch and ascribe these books to the northern kingdom, or to the influence of the northern kingdom?

But further, as Briggs in his Commentary has pointed out, in the Korah and Asaph collections (42-49, 84-89; 50, 73-83) contained in these two books of Psalms there is a peculiar frequency of reference to Jacob and Joseph; the land is the land of Joseph, or the land of Jacob and Joseph; God is the God of Jacob and Joseph, etc. There are also certain local references in these collections, which can be satisfied only by the supposition of their composition in the territory of the northern kingdom. So in Psalm 89 12 we have this verse,—

“North and south Thou hast created them;
Tabor and Hermon rejoice in Thy name,”

where Tabor and Hermon are synonyms for south and north. Manifestly whoever wrote that wrote it at a point from which Tabor and Hermon were visible as the great land marks north and south, that is in north-eastern Galilee, on or close to the Jordan. But this is one of the Psalms of the Korah *addenda*, a little collection added at the close of the third book and belonging, according to its headings, with the Korah collection (84-89). Now turning to the Korah collection proper (42-49), we find that the first Psalm of that collection, Psalm 42, was by common consent of the commentators composed at the sources of the Jordan. Strangely, however, the commentators, while perceiving this, have assumed that it was written by some Levite from the temple of Jerusalem, carried captive by Nebuchadrezzar,

who as an exile there, or on his way to Babylon, composed this poem; and so Kent. The same old obsession of commentators, that the Psalms are not hymns but poems written on special occasions! It surely was written at the sources of the Jordan; but it also was certainly a liturgical hymn, intended for use at some ritual festivity. It is at least natural, therefore, to suppose that the original of this Psalm was a temple hymn of the Temple of Dan at the source of the Jordan; the more so as still another Psalm of this collection, Psalm 46, pictures a river sanctuary in a region whose description suggests the same locality. Many commentators, including Kent, assign Psalm 45 also to the northern kingdom. The ascription of this collection to the Sons of Korah points in the same direction, for according to the genealogy of the Priestly Code (Ex. 6 16 ff., Num. 26 57 ff.) Korah was the primitive ancestor of Asaph, who is the patronym of the guild of singers in Ezra and Nehemiah (cf. also 1 Chron. 6). But Korah was further a Levite of the Kohathite gens, to which Moses belonged. It was this gens of the Levites which furnished the priests of the Temple of Dan, according to the account of the founding of that temple in the Book of Judges. The Sons of Korah of the Psalter were apparently, then, Levites of the heretical Temple of Dan, which gives point to the anathema story of the Jerusalem priests against Korah contained in Numbers 16.

And here we come to the method of treating and dating the Psalms which holds out the most hope of real results, namely, by the collections. Kent notices the existence of these collections in the Psalter, and somewhere says that in a general way the collections are arranged according to age, so that the earliest Psalms are in the earliest books, and *vice versa*; but in actual practice, following the bad example of his immediate predecessors in Psalm study, he throws away this

objective evidence and proceeds to date each individual Psalm for itself on subjective grounds, assigning it to any period toward which he fancies the tone of its contents to point. In fact he ascribes only nine Psalms out of the first three books (1-89) to the pre-exilic period, three to the sixth century, twenty-three to the fifth, twenty-eight to the fourth, fourteen to the third, and seventeen to the second century before Christ. In his practical arrangement of the Psalms for study he shows a still greater disregard of the collections, arranging them in groups according to his understanding of their themes (under which grouping he classes, by the way, only twelve Psalms as "Liturgical Hymns"). The result of this treatment is to conceal from the student the evidences of the growth and development of the Psalter, and its true relation to the history, the religion, and the literature of the Jews.

As historical facts the division of the Psalter into five books, and of those five books again into a number of smaller collections, may not be disregarded; indeed they constitute the point of departure for Psalm study. Why is this collection designated as of David, that one as of the Sons of Korah, another as "The Prayers of David son of Jesse", etc.? Why is this group of Psalms (51-63) so systematically provided with headings, taken from the Books of Samuel, ascribing them to events in the life of David, while the other Psalms in the same book have no such headings? Why should this same group of Psalms be so uniformly penitential above all other groups, reminding one of a Sumerian collection of penitential hymns? Why should we have one divine name in two books, and another in the other three? Why does a collection like that of the Sons of Korah have a peculiar stamp of its own, in language and in literary charm, which all commentators note? Why is a collection headed "Songs of Degrees"? Why are some

Psalms divided by *Selahs*, and others not? Why do we have groups and collections of Psalms provided with musical headings, while other groups and collections are without them? and why should the musical notations differ in different collections? Above all, why should we have these musical notations and directions in the first three books and not also in the last two, and why should Chronicles and the Septuagint be ignorant of the meanings of those terms? Why should there be such a divergence as to general form and content between the Psalms of the first three and the last two books of the Psalter? Why should composite Psalms always be formed out of Psalms preceding and never out of Psalms following them in the Psalter? why should Psalms cite only preceding and never succeeding Psalms? and why should composite Psalms and Psalms framed on or citing other Psalms occur only or peculiarly in the last two books of the Psalter (90–150)? These and other questions of a similar sort, the very foundations of a proper understanding of the origin, the growth, and the purpose of the Psalter, are practically ignored in this volume.

Take the musical headings above referred to. They are evidence of long use of certain Psalms, and of growth and change in the treatment of the Psalter as a whole. They were preserved long after their sense was lost, as is the case regularly in liturgical and ritual use. They are relics, puzzling in their exact interpretation, but of immense value for the study of the growth of the Psalter. They are the sort of ear-mark by which we can judge antiquity. That they are used freely in the first three books, disappear in the last two, and are utterly unintelligible by the Greek period, shows not only that the first three books antedate the last two books, but that between the collections of the first three and of the last two books there is a gulf fixed, not merely of years, but also of conditions. The whole musical system had

changed, and the old terminology consequently become unintelligible. When, how, and why? It is in this direction, and not in the subjective direction of attempting to date the individual Psalms at the fancy of the critic, that sane Psalm study must proceed.

Kent has stated that the Psalms, as a whole, cover a very long period of growth. In point of fact, he has assigned four-fifths of them to the relatively brief period of one hundred and fifty years, from 400 to 150 B.C. I think the evidence goes to show that the Psalms of the first book are to be referred to the pre-exilic temple at Jerusalem; the second and third books to the northern kingdom of Israel; the fourth and fifth books to the period beginning with Nehemiah. But here we meet with another factor, which has been the cause of much confusion—the factor of long use, and of growth and adaptation due to that use.

Speaking roughly, we must date the Psalms according to their collections, and not pick out a Psalm from this collection and date it with a Psalm from another collection. But individual Psalms frequently seem to constitute exceptions to the collections in which they stand; or words, phrases, turns of thought, and allusions in individual Psalms seem entirely out of keeping with the dates suggested by the collection headings. These exceptions have seemed to the scholars to whose works I have particularly referred so numerous as to constitute the rule; hence they have proceeded to disregard the collections as such, and to date the individual Psalms according to the latest elements which they found or thought they found in them, by that means bringing together as often as not Psalms from very various collections. But this is very much as though one were to date the *Te Deum* by the form in which it appears in the American Prayer Book. Indeed the *Te Deum* is an admirable example of the method of creation,

development, and adaptation of liturgical hymns. Of course old writers attempted to connect it with individual authors and with a particular event, and so the tradition has come down that it was composed and recited responsively by Ambrose and Augustine at the conversion or baptism of the latter, toward the end of the fourth century. The first certain evidence of its existence, however, is from the fifth century and the Gallican Church. As we have it, it is a composite hymn, consisting of three clearly marked parts—a hymn to God as the Trinity, a hymn to Christ, and a closing penitential Psalm, which belongs in itself neither to the one hymn nor the other. In analyzing this, would you reserve the name *Te Deum* for the entire composite hymn, or use it for the two great pre-existing hymns also? How would you date it? By its completion as a composite, or by the creation of its parts? We have evidence of the existence of more primitive hymns containing words and thoughts now in those two great hymns of the *Te Deum*, going back to the third century. Would you refer the *Te Deum* to that date? That would be to follow the principle of dating the Psalms by the earliest discoverable element; to date the *Te Deum* by the date of the American Prayer Book would be to date it as some scholars wish to date the Psalms.

Again, in dating the *Te Deum*, would you date it by the tone of its contents? Would you suppose the first and second hymns contained in it to have been composed in a time of triumph, and the last stanzas to have been added in a period of humiliation? This does not seem to have been the fact; but the idea seems so plausible that it has been freely applied by Old Testament scholars in dating the Psalms of the Psalter, ascribing them to times of national success or of national disaster according as they are glad or sad. It is true that there are certain periods when, owing to external events or internal

movements, the penitential element is strong, and conversely it is generally legitimate to suppose that when the penitential element is strong, there is some extraordinary exciting cause. If you have large collections of penitential Psalms, and nothing else, as in the case of Lamentations, you may assume a period of catastrophe and oppression. Similarly if you find a collection of Psalms worked over again, changed from gladness to gloom, triumphant Psalms provided with penitential endings, and the like, you may assume that this represents an adaptation of those Psalms in a period of calamity or of puritanism. But this is true in the bulk of groups and collections, not of individual Psalms. We can trace precisely such reworking in some of the collections which I have suggested were originally pre-exilic.

In one Psalm of the first book the limits and methods of this re-working are curiously discernible. The ninth and tenth Psalms originally constituted one Psalm, an alphabetic acrostic. The first half and the end of that acrostic are still preserved in the ninth Psalm and the last few verses of the tenth Psalm. The greater part of the tenth Psalm, however, is not acrostic, and is quite different in tone from what precedes and follows, strongly penitential and woeful. In the forty-fourth Psalm the process and its limits are equally discernible, but the method of revision was different. The first part, verses 1-6, marked by a *Selah* at the close, are quite triumphant; then follows a long penitential addition, a very cry of calamity.

Revisions or adaptations of this character are so numerous that it seems clear the earlier collections as such went through a revision in some period of calamity, and a comparison with Lamentations suggests the Exile as at least the beginning of this period.

We have also unmistakable indications of revision of another sort, to connect the Psalms with a new theology.

So for instance the nineteenth Psalm, originally a hymn to Yahaweh as the sun, has been enlarged by the addition of a hymn of very different metre, the praise of the Law. Elsewhere also in this collection of hymns we find traces of a revision intended to adapt it to the new thought which became dominant with Ezra's reform in the fourth century.

I have said that hymns, and this is true of devotional literature in general, rarely contain references to extraneous events of such a nature as to render it possible to date them by those references. There are, however, notable exceptions to this. For instance, we have in an old Christian litany a petition for deliverance from the Lombards. The litany as litany is older than this particular petition, which shows that this litany was revised and adapted to the peculiar conditions prevailing in northern Italy about the time of the Lombard invasion. In the seventy-fourth Psalm we have a specific phrase which is almost equally dateable: "They have burned up all the synagogues of God in the land." The earliest known mention of synagogues in Hebrew history dates from the year 242 B.C. The first destruction of synagogues of which we know occurred about 168 B.C., under Antiochus Epiphanes. The natural reference of this passage seems to be to the Maccabæan revolt. This does not necessarily mean that the original Psalm belongs to that period, however, and indeed it contains some of the most archaic mythological expressions and references which we find in the whole Psalter. It does suggest that the Psalter had not crystallized into absolute fixity by the Maccabæan period, but was still in living use, so that older hymns might be changed and adapted to then existing needs and conditions. And indeed, while no other Psalm contains so unmistakable a reference to Maccabæan conditions, nevertheless it seems probable that many earlier Psalms were more or less revised to

adapt them to those times and their new exigencies of worship.

I might note other marks of more or less extensive revisions: under the influence of the reverence for the Name, resulting in the substitution of Adonai, Lord, for Yahaweh; to adapt the Psalms to synagogue and personal use, with the increasing development of the synagogal as over against the temple religion. But through all these changes the *cadres* of the older collections remained unchanged, and ritual, liturgical, and musical notations were retained, even though long since unintelligible. We shall not presumably always be able to state the exact limits of changes and revisions, or even discriminate accurately in many cases between the new and the old; but if we are to do it at all and to follow in any fashion the complicated but fascinating story of the growth and development of this great body of Hebrew devotional liturgy, we must do it, I believe, by following the clue of the collections.

Time and space will not permit of further discussion either of the Psalms or of Kent's book. I have reviewed the latter at great length, not so much for itself as because it is symptomatic, the last expression of what I believe to be an entirely erroneous conception of the nature and origin of Hebrew psalmody prevalent among an influential school of Old Testament scholars.

SCEPTICISM AND FAITH IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PASCAL

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The neglect of Pascal by the English-speaking world today is little short of amazing. Within the last decade France has produced literally scores of studies of his life and thought; but, with the exception of a book by St. Cyres and an essay by Paul Elmer More, there has been scarcely a sign that we were conscious of any special relation between the spirit of our own age and that of this seventeenth-century genius. Yet Pascal is indeed a man of the present, and a study of his multiplex personality has never been more pertinent than it is today. Geometrician, experimental physicist, biting satirist, literary artist, keen-sighted moralist, devout believer, philosophical sceptic, man of the world, ascetic recluse, the problem of the balance and inter-relation of these selves is still waiting a completely satisfactory solution. How was it that the geometrician and experimental physicist could be a pronounced supernaturalist? How was it that the almost cynical man of the world could become the devout recluse? What relation can we find between the sceptical doubt of the possibility of knowledge and the obedient acceptance of the dogmas of the church? With what consistency could the rationalistic critic of Jesuit morality be the challenger of all philosophic creeds? How could all these conflicting interests keep house together in the same frail tenement and present the semblance of a unified life? Perhaps they could not, and his death in his fortieth year was the outcome.

But while these problems are still pressing for solution, the present essay makes no profession of having solved them all. Its problem is to interpret the meaning of Pascal's religious thought in the light of his personal experience and with reference to its significance for ourselves. Even this attempt is ambitious enough to invite failure; yet whether it succeeds or not it may at least serve to call attention to the problem and the man.

Blaise Pascal was born at Clermont-Ferrand in Auvergne, the 19th of June, 1623. His father, Étienne Pascal, was a judge, president of the Cours des Aides, and the descendant of a long line of men prominent in the administration of the country. His mother is said to have been very pious and very clever, but she died when Blaise was only three years old, leaving himself and two sisters, Gilberte, born in 1620, and Jacqueline, born in 1625, the former of whom was to become her brother's biographer and the latter his confidante and counsellor in religious matters.

Étienne Pascal was no ordinary man. He was keenly interested in the new scientific movements of the age and had views on education. These latter determined him to conduct his son's education himself, and accordingly, in order to satisfy his own interests as well as to give his son the best opportunities, he sold his position and moved to Paris in 1631, where he formed one of a distinguished group of mathematicians, whose informal organization later developed into the Académie des Sciences, and which included such men as Roberval, Fermat, and above all, Mersenne. In an atmosphere charged with scientific activity the young Pascal was educated entirely by his father and after his own plan. It seems to have been an extremely informal type of education and to have consisted largely in intellectual stimulus, furnished, perhaps unfortunately, mainly at meal-times and immediately

thereafter. The boy was asked questions on things in general, and encouraged to work out his own answers and make his own experiments. Fearing the all-absorbing fascination of mathematics, the elder Pascal planned to postpone the study of these until his son's fifteenth year, so that he might not be drawn away too early from the study of language and literature. Accordingly he began by giving him some general suggestions as to the function and value of grammar, and then in his twelfth year proposed that he should take up Latin. But genius was too much for him. Blaise had had his interest roused in mathematics and demanded instruction therein, which his father promptly refused, locking up his own books to enforce his decision. Nothing daunted, however, the young inquirer amused himself in his hours of recreation with working out his own conceptions, until one day his surprised father found the walls of his play-room covered with demonstrations which corresponded with the first thirty-two propositions of the first book of Euclid. The boy had devised his own axioms, definitions, and proofs, even though the names of the figures were as yet unknown to him. Upon this his father capitulated, and Blaise was introduced to mathematics in a formal way. Four years afterwards he delights his father's scientific circle by the production of a work on conic sections, in which he carries still further the method recently invented by Desargues for the treatment of that subject—a method as yet incomprehensible to many of the older mathematicians of the day. The work established at once his reputation as a mathematical genius, and he took his place among the older men of the intellectual aristocracy as a recognized equal.

Nor was his interest confined to pure mathematics. From his early boyhood he seems to have had an interest in physics, having written a childish treatise on sound, pronounced by his impartial family a remarkable

production for a boy of his years. And oddly enough, as well as significantly enough, his reliance in his investigations seems to have been upon experiment and observation rather than upon mathematics simply. Recognizing in pure mathematics the ideal of logical reasoning and delighting as he did in playing its fascinating game, for the attainment of real truth he looked to the slower but surer method of experiment. The model for his investigations was not the brilliant rationalistic physics and metaphysics of Descartes, but the more sober and empirical method of Galileo and his like. Geometry was delightfully certain, but by itself it was not adequate for the investigation of nature. This early conviction of his—that the truths of physics are of a less degree of certainty than those of mathematics—we shall see later developed into his recognition of the uncertainty of all human knowledge when tested by the ideal of absolute demonstration.

The effect of this intense intellectual activity upon the constitution of Pascal was bad. He had never been a robust child. When a year old he suffered from some unknown trouble which baffled the physician, until it was traced to the evil influence of an old woman of the neighborhood; whereupon, at her suggestion that life must be given for life, a cat was flung out of the window, some herbs applied, and a cure effected. But all through his life Pascal gave evidence of a nervously disorganized constitution, attributed by his sister to his excessive intellectual labors, and at any rate fostered by them. He seems to have been at all times eager and impatient, quick at retort, apt to offend, yet always by his generosity and penitence retaining the friends he sorely tried. Wit he had in abundance, but the humor which goes with the easier nature and relieves the strain of life he lacked. Life for him was tense and serious even in his ridicule of human folly and false pretension. The gospel of

relaxation had not yet been preached with effect. He seems to me in these early years like a dog, keen and alert, with an ear for every sound, but with as yet no unity of purpose or fixed philosophy of life.

What his religious life was during this period we have scanty means of knowing. We have, however, the very significant statement of his sister that in spite of his intense intellectual curiosity he had always limited it to things natural, regarding the truths of religion as outside the field of human reason. This attitude he told her he had taken from his father, who from his earliest years had impressed upon him the principle that "whatever is the object of faith cannot be the object of reason, much less subordinate to it." There seems not the slightest ground to suspect that he was ever tempted from this position, although some have tried to establish the fact, but that, to use his sister's phrase, throughout life, "in all the things of religion he remained as submissive as a child." Certainly in his earlier years physics and mathematics furnished a sufficient outlet for his intellectual energy, leaving his emotional life to express itself in the traditional pieties of his inherited religion. And even in his later years, when he was forced to busy himself with theological problems, it was the practical significance of these rather than their theoretical value which absorbed him. In all which he was a serious representative of that convenient division of territory common in late scholasticism by which were rendered to the scientific Caesar the things that were Caesar's and to the God of religion the things that were His.

That this ingrained respect for the truths of religion meant anything more for him in his youth than a refusal to make them the subject of critical study, is doubtful. Indeed, the manner in which, after his conversion, he deplores his early absorption in worldly knowledge seems to indicate at that period no divided allegiance, but a

complete absence of the intense emotional life which characterized his later years. The whole of his vital energy was going into his intellectual pursuits and it was in all probability the over-strain of this life that conditioned his later conversion.

In 1640, when Pascal was seventeen, the family moved to Rouen, his father having been given a government position there as intendant. The seven years of his life there are marked by two events—the invention, after many trials, of Pascal's arithmetical machine, and the conversion of the family to Jansenism. The former is significant of the universality of Pascal's genius, which found expression not only in the field of pure theory but in that of practical invention as well. It is true that the machine was not perfect, but it was workable, and was the ancestor, I suppose, of the homely cash register. It is to Pascal also that Paris owes its first public omnibus line, the idea of which arose from his desire that the poor of the city should share in the motor privileges of the rich. His venture was a great success, even women, his sister Gilberte writes, daring to use the coaches.

More significant, however, was the conversion of the entire family to the austere type of religion represented by Jansen and the leaders of Port Royal. Pascal is reported to have been very zealous in the new faith and to have stimulated the devotion of the others, especially that of his younger sister, Jacqueline, who in consequence wished to take the veil. There is some doubt, however, as to the real depth of his conviction, and I am inclined to feel that this first conversion was largely a matter of the head rather than the heart, and that Pascal's interests were still more in right thinking than in Christian living.

At any rate, his scientific work was being pursued with unflinching devotion in spite of increasing physical disorder, which, from his eighteenth year, left him no day without

pain, and in the summer following his conversion resulted in almost complete collapse—a violent and prolonged neuralgia, partial paralysis of the lower limbs, inability to swallow save drop by drop—apparently a case of intense neurasthenia. Yet just before and even during this period Pascal was engaged in the solution of the physical problem which has placed his name high on the list of genuises in physics. This was the mystery of the vacuum and the nature of atmospheric pressure. The problem, and even the suggestion of its probable solution, he inherited from his older contemporaries, Galileo and Torricelli, but it was wholly due to his own picturesque imagination that we have the convincing and spectacular proof of the theory furnished by the measurement of the height of the column of mercury in a vacuum at the base and at the top of the mountain near his home, the Puy de Dôme.

The significance of this experiment, as Pascal recognized, is not to be found merely in the particular truth established by it, but much more in its contribution toward the theory of scientific method. It meant the triumph of the experimental method over authority and superstition.

Though this experiment on the Puy de Dôme was the most spectacular of Pascal's achievements in physics, it was not his only one, nor perhaps even his most important one; but into his later investigations in hydrostatics and his discovery of the principle of the hydraulic press we cannot go.

During the course of these experiments Pascal had come up to Paris, largely on account of his health, and thence, upon the advice of his physician, had given up his studies and gone back to his former home at Clermont for a year. But he was not really at home in the country, so that in 1650 we find him again in Paris, entering upon what is usually known as his worldly life.

Just how worldly these next few years were, we do not know, nor even the motives which led him into the special life of the day. It is probable, however, that in his forced abstention from severe study and in his inability to find amusement in country life, he tried the pleasures of the Paris salons as the most attractive distraction possible to him. And that he found a real distraction in them at first there can be no doubt. It is true that he found in them few intellectual equals, but it is true also that he found in them men and women of intelligence and charm interested in playing the social game upon a high level—interested not merely in amusing themselves but in making of social life a serious profession. For it was the middle of the seventeenth century, the period when society was organizing itself in France, the period of the Hôtel de Rambouillet, of Mlle. de Scudery, of the *Précieuses*, and, while the talk was not profound, it yet involved ideas and implied an atmosphere of refinement which, while perhaps formal, yet made of intercourse a thing of art and beauty. That a brilliant young man of twenty-seven should find the game distracting is not surprising, and we have not to invoke his philosophical interest in experience to account for his four years of social life, though it is true that these years gave him much material for his later thought.

That Pascal did not remain wholly an alien in this society is perhaps indicated by his having been moved during this time to write an *Essay on the Passions of Love*, a rather formal composition, but one whose minuteness of detail seems to argue experience rather than hearsay. "A woman," he writes, "is the highest form of beauty. Endowed with mind, she is its living and marvellous personation. If a beautiful woman wishes to please, she will always succeed. The fascinations of beauty in such a case never fail to captivate, whatever

man may do to resist them. There is a spot in every heart which they reach. . . . The pleasure of loving without daring to say anything of one's love, has its pains but also its sweetness. With what transport do we regulate all our actions with the view of pleasing one whom we infinitely value. The fulness of love sometimes languishes, receiving no succour from the beloved object. Then we fall into misery; and hostile passions, lying in wait for the heart, tear it into a thousand pieces." Who this "marvellous personation" of beauty was we do not know, but that she was a reality and that she may have been Charlotte de Roannez, the sister of his friend the Duke, are guesses which have something in their favor. It may perhaps be also true that a hopeless passion for one above him in rank had something to do with his weariness of the world and his retreat to Port Royal, but the writing of imaginative soul-history is not a profitable occupation.

The turning-point in Pascal's life came in his thirty-second year. Up to this time he had been the eager, unresting thinker and man of the world. Life had stimulated and entertained him. It had offered him endless subjects for his boundless curiosity. Wherever he turned, problems had presented themselves and opportunity had been given for intellectual play. But as yet life had been all play, and play, even scientific play, loses its zest in time, save for those gifted with unbounded energy and unreflective minds. And these latter gifts were not Pascal's. Nervously broken down and worn out with his intellectual activities, life began to pall upon him and to force upon him the fatal question, "To what end?" His reply was his conversion and retreat to Port Royal.

Much legend has gathered about the facts of his conversion, of which this story told by Bossuet is at the root: "One day in the month of October, 1654, when he went

according to his habit to take his drive to the bridge of Neuilly in a carriage and four, the two leading horses became restive at a part of the road where there was a parapet, and precipitated themselves into the Seine. Fortunately, the first strokes of their feet broke the traces which attached them to the pole, and the carriage was stayed on the brink of the precipice. The effect of such a shock on one of Pascal's feeble health may be imagined. He swooned away, and was only restored with difficulty, and his nerves were so shattered that long afterwards, during sleepless nights and during moments of weakness, he seemed to see a precipice at his bedside, over which he was on the point of falling."

That such an accident as this may have contributed to his conversion is quite probable, but that the change had been long in preparation, his sister's account of his talks with her makes very evident. Of his visit to her in September, 1654, she writes to her sister Gilberte: "At this visit he opened himself to me in such a manner as moved my pity, confessing that in the midst of his exciting occupations and of so many things fitted to make him love the world—to which we had every reason to think him strongly attached—he was yet forcibly moved to quit all; both by an extreme aversion to its follies and amusements and by the continual reproach made by his conscience. I confined myself to watching his mood without attempting unduly to influence him; and gradually I saw him so growing in grace that I should hardly have known him. I believe you will have the same difficulty, if God continues His work; especially in such wonderful humility, submission, diffidence, self-contempt, and desire to be nothing in the esteem and memory of men. Such he is at present. God alone knows what a day will bring forth."

What the day did bring forth was only the persistence of this changed life. He retired from the world, first to

a house in the country, and then to the quiet valley of Port Royal, where he joined himself to the Solitaries and lived their life of ascetic routine. Henceforth the occupations in which he had formerly delighted knew him no more; geometry, physics, society, all intellectual activity—these he put behind him and counted as nothing, so that he might walk the way of humility and self-denial. Nothing more significant of his change of attitude can be found than this passage in a letter to the mathematician Fermat: "To tell you the truth, I think geometry the finest training the human mind can have; but at the same time it seems to me so useless, that I scarcely trouble to distinguish between a geometer who is simply a geometer and a clever artisan. It is the finest trade in the world, and nothing more than a trade—excellent, as I have often said, for us to try our wings on, but not fit to be the object of our flight. For my own part, I would not walk two steps for geometry, and I fancy you are very much of my opinion."¹

Port Royal des Champs, to which Pascal had retired, had been a convent of Cistercian nuns founded about the middle of the thirteenth century in a wooded and marshy valley eighteen miles west of Paris. Its celebrity dates from the accession to power of Jacqueline Arnauld, appointed abbess at the age of eight and known officially as *La Mère Angélique*. Entering upon her duties at the age of eleven and converted six years later, she came under the powerful influence of St. Cyran, and succeeded in transforming her convent from a home of luxury and dissipation to a centre of the highest religious life. In 1635 the nuns removed to Paris, and there settled in the valley the group of remarkable men known as the Solitaries or hermits of Port Royal, men who had taken no monastic vow, but who had renounced the world and dedicated themselves to the life of piety and

¹ Letter of Aug. 10, 1660.

self-denial. Some, who formed the nucleus of the band, lived wholly in the valley; others, among whom was Pascal, came and went as need dictated. Their names are familiar ones in the history of French literature and philosophy—St. Cyran the leader, three nephews of the Mère Angélique—Lemaistre, de Saci, and Robert Arnauld d'Andilly—Pierre Nicole, and above all, the most celebrated of the Arnauld family, the youngest brother of the abbess, Antoine Arnauld.

Upon the return of the nuns in 1648, the brotherhood retired, some to Paris, and some to the farm on the hillside known as Les Granges. Their mode of life was simple. "They wore no distinctive dress. Their wants were supplied by the barest necessities in the shape of lodging and furniture. From early morning—three A.M.—to night, they were occupied in works of piety, charity, or industry. They met in the chapel after their private devotions to say matins and lauds, a service which occupied an hour and a half, after which they kissed the earth in token of a common lowliness, and each sought his own room for a time. The Gospel and Epistle were read daily, and sometimes during or after dinner the Lives of the Saints. They dined together; and a walk thereafter formed the sole recreation of the day. Two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon were devoted to work in the fields or in the garden by those who were able for such tasks. Confession and Communion were frequent, but no uniform rule was enforced. In this, as in fasting and austerities generally, each recluse was left to his own free will."²

But scholarly activities were not neglected by the brothers, and, under the general supervision of Antoine Arnauld, translations, books of devotion and polemics, came in rapid succession from the press. Of these the most famous is the series of letters professedly to a

² Tulloch's *Pascal*, p. 89.

provincial, known as the *Provincial Letters*, of which Pascal was the half-suspected author. Into the familiar story of this controversy, to which the *Letters* were the chief contribution, we do not need to go, for it throws but little light upon the development of his religious life. And yet it is true, none the less, that the battle with the Jesuits which Pascal really won with his *Provincial Letters* was part of the same campaign in which he contributed by his *Pensées* to a drawn battle. For it was against the worldly spirit of compromise, apparently necessary for a world-church, that the *Letters* were directed, and their effect was fatal for the whole system of Jesuit morality and easy accommodation to the desires of both flesh and spirit. And it was against the same spirit of fusion in respect to God and man, nature and grace, reason and faith, that his later and fragmentary work was an unconvincing argument. Jesuit morality never recovered from his biting ridicule, but men still hesitate to accept the "either-or" of his sharp disjunction and make their choice for nature *or* grace.

The *Provincial Letters* appeared in 1656-57, and were his last systematic work. That these, the most brilliant of his writings, appeared only six years before his death, is evidence enough, were any really needed, that Pascal's conversion was not the sign of intellectual senility. Indeed one is tempted to feel that his earlier scientific activity, valuable as we have found it to be, was yet after all merely a preliminary intellectual game, and that his true genius could only come to complete expression under the stimulus of religious passion. It was this that gave the unity of purpose, intensity of faith, sincerity of conviction, that were necessary to unite head and heart and make possible a work that should express the whole man.

But his powers ripened only to decay. Within two years of this controversy and perhaps largely as a result

of it, his old nervous trouble began to return, and all continuous intellectual labor became impossible to him. "But although his malady prevented his being serviceable to the public or his friends," writes his sister in her memoir, "it was not without use to himself; and he underwent it with such tranquillity and patience that there is reason to think that God by this means was pleased to render him just such as He would have him appear at the Last Day. For during all this long illness he always bore in mind these two great maxims: a renunciation of all pleasure and of all superfluity. In the very height of his distemper he kept a perpetual watch over his senses, absolutely refusing them whatever gave them pleasure. And when necessity constrained him to do something that might afford him some sort of satisfaction, he had a wonderful address in disengaging his mind from having a share in it. For example, his continual diseases obliging him to feed upon delicacies, he took the utmost care not to relish what he ate; and at the very beginning of his retreat he laid down stated rules concerning all his future meals." During these last years, he also wore next his flesh an iron girdle with sharp spikes which he pressed whenever he felt a tendency to pride or worldly pleasure.

"His charity towards the poor," his sister continues, "was always very great, but toward the end of his life he redoubled it. He said that it was the universal vocation of all Christians, and that there was no need of any particular mark to know if one had a call to it from above, because this was incontestably the very mark upon which Jesus Christ would judge the world." "About two months before his death he did a very remarkable work of charity. He had in his house a good, honest man, with his wife and family, to whom he gave a room and a supply of firing. . . . This good man's son falling ill of the small-pox, my brother, who needed

my assistance, feared that I should be under some apprehension of coming to the house. But, as he thought that the sick boy could not be moved without danger, he chose to leave the house himself, although he was so very ill. On June 19, 1662, he came to us, and returned home no more." "On August 19, 1662, at one o'clock in the morning, being of the age of thirty-nine years and two months," he died.

It was during the last four years of his life that Pascal jotted down the fragmentary thoughts which constitute his greatest gift to the world. Absolutely without form or finish, mere fragments of a proposed Apology for Christianity, these fragments make the eternal appeal of life to life. "*Les Pensées de Pascal*," says Vinet, "ne sont point un livre . . . elles sont Pascal lui-même, tout Pascal."³ It is to Pascal himself then, to this book of the *Thoughts* that we now turn, to see if we can discover the secret of the man and of his hold over men.

But when I say that his secret was just Christianity, it may seem as if I were denying his possession of a secret at all, for Christianity may seem too familiar and obvious a thing to be called by that name; but while unto the Jews it may be "a stumbling block and unto the Greeks foolishness, unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks," it may be the power of God and the wisdom of God, and the mystery of its power and appeal in the case of Pascal is worthy of our examination.

And first, what *was* Christianity for Pascal? To put it in one word, Salvation. Its fundamental beliefs are two: "that there is a God of whom men are capable, and that there is a corruption in their nature which renders them unworthy of him."⁴ Sin and God are thus the poles of his thought. "The whole of faith consists in Jesus Christ and Adam."⁵ It is the Pauline, Augustinian,

³ A. Vinet, *Études sur Pascal*, p. 13.

⁴ *Pensées*, 556. References are to the standard edition of Leon Brunschweig.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 523.

Calvinistic concept of Christianity—man created free and innocent, falling into sin through his own choice, his will thereafter wholly corrupt and incapable of choosing good, hopelessly lost, so far as his own powers were concerned, since he could not even will to will the good. This is the Christian doctrine of man. On the other hand, there is the revelation of a personal God, all-powerful, wise, and loving, who has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ and will save all those who put their trust in Him. The Christian message for Pascal is essentially the same as that on the banners of the Salvation Army—“Jesus saves”; it is the message of sin and salvation, of bondage and release.

But the *Thoughts*, as I have said, were part of a proposed Apology for Christianity, and we must ask what evidence then Pascal brings forward for the truth of these traditional doctrines, what was the character of his argument, on what grounds did it appeal to him? In the eighteenth century, Bishop Butler in England published his apology for religion under the ponderous title, *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*. Pascal's work might well have borne a similar title, though it would have read, *The Analogy of the Christian Religion to the Constitution and Course of Man*, for his aim is to show by an analysis of human nature that Christianity is just the kind of religion which fits in best with the actual nature and needs of man. In its teachings man finds a mirror of himself; it reveals his desperate condition as no other religion or philosophy does, and at the same time it offers the only remedy possible for his case. His method is psychological and ethical, rather than metaphysical, and in this is partly to be found the explanation of his appeal to the present. His question is direct and personally verifiable—“Is the Christian account of your condition true or not? If it is, is there any other reasonable relief save the

Christian?" Here are no scholastic subtleties or abstruse metaphysical reasonings; the appeal is to the individual's experience of sin and salvation. In this, Pascal's little book represents the prevailing tendency today to rest the argument for Christianity upon the evidence of Christian experience.

But it is not merely in his psychological method that the strength of Pascal lies. It is much more in the passionate earnestness with which he applies his method and in the vividness and incisiveness of his analysis, that we feel his power. Pascal is neither a closet philosopher nor a laboratory psychologist. His picture of human nature is neither telescopic nor microscopic. He does not take his stand outside of experience but speaks from within, with the passion and power of one who has himself felt all that he describes. For the *Thoughts*, though not in form confessions, like those of his master St. Augustine, are in fact transcripts of his inner life. He is himself the hero of his tale—the sinner, fallen, struggling for some good, redeemed by a power not his own. And to this desperate interest in the drama he describes is added a power of incisive as well as picturesque description rarely equalled. He might have failed in larger systematic construction, but in fitness of phrase he has no superior. Every word tells. There is no haziness or blurring of the figure, but we are brought face to face with ourselves, with every feature clear cut and distinct. It may not be all of life that Pascal presents, but it is at least life, and life in its intensity.

And what now does Pascal find man to be? A strange compound of grandeur and misery. A being raised above nature by virtue of his knowledge but rendered miserable by that which he knows. To quote the most familiar passage in the *Thoughts*: "Man is but a reed, the weakest thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed. It is not necessary that the entire universe arm itself to crush

him. A breath of air, a drop of water, suffices to kill him. But were the universe anxious to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which kills him, because he knows that he dies; and the universe knows nothing of the advantage it has over him.”⁶ Here speaks Pascal the intellectualist, the geometrician, the man of science. Far from condemning reason, he finds in it the peculiar glory and grandeur of man. Pascal may despair of knowledge but he does not despise it.

But when man, endowed with consciousness, turns it upon himself, what does he see? “What is man in the midst of nature?” he asks. “A nothing in comparison with the infinite, an all in comparison with nothingness; a mean between nothing and all.”⁷ “The greatness of man is great in that he knows himself miserable.”⁸ “Let us imagine a number of men in chains, all condemned to death, where some are killed each day in the sight of the others, and those who remain see their own fate in that of their fellows, and wait their turn, looking at each other sorrowfully and without hope. It is an image of the condition of men.”⁹ “The last act is tragic, however happy all the rest of the play is; at the last a little earth is thrown upon our head, and it is all over.”¹⁰

This is the note that recurs again and again throughout the *Thoughts*—the terrifying and paralyzing effect of consciousness. This divine attribute which raises a man above nature seems given only to crush him with the terrors it reveals. As he realizes the weakness of man and the brevity of his life, Pascal cries out, “The eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me.”¹¹ “Between us and heaven or hell there is only life, which is the frailest thing in the world.”¹²

It is to escape thought, to turn their attention away from their wretched condition, that men seek amusement

⁶ *Pensées*, 347.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 397.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 210.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 206.

¹² *Ibid.*, 213.

and distraction. "Those who think men unreasonable for spending a whole day in chasing a hare which they would not have bought, scarce know our nature. The hare in itself would not screen us from the sight of death and calamities; but the chase which turns away our attention from these does screen us."¹³

Such is man, as Pascal sees him, a being of infinite possibilities, yet frittering away his time in a vain attempt to escape the consciousness of his own miseries. World-weary and self-weary he passes from excitement to excitement seeking in vain for an eternal good. But an eternal good is not to be attained by temporal powers. Herein Pascal sees the truth of the doctrines of Montaigne as against the teaching of the Stoics. Our human reason is not sufficient for the discovery of absolute truth nor are our human powers equal to the attainment of a real good. The Stoic ideal of a life in accordance with reason is a noble ideal, but all experience shows it as impossible of realization. We see the better, but we follow the worse. Man, as the Stoic sees him, is man in his original innocence and virtue, man before the fall. Man, as Montaigne paints him, is man in his present condition, ignorant, corrupt, and helpless. Both these views of man Pascal holds to be reconciled in the Christian theory, and in the Christian theory alone. It alone is psychologically sound and shows man his dual nature.

And this brings us to the remedy for human misery. As we have found already, this is Christianity with its doctrine of a loving God able to save all who put their trust in him. In finding God, man finds an eternal good able to satisfy his heart and quiet his restless search for distraction. The Christian God is the very God of peace.

But what ground is there for believing in such a God? What means have we for knowing truth? Here is the

¹³ *Pensées*, 139.

much vexed question of Pascal's scepticism. Does he or does he not believe in the possibility of knowledge? Does he or does he not preach blind faith and submission to authority? Does he or does he not give us a consistent account of truth? If one selects his quotations with care, one can prove almost any thesis about Pascal. It is easy enough to point out the familiar passages in which the impotence of reason is asserted as dogmatically as by a modern agnostic: "What is thought? How foolish it is."¹⁴ "The last attainment of reason is to know that there is an infinity of things that surpass it."¹⁵ "Nothing is so in conformity with reason as this disavowal of reason."¹⁶ Or read the scornful passages in which he ridicules all human laws and institutions as products of absolutely irrational custom. "Truth this side the Pyrenees, error that side."¹⁷ Or this ironical bit on the effect of conditions on judgment: "The mind of the supreme judge of the world [man] is not so independent as not to be liable to be disturbed by the least uproar that is made about him. . . . Do not wonder that he reasons ill just now; a fly is buzzing in his ear; it is easy enough to render him incapable of sound judgment. If you are desirous that he should find the truth, drive away that insect, which suspends his reasoning powers, and frets that mighty mind which governs cities and kingdoms. Here is a pretty god, indeed! *O ridicolosissimo eroel*!"¹⁸

But over against these gibes at reason we have to set the following: "We know the truth not only by the reason, but also by the heart. It is by the heart that we know first principles, and it is in vain that reasoning, which has no part in it, tries to combat them. The Pyrrhonists, whose only object this is, strive for it in vain. We know that we do not dream, however impotent we may be

¹⁴ *Pensées*, 365.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 267.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 272.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 294.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 366.

to prove it by reason: this impotence proves nothing more than the feebleness of our reason, but not the uncertainty of all our knowledge, as they pretend. For the knowledge of first principles, as of space, time, movement, numbers, is as certain as any of those that our reasoning gives us. And it is on this knowledge of the heart and instinct that reason must support herself, and on this she founds her whole procedure. . . . Principles are felt, propositions are proved, and all with certainty, although in different ways. And it is as ridiculous for the reason to demand of the heart proofs of its first principles in order to consent to them, as it would be for the heart to demand of the reason a feeling of all the propositions that it demonstrates in order to be willing to receive them. This impotence ought to serve then only to humble the reason, that would judge of everything, but not to combat our certainty, as if there were nothing but reason capable of instructing us. Would to God that, on the contrary, we never had need of it, and that we knew all things by instinct and feeling. But nature has refused us this good, and she has given us, on the contrary, but very little knowledge of this kind. All other knowledge can be acquired only by reasoning.”¹⁹

Here then we seem to have a sure foundation in principles which are the basis of all reasoning and which therefore are themselves beyond the demand for proof. The proof of everything else can't itself be proved. These self-evident principles Pascal assigns to the heart rather than to the reason. Their certainty is immediately *felt*, not demonstrated.

But no sooner have we reached this firm ground than it begins to tremble under our feet. Pascal goes on to admit “that we have no certainty of the truth of principles, beyond faith and revelation, except the natural

¹⁹ *Pensées*, 282.

conviction of them which we feel within us. Now this natural conviction is not a convincing proof of their truth, since, having no certainty except through faith whether man was created by a good God, by an evil demon, or by chance, it is doubtful whether the principles thus given to us are true, false, or uncertain.”²⁰ It may be, as Descartes had suggested before him, that our faculties are not constructed capable of truth and that our most intense conviction is an illusion. We may be the spirit of a maliciously humorous demon.

Does the victory then rest with the sceptic? Yes and no. Rationally we have no logical grounds for our most fundamental truths—they are not reason-compelling—they are at best only convictions or beliefs, which we are powerless intellectually to defend. But, on the other hand, they are so firmly rooted in human nature that they need no defence.

However much the sceptic may point out the feebleness of our intellects and the dependence of our judgments upon custom and prejudice, nature will always prove too strong for him, and though we may assent to his arguments we shall disregard his conclusions. Instinct will triumph over intellect and life will demand faith. This is the essence of Pascal’s familiar saying: “Nature confounds the Pyrrhonists, and reason the dogmatists. Our inability to prove anything is such as no dogmatism can overcome, and we have an idea of the truth which no Pyrrhonism can overcome.”²¹ Not Hume nor James has better expressed the contrast between life and thought and the irresistible dominance of the former. Those whose “lives are sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought” are bound to be replaced in the struggle for existence by those in the full tide of life and faith. Scepticism is but humanity’s momentary pause as it takes its breath and looks about preparatory to its new advance.

²⁰ *Pensées*, 484.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 484.

Much has been made of the sharp contrast in Pascal between faith and reason and of the irrationality of his belief in Christianity; but the more one studies his general attitude toward knowledge, the less exceptional seems his attitude toward Christianity. Christian faith may be blind, but it is only to a degree blinder than other faith; Christian doctrine may be incapable of demonstration, but so in last instance is all knowledge. So far is he from admitting the irrationality of religion that he asserts it to be more certain than many of our common-sense beliefs. "If it were necessary to do nothing but for the certain, we should do nothing for religion; for it is not certain. But how many things we do for the uncertain, as sea-voyages, battles. I say, therefore, that it would be necessary to do nothing at all, for nothing is certain, and that there is more certainty in religion than that we shall see to-morrow. . . . Now when we work for to-morrow and for the uncertain, we act with reason."²² The irrationality of religion, for Pascal, is merely its lack of demonstration and compelling proof, but that it is reasonable in the larger sense of the term he insists again and again. Indeed, his proposed Apology for Christianity would have been an absurdity on any other assumption.

What has given currency to the idea of his irrationalism is the failure to recognize the distinction between logical validity of proof and psychological effectiveness in action. Pascal believes that the evidence for religion, while not amounting to demonstration, is yet stronger than that on the other side, so that probability is for it. But he also believes that this logical credit is not sufficient to induce practical acceptance and action, for it is not an affair of pure reason but of feeling, emotion, and will. The natural man resists religion, not because it is not probable but because he does not *want* to believe

²² *Pensées*, 234.

it and to act upon it. It is not enough to convince the reason; we must influence the will. And hence the passage which has outraged the intellectualists: "You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. . . . Follow the way by which they began—by acting as if they believed, taking holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will make you believe and stultify you. . . . It is this which will lessen the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks."²³ Now whatever we may think about the particular efficacy of holy water and masses, Pascal's point here ought to be clear enough, that since religion is a matter of life and action, it is to be induced not merely by evidence but by appeal to will, and that therefore the essential preparation for it is the discipline of the life and the purification of the emotions. It is not against evidence that faith has to struggle but against pride and self-will. It is, in a sense, not so much irrational as involuntary.

And to this same truth, even Pascal's famous figure of the wager bears some witness, though it is usually cited on the other side. He "represents man as playing the game of life against inscrutable nature: heads, God exists; tails, he does not. On which shall we bet? There is compelling reason on neither side, it is an irrational venture. But if we choose heads and win, the rewards are infinite. If we lose, we lose comparatively nothing, for religion even in this life is profitable through its results in character and social success. If we choose tails and win, we gain only the fleeting pleasures of this life, while if we lose, we lose an eternal happiness. It is the part of wisdom therefore to bet boldly upon heads and the existence of God, for the risk is nothing and the gain may be infinite.

²³ *Pensées*, 233.

"Now one must admit that the idea of this religious gamble is not wholly attractive. And at first thought it seems to support the theory of the pure irrationalism of Pascal, for both moral and intellectual considerations seem ignored and everything put to the hazard of chance."²⁴ But one must remember both that this wager does not represent his true idea of the situation and that its point is to emphasize the practical considerations involved in religion. His contention is that *even if* the evidence were evenly balanced, as he believes it is not, still there are inducements which may be offered sufficient to incline the will in the direction of faith. Considerations of value may take the place of logical proof.

It is effectiveness, therefore, rather than truth which philosophy lacks. What men need is help, not knowledge. They need to be saved from their own weakness and viciousness, and this can only be done by the power of God renewing the will and enabling it to embrace the true and eternal good.

And this true good is conceived by Pascal wholly in an ascetic sense. It is to be found only in a complete suppression of the natural desires and an absolute submission to the law of the spirit. There can be no compromise with the world. Peace is to be obtained only through discipline, humiliation, fasting—the absolute suppression of the natural longing for happiness. The self must die in order that God may be all in all. Marriage he condemned as the "most perilous and lowest of the conditions of Christianity."²⁵ Even the delight in intellectual activities is a vanity not to be endured. Sickness is the true and proper state of mankind, since it involves a lowering of all the vital energies and makes pleasure impossible. Life as a whole is but a meditation upon death, as one cannot but feel as one

²⁴ Wilde, *The Pragmatism of Pascal*, Phil. Rev. XXIII, p. 546.

²⁵ Letter to Mme. Perier.

reads Pascal's own *Thoughts*. But it is only as one thus renounces absolutely the unsatisfying pleasures of the world, that one can find an eternal satisfaction in the love of God. To retain but a single natural desire is to have an enemy within the walls who will inevitably destroy this longed-for peace of death.

It is a stern creed for which Pascal stands, yet I cannot but feel that it is the natural expression of his character. Much is said by his sister and repeated by his biographers of the loveliness and lovingness of his disposition, and his charitable deeds are offered in evidence, and yet I doubt. The charity which characterized his later life is not, it seems to me, the charity of a loving heart, but the almsgiving of the penitential sinner. The value of the deed is felt to be in its mortification of the flesh, in its humiliation of the spirit, rather than in its relief of the poor. It is a duty, not an act of love, and its worth is proportionate to its difficulty rather than to its results. And hence Pascal was suspicious of organized charity or institutional endeavor, because it lessened this opportunity for individual self-discipline. The poor were spiritual laboratory material, the supply of which must never be exhausted.

And a careful reading of his *Thoughts* leaves us with the same impression. Of kindly, sympathetic interest in men, there is not a trace. Nowhere is his power greater and his wit sharper than in his analysis of human weakness and folly. He is a Montaigne, minus the human sympathy of that genial cynic. Again and again his personal scorn flashes out. "How I hate those who set up for doubters of miracles." "How I hate these stupidities," e.g. not to believe in the Eucharist. Human negligence "irritates me much more than it excites my pity." It is everywhere the impatient intellectual aristocrat, recognizing spiritually his nothingness before God, yet feeling intellectually his superiority to men.

He is a kind of Christian Socrates, conscious that he is as ignorant as others, but conscious too that his knowledge of his own ignorance puts him in a class by himself. With an over-developed intellect and an under-developed social self, his conversion makes him conscious of his social duty but never results in a generous love of mankind. They are to be cared for and served because it is unnatural, and therefore spiritual, so to do. Pascal's religion, in being non-human, tends to become inhuman, and expresses what I cannot but feel is an inhuman element in him.

But we must not leave Pascal with a criticism which may itself appear inhuman. Three aspects of his thought call for special recognition. Philosophically, Pascal's service consisted in his questioning of the validity of the rationalistic dogmatisms of the day, represented by the mechanical philosophy of Descartes. Such an intellectually necessary system of the universe is impossible. Demonstration has its limits, and above and underneath it lie what Pascal called the truths of the heart, incapable of proof and grounded in the non-rational elements of human nature—instinct, will, and emotion. By contrast with the prevalent ideal of mathematical demonstration such a contention seemed to the men of his time and perhaps even to himself sceptical, but measured by a less stringent standard we should be inclined today to call it empiricism and to invoke the name of William James as pledge of its respectability.

Theologically, this anti-rationalism meant the founding of religion not upon metaphysical arguments but upon faith, upon an act of will that is more than the conclusion of a syllogism. God is not demanded by our curiously inquiring intellects to complete our systematic scheme of the world. He is sought by our restlessly dissatisfied wills to give peace and steadiness to life. Mathematics and science could satisfy Pascal's love of knowledge;

he did not need to betake himself to religion for that. But mathematics and science could not fill his life, and it was to this end that he sought religion, not primarily for its truth but for its practical worth. And here again we may see foreshadowed the modern doctrine of the will to believe and the pragmatic value of religion, and in a form perhaps more reasonable than some forms in which it appears at the present day.

But it is in Pascal's appeal to the religious temper, or at least to one type of the religious temper, that his greatest significance is to be found. Like his saintly masters, Paul and Augustine, Pascal portrays with passionate intensity the eternal struggle between flesh and spirit out of which religion is born. Nowhere do we get more vivid pictures of the emptiness of life, of the nearness of death, of the tragedy of folly, than in Pascal. And nowhere is the natural helplessness of man presented with such desperate conviction as in Pascal. World-weariness is the mood he makes us see beneath the surface-happiness of every life. "Who will show us any good?", "Who will deliver me from the body of this death?", are the cries he makes us hear from the depths of every human heart.

Sainte-Beuve says of Jansenism, and by Jansenism he means this religion of Pascal, this Pauline conception of helpless man redeemed by grace, "*La seule objection qu'on était en droit d'adresser au Jansenisme, c'était non pas d'être un hérésie, . . . mais c'était d'être un anachronisme.*"²⁶ And yet wherever we find men and women disappointed with the unfulfilled promise of the world, wearied and beaten in the unequal struggle with self, men and women in whom, from whatever cause, there has been awakened the fatal hunger for the eternal, this religion of Pascal will seem neither a heresy nor an anachronism, but the deepest truth of life.

²⁶ Port Royal, II, p. 534.

THE DIARY OF AN OLD NEW ENGLAND
MINISTER¹

FRANCIS A. CHRISTIE

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

The morbid emotional self-consciousness of such a journal as David Brainerd's was not likely to find imitation in the active seaport society of Salem. But journals were kept there. Hawthorne began one at the tender age of twelve with the motive of self-improvement in expression, and the practised ease he gained appears in the later note-books, which are cherished illustrations of his grave and graceful style as well as of the artist's propensity to transmute experience into symbol and dream. The Salem boy doubtless did not know that his most eminent elder townsman was an indefatigable diarist, jotting down in careless, awkward language matter not meant for an imaginative version of life. Certainly too the older Salem diarist was not recording his spiritual condition. The Reverend William Bentley, a short and portly clergyman, living an unhampered celibate life, was wont to close days of phenomenal industry by hasty and incisive records of event and comment. After his vigorous walk in the early morning he had stood at a desk all the forenoon working on sermons and correspondence, on manuscript text-books in science or languages, on scripture commentaries, local history, critical reviews of books read, on bi-weekly summaries of home and foreign news to be printed in the newspapers, on parochial records minutely exact as to family occupation and personal

¹ The Diary of William Bentley, D.D., Pastor of the East Church, Salem, Mass. 4 vols. Published by The Salem Institute. Vol. I, 1905, pp. xliii, 456; Vol. II, 1907, pp. 506; Vol. III, 1911, pp. 601; Vol. IV, 1914, pp. 737.

circumstance. Other hours were given to private pupils, to parish visits, to care of the poor and sick, to catechizing the young or attending the School Board, or to watching with an eager and accurate eye every detail of local industry, politics, health, and weather. An unflagging curiosity made him familiar not only with the virtues and vices of his community but also with twenty languages ancient and modern, and therefore with the ways of men afar in space and time. In the evening he was occasionally something like a University Extension Lecturer, and when he got to his bedtime-diary he did not relax into sentimental self-contemplation. His attention was still on the not-self. In youth, to be sure, he had begun to make record of his moral experiences, but after some hundreds of pages had abandoned the practice. "Cool reflection told me a few devout prayers and well conceived reflections were better than whole volumes of confessions of feelings and vanity. Passion should be described, not lamented. Resolutions should be noticed not as made but kept" (Diary, II, 277).

Introspection, then, finds no place in the four substantial volumes of diary, which cover a period of thirty-five years (1784-1819). Even when unhappy relations with his father and brothers extort expressions of pain and vexation, he is brief and objective, recording painful facts but not his self-pity. Eager he was, undoubtedly, for public recognition of his abilities and accomplishments, but he is silent about praise, and leaves unmentioned an honor conferred by a Pennsylvania college, and the handsome offer of the Presidency of the University of Virginia. When at his life's end Harvard College tardily bestowed the degree of Doctor of Divinity, he records the event and the fact that his heterodoxy had been an obstacle, but he made not the slightest comment. Undoubtedly too he was a man of warm and tender affections, but only rarely did

he yield to their sweet pressure when the diary was opened. Once indeed he did, with words of touching, unselfish solicitude recording the marriage of his dear young pupil and friend, Hannah Crowninshield, and again when Captain Benjamin Hodges was taken with a bleeding of the lungs: "I never was more alarmed. I never before felt such sympathy. My tears flowed silently but plentifully. As I resisted them the waves rose." These volumes reveal many things about the wealth and poverty of the community, yet they all but conceal his own anxieties from financial hardship and wholly ignore his own persistent benevolences which made the hardship more painful. The very omissions reveal the finer traits of the man. Surely a sensibility deep and fine lay back of his cherished reticence, his seemingly complete absorption in outward things of social progress, his collector-passion for coins, medals, curiosities, portraits, and engravings, and his obsession by an interest in genealogies. Some sentiments were inhibited by a Stoical ideal. In verses (for, being without a sense of humor, he occasionally indulged in doggerel) a young lady, who asked why he neglected to marry, is told:

"Reason I followed;
But without fire, Love's but a name;
Reason is cool, deliberate, wise;
'Tis only passion fans the flame" (I, 82).

Cool, deliberate, wise; therefore, whatever his prejudices, a man of large and generous policy. The revivalistic preaching of Spaulding, a clerical neighbor, was anathema to him, but he urged the negroes of Salem to attend it, since it was suited to their temperament, and he regretted the final institution of a separate meeting for negroes (IV, 621). Wholly averse to the system of the Episcopalians, he was a genuine friend and neighbor to them. When Bishop Seabury passed through Salem,

Bentley politely got himself presented (I, 268), and A. V. Griswold, Bishop of Rhode Island, on being coldly received by the Salem Rector, found cordial hospitality in Bentley's home. The conspicuous illustration of this temper is shown by his relations to the Catholics. Significantly, it was to him that the Rev. John Thayer, a Yale graduate converted to Romanism, appealed in 1790 for a list of Salem Catholics and for aid in finding a place for worship. Bentley secured co-operation and protection from the Selectmen and wrote in reply: "It is my desire that every man enjoy his religion not by toleration, but as the inalienable right of his nature" (I, 162). Thayer was a presumptuous and cantankerous guest of Bentley for several days, even expecting his host to be Responsor in the Mass and to arrange for the sale of a batch of propagandist Catholic pamphlets which he left at his departure (I, 165). While glad to be rid of this uncomfortable missionary, Bentley readily aided the Spanish Consul and Dr. Francis Matignon in establishing Catholic worship in Boston, securing a contribution of fifty dollars from a family in his own parish. "We ought," he notes, "to do everything which can encourage the liberality in France and Spain by which the Protestant religion may be more fully tolerated" (III, 23). In 1803 Bishop Carroll of Maryland with two priests, one of them being Cheverus, gave him pleasure by a visit in Salem (III, 55), and in 1811 Bishop Cheverus, again a welcome guest, had Bentley for an auditor at a sermon which the Protestant pastor enjoyed and approved (IV, 20). At a later time the Catholics of Salem were grateful for Bentley's trouble in procuring a hall for their celebration of the Mass (IV, 552). When an Irish pauper died in the Poor House, Bentley conducted the funeral, conscientiously using such scripture as the Roman Breviary provided, and resorted to Bourdaloue and Massillon for the sermon.

On the same day he entertained two Catholic Indian chiefs of the Penobscot tribe, and at parting gave them from his cabinet a crucifix, two mass-books, and plaster images (IV, 502). In view of the sturdy intensity of his rationalistic convictions these incidents evidence a generous ability to transcend prejudice.

Moral guardian of a parish and having a mind habituated to expression by incessant practice, Parson Bentley did not fail to provoke resentment. Strength of conscience gave him calm, unyielding courage in the personal difficulties resulting from a sermon in 1788, when he protested against the violation of law by a ship's clearing for the slave trade (I, 104, 105, 106, 123); but there were other episodes which led him to resolve on "prudence in my conversation and great caution in my attachments" (I, 119). After five years of ministerial experience he emphatically determines to use cautious self-restraint, to "join the serpent to the friendly reprover" (I, 134), and he records the sober calculation which made him enter into friendships which would otherwise be uncongenial (I, 177; IV, 290). This discipline of self in public intercourse accounts, perhaps, for many things in the diary. Salem households accustomed by tradition to look back on Dr. Bentley with profound veneration have been scandalized by the gossiping disrespect and caustic acerbity of these notes. The reader's attention passes over the words of praise given to neighbors and parishioners as a thing expected, but is startled by such acidities as the obituary comment, "all sense but common sense" (I, 38), or the verdict, "not a man for God, or for society, and his passions make him terrible to himself" (I, 169), or the comment on a colleague in the School Committee, "the monkey shows his tail" (IV, 7), or again, "a fanatic of the first chop" (IV, 54), "Morse and his gang" (IV, 130), "a true brat of the troublesome father" (IV, 526). Political partisanship and

theological animus inspired many paragraphs of contemptuous or hostile disparagement. It was a time when men were embroiled, and the era of good feeling later brought corrections and reconciliations. In all instances, too, we may reflect that this lonely celibate, deprived of a listening domestic ear, needed a safety valve for the artificial repression prudently adopted out of doors. The diary was such an escape from unnatural tension.

In 1790 Salem was relatively a place of importance, with a population of 7,921, about half that of Boston. In theory 1,277 persons were supposed to worship in the East Church, though the church could not hold them all. The large numbers of young people in Dr. Bentley's catechizing classes show that he was in fact pastor to the whole district, though few indeed were the actual communicants—sixteen in 1785 (I, 20) and sixty-three in 1802 (II, 408). There were long-standing historical reasons in this neighborhood for this decline of the *ecclesiola in ecclesia*, but it marks also a decline in spiritual experience. The absorbing interests of politics and war at the end of the colonial period had been followed by a time of lethargy and moral weakness, particularly among the men, old and young. In 1808 Bentley notes that "all the Congregational Churches in Boston have not so many male members as one Church half a Century ago did contain" (III, 382), and in 1813, commenting again on this fact, he reflects that "the passions are seldom admitted to be doorkeepers" (IV, 152). In the ninety years of its history before 1808 the East Church of Salem had only fifty-eight male members, though the women counted four times that number (III, 382). In 1809, out of resentment at the minister's politics, the only male communicant besides the Warden left to join another society—and the Warden staid at home. Bentley made a sad appeal to his hearers "not to leave him and a reputable Church of females unsupported" (III, 473).

The parishioners were coopers, ropemakers, blacksmiths, carpenters, shoemakers, a few shopkeepers, many mariners, of whom fifty-nine were captains of vessels, and, because of the perils of the sea, there were many widows (I, 222). A large proportion were house-owners, and several families were of large wealth. In older Salem parishes there was still greater wealth. William Gray amassed three million, but that fortune was transferred to Boston. The ship-owner, Elias Haskett Derby, dying in 1799, left an estate of a million dollars, and his son Richard, making the grand tour in Europe, was received at foreign courts and came home laden with works of art (III, 55). In 1817 Captain Forester died as the richest man in Salem with an estate of \$1,400,000 (IV, 463). In 1815 George Crowninshield, Bentley's own parishioner, professed to have loaned a million to the United States treasury. The average conditions were surely comfortable in a town which voted to tax itself \$6,000 for the expense of funeral honors to George Washington (II, 327). In the exceptional time of the great embargo in 1809 there was a temporary distress. The richer citizens met the emergency with a soup-house at which a thousand applicants were well fed (III, 412, 414), and a fund was raised to supply each one with a loaf of bread a day. William Gray gave two barrels of flour a week and stood ready to give one a day (III, 409). At all times, indeed, there were straitened households where the cruel sea made so many widows. A few rich citizens seem to have provided—perhaps inadequately—the thousand or so dollars a year raised for their relief (IV, 371, 499), and some of them made the warm-hearted Bentley the agent of their philanthropy (III, 139, 140, 141). Improvidence and intemperance brought some to the Charity House; but in those days of churches which had been town churches the minister was a familiar guest there and the inmates had seats in the church.

In spite of the general ease, the occasional distinguished wealth, and the ready philanthropy, Salem was reprehensible in the support of its ministers. As an associate pastor Bentley began with a salary of £130 (\$433.) and as sole pastor had £160 (\$530.), which in 1804 was raised to \$800. (III, 108). This was, as Bentley observes in 1817, "one of the smallest in Essex" (IV, 490). The salary at the North Church was \$1,200. In 1817 he had cause to feel the insufficiency of salary, for at that time food and fuel were exceptionally dear (compare the market prices, IV, 434). On coming to Salem Bentley had been promised a "settlement" of £200, one-half being paid at once, the rest being due after a year. At that time such a settlement was advantageous as capital owing to the rapid increment of wealth, but twenty years later this had ceased to be the case and ministers preferred a larger annual salary without the initial settlement (III, 168). However, the second instalment of Bentley's settlement was never paid, and in 1817 after his long and eminent service the parish owed him not only the hundred pounds but salary for two years, or \$2,000 in all. In addition the minister had had to pay part of the cost of the church music, and only gifts from friends had saved him from immediate suffering (IV, 484, 490). The over-generous minister waived half of the debt, but with extraordinary meanness the congregation, on hearing of these private donations, deducted them from the parochial debt and paid him only \$800. (IV, 496). It is easy to imagine the difficulty for a man with dependent relatives, an impulsively generous friend of the poor, and a passionate collector of expensive foreign books.

The activity of the pastor of the East Church was not confined to his parish. He was an apostle of culture. From his other merciless industry he found time for private pupils, in some cases for charity's sake, and in

the School Committee he showed, no doubt, an irrepressible zeal that could hardly be restrained to the just limits of a member's share in counsel. He was as strenuous about style of penmanship and methods of teaching spelling as he was in the issues of national politics—and spelling seems to be the beam in his own eye. On his arrival in Salem in 1783 there was only one public school, containing both the elementary grade and the "Grammar" School which prepared for college. These students of Latin were few, seven in 1792, but the number seems to vary with the efficiency of the teacher. A considerable list of Latin authors was read, while Greek seems to be studied only for the sake of the New Testament (I, 275, 399; II, 12, 31, 146, 215). The course which Bentley provided for his private pupil, Charles Jackson, in 1787 covered English Grammar, Rhetoric, Literary History, the range of Latin authors now read in school and college combined, and something of the *realia* of ancient art and science. But nothing more! In the common public school teaching was limited to the three R's, the girls attending only from eleven to twelve, or in summer, when days were longer, also from four to five in the afternoon (III, 39). School development was rapid. Already in 1791 there were four public schools with five teachers (I, 275), and in 1803 the attendance was about six hundred, half of them girls. Before 1805 the common school teacher's salary was a beggarly hundred dollars, but then \$150. was demanded. The Grammar School master was better off with \$500. (in 1796, II, 175). The heart of pity goes out to the woman teaching a country school for four shillings sixpence a week and clamoring for a living wage of ten and six, or seventy-two cents more than her weekly board (III, 230). Private schools were equally numerous, four in 1798, and the new ones added in 1803 and 1804 engaged masters at the respectable salaries of \$1100. and \$900. (III, 2, 92).

This was not a democratic system of education, but democracy in Salem was not yet. It was a long climb from the lower level of popular culture to the intellectual life of the "educated," and the fact has its bearings on the ecclesiastical history of the town. In the higher circles there were men of eminent ability, not only those who, like the Pickerings and Crowninshields or Judge Story, rose to high public station in the nation's life, but also some men of marked scientific talent, like Captain Gibaut and Nathaniel Bowditch. To Bentley, who was over-conscious of his own academic privileges, Bowditch was objectionable as a self-taught youth and the unlawful heir of a fame that should have been Gibaut's, but in the end Bowditch's great mathematical eminence and his remarkable scientific library dominated the parson with respect. Lawyers and doctors were a learned class, but Bentley is dubious concerning the scholarship of the clergy both in Salem and elsewhere. We seem to be always hearing of a decline in clerical scholarship, of old and now. So Bentley looked back to the ministers of an older day as of higher learning (III, 88, 189): "I know not one Hebrew Scholar in New England, nor one Orientalist. . . . In Theology, few are acquainted with any but the few books of the day, and no Ecclesiastical Historian do I know that has consulted the best writers of this description." This was said in 1805. Soon, indeed, he found foretokens of a day of scholarship and intellectual life. He seemed to know the importance of the enterprise of Welles, scholarly bookseller in Boston, who in 1806 made the first importation, not on orders but for general sale, of German classical and critical works. The great efflorescence of New England culture which came in part from the invasion of this new interest was a promised day into which Bentley was not to enter, but the historians of it have reason to think of Bentley in connection with it. His correspondence with European

scholars enabled him to furnish George Ticknor with letters of introduction in 1815, and in that year also Edward Everett, appointed to the college chair that was "to connect Greek Literature with Biblical Criticism," promptly informed Bentley that the subject of his inaugural oration would be the authority of the Homeric poems. Remembering Emerson's great passage about the birth of a Periclean age for New England which began with Everett's exposition of Wolff and Heyne, attention underscores the entry: "I sent him Wolf and Heyne" (IV, 319). (Note: The text has Heman; a probable error.)

Indications of the growth of culture are abundant in the diary of this devotee of knowledge. On his travels he was keenly interested in the rise of circulating and public libraries (II, 49). A circulating library was opened in Salem in 1790 consisting chiefly of novels and works of science. When sold and dispersed in 1818 this had nearly seven thousand volumes (I, 136; IV, 546). Of earlier origin Salem had also a small "Social Library" and a joint stock Philosophical Library, a share in which cost Bentley £9 and involved annual assessments not inconsiderable (I, 151, 152, 369). In 1810 these two were joined in the Salem Athenaeum, the standards of which may be judged from the purchases it made at the sale of J. S. Buckminster's books in 1812: "Stephens Thesaurus for 225 dollars, Wettstein 50, D. Griesback 25 D." (IV, 112). Rich families, Derby and Pickering, imported European books, and Bowditch had a collection of mathematical works unsurpassed elsewhere (IV, 444); but the richest private library was Bentley's own, nearly half of which he gave to Allegheny College, then recently founded in the village of Meadville, Pennsylvania. The oldest college building fittingly bears the name of Bentley Hall. He loved to acquire books, he loved to make presents of them; poetry to young ladies, sermons and the like to adults (I, 19, 40, 63, 97, 111).

Bentley's interests were versatile and included the arts. As a local historian he prized the portraits of old worthies, but he had a critical appreciative taste for the manner as well as the subject of a painting. He knew what painters were "wretched daubers at best" (III, 470). His hosts knew that exhibition of their engravings made entertainment for him, and a secular dissipation in Boston consisted for him in the critical inspection of the religious paintings in churches, the portraits in the Court House, the works of art in Bowen's Museum. Popular interest in painting began in Salem when E. H. Derby brought from Italy a Neapolitan named Corné, who made an indifferent living by indifferent portraits and exhibitions of panoramas. Having no originality, he copied his panoramic scenes from engravings. His best success was in his paintings of ships. "In every house we see the ships of our harbour delineated for those who have navigated them. Painting before unknown is now common among our children" (III, 68, 275, 481). The pupils, however, did not arrive at fame. One became a sign-painter, another died early from drink, and Hannah Crowninshield married. Music made greater progress, and a chapter in the history of music in America might be written from the profuse entries of the diary concerning hymnody, choirs, and singing-schools. The minister's interest in music is ardent and constant, but his taste is for music that shows only moderate improvement on the bald harmonies of Puritanism. An ampler development began when in 1797 a music teacher, Holyoke, formed a society for instrumental music. "Music has ever been low in this place," Bentley had said, but now it was no longer true (II, 247; III, 292). The day came at last when there was an Oratorio of Sacred Music in the First Church, December 1, 1812, and the clerical connoisseur pens an acute criticism. In December, 1817, the Salem Handel Society is more successful, and repeats

the performance a month later (IV, 135, 492, 496). After that the oratorio was an annual affair, a solemn affair, indeed, with the clergy presiding. Bentley knew that music was a civilizing influence. "Our fathers mistook the power of Musick for the work of the Devil, when if they had taught the Indians music and made violent agitation accompanying shouts, clapping of hands as in David's time, they might have done more to gain the Indians than by all their practices" (IV, 560). Bentley never saw grand opera.

All these are high things, and what of play? Certainly life was not tame and monotonous. There was the thrill of maritime adventure and the tales of captains home from the Mediterranean or the Orient. There was the turbulence of politics through the hot passions of Federalists and Republicans. There was the spectacle of Napoleonic wars abroad, the pinch of Berlin and Milan decrees felt at home, the excitement of the Embargo, the approach and the anxious experience of war. All this is in the diary, but also the chronicle of amusements. This avid observer of life lists the "puerile sports" of New England—the succession of skating and sledding, marble time, tops in April, shuttlecock in May, then bat and ball and rickets, kites in autumn, and finally football for adults, though "the bruising of shins has rendered it rather disgraceful to those of better education" (I, 254). No dry-as-dust this bookish celibate, this caustic moralist. He seems to be saying, Mirth, admit me of your crew! How many picnics of young folk he managed, leader of what he styles their gambols! He frowns on the low tavern-drinking, dancing, and gambling of election day (II, 92), but watches with serene pleasure the innocent mirth with which Marblehead makes holiday after ordaining its new minister, noting the fishermen at athletic sports, and the free negroes merry at their dancing (II, 397). And shall not the heirs of Puritanism dance? It

was a vexed question. Militia balls had long been known, and balls for the birthdays of Washington and Adams. Most towns in fact had Assembly Halls for dancing and our parson inspects them on his travels (e.g., II, 17, 232). All this, however, implies a world that had slipped from Puritan control. But even this minister indulgently connives at a dancing-class for sea-captains' daughters under prudent regulations (1789, I, 81), and resents the local gossip censorious of the dance permitted in Captain Boardman's house (I, 119, 122). His artistic eye finds pleasure at sight of a circle of girls dancing. "How beautiful if this exercise were only a domestic amusement" (II, 296). In truth it is a valued accomplishment. "It were to be wished that it made a part in every education for more reasons than one, and that it might not be overrated" (I, 176). In 1798 a marked change came over Salem society. Two dancing-schools came into existence, one of them conducted by a prudent English gentleman married to a daughter of the musician Holyoke, and therefore to be trusted by social circles to which he belonged. Whereas formerly only one family of the East Church went to an assembly, every ball and assembly now drew many, especially the ball of Mr. Turner's dancing-class. In 1801 the minister records that all families are agog with expectation of the dancing-school ball. "The great attention shews that the subject is not very familiar to us" (II, 268, 322, 401). Three years later the clergyman feels it an honor to be invited to Turner's ball (III, 120), but he knows the limits of professional propriety and censures the Boston clergyman who is rumored to have taken part in a set dance. "A violation of the antient rule ought not hastily to have been practised. Archbishop Fénelon would have told him, let them dance, but do not dance yourself" (II, 363). Let them dance—but Puritan reluctance lingers. Mr. Nathaniel West's ball for the younger children of the danc-

ing-class was "at the request of his wife" (II, 372). Would Mr. West describe so meekly the conjugal pressure?

But the theatre! For that too threatens to invade Puritan precincts. In 1792 Salem is agitated by rumors of that which agitates Boston—the demand for a theatre, the united opposition of the clergy, the strife of opinions, the plea of one that pulpit dulness could be corrected by lessons of the stage, the Rev. Dr. Beattie's severe rejoinder that the theatre is not the School of Divines, the Governor's final order that the Sheriff shall obstruct the theatre as a direct violation of law (I, 340, 414, 415). A few months later Bentley hears that a French opera has been performed in Boston: "a curious progress of theatrical exhibitions, which it has been said are intended to assist the pulpit." The Boston theatre came to pass in December, 1793, and Bentley—*nihil humani alienum*—kept informed as to its prospects, its choice of plays, the merits of the actors. Visiting Boston in 1795 he makes a daytime inspection of the interior of the theatre. It is a pleasant building, but he has seen no other theatre and withholds his judgment (II, 127). Vain are the efforts made to induce clergymen to attend performances. "They feel the Compliment of a Visit to the Theatre, as our Country Gentlemen used to receive the news of a Visit to their Minister" (II, 132).

Salem itself was in danger. Even while Boston was fighting the innovation (1792), strolling actors came to Salem "to act comic, sing sailor's songs, and dance jigs for the amusement of all who will pay three shillings," and an audience of one hundred was well pleased. This, Bentley saw, was the entering wedge. An actress, Mrs. Solomon, was there in 1794, "complimented upon her performing a Low character very well" (II, 80), and on March 3 a series of performances began, passionately advocated and eagerly expected by some, so that

tickets "afforded matter for profitable speculation." Bentley learns that the acting is not notable, and records that after a few performances the company broke up, "all of them loaded with debts they will never discharge" (II, 81). Again in 1797 a series of mean performances failed after eight nights, chiefly because the people "have not the money to spare so often as three times a week." The difficulty is economic, not moral, but Bentley could not approve even a schoolmaster's dramatic exhibition, since it "tended to introduce a love of the theatre and to form those manners which we ought to detest. Our manners change and our evils will multiply" (II, 299). Yet was it so? His opinion wavered later. Chronicling balls and theatres, he felt constrained to admit that "whatever be our fears, the town never had less open vice in it than at the present time" (II, 401). But he did not surrender. After an ironical note of the praise of horse races and theatres as revivals of Greek civilization, he concludes: "Everything of this nature may be relatively good, especially when congenial with national manners and education. The theatre and the race were refinements upon savage customs among the Greeks. With us they are triumphs over the character which our country has been taught to love. In one case they exalt" (IV, 59). The reader can extend that sentence.

We infer, then, a simple, grave, and relatively innocent society beginning to enter upon higher intellectual life and relaxing its prejudice against worldly amusements. Over against this we must set revelations of the vice of drunkenness which are appalling. Bentley himself is evidently appalled. No Puritan tradition vetoed indulgence. When the East Church was enlarged in 1770, the Church Committee contracted to furnish the workmen with thirty gallons of rum. "On Wednesday (August 22, 1787) we had a funeral celebrated in the Church of

England, quite in West Indian taste. The Singers were Bacchinalians from Marblehead, who were entertained with punch in the Organ loft, which gave the true air to their music, to the no small satisfaction of the devout men who gave the invitation" (I, 72). As is well known, intemperance came in like a flood with the Revolution, the temperance reform came after Bentley's death. The indices of these four volumes are inadequate for measuring all the painful facts recorded. Young and old, rich and poor, men and women are victims of alcohol. Many are the accidental deaths due to the scourge. Drowned at last, says Bentley in one case. Many the insanities and suicides. Alienists who now emphasize the connection of insanity with intemperance will find data for their thesis in these records. The evil went on increasing over the country because of "the little retailing shops which offer the temptation" (IV, 501).

Would that the diarist's fixed determination and disciplined habit had been at times relaxed that we might read his heart more deeply than is allowed by the sharp brief comments made for the relief of fretting cares in these wearier hours at the close of day. Did not his valiant hope and faith have to strain against a world crude and sordid as seen by the vision of the world his energies sought to build? Is there not something wistful and sad masked behind the resolute, confident, eager vitality of his portrait? What gospel had the good parson for our raw human material that is so resistant to the form of spiritual personality? As a young man he championed an advanced radicalism, the earlier Arminianism of his neighborhood having developed, in his case, into an eighteenth century Rationalism held with a sharp definition and explicitness that was uncommon in America. His elder colleague at once censured him for spreading new doctrine (I, 23), and much later (1808) the *Salem Gazette*—from political animosity, to be sure—linked his

name with that of Thomas Paine. Lending a work by the Deist Tindal and Ethan Allen's *Oracles of Reason* made him suspected of a more pronounced infidelity (I, 82). Such books did not represent his mind. Like his intimate friend James Freeman, he had at the outset of his career set aside the doctrine of the Trinity and adopted the humanitarian view of Jesus; yet he was a Bible Christian, reading the Bible with the sympathies of ethical Rationalism. He was in the beginning enough of a propagandist to distribute Hazlitt's sermons and other English Unitarian literature which he received from Hazlitt. He gave most favor to minor tracts of Priestley which he recommended to his friend Hodges as containing "all you may want to know of the simple doctrines of Christianity. Your own good heart will supply the rules for practice" (I, 111). This sympathy with Priestley and Freeman shows us his attitude to doctrine. The attitude of soul which is more significant than doctrinal apprehension is revealed by his custom of giving to every catechumen Zollikofer's *Exercises of Piety*, "which had been printed at my request" (II, 191). Doubtless it was by his counsel that the Salem School Committee in 1808 gave Zollikofer's *Exercises* as a school prize (III, 186). Apart from the eighteenth century argumentation which it implies as the ground of faith, Zollikofer's devotional book might well be read today as a pure and kindling expression of Christian piety. It was, we may judge, Bentley's canon in religion, though he had none of the German's glow of feeling and excellence of style which won the praise of Goethe in his *Dichtung und Wahrheit*.

Specific doctrinal opinions are less interesting than Bentley's open-minded search for truth and his fidelity to a mission of preaching character as salvation. For the ministry he demands a man "who, upon the full conviction of a future moral retribution as the great point of

Christian faith, preaches with sober regard to the virtuous happiness of mankind, being able to abandon without reluctance all worldly interest which may interfere with the conscientious discharge of his duty" (I, 121). "I have adopted many opinions abhorrent of my early prejudices, and am still ready to receive truth upon proper evidence from whatever quarter it may come. I think more honor done to God in rejecting Christianity itself in obedience to my convictions than in any fervor which is pretended towards it, and I hope that no poverty which I can dread or hope I can entertain will weaken my resolutions to act upon my convictions. The only evidence I wish to have of my integrity is a good life, and as to faith, his can't be wrong whose life is in the right" (I, 98). It was his defect to know nothing of Edwards and to be incapable of understanding the intransigent Hopkinsian preaching of his day, stigmatizing it as New Light, Mysticism, ridiculous doctrines of grace, religious frenzy. It was the defect of the Hopkinsians to have none of his ecclesiastical breadth and to acknowledge as religious only men of hectic temperament. For the controversy which began in 1815 he had no great interest. Though as a young man he had shown propagandist zeal for Unitarian views, he seems to have developed another attitude natural to his office as minister to the Eastern parish of Christians living in Salem. It was his duty to edify this section of the community in religious faith and moral strength, and not to use his pulpit in the interest of party or dogmatic views which would divide the community. This is said without knowledge of his sermons, but it is not merely interpretation or surmise. It is the exact meaning of words he used in reviewing his ministry (IV, 352) and the implication of many other comments. No one could fail to know what his personal convictions were, but his aims as a pastor were not those of a theologi-

cal partisan. When therefore Jedediah Morse and the Panoplist summoned the orthodox to come out of these inclusive neighborhood churches and be clean by theological separateness, when Channing's letter to Thatcher appeared and the Unitarian controversy opened, the pastor who had served the Eastern parish of Salem for thirty-two years had little party spirit and spoke of the matter in what might be thought curiously local terms. His response to the situation is chiefly one of vexation that his orthodox neighbor, Worcester, should desert the ideals of the ancient order for the rôle of a theological partisan (IV, 342). Some illusion there was in this phrase—"ideals of the ancient order"—but the fact stands that Congregationalism was a polity without prescription of theological system, and that from its ancient New England history it had preserved the consciousness of being the general church in which, now that men disagreed, citizens of various theological sympathy could meet for the quest of a Christian heart and life. Parishes might vary theologically, but they kept fraternity and their ministers associated in one Association—this being about the only form of denominationalism that existed. If, as in Reading, 1790, an Hopkinsian pastor was settled in a "liberal" neighborhood, a man like Bentley could only say, "at present we are the sport of the ignorant," and try to make the best of it (I, 177). There might be discomfort, as when his Hopkinsian neighbor in the South Church in Salem was intrusively concerned for souls going to ruin under the preaching of the East Church (I, 176); but the liberal pastor held to the ideal of community churches and tried to keep confidence in its success.

The great menace to these parish churches was from the invasion of the so-called sects, Baptists, Methodists, Universalists, or such house-meetings as were occasionally gathered by unlearned and intruding Hopkinsian

itinerants of revivalistic type (e.g., I, 104, 108). There was no disposition to be rigidly exclusive to a properly qualified preacher from without the fold. A Methodist or Universalist might be invited to preach. If the Rev. John Murray was denied a pulpit and had to get a hearing in the Court House, it was not because of his doctrine but because of his lack of education, his attacks on the clergy and his lack of ordination (I, 107 f., 112, 113). The growth of sects was partly due to a fact not directly of a religious character. The hereditary parish churches were suffering from the social shift that followed the Revolution. In such churches dating from a period when society had an aristocratic organization, the seating of the members indicated the social gradation. The wealthy old families had pews on the floor of the church—and gradations were visible there—while the poorer people sat in the galleries. This could hold only when class divisions were meekly accepted. After the Revolution a restless democratic temper grew among the poorer people, and newcomers to growing towns refused the old social subordination in church. Originally the preaching could appeal to all, for it was rehearsal of Bible texts that all knew. Now that a freer intellectual sermon was attempted in a time of growing inequality of culture, the occupants of the gallery were not moved by that which edified the dignitaries in the chief seats. In Boston the galleries of old churches became empty (II, 127, 425). The lowest class of people in Boston, says Bentley in 1795, neglect public worship, and those who go to church are found in the Baptist and Universalist meetings. There the galleries are thronged. In 1807 he writes: "The Rational Congregations have thin galleries. Even hired servants of both sexes, but especially of the females, stipulate for night Lectures (i.e., revival meetings) when they agree for their wages. I do not know a reputable family in town that carries

all its servants with them to the public worship" (III, 271). This social cleavage was accentuated by the bitter opposition of the Congregational clergy to Jeffersonian Democracy. The name of Jefferson was to the despised sects a symbol of religious liberty; to the poor and socially disesteemed it meant political equality. Baptist and Universalist preachers were champions of Republicanism; the standing order revelled in Federalist denunciation of Jefferson's radicalism. The poorer and uneducated, especially when they were newcomers in an old town, shunned the church home of the upper class, and the growth of sects particularly in the case of the Baptists was such as to excite alarm (II, 409, 419, 432; III, 4, 66, 82, 157, 469; IV, 385 f.). The need of proselyting for the sake of church building led the sects into exasperating methods. "Sects in their infancy," Bentley observed, "are much like children, very cross and peevish. They have strong passions and little judgment, have many faults and yet many efforts before they get strong and make the world think favourable of their strength" (III, 167).

Bentley, as we have seen, was distinguished by a tolerant spirit, in spite of the rude remarks he put into his private notes. Among the Congregationalist clergy also he was exceptional by a fervid devotion to the party of Jefferson. He refused therefore to be prejudiced against Baptists. He had a good opinion of their integrity, and only lamented that their preachers were so notably ignorant (III, 28, 85). When a small Baptist church was built in Salem, in 1804, he believed the competition would never be dangerous. He would even welcome the case of such sects being more powerful, since they would thus restrain the spirit of persecution, or, as he said another time, promote a balance of power (III, 82, 119, 297). But he is soon aware of their rapid growth. In 1808 he estimates that Baptist societies in Massa-

chusetts are half as numerous as the Congregationalists. Methodists also increased (III, 345). But Bentley would not allow himself to become sectarian. "If the Baptists refuse our communion, let us not follow their example." "I love principles but hate fanaticism" (III, 241).

The proud old parishes thus were losing social control. They were not an organized denomination. They had no corporate and concerted strength. They agreed only in parish laws, as Bentley said, and they were falling into theological parties—Old Calvinists, Hopkinsians, and liberals who might be variously named as Sublapsarians, Arminians, Unitarians (III, 346).

Into the liberal Arminian region of eastern Massachusetts after the Revolution came pastors educated in Yale or under the influence of Edwards's theology. It was they who conceived the project of making a denomination. The Hopkinsians, beginning with Hopkins himself, inclined to sectarian separation, but they were held in some control by the redoubtable Jedediah Morse, who had more of the old Calvinist temper. Morse from the beginning—in those days of constitution-making—hoped to make a denomination that, like the Connecticut Consociation, could be in affiliation with the Presbyterians south of New England. It was necessary therefore to strengthen conservatism in the neighborhood, and he worked frankly and persistently for that end. He hoped to include all, but his chief anxiety was over the Hopkinsians. A new theological school was a part of his plan, and he managed to unite two rival projects, Old Calvinist and Hopkinsian, in the Andover foundation. So in the end his denominational plan was a union of these two parties with a sacrifice of the liberal wing. Bentley sees the process going on and is fully aware of the meaning of the steps taken. Of Morse he is always abusive and beyond bounds. It may be said in apology

that Morse had made himself odious to Bentley by his fanatic attacks on the order of Masons, Bentley being an enthusiastic Mason, and by his haughty and rancorous Federalism, Bentley being an enthusiastic Republican. This is but to say that the horribly embroiled conditions of those times, when the clergy were politicians as well as pastors, explain the sins of ecclesiastics who were struggling with a difficult church problem. The unexampled bitterness of political strife came to an end in 1814. The era of good feeling in politics began. But the problem of church organization was still on hand, and the habitual passionateness found further exercise with the rending of parishes and the system of exclusion and denunciation. In all this Bentley had no part. A happy death saved him from that necessity. But if the situation had been in his control, the schism would never have come to pass.

BOOK REVIEWS

IS CONSCIENCE AN EMOTION? Three Lectures on Recent Ethical Theories (delivered at Leland Stanford Jr. University). HASTINGS RASHDALL, D.Litt., D.C.L., LL.D., F.B.A., Fellow and Lecturer of New College, Oxford, Canon Residentiary of Hereford. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 200. \$1.00.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge gratefully the interest of Dr. Rashdall's searching examination of the recent restatements of the view that conscience, or the moral consciousness, is nothing but emotional approbation or disapprobation. And there is admirable vigor, persistence, and lucidity in his reaffirmation of the rationalistic counter-position that moral judgments rest on the "category" or "notion" of value or good. The first lecture, "Moral Reason or Moral Sense," gives a compact historical survey of the issue between emotionalistic and rationalistic ethics, as it has appeared in English philosophy. The second lecture, "The Morality of Savages," criticises at length the attempts of Westermarck, in his *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, and McDougall, in his *Social Psychology*, to support emotionalistic ethics by evidence drawn from evolution, to the effect that the moral consciousness is nothing but a highly developed form of emotions and instincts traceable in savages and even in animals. There is an appendix to this chapter, containing acrimonious polemics against Dr. McDougall's criticisms of Dr. Rashdall, which seems to me entirely out of place in these Memorial Lectures. The third lecture, "Value or Satisfaction?" criticises the identification of value and satisfaction, more especially as defended by William James.

In broad outline, Dr. Rashdall's position is that of the champion of rationalism versus emotionalism, of a metaphysical (and theological) versus a merely anthropological and psychological treatment of the moral consciousness. The issue is worth debating for him, because the decision cuts deep into our practical lives and our theoretical convictions. In practice, so Dr. Rashdall holds, emotionalism weakens the sense of duty and makes moral education ineffective. In theory, if we are willing to make "the assumption that our ultimate moral judgments represent real deliverances of Reason—self-evident judgments about the real nature of things" (p. 49),

we have a basis for inferring that the universe is spiritual and purposeful. "We have the right to claim that in the moral consciousness of man at its highest there is contained a true revelation of the rational Will which expresses itself in nature" (p. 50). On the same evidence we can believe in God's love, and cherish a hope of immortality. These inferences follow, according to Dr. Rashdall, if we can show that our moral judgments are not "merely the formulated result of some kind of feeling or emotion," but that "they represent one particular activity of that same self which also gives us the fundamental intellectual truths which are presupposed by all thinking and knowing; and therefore can claim the same kind of objective truth or validity as the axioms of mathematics or those self-evident laws of thought upon which in the last result all scientific reasoning depends" (pp. 46, 47).

The chief arguments in support of this thesis may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) The alleged feelings of approbation and disapprobation are hybrids. Judgments such as "this is good," "this is better (or worse) than that," mean more than "I like this" or "I like this more (or less) than that." In short, to like is one thing, to approve and value is another, even if emotional preference and intellectual estimate of value should happen to coincide. This becomes especially clear when we realize that comparisons of likings tend always to reduce themselves to comparisons of degrees of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Or, to put it differently, when we ask for the "reason why," the evidence or ground of our moral judgments, we have to choose between two alternative answers. The emotionalist points to the *fact* of liking as ultimate unchallengeable evidence; for, as Hume said, "'t is impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken." The rationalist urges that our likings may or may not be what they *ought* to be. He insists on the criticism of likings by a standard, an ideal, a principle of duty resting on a principle of good—in short, on a realm of objective values which may be, but is not necessarily, reflected with accuracy in our emotional preferences. The analysis of the developed moral consciousness of grown-up men and women can, according to Dr. Rashdall, result in none but the rationalistic thesis. (b) But what then of the arguments of the evolutionary emotionalist? To him Dr. Rashdall makes far-reaching concessions. While insisting, against the evolutionist, on the impossibility of explaining away the evidence drawn from the analysis of the mature moral consciousness, Dr. Rashdall in his turn is forced to allow that if you trace back the evolution of that consciousness, there sooner or later comes a point where not only the

explicit recognition of duty and value ceases, but where even large drafts on the "implicit" no longer suffice to support the rationalistic thesis. Where the line is to be drawn is hard to say. Dr. Rashdall makes a valiant attempt (pp. 84 ff.) to trace a hazy notion of right and wrong even in the conduct of the most primitive savages, but on the whole declares himself ready to admit that in animals certainly no recognition of standards of value is to be found, and that the morality even of savages and children is mainly "customary" and "emotional." The net result is that he has to argue for the emergence, at some point or other in the course of evolution, of a distinctively new non-emotional capacity for recognizing value—a recognition which must be, *a priori*, immediate, intuitive. (c) The argument against the remaining forms of emotionalism, viz., that all those things, and only those things, are good which either (1) are desired or (2) which satisfy, rests on the same logic as the argument against identifying value with liking. Desires and satisfactions demand criticism, and criticism implies a standard which feeling, as such, cannot supply. "The identification of the good with the satisfactory reduces diversities of moral judgment to differences of taste quite as much as the theory of the moral sense school" (p. 171). The principle, in a nutshell, is that value is *thought*, not *felt*. Provided this be granted, Dr. Rashdall is prepared to meet the emotionalist more than half-way by admitting, e.g., that feelings of pleasure are always among the things which we think good; that sometimes the feelings aroused are the only elements of value in an experience (p. 151 ff.); that what we think good is always something which satisfies (or is capable of satisfying) some one; and even that, in last analysis, the satisfaction must be that of "a part of my own nature" (p. 176). No emotionalist, even though he be a hedonist, can quarrel with the sweet reasonableness which Dr. Rashdall here exhibits. The difference between him and his opponents lies obviously not, in the main, in the list of things which they respectively judge to be good, but in the divergence of principle over the question whether our value-judgments register facts of emotional preference or immediate intuitions of objective worth on the part of Reason (with a capital R).

This summary, I trust, shows where the strength of Dr. Rashdall's argument lies. A few points, however, seem to call for comment.

(1) Seeing that the dispute concerns less the list of concrete values than the nature of the act of valuation, it might seem as if little more than arid academic technicalities were at stake, if it were not for the wider issues involved. This being so, I, for one, should have been grateful if Dr. Rashdall had developed this side of his argument

more fully, the more so as he must be well aware that it is possible to be a rationalist in ethics without agreeing at all with the metaphysical and theological inferences, for the sake of which he is anxious to establish the rationalistic thesis. Mr. Bertrand Russell and Mr. G. E. Moore, for example, whom Dr. Rashdall rightly quotes in support of his view that good is ultimate, unanalyzable, and apprehended by immediate intuition, would, I take it, repudiate utterly his whole metaphysical superstructure. And more than that; Dr. Rashdall oscillates in his language between speaking of value as an "objective" principle, recognition of which is "a piece of insight into the true nature of things" (p. 177), and as a "category" or "notion" with which Reason "invests" things, or which exists only through a specific activity of the rational self. Here again, he must know, many rationalists would not follow him. Russell and Moore, holding value to be something which the intellect apprehends, would reject the view that it is a category inherent in the intellect, or a character conferred on things by a certain kind of thinking. In short, a rationalist may be either a realist or an idealist, and in the present state of the controversy between these two schools, Dr. Rashdall should have been careful to point out where the realistic rationalists would refuse to follow the inferences which he, as an idealist, is prepared to draw.

(2) To my own thinking, the real issue between emotionalism and rationalism is whether only feelings are valuable or other things as well. The emotionalist, as I understand him, holds that the only primary values are feelings, and that all else has only a secondary or derivative value as the cause or condition of feelings. The rationalist, on the other hand, recognizes primary values in the world of objects. As for feelings, he may either, like Dr. Rashdall, class them among the things which have value, or treat them as a mere index or reflex of objective values. If we conceive the issue in this way, the point of the assertion becomes clear that the emotionalist's valuations can have no universal validity, no reference to an "objective standard." I am not sure that this is made equally clear by Dr. Rashdall's way of stating the issue as being "by what sort of faculty we know" the difference between right and wrong. Again, when he says that "moral judgments are a kind of thinking, not a kind of emotion or feeling or desire" (p. 138), his expression does not seem altogether happy. No emotionalist would, strictly, claim that a feeling "knows," or fail to distinguish between an emotion and a judgment. His thesis is that the judgment asserting the existence of a feeling of liking (or aversion) for a thing has the same meaning

as the judgment asserting the goodness (or badness) of that thing. The rationalist insists on the essential difference between these two kinds of judgments. The issue therefore is not strictly between emotion and judgment, but between taking moral judgments as registering the occurrence of an emotional attraction or aversion and as expressing the apprehension, by intuition or thought, of an inherent value in things.

(3) I could have wished that Dr. Rashdall had dealt more fully with the difficulties arising for his theory from the acknowledged conflicts between our moral judgments. If values are apprehended by intuition, how do we ever make mistakes? We might conceivably fail to intuit a value which is there, but we could hardly intuit one which is not there. Or again, if the intellect "invests" things with value, how does it ever come to misapply this category? Dr. Rashdall says calmly, "It does not shake my belief in the validity of that category that it is sometimes misapplied" (p. 79). But a critic might retort, "How do you know whether, and where, it is correctly applied?" Granted that our moral judgments presuppose an "objective" standard, we must, in view of the disagreement in detail between our judgments, confess ourselves to be ignorant of its nature. If so, how much, after all, is this "insight into the true nature of things" worth? Is not the position which rationalism at best establishes exiguous and of little importance? Dr. Rashdall should not have left himself open to this line of argument.

(4) Finally, one cannot but regret that, in his last chapter, Dr. Rashdall has passed by, with a bare mention, Dr. Bosanquet's version of the identification of the good with the satisfactory; the more so as Dr. Bosanquet agrees with Dr. Rashdall in maintaining the necessity of a criticism of our actual desires. In fact, Dr. Bosanquet tries to supply the "logic" of this criticism, and thus his version of the theory would appear to escape the objections which Dr. Rashdall urges against James's version of it.

The comments I have ventured to make will help to show how far-reaching and interesting are the problems which Dr. Rashdall's lectures open up. Room could have been found for some of these points, if less space had been given in the first lecture to the historical retrospect, though one would have been sorry to miss the excellent criticism of Hume, culminating in the brilliant epigram which describes Hume's theory as "the apotheosis of flunkeyism."

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PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM. WILLIAM CALDWELL, D.Sc. Adam & Charles Black. 1913. Pp. ix, 268. 6s.

"What is attempted in this book," Professor Caldwell announces in the opening sentence of his preface, "is an examination of the Pragmatist philosophy in its relations to the older and newer tendencies in the thought and practice of mankind." It is inevitable that so comprehensive a programme should remain an attempt rather than become an achievement; an attempt indeed that confounds. The reader gets no clear idea of what the relations said to be examined are, or in what respects pragmatism and idealism resemble each other and differ. Instead, he gets an overwhelming impression that the author has read much and digested little, and that his thinking and reporting are careless and slovenly to an extraordinary degree. In structure the book is not a logically developed exposition of a theme, but a collection of separate essays, the relations of which to each other are uncertain, and one of which—*Pragmatism as Americanism*—seriously violates the unity of the book. In content it is largely an enumeration of proper names, titles, philosophic terms, epithets, and foot-notes, with little or no regard to their explicit significances and no demonstration of their connections with pragmatism; the writer appearing to assume that his *ipse dixit* is sufficient to establish these. Here is a characteristic passage: "The writer finds that he has noticed in this connexion [i.e. the relation of pragmatism to the philosophic tradition] the doctrines of Stoicism and Epicureanism, the 'probability' philosophy of Locke and Butler and Pascal, the ethics and the natural theology of Cicero, the 'voluntarism' of Schopenhauer, Aristotle's philosophy of the Practical Reason, Kant's philosophy of the same, the religious philosophy of theologians like Tertullian, Augustine, Duns Scotus, and so on—to take only a few instances." Only a few, indeed! There is the unmistakable scent of the card-index and library-catalogue about such writing. And this becomes very strong when one regards the style, with its incoherences, its clumsy introductions of new matter with "as for," "as to," "in regard to" (the book bristles with them), and its monotonous use of the epithet "great" for doctrines that are approved and the epithet "mere" for doctrines that are disliked. Manner and matter being inseparable, faulty argument and inaccurate statement are not surprising; the latter often arising from the fact (as in the reference to Poincaré on page 33) that the information offered has not been obtained at first hand.

As an "examination of the pragmatist philosophy" the book turns out to be a bare collocation of what its author considers the

characteristic doctrines of pragmatism's protagonists, with the names and sometimes the opinions of thinkers not pragmatists. In consequence, pragmatism appears to have affiliations of no less than universal scope, so much so that one wonders whether there exist any differentia whatsoever by which pragmatism could be distinguished from other ways of thinking. The fundamental traits which Professor Caldwell assigns to it are four in number: (1) the opinion that all truth is "made" truth; (2) the belief in the prime importance of belief; (3) the anti-rationalist "deeper" view of human nature and volition; (4) an "anti-intellectualism," to which English Hegelians have made many concessions. But these traits, the learned author tells us, pertain to ancient and mediæval and modern philosophies quite as much as to pragmatism, so that they fail in fact to constitute, whether we take them distributively or collectively, a differential criterion whereby the modern way of thinking may be identified. Professor Caldwell is compelled, consequently, to seek such a criterion elsewhere, and it becomes uncertain whether the essence of pragmatism is these traits, or what he calls the pragmatist emphasis of the importance of human action for philosophy; an importance which is emphasized incidentally by Nietzscheans, theosophists, and spiritists also, and which Professor Caldwell himself minimizes completely by his ostensible reinforcement thereof with the consideration that there is "no necessary presumption against the idea of regarding human evolution as at least in some sense a continuation or development of the life that seems to pervade the universe in general" (p. 103). This is minimization; for all monisms and transcendentalisms are concerned to show the essential continuity and identity of human life with the life of the universe "in general." That is their chief stock in trade.

There appears then, although quotation is often so ample as to be confusing, no clear delineation of pragmatism. The criticism of this intellectual movement has the same characteristics. It is vague, ill-informed, and self-contradictory. In summary, Professor Caldwell makes the following points: "that Pragmatism is unsystematic and complex and confusing; that it has no adequate theory of 'reality,' and no unified theory of philosophy; that it has no satisfactory criterion of the 'consequences' by which it proposes to test truth, and that it has not worked out its philosophy of the contribution of the individual with his 'activity' and his 'purposes' to 'reality' generally, and that it is in danger of being a failure in the realm of ethics" (p. 127).

The first accusation is inevitable in a book which affiliates pragmatism with all existing types of philosophy and fails to establish its differential either empirically or deductively. The second accusation turns on the meaning of the word "adequate"; but that there are several pragmatist "theories of reality," all of which have the notion of activity as their fundamental concept, is of course a matter of record. Professor Caldwell appears to disagree with these theories, if indeed he knows what they are (his treatment of James's "radical empiricism," Dewey's immediatism, and Schiller's humanism suggests that he does not); but the grave assumption that a theory is inadequate because Professor Caldwell disagrees with it, requires more evidence than his book supplies. The third count seems to be based on misinformation; for it is a matter of record that pragmatism regards all thinking, philosophical as well as scientific, as a method and process of control. The fourth count, in view of the very explicit statements of James and Schiller and Dewey concerning the criterion of truth, can mean only that these statements do not satisfy Professor Caldwell; but pragmatists have pointed out that satisfaction must be social and involves a "long run." The sixth count shows the author to be either forgetful or ill-informed; as James has discussed the importance of the individual innumerable times, and has devoted a whole book, namely, *A Pluralistic Universe*, to defining its place in "reality generally." Schiller has done the same thing in *Riddles of the Sphinx*, and Dewey and his followers in almost all of their studies. The final count, which, incidentally, ignores altogether James's very important ethical studies in *The Will to Believe*, is specified by the remark that Dewey and Tufts in their ethics fail "to provide a theory of the ordinary distinction between right and wrong" (p. 138). On the other hand, on page 140 it is suggested that they do provide such a theory but that Professor Caldwell does not like it. But it is hardly possible to define failure as doing that which Professor Caldwell does not like. On the whole, the case against pragmatism seems in this book to rest upon the use of such categories as "adequate," "satisfactory," "failure." These are pragmatic categories, and to use them in criticism of pragmatism is simply self-defeating. It is for this reason perhaps that Professor Caldwell finds pragmatism "true in the main" in one place, and incapable of any trueness whatsoever in so many others.

If companionship in discomfort is comforting, pragmatists may take comfort in that the idealism with which pragmatism is compared fares no better than it. There are disparaging references to

various "Anglo-Hegelian" writers, like Bradley; one chapter is devoted to an attack on the first series of Mr. Bernard Bosanquet's recent Gifford Lectures, and another to Bergson, who is called, curiously enough, "the greatest of all the pragmatists." Professor Caldwell appears to like Bergson better than Bosanquet, but believes, of course, that he can be improved upon. Bergson-improved would give rise to the "great" philosophy of the future, "the constructive philosophy, in which we are interested as the outcome of Pragmatism and Idealism." There are indications that such a philosophy may be looked for at the hands of Professor Caldwell.

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HUMAN MOTIVES. JAMES JACKSON PUTNAM, M.D. Little, Brown, & Co. 1915. Pp. xvii, 175.

Dr. Putnam tells us in his preface that the human race is bound by higher obligations and ideals as well as by passions and longings, and that these two sources of human motives necessitate two different modes of approach, the philosophical and the psycho-analytical. He has been for years interested in the Freudian method of psycho-analysis, so that it is to be expected and desired that the greater part of the book should be based principally upon his experiences with this method. A chapter upon The Rational Basis of Religion, however, precedes a description of the Freudian method, and is not the least interesting part of the book. It is pronouncedly idealistic in its philosophy. Love, justice, honor, and power "are just as real as any fact in nature." Free will is defended as well as the self-activity of all reality, the "*elan vitale*" of Bergson.

The chapter entitled "Educational Bearings" is the most practical part of this little book. According to the Freudian theory, many abnormal manifestations are due to suppressions in childhood. The relation of this fact to education is evident. Emphasis must be laid upon motives rather than acts. Care should be taken to prevent suppressions which may become the source of much that is harmful in adult life. A useful warning is given to the effect that both physicians and teachers place too much weight upon their personal influence with their patients and pupils, thus robbing them of the sense of independence. One of the last chapters is upon instinct and ideals.

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DELIVERANCE. THE FREEING OF THE SPIRIT IN THE ANCIENT WORLD.
HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR, Litt.D. The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. 294.
\$1.25.

This latest book by the author of *The Mediæval Mind* is intended not so much for professional students of the history of religions, as for those who combine an elementary knowledge of the subject with a real interest in the ways in which men of different ages and of different lands have sought adjustment with the universe. Such readers will, indeed, find certain chapters—as, for example, that on Paul—so full of allusions to technical problems as to be well-nigh unintelligible; but these chapters may be passed by with little loss, for they are the least successful in the book, and the least fruitful as well for the specialist as for the general reader. Where, however, Dr. Taylor is less pretentious in his scholarship—as in the chapter on “The Heroic Adjustment in Greek Poetry”—he gives his readers an insight into the religion of the men of the ancient world that is as remarkable as that which *The Mediæval Mind* gave into the thought and thinkers of another period.

This book is not a systematic treatise on the religions of ancient times, and it must not be read as such. It is rather, as the author himself says, a collection of “night thoughts” about the religious life of the ancient world, with many of the delightful whimsies and insights that come to a man of wide reading and cultivated mind in the night watches. By the canons of such writing this book is, in many of its chapters, thoroughly successful; to test it by any other canons is hardly fair to the author.

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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS. B. A. G. FULLER. Cambridge University Press. 1912. Pp. xx, 333.

A perusal of this book is calculated to promote chastening reflections upon the nature of philosophy's advance. There is an evident shock in discovering that most of the classical attempts to provide a solution for the problem of evil are represented here, that even the metaphors and analogies by which we try to relieve the situation are identical with those of seventeen hundred years ago. They may wear an ancient dress, but the figures beneath are the same. If one be inclined to demand that the labor of the human mind upon these central issues should move more swiftly, let him compare the fruits of his best reflection with those of Neo-Platonism.

The scope of the work is sufficiently indicated by the title. The Introduction and the first chapter are preliminary to the main business of clarifying and criticising Plotinus' argument. A fourfold classification of evil is adopted: metaphysical evil, the existence of finitude as such; physical evil or suffering; moral evil, the sting of which is traced to the facts that man has to make choices and that all choice is destructive of so much possible good; and, finally, "the apparent injustice with which nature apports reward to merit." The historical growth of these problems as it determined Plotinus' approach is next briefly indicated. The chief purpose of this survey is to show that "Plotinus succeeds to two traditions or points of view—the naturalistic and mystic—which were left him, with years of accumulation and development between, by Plato. . . . On the one hand, he inherits the Hellenic belief and joy in natural goods . . . partially expressed in Plato and Aristotle, and over-reaching itself and complicated with an ascetic morality in the metaphysical system of the Stoics. On the other hand, all the fruits of a mysticism and dualism latent in Plato and Aristotle, strong in certain cults of the popular religion, and ripened in the later Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic movement—the hatred of matter, the scorn of the world, the contempt of the body, the despair of reason, the yearning after the infinite and ineffable where alone the soul can find peace and its true beloved—these were all his."¹ After a chapter outlining the main features of the Plotinian system, the author passes to a very detailed and discriminating consideration of Plotinus' efforts to deal with the problem of evil in the forms already mentioned; concluding with two chapters on Matter as the principle of evil, and the Theory of Emanation respectively. The former of these is a careful and especially illuminating analysis. One cannot help feeling that Mr. Fuller has here revealed a bar sinister in the pedigree of the Absolutely Homogeneous.

Throughout the work Mr. Fuller presents both the arguments of Plotinus and his own criticisms in fine detail, but he lightens the labor of attention by returning again and again to a central theme: that Plotinus alternates between these two incompatible points of view—the naturalistic and the mystic—seeking refuge now in one, now in the other, so that a consistent solution of his difficulties is denied him. One example of this may be given. Take the case of the failure of any finite particular, any man for example, to realize his own perfection. No man is the perfect man. How is the evil thus implied to be justified? From the naturalistic point of view

¹ P. 329.

the answer would seem to be simple. If each man perfectly embodied the Platonic idea of man, there would be, on the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, not many men at all, but one Man, the only member of a class of one. "Hence, if there are individual men, they must by reason of their individuality fall short of their ideal nature." That is, any man can be justified for being no better than he is by the plea that he is as good as can be expected of *him*; he is at any moment perfect as the nature-fact is perfect. There is thus an indefinite number of kinds of perfection. But, as mystic, Plotinus was forced to a different conclusion. Just as the One was the most perfect and in fact the only truly perfect being, so that in comparison with it even *νοῦς* and *ψυχή* fell short, in the same way any particular man exhibits a deficiency in so far as he falls short of the universal human type. To be a particular man is to be a failure, and men differ only in degrees of imperfection. But such a pessimistic result was intolerable. Plotinus is unwilling to abandon either line of thought, and his alleged solution consists in holding to both points of view simultaneously. He will insist on grading kinds of perfection so that one perfection can be more perfect than another, with the paradoxical result in this case, as Mr. Fuller acutely observes, "that the proper perfection of the individual man consists, when all is said and done, in failing to attain it."¹ This is only one instance of Plotinus' double attitude; but in great part the fascination of the book is owing to the skill with which Mr. Fuller detects its influence upon his treatment of the problem in its various aspects. His inevitable conclusion is that Plotinus "comes out by the same door wherein he went. His theodicy ends in the dilemma from which it started. Either God is not justified or Evil is not explained."²

To pass to some comments. With regard to Mr. Fuller's general formulation of the problem of evil some criticisms suggest themselves. It is, he says, "the problem of reconciling the hypothesis of a good and beneficent God with the existence of an evil and apparently imperfect world. Or, since omnipotence is commonly regarded as an attribute of divinity, it asks how God can be at once omnipotent and entirely good." Omnipotence he then proceeds to define as "the non-existence [for God] of those limitations in power which alone seem to hinder us from realizing our ideal of a happy and perfect life."³ He goes on to indicate four possible types of solution, and finds none of them convincing. Is it any wonder? For is it not clear that so to define omnipotence is to make the problem insoluble from the beginning? If an omnipotent being is one which

¹ P. 142.² P. 333.³ P. 19.

can "do anything it likes," then all its creations are unconditioned and arbitrary, and we can ask of any one of them why it should hold a place in being rather than any other conceivable creation. "Why this rather than that?" is a question which will then remain legitimately open to all eternity. All ultimate questions about reality will be unanswerable, for the reason that a being whose power is expressed as freedom from limitation is not omnipotent but very impotence itself. It is strange that Mr. Fuller should have rested his statement of the problem on such a scholastic concept of omnipotence instead of following the clue to its meaning given by the religious consciousness, which, as he says, "needs and assumes in its God *power enough* to carry the evolution of reality through to a happy consummation";¹ though we cannot agree with him that a dualistic theory will satisfy this requirement.

In the second place, the whole conception of a problem of metaphysical evil to which chapter ii is devoted is open to some question. "The expression 'metaphysical evil' I have employed to express that *a priori* dissatisfaction with the mere fact of the finite, quite apart from any *a posteriori* valuation of it, which is characteristic of so much mystic thought. The world from this point of view is evil for no other reason than that it is a world; the individual imperfect because he is himself and not another, one fact among many and not the only fact."² To begin with, one may doubt if there has ever existed such an *a priori* dissatisfaction with the finite. Can we seriously believe that any man has ever wanted to be the whole of reality or was dissatisfied because he was not? Where we find such an apparent ambition it is worth while inquiring if it be not open to some other interpretation. Certainly this is no true account of the mystic "*nostalgie de l'au-delà*." That there have been those whose love of God has seemed to them to compete with the love of the world one cannot deny, but these do not constitute even the majority of the mystics. If we turn to the experience of those who are commonly recognized as the great mystics—to their experience as distinct from their own interpretation of it—what we find is a state of unrest created by a consciousness of *alienation* from God, from that which makes life worth living. What they report as their achievement is the surmounting of the barriers which separate man from God, the overcoming of that "pathos of distance." The mystic has become one with God. Even if he sometimes describes his attainment as deification, he does so at the cost of denying his motive, which is confessedly not deification but restoration to

¹ P. 223.² P. 2.

union with God. It is not the mystic who condemns finitude as such. And where we find such a judgment, namely, in connection with a philosophy of the abstract universal, it is not *a priori* but an inference from that doctrine, which already has its own standard of logical perfection. Is the difficulty then of deducing the Many from the One fairly to be called a form of the general problem of evil?

The argument has made it clear to us that, metaphysically, Plotinus is a Mr. Facing-both-ways. But it remains a matter for wonder that Plotinus should have been blind to this inconsistency. The fact that he inherited two conflicting tendencies in thought is hardly enough to account for this failure in logic on the part of such an acute thinker. Some powerful influence must have been at work to strengthen the tenacity of that hold on two views at once: the world of finite objects as utterly incomplete and evil, and that world and everything in it as nevertheless perfect. The suggestion is here offered that we have in this confusion a report of mystical experience, and in his metaphysics the traces of familiar stages in the mystical life. It is noteworthy that Plotinus was not only a speculative mystic but, as we learn from his biographer, one who "practised the presence of God." Now we know that in the career of many mystics there is a world-negating period, when the mind is withdrawn from all particular objects in its concentrated thrust of attention upon its Absolute Object; and also a world-affirming period, when the mystic, returning to the world, sees in a new light all he had spurned. The very things whose worth he had denied have now become freighted with divine significance; he is able to perceive all about him echoes and traces of deity. His experience has been one of arrival, of touching the most real. It is as though from that vantage point of attainment he sees how his negations have been the steps by which he mounted to the vision; the world which he had left is now, upon his return, seen as the mediator between man and God. The history of the normal mystic career is the history of just such continual alternation, and by some Christian mystics, such as Behmen and the author of the *Theologia Germanica*, the principle of it has been recognized and formulated in the doctrine of "The Two Eyes of the Soul." We are perhaps justified in assuming that Plotinus was subject to this type of experience; and if so, may we not discern in this twofold judgment of worth a record less of his thinking than of his spiritual history, and may not the very obstinacy of that refusal to surrender either view reflect the alternate certainties of the flight from

the world of unconvincing worth and the return to a world reborn in the light of the mystic vision? This hypothesis receives support from another consideration. Plotinus, in attempting to find reasons why the One should ever have broken the circle of its own self-contained perfection and given rise to the world of manifold particulars, does not always fall back on the imagery of physical processes, such as the radiation of light or of perfume. Sometimes the analogy is psychological. Thus he writes: "How then should the most perfect and primal Good stay shut up within itself as though grudging of itself or impotent?"¹ Again, referring to the One and its relation to the world, he talks of "that which has after all given it being out of mere generosity."² The idea of a principle which through a superabundance of being must express itself, constantly recurs. May we suppose that Plotinus is attributing to the One that same psychological need for expression which marks the mystic consciousness? Few things are more significant in mysticism than that strange union of an urgent need to unfold and declare the content of the experience with the statement that the object of the vision is in its nature inexpressible. It is the mystic who has told us that he who knows the truth is silent; none have been more prolific in utterance than he. Plotinus does not escape the paradox. He will reiterate the ineffability of the One; yet so continuous is his effort to tell us about it that he sets the mind on a constant strain. If Plotinus had in mind that passion which urged him to utter the burden of the mystic revelation, may it not have been easy for him to assume that the One would be driven in similar fashion to utter itself in this variegated world?

In so far as a general criticism is implied in these reflections it is this: that Mr. Fuller has not done justice to the real mystic strain in Plotinus; he has not seen that mysticism is not necessarily identical with a bad philosophy, and thus he has not distinguished Plotinus the seeker after God from Plotinus the philosopher of the abstract universal. We are beginning to discover that mysticism has done less than justice to itself in choosing that doctrine to represent it in the world of theory, and we have yet to learn fully what practical mysticism may have to offer to philosophy in the way of suggestions both for statement and solution of its problems.

Yet these remarks are intended less as a criticism of the book before us than as comments upon its power of suggestion. Mr. Fuller has limited himself to a discussion of a particular problem as it appears in one historical form; but just because within these

¹ *Enn.* v, 4, i.

² *Ibid.*, iv, 8, 6.

limits he has been faithfully patient in exposition and searching in criticism, he has produced a work of universal significance. He has not only contributed to our understanding of the extraordinary richness and the wide range of Plotinus' thought, but he has shown in what directions and how deep run the roots of the problem of evil in the soil of absolutism. This, even if it be negative, is no small service. It may be that in some ways the burden of the problem has been lightened for us since Plotinus struggled with it, but nevertheless such difficulties as he accumulates in trying to account for moral evil (e.g. p. 200 ff.) are in principle the same as confront our current Absolute Idealisms, and whoever sharpens our perception of them performs a work of present value.

Mr. Fuller's style is the servant by nature of a finely tempered mind. It is exact, concise, and unusually lucid. There is the sparkle of frost and the glint of steel in this work of penetrating analysis and dexterous criticism.

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THE ENLARGING CONCEPTION OF GOD. HERBERT ALDEN YOUTZ. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. x, 199. \$1.25.

Professor Youtz's book is one more of the innumerable protests of our day against "dogma" and in favor of freedom, liberalism, the tone of the age. It tells us of the peril of a fixed and safe theology and the merit of a theology pliant to the needs and spirit of our period. It is accordingly not free from what must be called vague commonplace, more particularly in the opening portion. But the persisting reader has his reward. As we go further we catch inspiration, and when we reach the eminence of the last chapter and from there look back over the book, we feel a certain greatness. What we have by this time fairly well in our grasp is by no means commonplace.

The first chapter, whose name is also the title of the book, argues that our best conception of a living God must have its roots in contemporary thought and morality; it must reflect the ruling mental ideas of the times; or, in another phrase, "the ideals that control men's thinking today" should be decisive in shaping the God-ideal. In the following chapter the contrast is presented between traditional and modern theological method. The true method is to learn the spiritual gospel from Jesus Christ and from all experience and history as the context of Jesus and his gospel, and then

to find that vehicle of expression which shall make men feel today the sense Jesus had of a message straight from the living God. By way of justification it is pointed out that the laws of language, thought, and personality encourage us to shake off cramping formulas and work with those ideas that tell in present life. The author then sketches the altered view of creeds, of the Bible, and of Christ, to which such a method would lead us. Having in his fifth chapter put aside the ideal of a "safe theology," declaring "the principle of guaranteed security a menace to the higher life of the spirit," he comes to the sixth and last, where we are told to see in the frankly human Jesus the actual saving life of God. This review cannot pretend to do justice to the thought which here culminates and which unifies the book. Nor indeed does Professor Youtz himself do this justice. He does not profess to do it, and we are left with a feeling that the expression of his thought in some aspects is more commonplace than the thought itself.

The insistence that the church must meet the age on the age's highest plane of aspiration and ideas—this is of course beyond all question and all praise. But like the numberless other reactions against old theology, the book fails to see the function and place of dogma, the nature of continuity, the distinction between substitution and growth. Our author joins the great band of pamphleteers and preachers who flatter the vices of the age. For example: "The conservative attempt to hold over in religion conceptions that our time has left behind, is paralyzing to religious vitality." This is enthroning fashion. A time will come when our own fashionable conceptions will be no longer in vogue. What rules should be not time but truth. What we need is not to yield to the moods of the race any more than to those of the individual, but to mount securely above mood and contagion to the enduring tests of worth. Our author does not exclude this, but he does not include it. He fails to note that Christian dogma has borne the gradual wide test, not of scientific demonstration, but of the religious experience of Christendom. Dogma is one thing; philosophy and science are another. Essential dogma is subject in every age to a fresh analysis and illumination at the hands of philosophy and science. Meanwhile it unfolds in every age fresh meaning, application, and direction for the spirit. Its function is to hold together the existing church, and also to hold together, in a certain true unity of spirit, the church past, present, and to be. Any one generation is the heir and recipient of a body of Christian conceptions which is not intended solely for that generation, but of which it is rather the custodian

and trustee. No one individual and no one age is in a position to draw out the full meaning of the creed. It stands for a wider and more comprehensive experience and contact with reality. The present generation is not wholly to give the law, but partly to receive the law. Modernism is provincialism in the realm of time. It is quite too happily and innocently confident in its own new and enlightened ideas. The conceit of *modernité* vitiates a great portion of American religious literature, and it needs the old corrective of modesty, and of sympathy, intellectual and spiritual, with minds other than its own. "When a new book is published," said Lamb (in effect), "I read an old one." This is an extreme; but when a new book is reviewed, it becomes the duty of the reviewer to recall the old. One would venture to commend to the author's attention the discussion of ideas and their development in Newman's "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine." Its guiding principle cannot be wholly alien to one who has dealt with the idea of Incarnation so powerfully (if inadequately) as Professor Youtz in this book. Newman was, of course, laying wider foundations than he knew, and therein was more faithful to his own principle than he knew. The doctrine of development may be developed.

One may agree, then, to the full with all that is here said and felt in regard to the present and its needs, in regard to newness and vitality. Newness has its place in growth; the church should be utterly free in thought and exploration, and should feel that all causes that promise good fruit are its own. But that is not because it is at the mercy of winds of doctrine and tides of enthusiasm, but because it has a commandment and a conception which are an eternal foundation and upon which all enduring structures for human good may be built. Its essential faith, the reflection of its spiritual experience, is not in the slightest danger of becoming an "outworn conception," so long as it sends men to act and live; and its quest for truth is not in the slightest danger of becoming destructive of its essential faith, so long as in that quest it is not forgotten (as our author himself amply testifies) that the warrant of faith is in religious life and experience.

DICKINSON S. MILLER.

GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK.

PROBLEMS OF CONDUCT. AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY OF ETHICS. DURANT DRAKE. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 455. \$1.75.

Problems of conduct are not only those which the private life offers and which every individual has to solve for himself, but also those with which the community as a whole is concerned and which must be solved by public action. For both groups alike the standard must be the amount of happiness secured. Morality is the organization of interests, and as students of ethics we have to disentangle the passing and the lasting desires of ourselves and of our neighbors and of those who come after us, and have to determine in every case the safest way to reach the goal of greatest happiness. Professor Drake undertakes this analysis in a broad-minded spirit. His discussion is cautious and controlled by an evident desire to be fair. At certain points both in questions of personal hygiene and of public policies individual prejudices slightly interfere with this endeavor and make him shade the arguments of his opponent too darkly. Sometimes, especially in the question of economic policies, perhaps the discussion takes too much the character of editorials written for the day. But on the whole we remain on the height of truly psychological study, and we certainly never lose the feeling of being in contact with a well-informed, conscientious, and sympathetic guide. He leads us from the problems of physical health and efficiency, of athletics and cigarettes and alcohol, through questions of chastity in marriage, of loyalty and luxury, of truthfulness and aesthetic culture and self-control, to those of patriotism and political purity, of social alleviation and industrial reconstruction, and finally of liberty and legal control, of equality and privilege, of single tax and woman-movement; and everywhere order is brought into the chaos of conflicting arguments by a steadfast holding to the principle of greatest happiness.

The author, however, devotes only the second half of his book to that which the title indicates, the actual problems of conduct. The first half prepares this detailed criticism of present-day tendencies by a general study of the principles. The selection of the standard of greatest possible happiness must first be justified. The first half, accordingly, as the sub-title of the book suggests, is an introductory survey of ethics. Its trend is evident from its outcome. It is the ethics of utilitarianism which finds here a consistent and enthusiastic expression. The argument does not claim originality, but it might claim the merits of clearness and completeness in a short form, of felicitous expression and breadth of view. Is it convincing? I am afraid only to those who are convinced. There is many a fine word

against Carlyle and Kant, against Newman and the ascetics, against the intuitionists and the idealists, against religious and against meta-physical ethics; but we wait in vain here, as so often in utilitarian systems, for a fundamental argument why we should follow the voice of our conscience. On principle, we receive the story of man's actual behavior with reference to the resulting happiness and pain; but why a man in a concrete life-conflict ought to sacrifice himself in the interest of his moral duty can never be brought nearer to us through a mere psychogenetic analysis. Professor Drake stops, as so many others have done, with the psychological fact that pleasure is always desired, and this silently transforms itself into the demand that the creation of individual pleasures be the goal of every possible action. There is a jump from the "is" to the "ought," which, after all, takes the real strength out of his whole argument. It is Hamlet with Hamlet left out. Yet as a presentation of eudemonism and as a psychological study of the motives for man's actions, Drake's survey has unusual attractions and is warmly to be recommended to every student.

As is most suitable for such ethics, which is guided not by the appreciation of values but by the recognition of facts, Drake first looks back to the anthropological origin of social morality. He shows how savage life is essentially brute life, in which the individual is nothing and the tribe everything, and he can then point to the various means by which morality was evolved. Then the emphasis naturally lies on the idea of customs. Morals are simply customs that matter or are supposed to matter, standards to which each member of a group is expected by the other members to conform and for the neglect of which he is punished. Toward these standards the individual therefore feels a vague pressure, the reflection in him of the feelings of his fellows. Historically there has been a gradual though not continuous advance toward those codes of conduct which make for the preservation of life and for happiness. The moral guidance in this historical development passes through five stages—guidance by instinct, by custom, by law, by conscience, and by insight. The definite conception of "conscience" is very late, scarcely appearing until very modern times, and the fact that conscience itself is much later in growth than the natural animal instincts which it developed to control and guide, is shown by its late development in the child, normally not until the beginning of the third year. We reserve the name "conscience" for the vaguer and more elusive restraints and leadings, the accumulated residuum of inner experiences and outer influences. "The very lack of com-

prehension serves in less rational minds to enhance their prestige with an atmosphere of awe and mystery." The whole development can be summarized so. Instinct and desire alone are not sufficiently adjusted to the needs for happiness. Society tries to control them by law and custom; but these are external and would easily awake a rebellious spirit, producing perpetual conflict between the internal impulse and external restraint. To overcome this the development led to that secondary and overlying set of inhibitions and promptings which we call the moral sense or the sense of duty, by which that external restraint is reflected within the individual mind. As men grow more and more adjusted by instinct, training, and reasoning to their real needs, they have less and less use for conscience. "After all, there is something wrong with a life that needs conscience; it is a transition-help for the long period of man's maladjustment."

From the evolution of morality Drake turns to the theory of morality. Its core is that "to be virtuous is to be a virtuoso in life." The greatest total happiness is the only desirable aim. To purchase one's own happiness at the expense of others, and to purchase present satisfaction by an act which will bring less good in the end—these are the cardinal sins. Mere conscientiousness cannot help us and has no value. "Conscientious cranks and blunderers are perhaps even more of a nuisance than out-and-out villains. There is hardly a folly or a crime that has not been committed prayerfully and with a clear conscience. The saint and the criminal are sometimes psychologically indistinguishable." "Asceticism, like self-indulgence, is selfish. It asks, what shall I do to be saved, rather than, what shall I do to serve."

To be sure, Drake sees too that the question why the individual ought to be altruistic must be answered somehow. But we hear only that the life of service is in normal cases a happier life in itself than the life that is preoccupied with one's own pleasures, and that the altruistic life earns the gratitude of others. "In the long run it pays to be good to others." The theoretical failure of every eudemonistic theory is at no point more obvious. It is only consistent that Drake treats the cases of moral self-sacrifice simply as "abnormal cases." Where the moral obligation is taken as obedience to the will of God we must consider that we cannot know what the will of God is except by analyzing what makes for human welfare. Moreover, if God were to command us to sin, it would surely not be right to obey Him. Morality is older than religion. The organization of our interests with the aim to secure the greatest possible happiness for the greatest number must remain our ultimate

test. Even those who feel dissatisfied with such a psychologizing ethics of enjoyment will appreciate on every page the tart formulation of the argument. In its merits as well as in its limitations it strongly reminds the reader of Perry's *Moral Economy*. Every chapter is supplemented by a well-chosen list of detailed references to the ethical literature in the English language.

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION AND MEDICAL PROGRESS. Professor W. WILLIAMS KEEN, M.D., LL.D. With an introduction by President C. W. ELIOT, LL.D. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. **REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON VIVISECTION.** Presented to both Houses of Parliament, 1912.

Under the above title Dr. Keen has republished a collection of essays written by him over a series of years from 1885 to 1914, dealing with certain aspects of what is generally, but not very accurately, described as "the vivisection question." The author apologizes for the rather wearisome repetition involved in such republication of collected papers, each of which was deemed to be "complete in itself," but he justifies such reiteration as antidotal to "the constantly repeated misstatements by the opponents of experimental research in spite of public exposure of these misstatements."

The volume has a commendatory foreword by President Eliot, which speaks of "the very interesting manner" in which Dr. Keen describes "the new surgery of the last forty years and its extraordinarily beneficent results." "The new surgery has been made possible," we are told, "by the combination of anæsthesia and asepticism," and "these immense benefits" are "due to animal experimentation." On the ethical side of the question President Eliot assures us that the "sacrifices of animal life or happiness" are "always made as painless as possible," and he asks, "How many rabbits or guinea-pigs is it justifiable to incommode or kill in order to save the life of a child attacked by diphtheria? How many monkeys would a competent experimenter be justified in sacrificing, in order to find a sure treatment for infantile paralysis?" The reasonable answer to all such questions is to be found, according to President Eliot, in Dr. Keen's pages.

About one-third of the book is devoted to criticism and exposition of the methods of certain anti-vivisectionist writers. Dr. Keen

undoubtedly convicts many of his opponents of inaccuracy and blameworthy carelessness, if not of wilful misrepresentation. He quotes with approval from the very valuable Report of the British Royal Commission on Vivisection, published in 1912, a statement as to misleading descriptions and illustrations issued by certain opponents of the practice, whose zeal had clearly outrun their discretion. As this British Report is the most recent official, and, we would add, judicial and impartial, pronouncement on this *quæstio vexata*, it might be wished that Dr. Keen had made greater use of its findings, which were the fruit of some six years' labor and the examination of eminent witnesses representative of "every class of opinion interested" in the question.

Nearly all the claims made on behalf of vivisection dealt with by Dr. Keen are here passed under review—antiseptics, anæsthetics, new drugs, the new surgery, especially in its application to the brain, the abdomen, the nerves and blood-vessels; the treatment and prevention of infectious diseases of man and animals—hydrophobia, tuberculosis, tetanus, myxedema—all these were duly considered by the British Commissioners. The conclusions at which they arrive ("apart altogether from the moral and ethical questions involved") are:

"(1) That certain results claimed from time to time to have been proved by experiments upon living animals and alleged to have been beneficial in preventing or curing disease, have, on further investigation and experience, been found to be fallacious or useless.

(2) That notwithstanding such failures, valuable knowledge has been acquired in regard to physiological processes and the causation of disease, and that useful methods for the prevention, cure, and treatment of certain diseases have resulted from experimental investigations upon living animals.

(3) That, as far as we can judge, it is highly improbable that, without experiments made on animals, mankind would at the present time have been in possession of such knowledge.

(4) That, in so far as disease has been successfully prevented or its mortality reduced, suffering has been diminished in man and in lower animals.

(5) That there is ground for believing that similar methods of investigation if pursued in the future will be attended with similar results."¹

¹ Final Report of the Royal Commission (Cd. 6114), p. 47.

The Commissioners have no doubt that "the great preponderance of medical and scientific authority is against the opponents of vivisection," and that it is more markedly so now than was the case thirty or forty years ago. Biology, or the science of living things, and its application to medicine and surgery, are in fact advanced like other sciences by observation and experiment, i.e. by finding facts or procuring them. Unlike other sciences, however, experiment is here, in the absence of anæsthetics, often confronted with the element of pain, and "its infliction at once introduces moral or ethical considerations which have no counterpart in the scientific pursuits of the chemist or the physicist."² Comparing Dr. Keen's contentions with the findings of the Commission on the scientific part of the question, we observe that on the whole the latter are more guarded and critical than the former, the shadows are painted as well as the high lights. Thus in regard to anæsthetics the Commission state, "The discovery of anæsthetics owes nothing to experiments on animals."³ In regard to antiseptic and aseptic surgery, due homage is paid to Pasteur and Lister; but the fact that Semmelweis anticipated both in the matter of surgical cleanliness is also referred to,⁴ and he, according to his able biographer, ignored experiments on animals.⁵ Again, while Dr. Keen and the British Commission alike give due credit to Koch for his work on tuberculosis, the latter do not hesitate to speak of the treatment of consumption on his lines as "a vast failure,"⁶ and ascribe to general "improvement in sanitary conditions" the steady decrease which has taken place in that disease. So also the untoward results which accompanied the use of Haffkine's anti-cholera vaccine in India, and the criticism of Sir Almroth Wright's anti-typhoid vaccine statistics by Professor Karl Pearson, are referred to in the British Report. In all these cases, as in the case of other claims made on behalf of vivisection, the Commissioners set out the contentions of those who give the whole or chief credit to experiments on animals, along with any counter statements or alleged failures or untoward results urged on the other side; but they do not appear, except so far as the general conclusions above quoted go, to commit themselves to the enthusiastic endorsement of the particular claims on behalf of vivisection which we find so repeatedly made in the pages of Dr. Keen.

The system of restriction by law of the practice of vivisection, which has been operative in Great Britain since 1875, and which was at first strongly resented by physiologists and pathologists,

² Final Report of the Royal Commission (Cd. 6114), p. 21. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴ Sir Wm. Sinclair, *Life of Semmelweis*, 1909. ⁵ Report of R. C., p. 31.

is not apparently now regarded in that country otherwise than favorably by leading scientists and medical men.⁶ True, Sir William Osler spoke of such restriction as "a standing insult to the humanity" of those in charge of physiological laboratories, in whose hands he thought the matter might be safely left; while Dr. Pembrey held that "the limitations of the Act are against research." The Commissioners, however, denounced some of the latter's views in regard to painful experiments as "absolutely reprehensible," and held that "to grant a license or certificates to any person holding such views as those formerly expressed (1875) by Dr. Klein and as those entertained by Dr. Pembrey, is calculated to create serious misgiving in the minds of the public."⁷

Dr. Keen asks, "Is it not wrong so to hinder research, when in the vast majority of instances animals suffer little or nothing?"⁸ We apprehend that no one is opposed to research or experiment as such, but that it is the infliction of pain which complicates and dominates the whole question. The former British Commission of 1875 alleged that "it is not to be doubted that inhumanity may be found in persons of very high position as physiologists"; and we gather from Dr. Keen that while he asserts that in the case of syphilis, "of course, no experiments on human beings are allowable,"⁹ we also learn that, nevertheless, such appear in fact to have been made by a certain Dr. Neisser.¹⁰ Here we at once pass from medicine to morals, and must address ourselves to the ethical side of this very difficult problem.

The British Commission assert that "the quest for knowledge may, of course, conflict with moral principle," and cite the case of judicial torture, which was discarded "not because it did not lead to useful knowledge, but because, however useful the result, the means could no longer be justified." Human vivisection, practised in ancient Egypt, comes under the same condemnation. The average moral sense of contemporary Christianity is however not offended by "the sacrifice of lower animals for the food, clothing, adornment, and, within limits, the sport of man." Painless sacrifice of animals for purposes of experimental research clearly cannot be condemned or forbidden by law so long as the aforesaid practices are approved or permitted. The Commissioners clearly differentiate between painless sacrifice of animals for research and the pursuit of research despite the supervention of pain and perhaps of prolonged and severe suffering; a distinction which seems

⁶ Report of R. C., pp. 63, 67.

⁷ Ibid., p. 20.

⁸ Dr. Keen, p. 108.

⁹ Ibid., p. xi.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 127.

insufficiently appreciated both by Dr. Keen and by the distinguished author of his preface. The Commission "strongly hold that limits should be placed to animal suffering in the search for physiological or pathological knowledge," but that "experiments upon animals, adequately safeguarded by law, faithfully administered, are morally justifiable and should not be prohibited by legislation." At this point the unanimity of the British Commission appears to have broken down, and three of their number in a dissentient memorandum carry these findings farther than is the case with the remaining five.

On the question of pain, whether due to the after-effects of some inoculatory procedure or to keeping the animal alive after recovery from a surgical operation under anæsthesia, there is considerable support among the eminent witnesses who appeared before the British Commission in favor of Dr. Keen's contention that the great bulk of so-called vivisection experiments are, or ought to be, painless, or at most productive of but little suffering or discomfort. There is much force in the view maintained by the three dissentient Commissioners:

"The evidence appears to us to be conclusive that such experimental investigation upon living animals as is now generally deemed essential or necessary can be performed either painlessly under anæsthetics or under an imperative requirement that, should obvious suffering result, the animal shall be forthwith painlessly killed."¹¹

The question thus becomes narrowed down to this: Are there instances in which the pursuit of physiological or medical science demands the continuation of experiment or the preservation of the life of the animal, *although a state of obvious suffering or enduring pain has supervened*? Everybody would be relieved if this question could be answered in the negative. If that is not possible, there will probably be in most communities, as there was in the British Commission, a cleavage of opinion. This appears to be, on the ethical side of the question, the real point at issue, and one which is apt to be overlooked or minimized when reading with due appreciation the beneficent story of the progress of modern surgery which Dr. Keen is so well able to tell, and which, in his collected essays, he has related with the enthusiasm which that progress can never fail to inspire.

¹¹ Report of R. C., p. 70.

WHAT CAN I KNOW? AN INQUIRY INTO TRUTH. GEORGE T. LADD.
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Pp. viii, 311. \$1.50.

Dr. Ladd in this first volume of a series of four books, in which he is to discuss some of the fundamental problems of life, shows that man is compelled by his very nature to ask questions. These are at first the practical questions of life relative to the preservation of his existence. Soon, however, the great abstract and deeply hidden questions are asked, and the mind's full powers are required for their answer. In answering its questions the mind finds satisfaction, and this very satisfaction stimulates it to ask still further questions. Now the greater questions of life are those concerning our knowledge, our duty, our belief, and our hope. In this volume the epistemological question, What can I know? is raised. Since this is for every man the fundamental and controlling question, its discussion comes first. The author traces the historic attitude toward the question, the meaning and specific kinds of knowledge, the psychological processes of knowing and the types or classes of mind, especially the part the emotions and the will play, and concludes that knowledge is a matter of the entire man. Knowledge is taken to mean, in Kantian phrase, "objective sufficiency." There are many searching criticisms here and there in the course of the discussion, of Empiricism, Pragmatism, and Bergsonianism. One regrets the author's long discussion of secondary matters and his failure to meet the primary problems; and in no place is this more evident than in the last chapter, in which he discusses the question, "Can we know God?" The reason for this failure is doubtless the attempt to write a book of a more or less popular character. The mind is more on the reader than on the subject. The book will serve, however, in spite of these defects, to orientate many persons in this region of thought.

DANIEL EVANS.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE BEACON LIGHTS OF PROPHECY. An Interpretation of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Deutero-Isaiah. ALBERT C. KNUDSON.
Eaton & Mains. Pp. xii, 281. \$1.25.

The author assumes that the ordinary results of criticism may be taken as established, and so addresses himself almost at once to his task. His object is to present the most vital message of each of the six greatest literary prophets, to review their contribution to the growing religious thought of Israel. After an introductory chapter upon the history and nature of prophecy, he devotes one chapter to

each of the two earliest-writing prophets, and to Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Deutero-Isaiah. The audience which the author hopes to reach is not the one composed of Old Testament critics, but of preachers and laymen who have many interests other than the study of the Hebrew Scriptures. The book is scientific without being technical. It deals with the religion of the prophetic books rather than their criticism, without being homiletical.

F. B. BLODGETT.

THE GENERAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK.

SPIRITUAL REFORMERS IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES
RUFUS M. JONES. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. lii, 362. \$3.00.

This volume by Professor Jones of Haverford College is the fruit of his research into the life and influence of Jacob Boehme, and of his discovery that Boehme, instead of standing as a solitary figure, was in reality one of a widespread group of men who formed an important though largely forgotten undercurrent of the Reformation. Professor Jones has given us fresh information about eight or ten of Boehme's forerunners; has discussed Boehme himself, and his influence in England; and has concluded his book with studies of a dozen Englishmen of the seventeenth century whom he considers as "interpreters of spiritual religion." Most of the men of whom he writes are but little known to the average reader; some of them he has drawn up from an oblivion which has long hidden them. The German forerunners of Boehme—for example, Hans Denck, Bunderlin, Entfelder, Weigel—have been hitherto not only practically unknown to the English-speaking world but have been scarcely noted even in Germany. Professor Jones is primarily interested in these men as forerunners of Quakerism—"Quakers before Quakerism"—and he has had no difficulty in showing that the Society of Friends is founded upon religious ideals which had long been current in Germany and England, and which waited but the moment of crystallization. But these men were, quite as truly, the forerunners of religious liberalism in general, and some of them are startlingly modern in their point of view. Only a few of them are properly to be classed as Mystics, and Professor Jones has chosen a happy title in calling them Spiritual Reformers.

The book opens with an admirable introduction on "What is Spiritual Religion?"—an introduction which many readers will find the most suggestive and helpful chapter in the book. The author has fully recognized the contribution to our knowledge of religion

made by studies into racial origins and by psychology, but he points out that the content of religion is something much greater than the phenomena which science thus limits and describes. He clearly distinguishes between those types of mysticism which have grown artificial and flabby, and the deep religious faith and feeling, guided by breadth of vision and clear-sighted intelligence, which he terms "spiritual religion." For these "spiritual reformers," though well acquainted with mysticism, were at the same time Humanists. Most of them were university graduates. They were confident of the power of the human intellect, but they were profoundly distrustful of the ability of the dialectic of scholasticism to discern truth. They were in fact the religious radicals of their time, and when the earlier of them broke with the Reformation leaders it was because the leaders failed to carry the Reformation on to its logical conclusion. Their emphasis was laid upon the ethical aspect of religion, upon Christianity as a way of life rather than a system of dogma. Sacrament and ceremony they did not condemn, but rather came to think of it as unimportant. The church was for them not a mysterious and supernatural body, but "a Fellowship, a Society, a Family." Some of them, Hans Denck, for instance, held a doctrine of "the inward word" practically identical with the Quaker belief in "The Inner Light," and all of them believed in the continued revelations of the Divine to the waiting soul. Many of them were persecuted for their opinions; some suffered a martyr's death. Yet all they asked of the Reformation was no more than its legitimate fruit. "I am," writes Castellio in his appeal for toleration, "I am a poor little man, more than simple, humble and peaceable, with no desire for glory, only affirming what in my heart I believe; why cannot I live and say my honest word, and have your love?"

When Professor Jones turns from the noble but pathetic story of these well-nigh forgotten men to discuss the influence of Boehme in England, we come among more familiar figures. He finds such strong traces of Boehme's influence in the writings of George Fox that it is difficult to believe that the founder of Quakerism was not directly indebted to the German mystic. Dr. John Everard of Clare College, Cambridge, was another Englishman whom he shows to have been profoundly influenced by Boehme's forerunners, Sebastian Franck and Sebastian Castellio. Through Everard's preaching the spiritual ideals of these earlier men were introduced into England. Professor Jones goes on to consider other Englishmen who come properly enough under the title of "spiritual reformers" but whose connection with Boehme and his German predecessors

is far less close. Perhaps the most notable of these was Benjamin Whichcote, one of the first of the Cambridge Platonists or "Latitude Men." The volume concludes with a discussion of Thomas Traherne and "the spiritual poets of the 17th century"—admirable subjects for a sympathetic study, but not very close kin to the earlier men whom the author has considered. Indeed the chief criticism to be made of this very stimulating and enlightening volume is that the last third is too loose-jointed—that Professor Jones has been tempted to include some men who are hardly entitled to be called "spiritual reformers," interesting as they are as types of religious experience. But readers of this fascinating volume will be more inclined to count this a virtue than a fault. And they will be grateful to Professor Jones both for bringing to light these little-known forerunners of a larger faith, and, not less, for giving them his own wise and uplifting interpretation of the significance of "spiritual religion."

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

ENGLISH CHURCH LIFE FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE TRACTARIAN MOVEMENT. J. WICKHAM LEGG. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Pp. xx, 428. \$3.75.

This is not a history; it is rather an encyclopædia of ecclesiastical customs. The author says (p. vii) that the period under consideration has been uniformly denounced as a time of general decay in religion, when the clergy were desirous only of fees and preferment, when the laity neglected religious observances, and the spirit of piety was dead. The aim of the book is to controvert this opinion by calling the writers of the period to bear witness to the practice of piety and morality among the people. The author opens his argument by referring to the large number of books on religious topics published during this time; remarking that "booksellers do not risk their money on such publications unless there be a fair chance of a return." He then goes on to show that while it was a common custom to celebrate the Eucharist monthly, weekly celebrations were frequent, and daily not unknown. He gives quotations describing the furniture of the churches, the ceremonies and vestments of worship, the use of discipline and public penance, confession, prayers for the dead, the invocation of saints and angels, an account of the attempts during the period for union with the Roman and Greek Churches and with the Protestants of the Continent.

The writer speaks throughout as a High Churchman. To him Dissent is "schism" (p. 30); proper worship must have "a decent pomp" (p. 41); and he prefaces his quotations which show children kneeling daily before their parents and asking their blessing, by saying, "The Fifth Commandment has for forty years or more been of little or no account in England" (p. 168). The book is a collection of quotations, which are from pamphleteers and playwrights as well as from more influential writers, and which are scrupulously substantiated by citation of title, volume, and page. This makes the work valuable, as was said, as an encyclopædia of ecclesiastical usages. It has the advantage of embracing a wider field than Wordsworth's *Notes on Mediaeval Services in England*; and while it covers much the same ground as the Cambridge Camden Society's *Hierurgia Anglicana*, it draws from a wider range of authors and from some not accessible at the time the latter volume was issued.

What is proved by such citations is not necessarily the common use of the practices referred to, for a custom may exist here or there without being general. Mr. Legg's quotations are of both kinds; they need to be sifted to ascertain how largely they represent general conditions and how largely private usage. The High Churchman can find evidence here for the continuance in the Church of England from the time of the Reformation of almost every ceremony to which he is specially attached.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A GRAMMAR OF THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH. A. T. ROBERTSON. Hodder & Stoughton. 1914. Pp. xl, 1360. \$5.00.

It is not difficult for the reader who has made his way through this formidable volume to appreciate something of the author's own sense of rejoicing at the completion of what is practically a life work. Here are assembled within some twelve hundred pages, and classified, the whole linguistic phenomena of the New Testament. This is not only the most modern of such grammars; it is much the completest. No subject is neglected, and many which have often been forgotten or crowded out for want of space are here treated fully. Thirty pages simply on word formation, five on anacolutha, indicate the extensive scale of the grammar quite as well as the voluminous indices. A select bibliography of "the main works mentioned in the book" has been reduced to about six hundred titles!

The author evidently has aimed rather to record facts and the current grammatical interpretation and illustration of them, than to make original investigations. He uses freely earlier New Testament grammars—especially the Moultons, Winer-Schmiedel, and Blass—comparative grammarians, and the recent grammatical study of the LXX, inscriptions, and papyri. His chapter on orthography, for example, is largely a repetition of Hort, with the new information derived from the papyri and LXX. It is a great tribute to that scholar's judgment that these new discoveries serve only to confirm his conclusions, with very few exceptions (e.g. -*ōiv*, p. 343), while the accuracy of Hort elicits Professor Robertson's special admiration, as he has tested his work "through the maze of details in the MS. evidence concerning the forms." In matters of syntax the author's own arrangement and observation are more in evidence; but even here his purpose is still chiefly to state the constructions used, to classify them, to trace their development in the history of Greek grammar, and to indicate their distribution and frequency in the New Testament and some other Hellenistic writings. In such work brilliant style is impossible; the stylistic merits of Robertson are rather clearness, brevity, and an occasional piquancy of phrase. His whole attitude towards linguistic study is delightfully sane, devoid fortunately of that *a priori* logic of language and that slavery to rules by which grammarians have tried to petrify living speech. This leads him to some very unorthodox views—as the classification of adverbs under declensions, and the renunciation of the so-called conditional relative (pp. 956, 961 f.). Such freedom of thought is most commendable, and especially the self-control with which he submits to triteness and common sense in dealing with the commonplace.

There are certain purposes which such a grammar does not and could not fulfil. It is not for beginners, neither can it easily be read by advanced students. Nor, in spite of its full index, is it always satisfactory for reference, to judge from a few random tests. And even when it actually discusses a given passage, it does not illumine the problems of the translator or the exegete. It merely replies to him, "Yes, there is the phenomenon; there are others like it, and others unlike." That amid the myriad details a few errors of number and spelling should have survived all proof-reading is not surprising, but they are very few and inoffensive; as "Smith" for "Smyth" (p. 290), Appollonius (p. 180), 'Ovιολωπος (p. 235). The neat and careful printing, the generous page margins, only match the author's painstaking and faithful preparation of the matter.

It is a pity that time was not taken to indicate cross references by pages rather than by chapter and section.

The most readable part of the volume is the Introduction, which is of a size, scope, and thoroughness to make by itself a useful general handbook on the language of the New Testament. The author reviews the study of grammar in general and of New Testament Grammar in particular, and shows how the growth of comparative and historical grammar has revolutionized the science. He also indicates the new material which recent discoveries and investigation have contributed to a knowledge of contemporary Greek. Then quoting fully all varieties of opinion until the present, he undertakes to indicate the place of the Greek of the whole New Testament and of its several authors in the varied developments of the Greek language. Of course it belongs to the *κοινή*, or common world language of the Roman Empire. This at last is agreed upon, and one can bury the ancient quarrels of purist and Hebraist and even the modern exaggerations of Dalman and Deissmann. But concerning the *κοινή* itself much vagueness and contradiction have existed, which Robertson largely clears up. He recognizes that a more fluid relation exists between all stages and grades of Greek language than the words "Attic," "*κοινή*," and "Atticistic" suggest. Greek has always been a living language, and even from the days of Pericles until today it has had both a literary and a vernacular form. Each has had a continuous history and each constantly has affected the other. In the *κοινή* the literary form is illustrated by Polybius, Diodorus, and others who "aimed to write without pedantry and without vulgarism"; the vernacular is now known to us in various grades through the papyri. "The New Testament is written in the popular *κοινή*, with some literary elements, especially in Luke, Paul, Hebrews, and James." The Semitic influences on the New Testament are treated with equal fairness and judicial caution. Unfortunately the very abundance of the quotations, often needlessly repeated, and a certain confusion of arrangement mar the clearness of this whole presentation, while the doubtfulness of traditional theories of authorship for certain books is not sufficiently allowed for.

HENRY J. CADBURY.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE, HAVERFORD, PA.

THE BOOK OF GENESIS. Rt. Rev. HERBERT E. RYLE, D.D. (The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) Cambridge University Press. 1914. Pp. 477, 68. 4s. 6d.

ISAIAH XL—LXVI. Rev. W. A. L. ELMSLIE, M.A., and Rev. JOHN SKINNER, D.D. (The Smaller Cambridge Bible for Schools.) Cambridge University Press. 1914. Pp. 137, 33. 1s. 6d.

One of the last volumes, and one of the best, in the series of the Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges is the Commentary on Genesis by Bishop Ryle. It is the product of a master, whose work has been spent in a congenial field. The author is not only a scholar but a teacher. While the results of modern scholarship are everywhere manifest, the main emphasis is placed on the religious teaching. "The supreme value of the Book of Genesis has always consisted in its religious message." To interpret this message in the light of modern criticism is the object of the Commentary. Bishop Ryle shows that folk-lore and tradition may be the medium of truth, and that a composite narrative may contain a Divine revelation. The notes are keen, suggestive, and stimulating. Again and again in the interpretation of some action or speech there is an analysis of ethical motive and religious principle which is illuminating and helpful. Especially valuable are the more extended notes on special subjects, such as the Fall, the Flood, the Sacrifice of Isaac, etc.

The Commentary on Second Isaiah is a much smaller book and intended for younger readers, yet it maintains the same high standard of scholarship and spiritual insight. A concise but comprehensive Introduction presents the main facts and principles of the Isaian problem.

EDWARD E. ATKINSON.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

ANCIENT BABYLONIA. C. H. W. JOHNS, Litt.D. Cambridge University Press. 1913. Pp. 148. 40 cents.

The author of this recent addition to the Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature stands high among the Babylonian-Assyrian scholars of the world, and Old Testament students have long wished for a more exhaustive treatment from his pen of the subject of the bearing of the monuments on Biblical history and religion. One has a feeling that the present volume will not prove as useful as Dr. Johns hoped it would. It is crammed with information, but it is presented in so condensed a form as to be scarcely understand-

able by such readers as the book is supposed to appeal to. A work so condensed is apt to discourage the reader and thus to frustrate the very purpose for which it is written. We shall hope that Dr. Johns may find time in the near future to give us a fuller discussion of the valuable material he is so well qualified to treat.

MAX KELLNER.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

TABULAR VIEWS OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY. G. P. PUTNAM, continued by
GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1914. Pp. x, 415.
\$2.50.

Because dates are dull, a reference-book of dates is necessary. This elaborate set of tables from the beginning of history to the autumn of 1914 presents, in a convenient and highly instructive form, a simple chronicle of what has happened in the human race. The series of synchronous tables is supplemented by small maps and by genealogies, and is admirably adapted to its purpose.

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UNIVERSITY PREACHING

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The classic chapter in Newman's *Idea of a University* on "University Preaching" remains at many points as timely and convincing as when it was written, in 1855. Its discrimination of real from spurious earnestness—"I do not mean that a preacher should aim at earnestness, but that he must aim at his object . . . which will at once make him earnest"; its warning against the recondite, remote, and abstract—"The most obvious truths are often the most profitable"; its advice that sermons should be prepared in writing, but spoken without notes—"While then a preacher will find it becoming and admirable to put into writing any important discourse beforehand, he will find it equally a point of propriety and expedience not to read it in the pulpit"—all these counsels and principles, though Newman throughout his preaching at St. Mary's violated the last of them, are as applicable as ever. Yet, on the other hand, the force of Newman's teaching is for many readers limited by his reiterated reference to ecclesiastical authority. What St. Francis de Sales, or St. Charles, or St. Antoninus, may have said about sermons is as-

sumed to be of more significance than the judgments of the not less saintly Newman. The preacher whom Newman has in mind is a Roman priest, who "has before his mental eye the Four Last Things," and feels "the horror and the rapture of one who witnesses a conflagration." Even the elementary truth that "definiteness of object is . . . the one motive of the preacher" is by Newman fortified as "the doctrine of St. Charles, St. Francis, and other saints"; and the practice of preaching without book but with written preparation, is commended not so much for its effectiveness as for its conformity to the examples of St. Augustine and St. Chrysostom, and to the advice of St. Carlo. Citations like these, though they testify to the touching humility of Newman's own mind, must impress non-Catholic readers as interruptions of the master's teaching rather than as re-enforcements of his luminous thought. The preacher of whom one of the most competent of English critics could say that, if he were sentenced to a desert island and permitted to take with him but two authors, he would select the plays of Shakespeare and the sermons of Newman, needs no confirmation of his counsels from Constantinople or Rome. In a word, the reader of Newman's chapter, if he be not a priest, must content himself with the by-products of the great teacher's intention, his allusions and analogies, his sagacity and irony, or what Mr. Hutton calls his "clear atmosphere," which "flows round you, pressing gently on every side of you, yet like a steady current carries you in one direction"; while he receives many of Newman's specific instructions as though they were delivered in an unknown tongue.

When one turns from this epoch-making essay to the later history of University preaching in England, he is again met by extraordinary merits and by obvious limitations. Both at Oxford and at Cambridge the Uni-

versity pulpit has been regarded by Anglican preachers as offering the best of occasions for their most serious thought, and the many volumes in which their University sermons have been collected make a very considerable library of dignified, though for the most part fossilized, remains. The first characteristic which impresses one in these English University sermons since Newman's time is their prodigious length. They are, as a rule, not so much sermons as treatises, intellectual achievements rather than homiletical appeals. Canon Mozley's famous sermon on the "Reversal of Human Judgments" contains not less than seven thousand words, and even at full speed of delivery must have required at least an hour of oratory; a prolongation of eloquence which would in most American congregations involve a reversal of human judgment on the merits of the preacher. His sermon on "Eternal Life," as though to justify its title, is still more indifferent to the passage of time. Bishop Lightfoot's University sermons at Cambridge are in actual number of words somewhat less formidable, though their weighty, and even ponderous, thought must have demanded hardly less time for its expression. Canon Liddon, in the preface to his first series of University sermons, remarks: "The reader will bear in mind that this is a volume of sermons. It makes no pretence to be a volume of essays. A sermon is confined within narrow limits." When, however, one turns to the discourses so modestly described, he finds a standard of dimensions to which the words "narrow limits" can hardly be applied. "The Law of Progress" is described in not less than ten thousand words, as though it were a planetary rather than a personal law; and the famous sermon on "Immortality" suggests in its thirty-one closely printed pages a timeless leisure in its hearers.

To the quality of sheer bulk must be added as a further characteristic of English University sermons the sub-

jects regarded as appropriate. A preacher, summoned to this academic opportunity, has usually felt himself called to grapple with some vast and comprehensive theme which shall be worthy of a Christian scholar, and has used the occasion, not so much for moral or religious edification, as for the elaborate discussion of some topic of philosophy or theology. He has had in mind not an audience but a problem, and has set himself to prepare, not a sermon, but a book. "The Atonement"; "Sacerdotalism"; "Nature"; "The Athanasian Creed"; "The Conflict of Faith with Intellect"—such have been typical subjects for preachers before the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Even Newman, when he passes from his *Parochial and Plain Sermons* to his *University Sermons* applies his homiletical gifts to a new intention. His volume is for the most part a series of discussions on the relations of faith and reason, and, as he remarks in his preface, "constitutes an exploring expedition into an all but unknown country." Accordingly, as his biographer reports, his University sermons, "though they were regarded by more speculative minds, as by Newman himself, as containing his best and most valuable thoughts," were "*caviare* to the general."

A striking illustration of this tradition of academic fitness is provided by the first impression made on English readers by the sermons of Phillips Brooks. In the fulness of his fame his torrential eloquence overwhelmed the conventional anticipations of English audiences, and his spiritual elevation of thought taught them a new significance in the great words: "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." His first volumes, on the contrary, were greeted by many English readers with perplexity, and by some with condescension. The *London Spectator* of October 4, 1884, reviewing his *Sermons preached in English Churches*, while admitting that "This is a very striking volume of sermons,"

proceeded to remark: "Mr. Brooks seems to us to be more acute than profound, more ingenious than penetrating. His thought is not always quite clear, and it is never deep. . . . Mr. Brooks is a fine preacher of the second class. . . . The deeper, more essential truths of religion do not seem to be very congenial or natural to him; but his sermons are full of interest to those who like to reflect on the secondary truths, the accidental development of morality and life." Never was a reviewer more misled by presuppositions. The approach of Phillips Brooks to the "deeper and more essential truths" through the "accidental and secondary," the homiletical skill with which a figure, an incident, or a phrase, becomes the narrow door through which one enters the great aisles of spiritual vision, the strategy which avoids a frontal attack on truth and reaches its citadel by suggestion and illustration—all this is unobserved by a critic who measures greatness by academic standards, and to whom a preacher is of the second class if he be not erudite, ponderous, or obscure. The same judgment might have been passed on the parabolic teaching of Jesus Christ. The very qualities of intimacy, suggestiveness, and vision, which gave those parables their wings, have given to the preaching of Phillips Brooks its permanent power, while those University sermons which have subordinated homiletics to dogmatics and life to literature, are with few exceptions respected rather than read. It is a curious fact that the English sermons of the last generation whose vitality has remained most undiminished by time were preached, not—as one would anticipate—before the Universities, but at Brighton by Robertson, at Lincoln's Inn by Maurice, at Birmingham by Dale, at St. Mary's, Oxford, in the *Parochial and Plain Sermons* of its Vicar, and in London, at Bedford Chapel by Stopford Brooke, and in Little Portland Place Chapel by Martineau.

When one passes from this academic tradition of Anglicanism to the later history of University preaching in the United States, he is met by a most interesting transition. Religion, in the older American colleges, had been for two centuries or more regarded as a form of compulsion, to be applied in the course of educational routine. Attendance at worship was required, and preaching, though in many instances of distinguished excellence, was as a rule administered as a form of penal discipline. When, on the other hand, the State Universities were established and supported by taxation, the maintenance of worship became regarded as inconsistent with the principle of non-sectarianism; and while every other topic of human concern, from metaphysics to blacksmithing, received scientific attention, the administration of religion was delegated to the competing Churches, which promptly established their preaching-stations at the gates of the Universities. Neither of these alternatives, of sectarianism and of secularism, has wholly commended itself; and a fresh experiment in University preaching has had in many institutions reassuring success. It must be detached from sectarian interests; it must deal with the comprehensive subjects in which all congregations of worshippers are concerned; and it must be of such a quality as to induce the voluntary attendance of young people in the course of their education. It must be offered, not as an obligation but as an opportunity. Religion must be regarded as a privilege to be gladly accepted by the unconstrained sympathy of academic youth.

These conditions of efficiency have created a special type of preachers who have been sifted out by their hearers as best adapted to address the Universities. The same persons are now welcomed by many institutions, remaining for a brief term of residence as temporary chaplains, and undertaking many forms of pastoral care;

and one of the most serious tasks of University administration is to secure as visiting preachers the best representatives of this limited group. Their preaching must have in mind the special doubts and sins which peculiarly tempt the academic life. It must be intensely personal and direct, and must avoid at all costs the sin of prolixity. Its first aim is to win and hold attention; and while sensational or acrobatic methods of attaining this end would be received by such hearers with ridicule or contempt, much may be accomplished by cogency, compactness, brilliancy, and epigram. The result is a kind of preaching which for lucidity and force has perhaps never been excelled. The alert minds of students are quick to recognize any sign of artificiality or pomposity, and to rebel against condescension or formalism; but they are responsive to reality, sympathy, and a just interpretation of the motives and ideals of youth. The University preachers, therefore, who have found most general acceptance under these conditions provide a striking instance of the survival of the fit.

One of the most admirable examples of this type of preaching is the *Straight Sermons* of Henry Van Dyke. The author frankly confesses the limits of his intention. "Their real purpose," he says of these sermons in a preface, "is nothing else than to help people to be good. . . . No thinking minister can stand up before a company largely composed of young men without a strong wish to be plain-spoken and to come straight to the point. . . . For this reason I have tried to write these sermons, not in a theological dialect, but in the English language." No one who has had the privilege of hearing any of these sermons can recall them without gratefully acknowledging that they accomplished all that was thus proposed. They were "Straight Sermons," from the compelling aphorism which as a rule arrested attention at the beginning to the abrupt appeal at their close.

They were like the arrow to which the poet-preacher once likened life:

"You must know
What mark to aim at, how to bend the bow;
Then draw it to its head, and let it go."

"A Man"; "Courage"; "Power"; "Faith"; "The Horizon"—such were the themes which should "help people to be good." "This is a sermon about Courage," begins one; and it ends, "If we have been brave enough to live, we shall be brave enough to die in peace." "There is no landscape which is not bounded by a horizon," begins another, perhaps the finest sermon in the book; and toward the close its teaching is summed up: "Our great need is not to know more about religion, but to be more sure of what we know."

The same characteristics of unassuming directness and ethical intention are conspicuous in the *University Sermons* of Henry Sloane Coffin. "They are," he says in his preface, "necessarily colloquial." They were "preached to congregations of students." They are, in a word, the translation into language easily apprehended by young people, of a singularly vivid and genuine experience of Christian discipleship. At many points they reproduce the terse and sparkling method of the *Straight Sermons*. "Here is a contrast," one sermon begins, "between gods that men carry and a God who carries men; between religion as a load and religion as a lift." At other points they are more Biblical in allusion than Dr. Van Dyke's sermons, and more picturesque in title and form. "Fools for a Purpose"; "Revelation by Concealment"; "Abilities suicidally used"—topics thus introduced invite curiosity and compel attention. Vitality, reality, and communicative power are felt in every phrase. Taken together, these two collections illustrate at its best the transition from formality to

reality which now characterizes University preaching in the United States.

If the conduct of University worship were invariably committed to preachers so inspiring as these, there could be little room for criticism. They use the "English language," it is true, but they use it with dignity and force; they are "colloquial," but they lift colloquialism into eloquence. If, however, the single desire "to help people to be good" becomes the ruling principle of less gifted preachers, they may be less successful in interpreting the spiritual needs of University hearers. Brilliancy, fervor, spiritual passion, and dramatic force are, it is true, better homiletical instruments than ponderous logic or bookish erudition. A sermon is designed for listeners rather than for readers, and the mind of the preacher should be concerned with immediate effect rather than with a posthumous volume. Yet, on the other hand, a University is not primarily established "to help people to be good," and a University sermon is not "necessarily colloquial." A University exists to promote truth; its controlling maxim is the sublime promise, "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free"; and its sermons, if they are to be consistent with the aims and respected by the members of a University, must be contributions to truth as well as exhortations to conduct; convincing to the reason as well as appealing to the will. A University preacher may attempt too much; but he may also attempt too little. He may miss his mark by aiming too low as well as by aiming too high. He meets an audience which is keenly aware of the fundamental problems of religion and ethics, and he may forfeit his opportunity by dwelling on the incidental, the fanciful, the ecclesiastical, or the obvious. He may win attention but lack authority. He may entertain rather than sustain. The preachers of the last generation who are still recalled as moulding the lives of University

students—preachers like President Walker at Harvard, President Woolsey at Yale, President Hopkins at Williams, President McCosh at Princeton, and their peers in other institutions—impressed their hearers, not as being brilliant or colloquial but as being masters of religious problems and at home in the great spaces of the spirit. When they put forth their sheep they went before and the sheep followed them, for they knew their voice. If they did not have always in mind, as Newman urged, “The Four Last Things,” they were profoundly concerned for that first thing which is worth seeking, the Kingdom of God and His Righteousness.

It would seem, then, that the English tradition of University preaching, though it may have encouraged impersonal, scholastic, and prolix discourses, has something still to teach to the ardent, personal, and practical intentions of many American preachers. The more picturesque and vivacious method may indicate the best way of approaching a theme, while the English habit of regarding a University as existing to promote substantial truth may suggest the end which the preacher should hold steadily in view. Imagination, narrative, poetry, and appeal remain the legitimate tools of the University preacher, but they are all put into his hands for the shaping of rational thought and the establishing of academic idealism. University preachers, in a word, cannot anticipate unqualified respect and gratitude unless they are recognized, not only as kindly pastors or brilliant rhetoricians, but as manifesting an intellectual mastery equal to that of the academic teachers at their side. They must be thinkers not less than orators, seers as well as doers, scholars as truly as saints.

This synthesis of vitality with wisdom, of personal appeal with philosophical insight, is not without distinguished illustrations in the University preaching of

the United States. The *Counsels to College Men*, by President Tucker of Dartmouth College, for example, combine in a striking degree the intimate approach and the large horizon. In their primary concern for students as hearers they depart from the English tradition; but in their sweep of thought and large conclusions they are of the school of Newman and Mozley. "Let me speak to you of the satisfactions of life," begins one of these discourses, as though preacher and student stood together on the level of ordinary experience; but the same sermon ends on the heights of mature and prophetic vision: "The modern world will not long be the world which marked a sudden shift from mediaevalism. The reaction is spent. Neither is it the world of raw force and of rank material power. The noise and smoke of its work, its sudden and unstable wealth, its pride and vain-glory, its impossible art, its commercialized morals, its crude, self-sufficient, unbelieving men—all these are fast going the way of their kind. These do not make up the world of to-morrow, the world in which your achievements are to be ranked and in which you are to be measured. You are in a world which will have ample room in it for the intellectual life, for rewarding action of every kind, for sincere and satisfying companionship and for faith. Do not miss your place in it. Do not live out of date. Make your own generation. Take the better fortune of your own time." Again the same preacher begins, with persuasive simplicity, "I want to speak to you about Jesus' test of moral maturity"; but near its close he rises to the passage: "I count it a great moral obligation of all believing men to have faith in the working power of Christ's sayings. . . . Believe in men against appearances. Do not take men at their word when they talk below themselves. Use the true, never the false in human nature, and persist in doing this. So shall you gain access, every one of you in his own way,

to the heart of humanity." Here is movement, lift, enlargement, surprise. Through the narrow door of personal experience the hearer is led into the great temple of a rational faith. Moral inspiration and intellectual precision meet, and from their fusion proceed light, heat, and power.

Finally, one turns to the unrivalled master of University preaching and recalls the method and aim of Phillips Brooks. No audience hung on his words with such complete responsiveness, and before none was the flame of his eloquence so quickly kindled, as among the students of a University. "This spoils one for anything else," he said one Sunday evening at Harvard. "This is the best of preaching-places." Not his sermons only but quite as much his conduct of free prayer, with its lift of soul and its vision of God, remains for those who listened a permanently sacred and chastening memory. One detail of his method is sufficient to correct much theorizing about preaching. Phillips Brooks was amazingly unhampered and copious in speaking without notes, and he employed this method with increasing frequency. When, however, he came to the University, a sense of the situation appeared to dictate to him the use of manuscript, and his University sermons were habitually read, with his desk lifted to its highest point and his hands swiftly turning the many pages. Yet this apparently restrictive method involved no loss of communicative power. No gesture was practicable save a quick toss of the massive head or a tense grasp of the preacher's gown. No representation of Phillips Brooks could be more inaccurate than the figure which commemorates him in Boston, with its hortatory attitude and its brandishing arm. Yet no hearer could escape the electric contact of his thought and the flash of his lifted eye. The manuscript was forgotten in the man. It was the same with Newman. In his later

and Catholic years, it is true, he advised that University preaching should be without notes; but in the great days of his own preaching he did not himself conform to this advice. "His sermons," Mr. Gladstone, then an undergraduate, said, in words which might have been written of Phillips Brooks, "were read, and his eyes were always bent on his book." Yet this habit did not obstruct his "delicate realism," nor blur the memory of that "wonderful blending of reality of insight with absolute faith in the spiritual world."

In Phillips Brooks's University sermons the blending of the personal with the permanent, the incidental with the universal, seems complete. It is quite true, as his English critic remarked, that he often appears to be dealing with the "accidental developments of morality and life"; but these familiar accidents are used by him to disclose the working of eternal laws. As one of the most appealing of his University sermons—"Deep Calling unto Deep"—says of life, one may get from the preaching of Phillips Brooks as much or as little as he will. Sometimes "deep calls to shallow," and the critic observes only the "accidental developments" of the theme. "Sometimes shallow calls to deep," and "power is wasted on the insignificant facts of the hour." Only when "deep calleth unto deep" is "the responsiveness of the life of man, the proportion between man and his world" secured. The same cumulative movement may be traced in "The Wings of the Seraphim." Attention is first arrested by the "majestic vision," and structural simplicity is foretold in the picture of the three pairs of wings. Then with convincing progress the preacher interprets the mystic wings as symbols of the higher life. Reverence covers the face; self-forgetfulness covers the feet; active obedience gives the wings that fly. "It is because of irreverence, self-conceit, and idleness that our lives are weak." It was a message which the young men

of Harvard University who heard it will never forget; and when, later, that sermon and others akin to it were "preached in English Churches," the tradition of insight and depth which had there been established as the test of University sermons became amplified by the more graphic and vivid method of the American pulpit, and the concurrent judgment of both countries acknowledged that the consummate type of University preaching had been attained.

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF BERTRAND RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY

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A philosophical argument is the attempt to record and communicate a vision. Or, if this phrase appears to fasten upon the philosopher the stigma of a mere visionary, let me say an intellectual perception—intellectual, because what he perceives is not even mainly made up of sense-data; perception, because it shares the directness and the self-sufficiency with which the sheer quality of sounds and sights comes to him. In speaking thus of vision or intellectual perception, I have no intention of setting up any antithesis between seeing and thinking or reasoning, nor do I mean to deny that the most comprehensive and penetrating philosophical visions are achieved, I might almost say built up, only through a toilsome process of reflection and argument. I use vision in the wide sense in which even thinking is a way of seeing, is indeed essentially the effort to see things as they are. There is no need to quote authorities, however great. My appeal is to the whole tradition which, from the earliest days of philosophy, has drawn from the eye and from its medium, the light, the language for expressing the way in which philosophical truth strikes upon the mind. The metaphors of the eye of the soul and the light of reason, of the clearness and lucidity of true thought and its power of illumination, run through the whole history of philosophy since Plato in the *Republic* likened the Form of Good to the sun, because it makes all things visible to the eye of thought as the sun makes them

visible to the eye of the body. It is only because words, defaced by much usage, have lost the vividness of their original meaning, that we speak of a man's philosophical "view" when we mean his "theory," and forget that to be engaged in theory is, in literal meaning and in actual fact, to be a spectator.

Why do I insist that philosophy is vision rather than argument—and that as an opening to a discussion of the religious aspect of Mr. Bertrand Russell's philosophy? Because I am convinced that forgetfulness of the difference between vision and argument is a constant temptation for all of us to take up a wrong attitude towards another's philosophy. If we argue against another without sharing his way of looking at things, we are sure to miss the full effect of what he has to communicate to us, and we are sure also to criticise him in the wrong spirit. Philosophical criticism is all too full of the clash of arguments and all too empty of the appreciation, nay even the enjoyment (in the sense in which we enjoy fine art and poetry), of what is valuable in another's vision.

I shall be told that it is impossible to compare philosophy with poetry or fine art, on the ground that art does not argue whereas philosophy does. A painting maintains no thesis. A poem expresses a vision or a mood, it does not assert a proposition. Art demands to be enjoyed, philosophy claims our intellectual assent or else provokes our intellectual challenge. To the one we respond with "How beautiful!" to the other with "How true!"

All this I grant, nor would I be understood as denying that philosophers' visions not only differ as works of art differ, but clash, and that they clash just because each, in claiming to be true, claims also that its opponent is, more or less, false. With the clash of such claims we are, of course, in the sphere of argument as ordinarily understood. The point of my plea, however, is just that

this is neither the whole nor the best attitude towards philosophy. Just as the world of poetry is enriched by every new nuance of feeling, every fresh thrill of thought or observation that any poet succeeds in voicing, so the world of philosophy is expanded by every fresh view which any thinker, pursuing honestly the truth as he sees it, puts within our reach. Even though we may violently disagree with him, the paradoxical fact remains that our intellectual world is richer by the presence in it and the pressure upon it of the very visions which we combat and deny. After all, he would be a poor philosopher in whom the experience of his failure to share another's vision did not keep alive a humble conviction of the limitation of his own, of some poverty in it of range or insight.

The upshot of all this is that the first and foremost function of all argument in philosophy is, not so much attack and defence in polemical debate, as reasoned exposition. It is to marshal and exhibit the materials which, envisaged synoptically, yield a particular thinker's vision. Even in criticism its aim should be to supplement and adjust rather than to refute or dispossess an opponent of his views. Philosophy is a curiously two-sided business, at once supremely individual and supremely universal. It is self-communion at least as much as it is communication to others. In thinking for himself, the philosopher thinks also for others, even for those with whom he disagrees and who disagree with him. But just for this reason, the best he can do in argument is to account to himself and others for just why and where his own vision compels him to dissent from that of another. Hence, if in the following pages I have to express frequent disagreement with Mr. Russell's views, it will not be because I cherish any illusion that I can prove him wrong or win him over to my view, but because, having tried, as every student of modern

philosophy must, to learn from a thinker so fresh, so stimulating, and above all so sincere, I have found my way of looking at things persistently refuse to fit itself to the pattern of his.

If Mr. Russell has gained a position in the very front rank of modern thinkers, it has been through the brilliant qualities of his work in mathematical logic and in epistemology, and through his stimulating advocacy of scientific method in philosophy. It has not, I venture to think, been due in any large measure to his two or three essays on Religion, its nature and its place in human life. Most students of philosophy know him as one of the foremost champions of the principle of "external relations," or as the author of a new theory of truth and error, or as a keen critic of Idealism and a potent ally of all shades of Neo-realism. Few only treat his views on religion as an integral part of his thought. Most of his keenest disciples appear to ignore *The Free Man's Worship* and *The Essence of Religion*, as if they had no connection with, no bearing upon, the rest of his philosophy; as if they were nothing more than brilliant exercises in literary style, or expressions of a passing mood, or even of a queer emotional streak in a mind otherwise so strikingly intellectual, so severely logical, so wholly given up to clear thinking on abstruse and technical questions. To me this attitude seems to be precisely wrong. Mr. Russell's religion appears to me to be an essential part, not only of the man himself (that would be his private concern), but of his whole philosophy (which is our concern too). So far as we ignore this side of his work, it seems to me that we are in danger, not only of losing an essential and valuable part of his philosophy, but also of benefiting by that part of it which, taken in isolation, cannot but give a falsely one-sided direction to the philosophical interests of our generation. In Mr. Russell the man is bigger than his philosophy, at any

rate if we give credit to the man for his religion, which, falsely as it seems to me, he struggles to keep out of his philosophy. The fact is that Mr. Russell is divided against himself. Both of the warring sides in him are voiced in his writings, but only one of them finds an ear among the majority of his disciples. There precisely lies the danger.

The escape from this danger does not lie merely in listening to the other side as well, for that would make us suffer from the same discord which runs through Mr. Russell's thought. The chief interest for us is to exhibit the causes of the conflict between Mr. Russell's religious and his philosophical views, and to discuss in what direction a reconciliation might be sought.

First, therefore, I shall examine Mr. Russell's actual statements about religion. Secondly, I shall inquire how far his philosophical theories, allowing for the changes which they have undergone, supply a basis for his religion. Thirdly, I shall point out briefly that Mr. Russell gets the best neither out of religion nor out of philosophy by the sharp antithesis which he sets up between religious experience on the one side and philosophy according to the scientific method on the other.

Like Faust, Mr. Russell might lament: "Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust." His personal problem, one is tempted to conjecture from his writings, is to reconcile the demands of a strongly emotional temperament with the demands of an intellect of unusual precision, subtlety, and analytic power. "Mysticism," he says, "is, in essence, little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe."¹ If this be Mysticism, then beyond doubt Mr. Russell is a Mystic. He has experienced, more strongly than most, this intensity and depth of feeling about the universe. But he has come to look upon

¹ *Mysticism and Logic*; *Hibbert Journal*, vol. xii, no. 4, p. 781.

feeling as a danger to clear thinking, a will-o'-the-wisp to the seeker after truth. Yet he acknowledges that "the highest eminence that it is possible to achieve in the world of thought" consists just in "the true union of the mystic and the man of science."²

To achieve this true union is, we shall not be far wrong in affirming, Mr. Russell's chief personal concern. Let us trace the different ways in which he has attempted this union, and ask whether his solution is one that we can accept on its merits for ourselves. The chapters of our story, in brief, are that Mr. Russell began as a Mystic at odds with the world because of its indifference to his moral demands, and that he has ended, so far, as a Mystic at peace with the world by refusing to press his moral demands against it. He began with a passion of protest against the universe which science offered as actual and real, and which he then described in language reminiscent of Tennyson's "Nature, red in tooth and claw." He has ended with acceptance of the actual universe by denying that human interest in ideals and values has any bearing on "facts." The true union, if we are to find it in Mr. Russell's present position, consists in that science, or rather logic, leads the way, ascertaining abstract truths, and that Mysticism follows, adjusting our feelings and lives to the revelations of the intellect. Philosophy, so Mr. Russell demands, has to cultivate an "ethical neutrality." It has to refrain from judging reality by our moral or religious standards and ideals, it has to eschew problems of good and evil or of progress, in order to devote itself exclusively to the analysis of "continuity and change."³ The only philosophical task which is worth while is to make "an inventory of possibilities, a repertory of

² *Mysticism and Logic*; Hibbert Journal, vol. xii, no. 4, p. 782.

³ *Our Knowledge of the External World* (hereafter quoted as "Lowell Lectures"); lect. 1, *passim*.

abstractly tenable hypotheses.”⁴ Thus there results the paradoxical position that philosophy is not only forbidden to consider purposes, values, ideals, on the ground that these introduce subjective bias and prejudice, but that it is in addition directed away from the actual to the possible, from the concrete to the abstract. Presumably this is because we can hardly refrain from valuing the actual. Anyhow, the result is that the only valuable philosophy will have nothing to do with values. The only passion which befits the truly scientific thinker is the passion for the contemplation of a world in which passions have no place, because it is only a world of abstract possibilities. Mr. Russell's religion was once a poignant cry of human protest against a non-moral world. Now it has turned into a passionate “receptivity to facts”—not the facts of concrete life and experience which call for moral judgment, but the facts of Mr. Russell's abstract logical and mathematical speculations. It is a religion of clear thinking on problems into which no values enter. The price of the “true union” has been the impoverishment of the materials of philosophical speculation by the sacrifice of the fulness of life.

The milestones in this pilgrim's progress are the famous essays on *The Free Man's Worship*, on *The Study of Mathematics*,⁵ and lastly the equally important but less well known one on *The Essence of Religion*⁶ which contains his *gran' rifiuto* of all demands on the universe.

The essay entitled *The Free Man's Worship* is not only an eloquent document of the severity of the conflict in the mind of a moral idealist confronted by the ruthlessness of the universe as conceived by science, but it

⁴ Spencer Lecture on Scientific Method in Philosophy; Oxford, 1914.

⁵ Philosophical Essays; II, III.

⁶ Hibbert Journal; vol. xi, no. 1, pp. 46-62.

is above all a defence of the only worthy, indeed the only possible, religion for a man who in such a universe would be "free"—free from fear and despair, still able to retain his faith in the dignity and worth of human life and human ideals. This is how Mr. Russell sums up for us the verdict of Science concerning the place and destiny of human life on this earth:

"That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built." ⁷

How is man to muster the courage to live in such a world? How is he to face this fate without flinching? How to conquer in spirit and die with head proudly erect? There is but one way: "to burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this the free man's worship." ⁸

No one will refuse a tribute of admiration to an emotion so nobly passionate, a courage so austere, an assertion so unflinching of the greatness of the human spirit. *Impavidum ferient ruinae*. If such is indeed the truth about the world which we must accept in the name and on the authority of "Science," as almost, if not wholly, beyond doubt, then this is surely the only attitude worthy of a human being—unyielding despair, stoic fortitude in

⁷ *Philosophical Essays*; pp. 60, 61.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 69.

defying a hostile world. Omnipotent matter, human ideals—here we have the two poles between which the modern mind oscillates, fatally divided against itself. Intellect endorses the one as scientific truth, the emotions cling to the other as alone making life worth living. Between them no reconciliation, no peace, is possible. A profound pessimism must inevitably characterize our estimate of the significance of ideals and values in a world which at bottom is nothing but brute matter. Against this we can put nothing but a defiance which in the end is as vain as the ideals themselves on behalf of which we defy the world. The best we can do is to confront the world as Job in the depth of his affliction confronted God: "I know that he will slay me; I have no hope; nevertheless will I maintain my integrity before him." The "trampling march of unconscious power" is bound to defeat us, though the very defeat will be a kind of victory if, accepting it, we count it as nought. To die with spirit unbroken, to contemplate without flinching the merciless extinction of human life and all its values, that is the one way in which we can effectively affirm ourselves and our ideals. Like Plato's "spectator of all time and all existence," Mr. Russell's Free Man is bidden to contemplate the forces of nature, to feel the "passionless splendour of Time, Fate, and Death."⁹ But whereas Plato's spectator sees value everywhere, in man and in the universe which is greater than man, Mr. Russell's modern soul sees values only in man, values which the world scorns, and which man can affirm only by scorning the world in his turn. Even the value of the very science which reveals to us such a world is, we must hold, only that it teaches us to know the worst. And we are most true to ourselves when we accept the worst undaunted and, even with the certain prospect

⁹ *Philosophical Essays*; p. 69.

of utter annihilation, still affirm that the pursuit of ideals is worth while.

Such is the deep and tragic conflict in the modern mind, such the austere harmony, tinged with pain, which alone it can reach, if harmony it may be called, where anguish and despair are so strangely mingled with defiance and exaltation. Such is the outcome of the passionate quest for passionless truth, such the reward of one who, sharing the Mystic's emotional demands, refuses the Mystic's hope, the Mystic's vision.

The reason why Mr. Russell must refuse the Mystic's vision is that he holds the object of that vision to be a mere product of man's imagination. "Thus man creates God all-powerful and all-good, the mystic unity of what is and what should be."¹⁰ Again and again he reminds us that God is but the creature of our own conscience, our own love of the good. But human thoughts are extinguished with human life. The universe heeds the one as little as the other.

It is true that the mood above described is not kept up throughout the essay without some oscillation. Mr. Russell himself warns us that an attitude of revolt is incompatible with full freedom. "Indignation is still a bondage, for it compels our thoughts to be occupied with an evil world."¹¹ Wisdom lies in renouncing our desires which are doomed to disappointment, but in holding fast to the thoughts that make us free. "To burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this the free man's worship." Thus a note of resignation is struck—not a passive resignation, but one which transforms the world by "creative idealism." "When, without the bitterness of impotent rebellion, we have learnt both to resign ourselves to the outward rule of Fate and to recognize that the non-human world is unworthy of our worship, it becomes possible at last so to

¹⁰ *Philosophical Essays*; p. 62.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 64.

transform and refashion the unconscious universe, so to transmute it in the crucible of imagination, that a new image of shining gold replaces the old idol of clay.”¹²

None the less the final note of the essay is a return to defiance. For the world, after all, goes on its relentless way, recking nothing of man and his imaginations.

“Brief and powerless is man’s life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power.”¹³

Four years later, in *The Study of Mathematics*, Mr. Russell gives us a fuller example of what he means by “burning with passion for eternal things,” and of what it is for the mind to return from “the dreary exile of the actual world”¹⁴ to a changeless, chanceless world of ideal objects.

“Mathematics” [he writes,] “rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty—a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show. The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the sense of being more than man, which is the touchstone of the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as in poetry.”¹⁵

The study of mathematics, in fact, is part of “the art of living in the contemplation of great things.”¹⁶ Who can

¹² *Philosophical Essays*; p. 66.

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 70.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 74.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 73.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 71.

mistake the emotional, the mystic, ring of this language about exaltation and the sense of being more than man? Not that mathematics is built on a flash of mystic insight. Its triumphs are achieved by the severe and patient labor of pure reason. But the thrill of its beauty which Mr. Russell voices is the Mystic's thrill, with its strange mixture of exaltation and humility—exaltation in finding one's nature stretched to its best, one's noblest impulses drawn out and satisfied, humility before the truth which is not of human making but is eternal. It is the language of the lover, the lover of wisdom in the Platonic sense. Mr. Russell feels about mathematics as the Socrates of the Symposium feels about beauty, straining after it until in fulness and purity it bursts on his vision. Mr. Russell's thought finds its natural home in the realm of mathematics as Plato's finds it in the realm of forms—both realms alike exempt from mutability and the impatient urgency of sensuous desires. Thither Mr. Russell escapes from "the dreary exile of the actual world," as Plato's soul, struggling free from the toils of sense and mutability in the things around us, recaptures in the contemplation of the forms something of its pre-earthly existence in heaven. It is but another side of the paradox of Mr. Russell's complex personality that he, a modern of the moderns, should stand in many respects so near to Plato. Mr. Russell may combat Plato's Mysticism in the name of science. But the modern scientist and the ancient Mystic meet in fellowship on the common ground of their admiration of mathematics. They admire and recommend it as an instrument for the training of the mind on exactly the same grounds, viz., because it teaches us to apprehend general truths, because it emancipates reason from preoccupation with particulars. At this point, however, they part company. For Plato, mathematics is the entry into the world of forms, whence the path of dialectic continues straight to the highest

form, the Form of Good. To Mr. Russell, mathematics is the supreme type of that science which pursues eternal truths, regardless of practical interests, of moral distinctions, of human preferences and hopes. To both mathematics is the propædæutic to philosophy—in Plato, as Mr. Russell interprets him, to a philosophy built on mystic vision, but in Mr. Russell himself to a philosophy cut down to symbolic logic.

Lastly, *The Essence of Religion* gives us the full flower of Mr. Russell's religious faith. Many critics, like Professor Pringle-Pattison,¹⁷ have found in this essay, compared with *The Free Man's Worship*, a characteristic change of front, a far-reaching readjustment of outlook. The note of defiance is gone. The opposition of fact and ideal, though still profound, is no longer so acute. The resignation is more passive. Instead of being called on to transfigure the world in the crucible of the imagination, we are reminded, in the spirit of Spinoza, that to understand the unalterable necessity of things is to be cured of indignation and protest. Throughout the emphasis lies on worship, acquiescence, love—in short, on union with the universe in thought, in feeling, in will. "Union in thought is knowledge, union in feeling is love, union in will is service."¹⁸ In *The Free Man's Worship* man says to the universe, You can destroy me, but you cannot break my spirit; in my innermost soul I am free from your power. In *The Essence of Religion* he says, I want to be at one with you. The free man had been told to achieve union with the universe with a high hand. "To take into the innermost shrine of the soul the irresistible forces whose puppets we seem to be—death and change, the irrevocableness of the past, and the powerlessness of man before the blind

¹⁷ *The Free Man's Worship, a Consideration of Mr. Bertrand Russell's Views on Religion*; Hibbert Journal, vol. xii, no. 1, pp. 47-63.

¹⁸ *The Essence of Religion*; Hibbert Journal, vol. xii, no. 1, p. 59.

hurry of the universe from vanity to vanity—to feel these things and to know them is to conquer them.”¹⁹ The later essay repeats this call on us “to conquer inwardly the world’s indifference.”²⁰ But the mood is gentler, a mood of peace and love. There is still an echo of the “fundamental evils” which “are due to the blind empire of matter,”²¹ but we are not supposed to be still quivering with the fight against fear and despair. The “divine part” of man “is not checked by what seems hostile, but interpenetrates it and becomes one with it.”²² By the side of the “selective worship” and the “selective love” which we give to the ideal of good, there is now admitted to be an “impartial worship” and an “impartial love” which is given indifferently to all that exists. With these the sense of solitude and isolation is gone which the free man still felt, alone with his ideals in a hostile world. Now, “wisdom does not feel this solitude because it can achieve union even with what seems most alien.”²³ The important change of front thus lies in the admission that there may be worship and love of the actual, where formerly we had been told “the non-human world is unworthy of our worship.”²⁴ Or, to sum it up in one sentence, formerly the religious man renounced all demands on the actual world but retained his claim to refashion the world in idea. Now he renounces even this claim, and accepts the universe just as it is. “The insistent demand that our ideals shall be already realised in the world is the last prison from which wisdom must be freed. Every demand is a prison, and wisdom is only free when it asks nothing.”²⁵

By this abstention from making any demands on the universe Mr. Russell hopes to save religion from the

¹⁹ *Philosophical Essays*; p. 68.

²⁰ *The Essence of Religion*; p. 62.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 57.

²² *Ibid.* p. 62.

²³ *Ibid.* p. 62.

²⁴ *Philosophical Essays*; p. 66.

²⁵ *The Essence of Religion*; p. 62.

wreck of dogma. "In order to free religion from all dependence upon dogma it is necessary to abstain from any demand that the world shall conform to our standards. Every such demand is an endeavour to impose self upon the world."²⁶ The whole essay is a plea for "a religion without fettering dogmas."²⁷ Let us surrender dogmas "to which an intellectually honest assent grows daily more difficult."²⁸ Is not religion at bottom a matter of feeling rather than of belief—of feeling that neither justifies nor is justified by any judgment about the nature of the actual world? Why not then discard the beliefs that trouble the intellect, and live by feeling a "life in the whole"?²⁹ To believe nothing, but to feel yourself one with the whole, that is, in effect, the reconciliation of religion and science which Mr. Russell offers.

Nothing novel in this, it will be said. True, but it is a view in which many are tempted to seek an escape from an intolerable conflict within themselves, and to have this view defended with all the sincerity and eloquence of a man of Mr. Russell's reputation is in itself a call to re-examination.

Not that Mr. Russell's attitude and mood remain perfectly uniform. Here, as in *The Free Man's Worship*, there are oscillations betraying traces of other views. Though we are to rid ourselves of dogma and live by feeling, yet the "life in the whole" is, in the same breath, described also as an "habitual direction of our thoughts."³⁰ May we then think but not believe? Again, the feeling which is religion has, as Mr. Russell finely says, "a quality of infinity," but it has also its own vision, its own way of contemplating the world. "The quality of infinity, which we feel, is not to be accounted for by the perception of new objects . . . ;

²⁶ *The Essence of Religion*; p. 60.

²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 51.

²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 46.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 47.

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 46.

it is to be accounted for, rather, by a different way of regarding the same objects, a contemplation more impersonal, more vast, more filled with love. . . ."²¹ Have we no right to formulate this contemplation, stating to ourselves what we see and believe? Again we read, "The things which have this quality of infinity seem to give an insight deeper than the piecemeal knowledge of our daily life."²² Surely it is clear that Mr. Russell's religious feeling expresses itself in beliefs of its own, and that the dogmas which he rejects are beliefs which have become for him non-expressive of religious feeling, not because they are insufficiently religious, but because they conflict with his scientific demands. In short, there are two strains in Mr. Russell's religion. There is the religion of clear thinking, in which the intellect presents to feeling for impartial worship the actual world of science and logic. And there is the religion of mystic emotion, which offers selective worship to an ideal of good visible only to the eye of imagination. Again, though we are to be "free" and "wise" by making no demands upon the world, yet we are also told that it will be an essential part of our worship of the ideal to wish it to exist as fully as possible, and of our worship of the actual to wish it to be as good as possible. This is as near as Mr. Russell comes to the position sometimes called Meliorism, viz., that the world is capable of being made better by our efforts, and that the chief duty of man is to remould it nearer to his heart's desire. Clearly, the no-demand attitude is seriously compromised when wishes are allowed to bridge the gap between actual and ideal. Moreover, are our wishes condemned to be ineffectual? May we not, must we not, try to realize them? to make the actual an embodied ideal, and the ideal a realized fact? Mr. Russell himself holds

²¹ *The Essence of Religion*; p. 49.

²² *Ibid.*

that religious feeling, however undogmatic, may be "dominant in action"; that universal love will express itself in service. But unless such action and service are held by him to be doomed to utter failure, of all life's disillusionments the cruelest, he must allow that action can break down the division of the ideal from the actual. And if action, why not thought? If the actual can to any degree be transformed into the ideal actualized, can it in principle be alien to the ideal? It is surely a poor "union" that Mr. Russell offers us in the shape of a pious wish that actual and ideal may fuse one with the other, whilst all the time he holds them on principle apart.

However that may be, we have the logical outcome of the no-demand attitude in Mr. Russell's most recent programme of scientific method in philosophy.³³ Science is objective, impersonal, impartial. On the other hand, to look upon the universe from a moral or religious standpoint is to make demands, to "give legislative force to our wishes," to philosophize as taste and temperament dictate. Hence, instead of the accumulation of assured results of scientific research, we have the never-ending conflict of private opinions, which explains the futility of all philosophy of the past. The philosophy of the future, so we are told, must employ the logical-analytic method, and in philosophy thus conceived there is no room for the attitude of religion. Indeed, the practice of the scientific method, it would seem, must itself be our religion, for only by the adoption of this method is the surrender of the self final, complete, exhaustive. Only in the receptivity to facts is our "submission to the universe" wholly purged of narrow, finite claims upon it. Only the dispassionate attitude of science, asking nothing, accepting everything, releases the pent-up flood of worship and of love.

³³ Spencer Lecture; Oxford, 1914.

This then is Mr. Russell's religion. What are we to say of it? Must we accept it, and with it the universe which will permit us this religion or none?

Take first the free man's world. What if it be but an evil dream? his terror and his courage alike begotten of an illusion? man defying a bogey of his own making? Of course, if the greatness of matter and the littleness of man be indeed the whole truth, if such greatness as is open to man be but a passionate protest against unheeding fact, or else submissive resignation—but why grant these premises? Mr. Russell adjusts religion to science. He will not allow ideals to have any grip upon the actual. But may not the reason why science gives us a world empty of values and reckless of ideals be just this, that it practises a deliberate abstraction from this aspect of things, an abstraction necessary enough, but not to be taken as the whole truth? To argue thus is not to deny or break down the limitations of outlook which are essential to the success of the scientist in his own proper work. It is not proposed that the hardly-won disinterestedness of science should be surrendered. Its "ethical neutrality," its indifference to mundane desires, are not in danger. The physicist, to adopt Mr. Russell's own words, will not be required "to prove the ethical importance of his ions and atoms," nor the biologist "to prove the utility of the plants or animals which he dissects."³⁴ Neither is astronomy asked to become again astrology. If the "matter" of the physicist and the chemist does not exhibit ethical qualities, nor show itself possessed of any other kind of value, well and good. But that is not to say that physics and chemistry give us all the truth that is to be had about "matter." In short, the point is that we ought to deal honestly even with matter. We ought to give it credit for all the possibilities which it shows itself to possess. This is not an appeal to

³⁴ Lowell Lectures; p. 27.

imagination, but to experience; to familiar facts which can be verified for the looking. Why not then look, for example, at the part which matter plays in human life? Our bodies are matter of the same sort as that which the physicist and the chemist studies. Whatever laws these sciences formulate hold good of the human frame. Yet in man matter, organized as body and especially as nerves and brain, becomes the basis of feeling, thought, and will. To adopt the language of evolution: at a certain level of complexity and organization it takes on, or gives rise to, this surprising, this startlingly new quality or power which we call sentience, thought, reason, in short, mind. Through mind science becomes possible, and science is the study of matter among other things. Truly, miracles are coming thick and fast, when we think of matter as, under certain conditions, giving rise to this power of contemplating itself. And further, with mind comes will, and the subordination of matter, alike in bodily movement and in the control and the transformation of the physical environment, to ideas and ideals. Is not this a fresh possibility that we ought, in fairness, to set down to the credit of matter—this capacity of becoming instrumental to the embodiment or expression of purpose? And all this not in defiance of the laws of physics and chemistry, but in faithful accord with them, in the spirit of Bacon's maxim: *Naturae non imperatur nisi parendo*. And, lastly, the material body as a factor in human life forms part of a whole to which no one will deny the possession of ethical qualities. In abstraction from this whole, the matter of the body may not deserve to have such qualities predicated of it; but it may fitly be said to share in them as an integral part of the whole person who is the proper subject of moral predicates. There is no escaping from this by restricting ethical qualities to the non-bodily part of man, under the name of soul or character. No such

crude abstractions will work here. Are we to exclude the desires of the body from the sphere of moral judgment? Or, because they are desires and so far classed as "mental," are we to deny their patent physical side? Hunger and sex are enough to wreck these artificial distinctions. Again, the James-Lange theory of emotions may serve to show us that we are dealing here with facts which cut across the usual distinctions of body and soul. And when we look beyond the body and consider that the physical environment of man is capable of being the scene of the realization of his purposes, yes, and his ideals; the object of his scientific study; a source of beauty; a symbol of God—then, I suggest, we can hardly help concluding that there is much more in "matter" than we should ever have learnt or expected if what physics and chemistry tell us were the whole truth about it. If there is anything in this point of view, we shall have to revise Mr. Russell's conception of the place of human minds and ideals in this material universe. We shall have doubts about matter being necessarily and always and in all its forms unconscious. We shall have doubts about denying to matter this or any other quality merely on the ground that such quality does not come within the purview of science, or, appearing there, is of set purpose neglected. This may seem "mysticism" to Mr. Russell—and in any case he will not agree with it. But I am content to have argued for a point of view from which neither the pessimistic estimate of the fate of values nor the heroics of the Free Man appear as the only possible truth. Technically, to sum up, the issue turns just on this point: No one blames science for not considering values where none appear; or for disregarding them where they do appear, if such abstraction is necessary for pursuing, without deviation or confusion, the special character of things with which a given science deals. But to accept such abstraction as final, and demand the adjustment of our

whole outlook to it, when experience is full of evidence that matter has far greater possibilities and more varied qualities than certain sciences recognize—that is to fetter the mind, not to free it.

And, again, have we not the right to ask Mr. Russell to be in earnest about his own suggestion that man is a child of Nature, and to judge Nature's character by that of her offspring? "A strange mystery it is that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular hurryings through the abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child subject still to her power but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking mother."³⁵ Whence have come to man these gifts, this knowledge, these ideals? From an alien and inhuman world? That were mystery indeed. Have we not here the patent result of abstraction, the wilful divorce of facts which should throw light on one another? In *The Essence of Religion*, Mr. Russell speaks of man as "a strange mixture of God and brute,"³⁶ as one part particular and finite, the other part universal, infinite, divine. But if man is wholly a product of Nature and yet is in any part divine, how can we refuse to interpret the potentialities of Nature in the light of that which she produces? Man, loving ideals and knowing good and evil, is either not wholly a product of Nature or Nature is not wholly lacking in those ideal qualities which man's worship seeks and loves. True, in *The Free Man's Worship*, ideals were treated as the creatures of man's own thought, and God, in effect, as the fiction of his own conscience. But that is no longer the tone of *The Essence of Religion*. There the "divine part" of man is said to "live in the whole," and the whole is assuredly more than Nature *plus* human fictions. On the contrary, "the object of selective worship is the ideal

³⁵ *Philosophical Essays*; p. 61.

³⁶ *Hibbert Journal*; vol. xi, p. 47.

good which belongs to the world of universals." Universals indeed do not "exist" in the sense in which the actual world exists, but, like the entities of mathematics, they form an objective, supra-personal order, which is as little, or as much, the creation of human thinking as is the actual world. The divine part of man, we can hardly escape the conclusion, must seek union with, and derive its being from, something objectively divine in the universe.

But it is just from this line of thought that Mr. Russell has debarred himself by the way in which he opposes the actual and the ideal—in short, by being half-hearted about the "whole." Religion is to be "life in the whole."³⁷ But Mr. Russell offers us no whole to live in; only a juxtaposition of two irreconcilables, an existing world of blind and omnipotent matter, and a non-existing world of ideals. Moreover, must we not hold that only if human nature is in principle a whole, or capable of being a whole, can it seek, and succeed in attaining, life in the whole? But man as little as his world is for Mr. Russell a whole. He too is a compound of two irreconcilables at war with one another—a finite, self-seeking part, and an infinite, self-surrendering part. If only the latter lives in the whole, it is not the whole man that does so. The union will be one-sided. The spiritual friction will persist. And, again, it will not be a union with a world which can truly be called a whole, so long as the ideal and the actual are on principle divorced. There is nothing that deserves or evokes worship in a world so wholly devoid of moral values, so alien to all ideals, that we ought not even to demand their being realized in it. There is nothing that deserves or evokes worship in ideals which do not express, so to speak, the *nisus* of the actual towards perfection; which are so little rooted in the actual that we have no right

³⁷ Hibbert Journal; vol. xi, p. 46.

to demand anything on their behalf. Indeed, in this respect the defiance of *The Free Man's Worship* seems more admirable than the renunciation of *The Essence of Religion*. The former allowed ideals to gain the victory at least in thought, to transform the actual at least in imagination. The latter surrenders even this modest claim. Truly, the great renunciation comes very near to being a great betrayal.

There is one further characteristic of Mr. Russell's attitude towards religion which is too important not to deserve a comment. It is his ever repeated cry for "freedom"—freedom through peace and union of the soul with the world, freedom through the inward peace and union of the soul with herself. But freedom from what? The list of Mr. Russell's answers is instructive. The free man was to be free from fear and despair, from the bitterness of impotent rebellion against "the wanton tyranny which rules his outward life"; free too from the desire for "those personal goods that are subject to the mutations of Time."³⁸ This freedom was to be achieved by the passion for eternal things, by accepting the alien world and reconquering it in part through the power of art and of philosophy. In *The Essence of Religion* it is rather the "tyranny of desire and daily care"³⁹ which is emphasized, the trammels of the struggling self with its exclusive, partial demands for satisfaction. The problem is to escape "from the prison house of eager wishes and little thoughts"⁴⁰ by cultivating, through the suspension of will, through the utter merging of the self, and through the complete renunciation of even our most cherished ideals, that "infinite life" in us of which "the impartiality leads to truth in thought, justice in action, and universal love in feeling."⁴¹ That in all this there is much truth, no one will care to deny. In

³⁸ *Philosophical Essays*; p. 64.

³⁹ *Hibbert Journal*; xi, p. 46.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 47.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 47.

the language of his contrast between the finite and the infinite in man, Mr. Russell rightly insists on the need for self-discipline in man's ascent to spiritual freedom. No one could urge more insistently the danger of the narrow vision, the spiritual blindness that comes with immersion in self-centred cares and petty preoccupations. No one could preach more eloquently the duty of breaking down all barriers between the self and the world, of living habitually in the company of "thoughts which give breadth to life," of that universal love "to which imperfections are no barrier, and that unifies the world by the unity of its own contemplation."⁴² Where he fails to carry all of us with him is in assimilating loyalty to ideals to the tyranny of desires, and in treating the religious conviction of the perfection of the world as the supremest and most insidious instance of the imposition on the universe of our selfish demands.

Here, it seems to me, we touch the root of the matter. It is the *judgment of perfection* which Mr. Russell challenges. At the bottom of all his pleas for a religion without dogma there lies the fierce hostility to one single dogma, viz., "the belief that in the end our ideals are fulfilled in the outer world." Sometimes Mr. Russell's arguments against this belief are based on the familiar ground that it is subversive of morality; for what meaning can there be in the struggle for good if the world is good already? The actual world is not good, and the ideal is not actual. The actual world is in principle indifferent to good, and the ideal in principle incapable of being realized. These are in substance Mr. Russell's counter-dogmas. They are the corner-stones of the creed of his religion hall-marked by science. But, as often, Mr. Russell himself supplies the ammunition for combating his views. Does he not remind us that "bare morality is very inadequate as a motive for those who hunger and

⁴² Hibbert Journal; xi, p. 49.

thirst after the infinite"?⁴³ Does he not realize that the judgment of perfection is the voice of that very love of which he says himself that "imperfections are no barrier to it"? Does he not recognize in it the fine flower of religious renunciation, which indeed renounces not so much its ideal demand that the real should be perfect and the perfect be real, as the cocksure finality of the moral judgment that the actual world is hostile to ideals and incurably imperfect? One of the chief mysteries in religion is, in fact, the mystery that moral zeal does coexist with, nay feeds upon, the conviction of that perfection of the world which makes us see in it a revelation of God.

So far we have passed in review those of Mr. Russell's writings in which he explicitly deals with religion. We must now turn to a line of thought which of recent years has increasingly engaged Mr. Russell's interest, and which would appear to have cut away the whole basis and background of his religious reaction to the world, without, so it would seem, his having realized the fact. The philosophical status assigned to Nature in *The Free Man's Worship* has been so transformed in the *Problems of Philosophy* and in the more recent Lowell Lectures on *Our Knowledge of the External World*, that it is hard to see how Mr. Russell can still continue to think of it as the blind empire of matter, or the tyranny of a non-human power. Writing in 1903, Mr. Russell treated matter as so much of a reality that he personified it as a hostile force, a relentless fate, and invested it, in the name of scientific truth, with attributes such as omnipotence and mercilessness which men have sometimes ascribed to their gods. Matter played in his universe the Mephistophelean part of the *Macht die stets verneint*.

All this has been changed by Mr. Russell's subsequent epistemological speculations. Inquiring into the founda-

* Hibbert Journal; xi, p. 50.

tions of our knowledge of nature he arrived, in *Problems*, at the conclusion that we know of the existence of matter only by an inference from sense-data, and that this inference rests at bottom on nothing more reasonable than an "instinctive belief"—an instinct moreover which (though Mr. Russell forgets to point this out) appears to entitle us to no assertion either way about the moral or non-moral character of matter. The Lowell Lectures bring a further change. Pursuing the same line of inquiry, Mr. Russell now holds material things to be known, not by an instinctive inference, but by a "logical construction," a "thing" being a logically constructed class or group of actual and possible sense-data. It is not too much to say that Mr. Russell has abolished matter in the original sense. His sense-data do not, like Berkeley's "ideas," exist only in minds human or divine, but in respect of its immaterialism his position now is essentially the same as Berkeley's. In short, in transforming the "blind but omnipotent mother of man" into a mere logical system of sense-data, Mr. Russell has knocked the bottom out of the philosophical foundations of his religion.

To prove this, let us consider his argument somewhat more in detail. Our immediate experience of the "things" which we believe to be physical turns out on analysis to consist of what we see, hear, taste, smell, feel—in other words, of colors and sounds, tastes and smells, temperature-qualities like hot and cold, touch-qualities like rough and smooth, shapes, sizes, etc. These "sense-data," however, may not be ascribed to the real object; they are "appearances." And this for two reasons: First, because they are so variable with changing circumstances and points of view, that it is impossible to say what, *e.g.*, the "real" color and shape of a thing are. Secondly, because sense-data are "private" to individual minds, whereas the object is common, or, in Mr. Russell's

language, "public" and "neutral." The conclusion drawn from these considerations is that we cannot identify the object with the sense-data or treat the sense-data directly as properties of the object. Yet "sense-data" are the "solid basis" of knowledge. We cannot know the object except by means of them, we reach the object by an inference from them. But this inference turns out to be precarious and inconclusive. Is there anything over and above the sense-data which differ for each observer and are private to each? Is there any such thing as matter? We cannot appeal here to the testimony of other people, for we experience other people and their testimony in the first instance just as sense-data, so that the same doubtful inference is involved in the belief that other minds exist as in the belief that physical bodies exist. Solipsism, however repugnant to common sense and the working beliefs even of the philosopher, cannot be shown to be wrong. "We can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences."⁴⁴ The inference then which takes us beyond sense-data to other minds and physical things derives its force from an instinctive belief, which is found to simplify and systematize our experience without ever leading to any consequences which could compel us to abandon it. Sense-data and instinctive beliefs—out of these materials we fashion our knowledge of our environment, material and social. The task of philosophy is to set forth "the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs,"⁴⁵ to remove their conflict, to present them in the form of a harmonious system.

In passing on to the Lowell Lectures we must, as lesser mortals whose wings flap heavily, forego most of the thrills of Mr. Russell's light-pinioned flights into the rarefied upper air of logical speculation. We shall follow only the fate of physical things. We begin by noting

⁴⁴ Problems; p. 34.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 39.

with pleasure that, setting out to clear away "incredible accumulations of metaphysical lumber,"⁴⁶ Mr. Russell sweeps onto the rubbish heap chiefly his own material things of *Problems* as well as the instinctive inferences by which they were supposed to be known. Belief in the existence of other minds is still held to be unavoidable though unprovable. But as regards physical things, the demand now is to interpret them in terms of pure experience, if I may borrow the phrase from Avenarius. We are to discard all "soft data," *i.e.*, all elements of ordinary experience and belief which become doubtful under pressure of criticism. Eliminating in this way all hypothetical elements, all assumptions that are not self-evident or capable of proof, we are left with "hard data" of two main kinds: (a) sense-data, (b) the general truths of logic. This list is capable of some extension, but in these two elements we touch the hardness of bed-rock, so to speak. In them we are face to face with a self-evidence so complete that doubt is impossible. What then is the result of this attempt "to state what is known in terms of sensible objects, *i.e.*, sense-data, alone"?⁴⁷ What is the "bare outcome of experience"?⁴⁸ We say, for example, that we look at a table as we walk round it. But "what we really know from experience, when we have freed our minds from the assumption of permanent 'things' with changing appearances . . . is a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations [? = sense-data, sensible objects?] with changes in visual sensations [? = sequences of visual sense-data?]"⁴⁹ Similarly we correlate with the sense-data of sight those of touch and other senses, so that, given some of a correlated group, we are led to expect others. Such occurrence of expected sense-data is all the verification which we can hope for either in common

⁴⁶ Lowell Lectures; p. 42.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 77.

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 83.

⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 77.

sense or in physics. Lastly, in bare experience there is no distinction between illusions and dreams as "unreal" and waking experiences as "real." Both are alike made up of sense-data, and there is nothing more real than these. They are just what they are. The only difference is that the sense-data in illusion and dream are connected with other sense-data in abnormal and unusual ways. Usually, for instance, one visual datum is correlated with one tactual datum. But the man who sees double but touches single is warranted in saying only that "the manner of the correlation of touch and sight is unusual" in this instance.⁵⁰

This is the point to which "one man's unaided observations"⁵¹ will carry him. Clearly, on so slender a basis no man can build much of a science. This "unstable" world of "momentary sense-data" is no adequate foundation for either physics or physiology. But the very method of appealing to bare experience and using only "hard data" has, so far, compelled Mr. Russell to argue solipsistically. Excepting only the laws of logic, there is nothing, according to him, of which we are so sure as our own sense-data. Strictly speaking, if we are to believe both *Problems*⁵² and *Our Knowledge of the External World*,⁵³ they are more certain even than "I" am myself, for the "self," with its apparent permanence amid change, is notably a "soft" datum. It would be wicked to press Mr. Russell with the awkward and inconvenient question, what reason there is to call the sense-data "mine," if "I" am doubtful and ambiguous. We must accept the privacy of sense-data, else the fair structure of the theory tumbles to the ground. Yet Mr. Russell, at a point of his argument when the assumption of other minds is still explicitly disavowed,⁵⁴ talks reck-

⁵⁰ Lowell Lectures; p. 82.

⁵² Problems of Philosophy; p. 29.

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 83.

⁵³ Lowell Lectures; p. 74.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 82.

lessly of "our" sense-data, meaning his and the reader's, and not using, as he should, the solipsist's *pluralis majestaticus*.

This then is the solipsist's predicament. His own sense-data are not enough to found the stable world of common sense and science on, but having put aside as too soft the hypothesis of the existence of other minds, he is debarred from eking out his own experience by the testimony of others. For that testimony, in terms of sense-data, is only "noises and shapes."⁵⁵

We shall not follow the ingenious hypothesis of a Leibnizian universe of monads by which Mr. Russell completes the materials needed for the construction of a physical thing. We will note rather the pronounced flirtation with solipsism which characterizes all his epistemological inquiries, a flirtation which stands confessed in an article in *Scientia*,⁵⁶ where Mr. Russell acknowledges his hope to be able to build up physics on a foundation of pure solipsism, and to avoid the hypothesis of other minds altogether.

In face of this development we need only ask, What has become of that "universal soul" in man of which it was said in *The Essence of Religion* that it links all men together and breaks through the barriers of competition and conflict which finite selves erect against each other? What has become of the "infinite nature" of man and the infinite life in which it enables him to share? "Between the infinite nature in one man and the infinite nature in another there can be no essential conflict. If its embodiments are incomplete, they supplement each other; its division among different men is accidental to its character, and the infinite in all constitutes one universal nature."⁵⁷ This is not the language of a solipsist. The ingenuities of the logical-

⁵⁵ Lowell Lectures; p. 82.

⁵⁶ Vol. xvi, no. xxxvi-4 (Aug. 1914).

⁵⁷ *The Essence of Religion*; p. 48.

analytical method are forgotten to the benefit of truth. Truly, "zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust."

Epistemology, in short, has played havoc with the universe of Mr. Russell's religion. It has dissolved "omnipotent matter" into a logical construction of sense-data, and the infinite soul of man into the solipsist's shivering wraith. What now becomes of the free man's defiance of fate and doom? Or what of his renunciation? Why should the human mind confess itself the plaything and the sport of structures which it has itself built up? Why should it refrain from making moral and religious as well as logical demands? Clearly, whatever may be the proper religious reaction to the material universe as now interpreted by Mr. Russell, neither the former heroics of unyielding despair nor the chastened wisdom of renunciation are any longer in place.

What, finally, in the light of all this, are we to say of the "ethical neutrality," the restriction to logical analysis of "continuity and change," which Mr. Russell would impose upon philosophy, and that in the name of its emancipation? If Mr. Russell really means that the things which have a quality of infinity—and these, we must remember, are the things of the actual world—"give an insight deeper than the piecemeal knowledge of daily life," why in the name of reason should we be debarred from making this insight available for philosophy?

It is impossible not to recall here that saner and more generous conception of philosophy and of human freedom which Mr. Russell himself offers us in the final chapter of *Problems*. There he speaks of philosophy in the same fervent language in which elsewhere he speaks of religion. The philosophical contemplation of the universe brings "freedom from narrow and personal aims."⁵⁸ It enlarges the boundaries of the self. Through contact with

⁵⁸ *Problems of Philosophy*; p. 244.

the infinity of the universe, the mind achieves itself some share in infinity.⁵⁹ The unalloyed desire for truth is the intellectual form of that "impartiality which in action is justice and in emotion universal love."⁶⁰ Is not this exactly what in *The Essence of Religion* Mr. Russell had said of religion? In fact, "the free intellect will see as God might see."⁶¹ Could philosophy be praised more highly or more truly? Yet surely God is not merely occupied in contemplating "continuity and change" by the logical-analytic method.

In the exaltation of this last chapter of *Problems* we catch again the Mystic's voice. But it is no longer the voice of a Mystic defying, or resigning himself to, a hostile world, nor the voice of one denying that Mysticism can be based on, or lead to, any valid judgments about the nature of the world. Rather, we hear words that promise genuine peace and lasting union. "Contemplation enlarges not only the objects of our thoughts but also the objects of our actions and our affections; it makes us citizens of the universe."⁶² Nothing now remains but for Mr. Russell to be in earnest alike about the "universe," which will not then be whittled down to the abstractions of mathematical physics, and about the "citizenship," which will not then demand ethical neutrality nor exercise itself merely in the "invention," by "abstract imagination," of an "infinite number of possible hypotheses." If Mr. Russell had not arbitrarily cut down the sphere of philosophical contemplation by imposing on it a false ideal of becoming "scientific," he would find a sufficient task even for his own thought in exploring the high-ways and by-ways of the fair city of his philosophical vision. He would not find it necessary to maintain that "Mysticism is to be commended only as an emotional attitude, not as a creed about the

⁵⁹ *Problems of Philosophy*; p. 246, (summarized).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 249.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 247.

⁶² *Ibid.* p. 249.

world,"⁶³ or that religious union with the universe must be "independent of all beliefs about the nature of the universe."⁶⁴ For though this secures that religion, since it asserts nothing, cannot be intellectually false, yet religion pays for this freedom from error the heavy price of not being able to justify itself reflectively as being rooted in the nature of the universe. Here surely there are problems for the intellect more important even than "the analysis of continuity and change." Let Mr. Russell recognize that in the philosophical city too there are many mansions, and that not all old mansions are outworn because it has pleased Mr. Russell to build a new one. There are more forms and methods than one of that "citizenship of the universe," of which Mr. Russell finely says that in it "consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the thralldom of narrow hopes and fears."⁶⁵

⁶³ *Mysticism and Logic*; *Hibbert Journal*; vol. xii, no. 4, p. 787.

⁶⁴ *The Essence of Religion*; p. 60.

⁶⁵ *Problems*; p. 249.

THE ETHICS OF COLLEGE STUDENTS¹

GEORGE HARRIS

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[This is the second of a series of articles on the ethical standards prevalent in different occupations. The first, by Mr. John F. Moors, on "Ethics in Modern Business," appeared in the January number of the REVIEW.—ED.]

The American college is a picturesque, a unique, a very vital community. Students are not out of the world—a college is not a monastery; yet it is a world of its own, with peculiar objects and traditions, with a distinct atmosphere. The catalogue shows a curriculum, a faculty, a few hundred names, and the college would seem to be lectures, study, recitations. But around all that and including it, the college is a great fraternity, a mystic circle, a cult. It is Alma Mater, a glorified personality.

Have college students a code of ethics in any way peculiar? It is thought that their notions of right and wrong are twisted, differing in some respects from the commonly accepted code; that some commandments are subtracted from, some added to the code; that the individual is subordinated to the community and does not assert himself against college sentiment, which is often wrong; that, in general, freedom from restraint and sense of irresponsibility mark the college student. I think that, so far as there is any ground for these suspicions, it is in the carelessness and thoughtlessness of youth rather than in any conscious immorality, or that it is found in

¹ The professional schools of a university are not included in this inquiry. College boys have there become men, and, while there is some acquaintance with students of the college, their main interests are different from the interests of undergraduates. My own experience has been gained in Amherst College, of which I was President from 1899 to 1912. It has no professional or graduate schools, is not a university, but simply a college.

love of fun. I think also that the great majority of students act under a very high ethical standard.

An enumeration of the distinctive virtues of students is one way of recognizing the code of ethics which, consciously or unconsciously, they adopt. This enumeration will lead up to their religion. Ethics and religion can be considered separately, though in fact they are inseparable.

This very subject, under the title of the "morals and manners of college students," was discussed before the National Education Association a few years ago, three college Presidents participating. There was a marked unanimity respecting the virtues of students. I was one of the three, and, with several years' experience since that time, I have no reason to change my opinion. The prime virtue of students is truthfulness. The pursuit of knowledge promotes truthfulness. Knowledge is truth. The supreme virtue of the scholar is veracity. Love of truth for truth's sake is intellectual virtue. It is the very basis of morality. This is the temper of students in all colleges. Some are lazy, taking the line of least intellectual resistance; some regard study as a hardship and go about it doggedly; but our students are truth-seekers, indignant towards falsehood and deceit. An ignorant or superficial teacher is not respected. It is a fatal verdict: "He does not know his subject." A teacher who evades facts, who is not downright honest in his opinions, is despised. I said that intellectual conscientiousness promotes morality. It certainly promotes truthfulness. College men, whatever their faults and wrongdoings, will not tell lies. A man's word is sacred. This virtue, which is associated with the English gentleman, has become as distinctively the virtue of the American gentleman and scholar.

And so, again, students regard themselves as gentlemen. They have the virtues of a gentleman. The ideal

is the ideal of a gentleman, of an honorable, generous, courteous man. There is no place where meanness has so little toleration as in college. You will search long to discover a student who intentionally hurts the feelings of a fellow-student or does not applaud the success of a comrade. A student must be a gentleman in all relations. Sports must be gentlemanly. There are queer notions, to be sure, of the manners, the speech, and dress of a gentleman. In some colleges rough and negligent dress is assumed, but only on college premises. Abroad or in society, none more punctilious than they. The code of manners in their mutual relations is somewhat peculiar. Nicknames are applied freely, but are expressions of regard and even affection, never of derogation. The give and take of conversation is slangy, possibly to the enrichment of the English language, but is recognized as the patois of the tribe and not for foreign use. The student is polite to ladies, and believes he can move with grace in the best society. In all his actions, the ideal of a gentleman in its essential moral quality is before him. "Thou shalt be a gentleman" is the first amendment of the Ten Commandments, and on it hang the academic law and prophets.

This leads to honor. Students are honorable. One illustration of this is the "honor system," which has been adopted in several colleges. As a system it pertains to examinations. Under the old system instructors were present during the examinations to watch the students and detect cribbing. Now the instructor remains a few minutes to answer any questions, and then leaves the room. A committee of students judges alleged instances of cheating (discovered usually by internal evidence, such as the verbal identity of papers, or the same mistakes in two papers). There is a hearing, and if the offence is admitted or proved, the committee recommends to the faculty that the offender be suspended or

expelled. The committee is usually more severe than the faculty would be, but the recommendation is generally adopted. Whereas there had been much cribbing, under the honor system there have been only two or three cases a year, and those were Freshmen. There was, to be sure, a tendency to go by the letter of the rules. If, for example, essays were not mentioned, then copying from a book, it was held, did not come under the rules. But, on the whole, the honor system is lived up to. In one college the students have been considering the extension of the system to all relations, not confining it to examinations. Honor, it may be said, is higher than morality, for it is more than justice. It is generosity and trust.

I should class among the virtues of students the democratic spirit. The rich and the poor from all sections of the country meet together. Each one stands upon his merit, not upon wealth or parentage. A college likes to boast that it is democratic, and regards the reputation of being aristocratic as a slur. The president of his class, the captain of the football team, a member of the oldest fraternity, as likely as not is working his way through college.

Loyalty is a virtue of students, loyalty to the college. One that excels in any capacity must run, play ball, sing, write, debate for the glory of the college. The student that will not come out is disloyal. He must make sacrifices for his college, his class, his fraternity. He will be a good citizen by-and-by, a patriot.

Drinking has diminished in recent years. An intoxicated student is rarely seen. There are few men of dissipated habits. The Dean of Amherst College recently said: "Some years ago drinking in the fraternity houses, which had not been tolerated by a number of our leading fraternities for years, was banished by all, and that by the action of the fraternities themselves." I

think that, in all our colleges, there has been a marked improvement within the last twenty-five years.

Impurity is exceptional. There are, indeed, some licentious students, but college sentiment frowns upon them. "Cut that out," fellows say to the obscene talker.

Self-depreciation may not rank as a virtue, but it is a characteristic of nearly all students. Boasting is excluded. A student who has done well and is praised is apt to say, "I ought to have done better than that," or "It was rotten."

Certain customs, peculiar to colleges, have lapsed. Hazing is no longer practised in respectable colleges. Physical violence and personal indignities are brutalizing to those that inflict them. To be sure, even when inflicted, it was understood by both parties that insults and injuries are impersonal, that the student suffers and is made to appear ridiculous, not because he is Thomas Smith, but because he is a Freshman, or because the violence and indignity are initiational mysteries. Happily these impositions diminished till they were little more than amusement for all concerned, and in most colleges have disappeared. All that remains is the class contest for possession of a cane, a cannon, a flag, or for breaking up a class supper. Tricks on the faculty are of the past. Students no longer regard the faculty as natural enemies, but as friends. Government is not paternal. Graduates used to tell of pranks, thefts, escapades, ludicrous objects placed in class-rooms. There is nothing of that sort now. Those frolics and fooleries are not to be regarded as immoralities, but only as silly customs, betraying a perverted sense of humor. On the whole, students of today are clean-minded, honorable, truthful, and generous. The morale of our colleges is healthy.

Religion is a vital interest of college students. Emphasis is on the essentials, on reality, on the life;

not on rites, ceremonies, antiquities, doctrines. Young men think more about religion than is commonly supposed. It is believed that their interest does not run in that direction; that they are all life, vivacity, gayety, on pleasure bent; that they are light-minded, unrestrained; that they regard the religious life as sombre and restricted. That is true of some that are shallow, of some that are conceited and selfish, of some that are immoral. But youth is idealistic. It is the young men that see visions. Students talk with most earnestness, not of sports, though they are earnest enough about sports, but of social problems, of politics, of philosophy, of religion. Students who have seemed to be external, so to speak, are awakened by studies in philosophy, literature, science, by great world-movements. Religion used to be shunned. Students would not talk about it. They thought of it simply as a personal appeal that makes one uncomfortable. There is no shyness now in approach to religion, but it is talked of freely.

The present generation in its attitude towards religion has a decided advantage over preceding generations of the past century. A century ago there was much scepticism, which invaded the colleges. Miracles were denied; the supernatural was flouted; errors of the Bible were pointed out. The scoffer was abroad. Students boasted that they were infidels, atheists, sceptics. A religious student was despised—a goody-goody, flabby, narrow, ignorant person. But now a student boasting of his unbelief, challenging Christianity, would be considered a callow, silly fellow. The very words, “infidel,” “sceptic,” “atheist,” have passed out of use. Half a century ago there was much doubt concerning religion. That time has been called the age of doubt. Evolution was making its way, and it seemed to shake the very foundations of faith. It did shake and overthrow certain

notions that were no part of religion, such as the recent and instantaneous creation of the world, the origin of man and his fall. Spiritual realities were not undermined. The Bible had been regarded as inspired and authoritative, every statement the word of God. More than once, when I was a pastor, young men said to me, "I should like to join the church, but I have doubts; I cannot believe the story of Jonah and the whale, nor about Adam." Ingersoll's stock in trade at that time was the mistakes of the Bible, the cruelties of the Israelitish wars, the imprecatory psalms. It was the age of doubt. But Biblical criticism treated the Bible as any ancient literature is treated. The traditional view of authorship, of the history of the Jews, of the earlier books, of the historical value of some portions, was modified, and there was a sense of uneasiness. Since many believed that the Bible is without errors or mistakes in any particular, it was a shock to be told that there are errors. That is all past. Young people of today do not even know that there was a reaction. They do not say, "I cannot believe this, I cannot believe that." Religion has come to terms with science without loss to religion. Science is founded on mystery; it can only see the "how" but cannot account for the potencies. The spiritual and moral values stand out clear and unencumbered. The Bible is recovered as religious literature: poetry, prophecy, gospel, faith, the Christ. The fact is that the younger generation was not brought up on the old theology. They would hardly know what one is talking about who should use the doctrinal phraseology current in former times.

The note of religion to which students respond is manliness; positive, healthy, generous, courageous manhood. A Christian is one who takes account of whatsoever things are true, honorable, just, pure, lovely, of

good report. The pallid type is not their conception of the Christian. Cant, pretence, they will not tolerate. Virile character, unsullied honor, magnanimity, courage, fill out the ideal of the Christian. Christianity is, to students, the religion of service. This is a striking sign of the times. To the call to service there is quick response. Students are ready to help. This is in accordance with the precept that thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. I have before me the annual report of the Christian Association of Amherst College, from which I quote the account of Community Service:

“Certainly the final test of Christianity lies in action, in the measure of helpfulness and service to those with whom we live. The very evident spirit of democracy and co-operation in the college is one of the best applications of Christian principles to which we can point. But our college world is necessarily somewhat restrictive and academic. So the Association is providing students with occasional opportunities for broadening service and practical usefulness in larger communities. Some one hundred boys in Amherst and Holyoke are being directed in clean sportsmanship and straight living by seventeen members of our boys’ work committee. Thirty men are spending an evening a week at the People’s Institute in Northampton, teaching immigrants the essentials of citizenship. For eight years the Association has helped support and direct the summer vacation school in Holyoke. Finally, we sent thirty-five deputations last year to preparatory schools, speaking before all sorts of boys on such subjects as ‘The Real Values of College,’ and ‘The Manliness of Christianity,’ and through personal conferences interesting them in college.”

In every college and university are bands of students engaged in similar service. A clergyman who was graduated from Williams College about thirty years ago, having preached there recently, said that in his day there were college prayer-meetings and class prayer-meetings every week and that he was rather sorry none are held now. However, he added, the Christian Association is very active and does a fine work.

Jesus Christ is revered. Students see in him the ideal. They do not try to define his person in exact terms. He is apprehended, as the world apprehends him, as the great friend of all the sons of men, the severe denouncer of social wrong, the self-sacrificing, loving, sympathetic helper, who brings them to God, his Father and our Father. He inspires courage, honor, faith. He is Master.

The college pulpit is a throne of power. The great preachers of the country come gladly to colleges with the message of truth and righteousness. The student responds with all his heart; for the intellectual man is the spiritual man. Students listen eagerly to preaching on the real, human Christ and on the service of man to man. Sermons are ethical and spiritual rather than theological. On Sunday evenings services are frequently held, at which attendance is not required, yet many students are present to hear a favorite preacher. After the service, the speaker visits students in the fraternity houses and in the dormitories. Groups sit around him, and ask questions that evince a deep interest in religion and in its application to life. One preacher returning to my house at midnight exclaimed, "Tired, but happy."

There are Bible Study classes, enrolling, in some colleges, as many as three-fourths of the student body. It is said that the young people of today are ignorant of the Bible, that they have read very little of it, that they do not recognize scriptural allusions. It is true that they have not been required to read the Bible through and become familiar with it, and that is a great lack in the education of the young. But of late years in the colleges there has been a revival of interest in the Bible, considered as literature and religion.

We do not hear now of revivals of religion in college. Formerly, when those who are now middle-aged men and old men were students, revivals were frequent. It was

said that at one New England college there had been a revival sometime during the residence of every class. The day of prayer for colleges was a day set apart when the churches prayed that there might be a revival. At the college it was a day of solemnity and prayer. The unconverted were marked men to be labored with and brought to the point of decision. It is not in that way that the college or the church now fosters the religious life, but rather by instruction, by appeal to manhood, to faith, and to service.

The Christian ministry is favorably regarded in the colleges. Not as many in proportion to the whole number of students become preachers as in former times. That is in part because there are so many professions, so many kinds of business, and because sons of business men in large numbers go to college. Formerly nearly all students were destined for the learned professions or for teaching. But some of the very best men choose the ministry. No surprise is expressed when it is said that So-and-so, a leading man in college, has entered a theological seminary. The only comment is, "He will succeed," or, "He will make a mighty fine preacher."

This representation of the morality and religion of college students is not an over-statement, but is, in the main, in accordance with the facts. I have looked upon the college community as a whole, in order to recognize the common standard of ethics. But a community that includes boys of seventeen and men of twenty-two years is not at one level of maturity. A Senior is not exactly the same as a Freshman. There is progress from year to year. One observes the development of students, which in some instances is very rapid. You can almost see them grow in knowledge, in sound judgment, in character. You can hardly believe, some one says, that such a one is the same man who entered three years ago; a boy then, he is a man now. Some indeed

seem to stand still, as immature as they were at first. Of a Senior I have heard it remarked, he is a Freshman still. A few deteriorate, and they are apt to disappear. But nine-tenths go from strength to strength, and, intimately associated, they build one another up. A college that counts students by hundreds secures more acquaintance of men with each other than a college that counts students by thousands, yet the American student of the large and of the small college has a high standard of intellectual conscientiousness, of right conduct, of character, and of a reasonable faith and service.

MYSTERY GOD AND OLYMPIAN GOD

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That man's social instincts and emotions have been intimately bound up with his religious emotions and ideas is, happily, in no danger of being forgotten. Through the cumulative impact of many motives, we are learning to look to man's social experience for such insight as the analysis of individual experience seemed not to afford. Thus far, the most striking instance of this—at least in the popular mind—is in the domain of morals. Conscience, when viewed as the possession and experience of the individual alone, has every appearance of something sacred and imperious, absolute and inexplicable. But once let conscience be put into the crucible of anthropology and social psychology, and its mysteriousness and absoluteness seem to have vanished. We see its function and we comprehend its genesis. It is simply the echo within the individual of the past experience of the race, an inherited instinct, which has a definite survival value in the struggle for existence. It would hardly be fair to say that every question about the meaning and worth of conscience is forthwith settled. Concerning the ultimate inferences to be drawn from the undoubted fact that conscience has had a history within man's social experience, there is much which may easily escape us in our first enthusiasm for the concepts of history, development, and social experience.

Something of the same zest and confidence which first attended the application of the concept of social experience to the analysis of conscience and morality has

reappeared among students of religion. Perhaps here too an understanding of the life of man in society will enable us really and for the first time to understand, at least in outline, what manner of thing religion is and has been and perhaps will be. For the problem is not purely theoretical; it is intensely practical as well. No thoughtful person can help wondering as to the future of those energies and sentiments and loyalties which have clustered around the religious life of the race, but which now present so many signs of disintegration and decay. How many prophets among us there are who see no future for any of the so-called religious energies, save as they are redirected upon man's supreme social interests and experiences. The life of society, the common mass life, we know, because we are of its very heart; it is indeed we; what if it be God as well? What if that which men have sought for in religion is, in truth, to be found in their actual social experiences? What if man's religion in the past has been only a language in which the realities of his social experience have found utterance?

"The human world has become infinitely more human than formerly; all the bounds which separated men from each other (religion, language, nationality, race) are regarded already by superior men as artificial. The human race itself is coming to be recognized as a part only of the animal kingdom; the entire world claims the attention of science, offers itself to our love, and opens for the devotees of mysticism the perspective of a species of universal fraternity. Just in so far as the universe thus grows larger, it becomes less and less insufficient in our eyes; and this surplus of love, which formerly mounted toward heaven in search of some transcendent resting-place, finds ample room upon the surface of the earth and of heavenly bodies not unknown to astronomy."¹

The fascinating and the radical aspect of this interpretation of religion lies in the fact that it seems to dis-

¹ Guyau; *The Non-Religion of the Future*, p. 200.

solve away the literalness, the objective truth of the fundamental religious ideas, while at the same time it does not dismiss those ideas as illusions, but interprets them as expressions of what is certainly real and important—namely, just man's social experiences and emotions. And the question then arises, if religion is the echo and deposit of the collective emotions and ideas of men, why should such collective emotions and experiences utter themselves in the form of religion; why should there ever arise the figure of a distant and remote God, literally real, and other than the life and experiences of his worshippers? Can we discover anywhere in history such a making of a God out of social experience? And if we believe that we can discover how and why the very real experiences of men undergoing group emotion should take on the form of religion and should leave as a deposit the idea of an objective, existent God, what should we infer about the essence and about the permanent worth and truth of religion?

An active school of writers has in recent years maintained the thesis that religion is such a deposit of social experience, and has endeavored to give in detail an answer to the questions we have just asked. From the side of sociology the leader of this school is Durkheim.² From the side of archaeology and the history of religion, the most conspicuous writer is Miss Harrison.³ The work of this school is impressive, I think, not so much because of the mass of detailed anthropological and archaeological evidence which they ingeniously or perversely adduce, as because of the deeper, the philosophical significance of the hypotheses they are so vigorously urging. A whole system of metaphysics lies concealed

² Durkheim's chief work on religion is *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. Paris, 1912.

³ *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*; Jane E. Harrison, Cambridge, 1903. And above all, *Themis; A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion*. Cambridge, 1912. There should also be mentioned the book of F. M. Cornford; *From Religion to Philosophy*. London, 1912.

within their interpretation of religion. Motives which are everywhere dominant in the thinking and feeling of our time here find concrete expression in novel and alluring ways. In Miss Harrison's *Themis* this main thesis about the essence of religion is applied to Greek religion, and is used as a means for estimating the religious worth of various strands in its marvellously complex totality. Concerning the mass of evidence which Miss Harrison adduces in verification of this thesis, the student of philosophy who is neither an archaeologist nor classicist has no right to an opinion; there are, however, philosophical and religious issues raised by these discussions which are, in very large measure, independent of the specific facts which are cited as evidence. The present paper offers a study of one such philosophical and religious problem—that, namely, which concerns the nature and significance of the contrast between mystery god and Olympian god. It is perhaps not too much to say that in the question about the meaning and the value of this contrast are concentrated the most profound and difficult of the religious problems which trouble our own age. Here too something of the universal genius of the Greek mind is displayed, sketching in bold outline the typical forms of culture and its enduring problems for all times.

Let us consider first the outstanding characteristics of the mystery god, and of the religion whose god he is, as these are set forth by the writers we are considering. We may best do this if we first observe that the mystery god of Greek and Hellenistic religion is the direct heir of the "God" who expresses the essential and unspoiled religious impulse of primitive man, if we accept Durkheim's interpretation of early religion. His claim to divinity is vouched for by this continuity. And he still possesses the vigor and the life of those emotions and instincts, which indeed *are* life and which gave

birth to the religious life itself. Herein, we are told, lies his religious superiority to the Olympians, "intellectual conceptions merely, things of thought bearing but slight relation to life lived."⁴ And thus we are sent to primitive religion, to the origin and source of religion, if we would rightly understand the mystery gods of historical Greece. What are the historical roots of the religious life and tradition?

Recent studies of primitive religion have evidenced an increasing discontent with the traditional view which sees in man's early religion chiefly the product of an illusory anthropomorphism due either to false inductive processes or to what Max Müller called a "disease of language." We may now, I think, say with some measure of confidence that whatever else primitive religion may have been, it was more and other than any simple belief in ghostlike beings conceived in order to explain the mysteries of life and of nature, the phenomena of sleep and dreams and death. Religion preceded such naïve animism, just as it has outlived it. Where then shall we look for the central core of primitive religion? Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites* opened the way to a different interpretation. He emphasized as the fundamental conception of ancient religion the "solidarity of the gods and of their worshippers as part of one organic society."⁵ This vital sense and emotion of social solidarity, which was also cosmic in its scope and intent, received its typical and supreme expression in the common sacrificial meal, where the community, men and gods alike, partook of one food, one life. More recently, Durkheim and his school have pointed out that even such a conception as that of Smith is too individualistic and too animistic. There are not at the outset men and gods; there is rather only the social group, and the collective emotions and representations which are gener-

⁴Themis, p. xvii.

⁵ The Religion of the Semites, p. 32.

ated through membership in the group. Let us expand this main thesis of Durkheim and report its chief constituents. There are two fundamental things to be noted: First, the essential ingredient of all religious ideas and rites is to be found in the distinction which such ideas and rites set forth or imply; the distinction, namely, between the sacred and the profane. "The division of the world into two comprehensive domains, the one comprising all that which is sacred, the other all that is profane—such is the distinctive trait of religious thought; beliefs, myths, dogmas, legends are either representations or systems of representations which express the nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers which are their attributes, their history, their relations with one another and with profane things." "Rites are rules of conduct which prescribe how man ought to behave with respect to sacred objects."⁶

There is thus an ineradicable dualism at the very birth of religion. Religion is man's expression of the discovery of a cleavage between that which is ordinary and common and that which is charged with mystery and sacredness. But this merely restates the problem. What is it in man's experience which compels him so to split up his universe? what is the source of the concept of the sacred itself? Durkheim's answer is that social experience alone can evoke the sentiment of the sacred. It is as a member of the mass life, when the individual is no longer merely himself, but lives and feels the larger emotions surging around and through him; it is through this social experience that he is transported to a level of existence which is beyond the common and the ordinary, which is divine. That social experience may intensify and transmute individual feeling is of course a familiar fact. "The laws of the multiplication of human power by association have never been worked out; but no one has failed to

⁶ Durkheim; *Les Formes élémentaires*, pp. 50, 56.

measure in frequent experiences what incredible enhancement of the value of any experience may occur in a single touch of endorsement from without.”⁷ And it is this enhancement of individual feeling through social experience which enabled Carlyle to speak of society as the “standing wonder of our existence, a true region of the supernatural,” in which “man has joined himself with man; soul acts and reacts on soul; a mystic unfathomable union establishes itself; Life in all its elements has become intensified, consecrated.”⁸

Durkheim applies such familiar facts of our experience to the question concerning the origin of the idea of the sacred. The life of primitive man seems subject to a rhythm in which there alternate periods of dispersion, when his life is ordinary, monotonous, and common, and periods of concentration, of social excitement, of contact which heightens the intensity and range of feeling and generates that which is inspired and sacred. Here are literally two worlds which the individual experiences—a world of sense-experience where economic and physical activities predominate, and a world which makes itself felt during those periods of social “effervescence,” when one immediately participates in a larger and different world through his social experiences, his group, or collective consciousness. It is a qualitatively new experience as well as one which is more overwhelming and intense. Here are then two outstanding facts to be kept in mind in interpreting the religion of primitive man. There is first the concept, or better, the emotion, the “collective representation” of something sacred, of something removed from the common, and of supreme importance for human weal and woe. Here is a supernaturalism which is prior to animism, a religion prior to objective or personal gods. And secondly, this rep-

⁷ Hocking; *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 222.

⁸ *Characteristics*. Works, Vol. I, p. 340.

resentation of the sacred, this theoplasm and matrix of all religion, is the deposit of *collective* feeling, of social experience. "Not only does the god reflect the thoughts, social conditions, morality, and the like, but in its origin his substance when analyzed turns out to be just nothing but the representation, the utterance, the emphasis of these imaginations, these emotions, arising out of particular social conditions."⁹

There follow from these two fundamental facts about primitive religion, certain derivative characteristics which must be briefly noticed. Here at its source, religion contains no worship of any foreign force or person. It is the felt participation of the individual in a collective consciousness which is super-individual, yet continuous with the individual consciousness. Here is a "reservoir," to use an expression of Cornford, to which the individual has access through religious rites, which, as we have seen, both utter and in turn intensify the group emotions. The vehicle of group emotion, the source and stuff of that which was sacred and supernatural, was no personal god or spirit, but an impersonal Mana, Wakonda, which is spoken of variously as a "sympathetic continuum," a "primitive magical complex," a "system of sanctities which knew no Gods," a "social force trembling on the very verge of Godhead." Everything which primitive man does and thinks—the chase and the warpath, the social relationships of marriage and kinship, his practices concerning birth, death, and burial, his magic and his art—are all charged with and rendered potent and awe-inspiring by this one pervasive and continuous Power, this Mana. Its influence spreads everywhere, infecting with fear and awe the entire range of the world. If its more positive and wholesome aspect is expressed in his religious rites and feelings—wholesome because under social control—its more negative and fearsome side is found in the darker practices of his magic and his taboos,

⁹ Themis, p. 28.

where the dread power has broken away from the more regular and social control of the group emotions.

But primitive religion is not merely an utterance of man's social experience, as we understand the term "social." This felt continuum of life and force which is the original stuff of all gods and the source of all spiritual substance, is not merely the bond which unites man to man in a common group life; it also unites the entire social group to nature so that both man and nature participate in one common life. It is impossible to say where the social and the human end, and where begins the mere awareness of natural objects. The totemic group includes both man and his natural environment in unbroken unity. Both man and nature participate in one common felt life. Here is a whole of life and nature, which as yet is unbroken, which is not yet disturbed by analysis and reflection, self-consciousness and individualism. The collective representation which feels and thinks this entire situation is governed by what M. Levy-Bruhl has designated the "Law of Participation." Because of the pervasive influence of the supernatural Power, the feeling and representation of which generates religion, there is a "mystic identity" between objects. Men actually are animals, the new-born infant actually is both the ancestor of the clan and the totem of the clan. According to this law, "objects can be at once themselves and other than themselves."¹⁰ Experience is interpreted in the light of this prepossession; the law itself is "impermeable to experience"—until indeed this pre-logical stage of human thinking gives way to the stage of a more logical and analytical thinking. Thus, man's social experience, his collective emotions and representations, have at the outset a more than human significance; they are cosmic and metaphysical in their scope and intent.

¹⁰ Levy-Bruhl; *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, p. 77.

There is one further fact about early religion which these writers emphasize. It is, they hold, a legitimate inference from the available facts. Religion can now be interpreted as something that in its essence is not illusory, precisely because man's social experience is not an illusion.

"We are able to say, in sum, that the religious individual does not deceive himself when he believes in the existence of a moral power upon which he depends and from which he holds the larger portion of himself. That power exists; it is society. When the Australian is carried in transport beyond himself, when he feels within himself the surging of a life whose intensity surprises him, he is the dupe of no illusion; that exaltation is real, and it is really the product of forces that are external and superior to the individual."¹¹

Such is the account of primitive religion and of the origin of the mystery god which Durkheim and his followers give. Miss Harrison summarizes the matter thus:

"Totemism then is not so much a special social structure as a stage in epistemology. It is the reflection of a very primitive fashion in thinking, or rather feeling, the universe, a feeling the realization of which is essential to any understanding of primitive religion. It is not a particular blunder and confusion made by certain ignorant savages, but a phase or stage of collective thinking through which the human mind is bound to pass. Its basis is group-unity, aggregation, similarity, sympathy, a sense of common group-life, and this sense of common life, this participation, this unity, is extended to the non-human world in a way which our modern, individualistic reason, based on observed distinctions, finds almost unthinkable."¹²

In the religion of such primitive mystery gods there is expressed unquestionably one potent and enduring motive and element of all religion. Let us apply to this entire motive, this one element of all religion, the term which appears in the quotation just given and which I have already used—the term "participation." The inti-

¹¹ Durkheim, p. 322.

¹² Themis, p. 122.

mate, immediate participation of the individual in a larger life than his own, this is what we have been describing. It is, of course, one ingredient of all mysticism. It is one impulse of the religious life to grasp some whole of things as one and indivisible, not as an inert collection, but as a single life, and to participate intimately in that life. Is it now the only impulse capable of imparting vigor and significance to man's whole enterprise? is it even the central impulse? for this is what religion must accomplish if it is to hold its own.

Let us keep this question in mind as we turn to that other tradition in Greek religion which centres around the great gods of Mount Olympus. Miss Harrison has presented the contrast between the mystery religion and the Olympian religion as if the latter were the product of motives and energies which, whatever their other values, are devoid of genuine religious worth. The Olympians, in the end, are judged to be "intellectual conceptions merely, things of thought bearing but slight relation to life lived."¹³ The mystery gods degenerate into Olympians just because religion, which means group-unity, emotion, indivisibility, life, participation, is unable to resist the encroachment of the "tendency in thought which is towards reflection, differentiation, clearness." As a matter of historical development and chronological sequence, we are not concerned with the correctness of Miss Harrison's thesis. It may be true that none of the Olympians ever developed from the impersonal, functional group demons, in the way Miss Harrison supposes. Nevertheless, the contrast between mystery god and Olympian remains, whatever may have been the genesis of the Olympians. And there remain too the motives which lead to the refusal to attribute any religious worth to the Olympians. This contrast and these motives concern us here.

There are five respects in which the mystery god is contrasted with the Olympian:

¹³ *Themis*, p. xvii.

1. The Olympians emerge only when all sacredness and divinity are excluded from nature. The primitive totemic unity, the "sympathetic continuum" between the social group and natural objects, in which as yet there is no external God, becomes broken. Divinity is now remote, not near; the immediate natural surroundings of men no longer are pervaded with mystery and Life, but become common objects, the domain of scientific analysis and practical utilities. The direct evidence for this, according to Miss Harrison, is that the "Olympian sheds his plant or animal form."¹⁴ He gradually shifts from a nature god, instinct with the life and emotions which pulse through nature and the social group continuous with her, to a human-nature god. And this process is essentially one of loss, so far as religious values are concerned. The characteristics of the Olympian human-nature god are mainly negative, the result of stripping off, through analysis and reflection, those vital characteristics which ever made the mystery god so near and so pregnant with meaning and value. The mystery gods, on the other hand, retain a strange beauty and charm and appeal to the very end. They "are never free of totemistic hauntings, never quite shed their plant and animal shapes. That lies in the very nature of their sacramental worship. They are still alive with the life-blood of all living things from which they sprang."¹⁵ Mysticism, let it be noted, never breaks entirely with pantheistic naturism. "Alle Schwärmerei ist und wird nothwendig Naturphilosophie," was the judgment of Fichte.

2. The Olympians cease to be either the symbols or the projections of a group soul. They no longer have, as an intimate part of their very substance, a community following, a *thiasos*; they are no longer a many-in-one, but solitary individuals. In the Hymn of the Kouretes,

¹⁴ Themis, p. 447.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 450.

whose elucidation furnishes the theme of Miss Harrison's *Themis*, the Kouros, the young Zeus, is hailed as coming at the head of his attendants, his *daimones*. Zeus then once had a *thiasos*, a following, a social group which attended him. "When he grew up to be the Father, it seems, he lost his *thiasos* and has gone about unattended ever since. If we can once seize the meaning of this *thiasos* and its relation to the god, we shall have gone far to understand the making of Greek mythology."¹⁶ And the meaning ascribed to the *thiasos* by the school whose teachings we are now considering is, as we have seen, the fundamental thesis that religion is to be interpreted wholly in terms of man's social experience. The Kouros, the young god, is only the projection of the Kouretes; Dionysos is "but his *thiasos* incarnate." The Kouretes, a band of youths about to be initiated, dance an excited mimetic dance. They thus utter together their feelings, their delight and terror, their desires. And

"being a collective emotion, it is necessarily felt as something more than the experience of the individual, as something dominant and external. . . . They sink their own personality . . . , they become emotionally one, a true congregation, not a collection of individuals. The emotion they feel collectively, the thing that is more than any individual emotion, they externalize, project; it is the raw material of god-head. Primitive gods are to a large extent collective enthusiasms, uttered, formulated."¹⁷

And just so long as the bond between the *thiasos* and the god remains intact, so long as the worshippers feel the intimacy which makes themselves and their god partakers of one Life, participating in a common substance, just so long is the god a genuine god, a true mystery god. But when the *thiasos*, the social group of worshippers, no longer participates in the life of the god, the god becomes a solitary individual, remote, and aloof, majestic it may be, but no longer the incarnation of man's deepest

¹⁶ *Themis*, p. 12.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 45-46.

emotions and desires. Such are the Olympians. They are "the last product of rationalism, of individualistic thinking; the *thiasos* has projected them utterly. Cut off from the very source of their life and being, the emotion of the *thiasos*, they desiccate and die. Dionysos with his *thiasos* is still Comus, still trails behind him the glory of the old group ecstasy."¹⁸

3. The Olympians cease to perform the functions of the older divinities, and demand instead that honor and service be rendered to them as superior personalities. The older gods, akin to the mystery gods, were without distinct title, ready to take on plant or animal shape, symbols of functions and activities performed, sharing in the life and labor both of man and of nature. But the Olympian renounces all of this; "instead of being himself a sacrament he demands a sacrifice."¹⁹ The inherent democracy of mysticism, of participation on the part of worshipper and god alike, in a common life and in common tasks, is replaced by the aristocratic and dualistic severance between the god who receives and men who give him honor and service. Gift-sacrifice, externality, formalism, are substituted for intimacy and felt unity, remoteness for participation. When the matter is thus presented, almost every motive which appeals to us makes us condemn the Olympians as sterile and fruitless. "Sentiment, tradition, may keep up the custom of gift-sacrifice for a while, but the gods to whom the worshipper's real heart and life goes out are the gods who work and live, not those who dwell at ease in Olympus."²⁰

4. One function which the mystery god performed for his worshippers was all-important. He not only lived and worked for them; he died for them as well. But the Olympian is immortal; this is his chief claim to distinction and remoteness from man, and also it is "the

¹⁸ Themis, p. 48.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 467.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 467.

crowning disability and curse of the new theological order."²¹

He gains deathlessness and immutability, and he thinks thereby to gain life; but the life he wins is only a "seeming immortality which is really the denial of life, for life is change."²² And this is part of a further paradox. The Olympian, we have noted, becomes completely human through ceasing to be a part of nature, through renouncing every plant and animal form, whatever is merely natural and non-human. But in thus being humanized, he loses the one supreme characteristic of human life, its change and mortality. The Olympian ceases to be both human and divine, and becomes divine alone. Men may now contemplate his beauty and perfection, but he is no longer such as men are; he no longer can sympathize with and participate in the human struggle. Hence the powerful appeal which the later mystery religions made to human need and feeling. It is not "to the bright Olympians who know naught of struggle and pain and death, but to gods who have shared these experiences, who have triumphed over death and risen to new life, that the hope of immortality attaches itself; for in their victory is the evidence that death can be overcome, and their example shows the way."²³

5. A final contrast goes to the very root of the problem. It is the contrast between two radically discrepant attitudes, two functions within human experience, which are as two opposite poles. One of these attitudes or functions has already appeared in our discussion. It is the attitude of felt participation. The mystery religions, and mystery gods, the social experience and collective emotions which lie at their root, have shown us the meaning of "participation." Let us call the other attitude "contemplation." The object contemplated is

²¹ Themis, p. 467.

²² Ibid. p. 468.

²³ Moore; *The History of Religions*, p. 444.

distinct from the one who contemplates; it is not participated in, not possessed in any of that emotional warmth which belongs to the essence of participation. Thus do the Olympians renounce all intimate participation in the life and sufferings of man, and take up their remote abode there where no mortal dare have any share or participation.

"We touch here on the very heart and secret of the difference between the Olympian and the mystery god, between Apollo and Zeus on the one hand and Dionysos on the other. . . . The Olympian has clear form, he is the '*principium individuationis*' incarnate; he can be thought, hence his calm, his *sophrosyne*. The mystery god is the life of the whole of things, he can only be felt; as soon as he is thought and individualized he passes, as Dionysos had to pass, into the thin rare ether of the Olympian. The Olympians are of conscious thinking, distinct, departmental; the mystery god is the impulse of life through all things, perennial, indivisible." ²⁴

At best, it would seem, the Olympians are objects of art, of aesthetic enjoyment; mere "artists' dreams and ideals," Gilbert Murray calls them. Detachment and remoteness, the forgetting of all selective interests, feelings, and desires, are the characteristic moments of the purely æsthetic attitude of contemplation. Such æsthetic contemplation and detachment means the decay of vital, felt participation.

Now this contrast between participation and contemplation is the crux of the whole matter, and raises a fundamental problem about the whole interpretation of religion. We must determine once and for all whether the motives that contribute to the development of contemplation, of remoteness, and the subsequent decay of immediate participation, are traitors to the genuine religious impulse, to be deplored as of purely negative and destructive influence upon the religious life, or whether, on the other hand, they contribute anything of positive

²⁴ Themis, p. 476.

worth to religion. We have more than once observed that, in the judgment of the writers we have been dealing with, the former is the true account of the matter. Throughout, in Miss Harrison's treatise, the Olympians are regarded as but an "intellectual backwater," "intellectual conceptions merely, things of thought bearing but slight relation to life lived." And this is the common judgment of all those who interpret whatever is enduring and significant in religion to be merely an expression of man's social consciousness and experience, his sense of participation in a common, mass life. This motive and this judgment are offered us now in the name of mysticism, and again in the name of democracy. There is no dearth of vigorous writers and teachers who see in just this same motive of participation which engendered the mystery god our one chance for religion in the future. Professor Leuba has written, towards the close of his volume, *The Psychological Study of Religion*, the following:

"There is no question but that Humanity idealized and conceived as a manifestation of Creative Energy possesses surpassing qualifications for a source of religious inspiration. Human relationships have always given rise to the noblest activities of men; they have been and remain the very fountain of life. In a religion of Humanity, man's attention would be directed not to a remote, intangible Perfection, but to a concrete reality of which he is a part and the perfection of which depends upon his own perfection. In Humanity each person can regard himself as a link in the chain connecting the hosts of the past with the hosts that are to come. The recognition of this vast relationship would give a sense of fellowship and unity; it would make a world worthy of one's best efforts." ²⁸

And again one other writer:

"It is this 'large figure,' not simply of human, but of cosmic society, which is to yield our God of the future. It is the figure of myriad lives, and yet one vast group life, in ceaseless activity. There is no place in the figure for an eternally perfect being, and no need;

²⁸ Themis, p. 355.

no need, for the vast society by its own inherent mass—dialectic, of struggle and adaptation, co-operation and conflict—is working out its own destiny; no place, for the society, democratic from end to end, can brook no such radical class distinction as that between a supreme being favored with eternal and absolute perfection and the mass of beings doomed to the lower ways of imperfect struggle. It is the large figure out of which is projected the conception of the God that is ourselves, in whom and of whom we literally are; the God that, in every act and intention, we, with all our countless fellows, are realizing.”²⁸

We face the problem then as to whether the motive and attitude of contemplation, of detachment and remoteness, is really a positive element within the genuine religious life, or whether it is an intruder, a source of decay and of blight. And for our age it is the problem as to whether the social experiences which sum themselves up in the idea of participation in the common life of humanity are adequate bearers of the religion of the future.

There are some fundamental reasons, doubly urgent in the present crisis of civilization which, I believe, point indubitably in a different direction from the one taken by Miss Harrison as well as by the authors I have just quoted. And I will say nothing here of the lack of historical justice, which would exclude from the religious life of humanity some of its most precious religious inheritances. If participation alone is worthy to count as the motive and generator of religion, one will of necessity exclude from the reflective religious tradition that contemplation of remote and deathless entities which Plato expressed in his theory of Ideas, the God of Aristotle's theology, Stoic resignation and “apathy,” one constant strain which runs through the *Imitation of Christ*, the most characteristic things in the theology of St. Thomas, Spinoza's Intellectual Love of God, and

²⁸ The Democratic Conception of God; Professor H. A. Overstreet. *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XI, p. 409.

certainly one element within mysticism which in its higher forms is a compound of both Participation and Contemplation. The inherent religious quality and worth of contemplation as well as of participation, must surely be admitted. But it is another and, as I believe, a far more serious criticism of the denial to the Olympians of religious worth, which may here be mentioned. The very absence of the possibility of participation, the remoteness of man and gods which contemplation signifies, are the necessary accompaniment of the long process whereby man learns to distinguish between what is near, close at hand, immediate, and what is good, what is the ideal and the goal of his destiny. The Olympian remoteness and contemplation are both an accompaniment of this moral process and they aid and stimulate it as well. And this is *the* moral process. The moral consciousness can emerge and can play its part in human life only as the primitive mysticism of participation breaks up, in order that some quality of contemplation may appear. Perhaps at some further stage of religion participation may reappear on a higher level, higher because of what it has learned from contemplation and the moral consciousness. The development of the Olympian tradition was then not loss chiefly, not an "intellectual backwater," but a necessary part of religion, contributing something of positive worth to the whole process. The distinction is a real one between the natural and the ethical religions. As long as man's life blends with that of nature in one felt unity, as long as that social and natural mysticism prevails, which characterizes the totemism of early religion, man will not dream of possessing or achieving an ideal good, freed from the irrational limitations of feeling and caprice. Both the social group and the nature continuous with it must cease to satisfy before man can seek or find a God who is also good.

That the Olympians came to represent and sanction moral ideals cannot be doubted. Imaginative playthings, objects of art, abstract intellectual conceptions, they may well have been, but the moral function is there too, and it is sufficient to save the serious and the religious character of the Olympians. The best proof of this is furnished by a study of the cult titles used in prayer and sacrifice. An exhaustive account of these is given by Mr. Farnell, in his *Cults of the Greek State*. Social, political, and ethical designations of the functions of the great Olympians are found in abundance; indeed it is not too much to say that they predominate. The Olympians, when worshipped under these ethical cult titles, were no *objets d'art*, yet they were, to be sure, objects of contemplation. But to contemplate a distant being or object is not of necessity mere idle play of the aesthetic imagination, though it may become this. There is a moral vision of some ideal perfection, contemplated from afar, not participated in, and from such contemplation may come added zest and significance.

But the radical fallacy which lurks in the disparagement of the religious worth of the Olympians and which supposes them to be mere intellectual playthings and objects of poetic fancy, lies still deeper. The fallacy rests at bottom upon the assumption that the immediacies of felt experience are self-sufficing, able to sustain and to guarantee all of the values of life; that whatever is not to be thus possessed and participated in, whatever is a distant object of mere knowledge and contemplation, is pale and shadowy, inert and fruitless. But that the religious consciousness which has uttered itself in the historical religions fits in with this assumption, whether true or false, cannot be admitted for a moment. Examine the religious consciousness and go back once more to its totemistic origins, as Durkheim and his followers would have us do. Here is, we have seen, the felt unity

both of a human group and of some province of nature. Both "pools," as Mr. Cornford calls them, the human pool and the nature pool, are, at the outset, continuous with each other, so that there is felt to be, in truth, but one group. Because everything belongs to the one felt group, the one "sympathetic continuum," every region of the group participates in every other region.

Here then is no dualism, no externality, no contemplation. And yet that which is later to become simply the human world even now really has its environment, its background; and this awareness of the environment, of some genuine whole of things, makes this primitive consciousness religious in addition to being social. The religious moment within this primitive feeling relates to the specifically human group. Totemism is, in brief, religious because the feeling to which the totemic system gives birth is more than mere feeling; it is something cognitive, it bears witness to a background and an environment. Now it is the function of the Olympians, as of all such gods who express the motive of contemplation rather than participation, that they keep alive this knowledge side of religion, this reference to some background of things precisely not here and now experienced and participated in. They are symbols of a distant city of God, a Platonic Realm of Ideas, the thought of which, even if only in sheer imagination, can alone lend stability and significance. Thus can the Olympians be spoken of, in a splendid phrase, as "the symbols of eternity and calm in a transient and troubled world."²⁷

It is because there is a profound difference between the immediacies of feeling-experience and some knowledge of what the environment and background of experience are, that religion is not, in the end, to be interpreted in terms of social experience. Social experience, in so many ways the highest level of our experience, is, after all, like

²⁷ J. Adam; *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 117.

all experience, something immediate, possessed now and here. Religion, better than anything else, can serve to keep alive in men's minds awareness of the total setting of our lives and our experiences, which even vaguely and dimly to know is infinitely better than sheer contentment with the immediate possessions of experience, even though they be as precious as are our social experiences. At any rate, such is the utterance of religion. To see nothing of positive religious worth in the "blessed ones who dwell on Olympus," to see in social mysticism, in participation, in the dominance of the democratic impulse, the whole of religion's enduring worth, is to be strangely blind to the inner impulse of the religious tradition itself.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE ENGLISH CATHOLIC REVIVAL IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. PAUL THUREAU-DANGIN. 2 vols. Simpkin, Marshall, & Co. London. 31s. 6d.

M. Thureau-Dangin is a distinguished Academician, whose *Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet* ranks as a classic. In the present work, published in France in 1899, he enters upon new ground. A liberal Catholic in the pre-Modernist sense of the word, he represents the best traditions of French Catholicism; traditions which, because they express the mind and conscience of the nation, will survive both Pius X and M. Combes. It is natural that he should look with interest at the Oxford Movement and its various offshoots; it is also natural that he should see them a little out of proportion and attribute to them a greater significance than they really possess. For the same reason that Catholicism is, and will long remain, a power in French life, it is not, and will not become, a power in English life; because it is not Catholicism but Protestantism which expresses the religious genius of Englishmen. Faulty, however, as M. Thureau-Dangin's perspective is, he has given us a very readable book, the result of wide and careful reading, in which much information not easily accessible to the general reader will be found. Those who demur to the dictum of James I, that one side of the question is enough for an honest man, may be referred to Archbishop Whately's *Cautions for the Times*; to Dean Stanley's *Life of Dr. Arnold*; to Miss Petre's memorable *Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell*; perhaps, *invito auctore*, to Mr. W. Ward's excellent and very candid *Life of Cardinal Newman*; and to Mr. McCabe's *Decay of the Church of Rome*. The subject falls into three divisions: (1) The Oxford Movement; (2) the Converts to Rome; (3) Later Anglo-Catholicism; and the comment may follow the same lines.

Whatever else the Oxford Movement had or had not, it emphatically had charm. It fell like a breath of romance upon an unromantic age, and a sure instinct drew the romantic to it; nor, if the romance of our own time is larger, should the day of small things be despised. Nor was the *vates sacer* wanting; in Newman it pos-

sessed a great man of letters, a born artist, a consummate advocate, and, if not a leader, certainly an inspirer and mover of men. It had also the power of personal piety; there was a more profound conviction of sin, a more "fearful looking for judgment," a livelier sense of the presence of God than are common today. Yet taken as a whole, the modern conscience is better informed and more right-minded. Fear was the dominant note of Tractarian religion, both in those who went to Rome and in those who remained. This led to a false moral standard. Either, as with Pascal, human nature as such was sin; or, as with the casuists, the conception of right and wrong became external. Those who scrupled at the curtailing of an office or the breaking of a fast would fall below the standards of men of the world in courtesy and consideration for others, in temper, in truthfulness, and honor. These they regarded as "natural" virtues. The result was a certain formalism; the impression left was one of regular observance rather than of spirituality or real goodness of heart. While the outlook over life was individualistic, poverty and sickness were the occasions for the practice of almsgiving, not evil social conditions which could and should be overcome. No social reformer—Manning's noble passion for reform came to him with the disillusionment of old age—was drawn to the Oxford Movement; nor, with few if any exceptions, did it attract those whom the older Evangelicals would have described as "converted" men. The Tractarians were devout; they were in trouble, often in lifelong trouble, about their souls. But the final experience—"joy and peace in believing"—lay beyond them; they were seekers, but they had not found.

The Movement bulks so large in controversy that we are apt to forget on how restricted a scale it acted. The rank and file of the nation were untouched by it; the leaders of English thought—the great Victorian poets, thinkers, historians, scientists—passed it by. It came into contact with a section only even of the religious world. To the English Nonconformist, the Scotch Presbyterian, the Irish Catholic, it was a mere name. The Evangelicals were hostile, non-party Churchmen suspicious; Cambridge, the University of common-sense, was indifferent. It was from Oxford, the University of ideas, that it issued—name and thing. An Oxford man may be forgiven a certain prejudice in favor of ideas. But the more importance we attach to ideas, the more important it becomes that our ideas shall be reasonable; and the ideas that underlay the Oxford Movement were unreasonable and without foundation in fact. Of Newman, Goldwin Smith notices that "he

was always in quest not of the truth, but of the best system"; of W. G. Ward, M. Thureau-Dangin tells us that "above all else a formidable dialectician, he professed to ignore history and to despise facts."¹

Ignorance, indeed, was the Achilles' heel of the Movement. The Oxford of the time was provincial; and, great in many ways as Newman was, his learning was moderate, even for his time.

"The force of his dialectic and the beauty of his rhetorical exposition were such that one's eye and ear were charmed, and one never thought of enquiring on how narrow a basis of philosophical culture his great gifts were expended. A. P. Stanley once said to me, 'How different the fortunes of the Church of England might have been, if Newman had been able to read German!' That puts the matter in a nutshell. Newman assumed and adorned the narrow basis on which Laud had stood two hundred years before. All the grand development of human reason from Aristotle down to Hegel was a sealed book to him."²

The common-sense argument against the Catholic position is strong, but it lends itself to one-sided treatment. The Tractarians knew too much to take the No-Popery polemic of their time at its own valuation; they did not know enough to see that, in spite of its faults of taste and temper, its substance was reasonable and its instinct sound. The growth of critical and historical science during the last half-century has transformed the situation. The Tractarian of the Movement did not know and did not want to know. The Tractarian of today goes farther; he wants not to know.

The more consistent Tractarians felt themselves less and less at ease in Anglicanism; logically and temperamentally Rome was their goal. The same reasoning which demonstrated the Divine Right of Bishops demonstrated also the Divine Right of the Papacy; nor could the temper which welcomed sacerdotalism find its formal completion in Papalism displeasing. On the other hand, the very virtues which dispose a man to Catholicism indispose him to independent action in religion; the quality in Pusey which M. Thureau-Dangin describes as "quiet obstinacy"³ appears to his biographer "sublime faith." The most distinguished of the converts were Newman and Manning. Each was a notable personality, a figure with which no Protestant ecclesiastic of the time could compare. They came to the English Catholic body at the psychological moment when, owing to the Irish immigration after the famine of 1847, it was driven to enlarge its borders. This material increase was

¹ I, 144.² Mark Pattison, *Memoirs*, p. 210.³ I, 386.

accompanied and enhanced by the prestige of the convert movement; the union of the two transformed what had been a scattered and obscure community into a Church which has become a power, if not in our intellectual, certainly in our political and social life. Never were two men more different.

"The one, a subtle and profound thinker, disdainful of outward action, more preoccupied with the realities of the invisible than of the visible world, used to study thought in all its phases, with an aptitude for understanding natures the most unlike his own, keenly appreciative of the perplexities of the human mind; the other a man of action and of government, little curious as to mere ideas, seeing only the basis of operation, a mind powerful, courageous, elevated, but absolute, easily imperious, seeking only what he believed the true and the good, and making straight for it, decided in treating as hostile whoever followed a different direction, incapable of entering into thoughts other than his own, or of sympathising with the intellectual difficulties of his opponents."¹

The English Church has been reproached with not having known how to use Newman. His type was perhaps too individual for a community to use easily. And certainly the Church of his adoption did not use him; from the first he was an embarrassment in England and a suspect at Rome. He liberalized, as good men do, with years and experience; in the sagacious and moderate Newman of 1870 it is difficult to recognize the fierce obscurantist of 1845. The former is the Newman whom we know. And if more than any one other man he made the legend of Catholicism—for he was a great magician, and, like the pious sons of Noah, he went backward and threw a veil over its shame—more than any one other man he opened to men irrespective of sect the ideal vistas of religion, seeing and enabling others to see the ladder of Bethel, which, though clouds and darkness which we may not pierce lie between them, unites heaven and earth.

Manning's best years were spent in the pursuit of the chimera of Infallibility. A reasoner as abstract as, though less acute than, Ward, he had Ward's contempt for history, the appeal to which he denounced as treason. At the Vatican Council his unscrupulous lobbying displeased the Cardinals even of his own faction—*Non ita sunt tractandae res Ecclesiae* was the reproach addressed to him. The definition for which he fought was imposed upon the Council, but with it leanness entered into his soul. The proof of the greatness of the man is that he learned his lesson; he "put away childish things." His last years were devoted to social service, in which he

¹ II, 87.

ranks with General Booth and Lord Shaftesbury. No man of his generation did more to restore the credit of religion with the masses than he. On this side he left a very noble record; and it is one of the paradoxes of human affairs that the best and most lasting work of each of the two great English cardinals was done outside the limits of the Church of which he was a prince, and has left its mark rather on those without than within the fold.

With their death "the heroic age"¹ of the Revival closed. The Roman Catholic body continues to attract wavering Anglicans, and does good work among the Irish poor in the great towns. But the converts have fallen off both in number and in distinction; while, among those in particular—and they are the great majority of the Catholic community—who stand on the margin of civilization, there is a great and increasing "leakage." The weakening of institutional and dogmatic religion, noticeable in all the Churches, is a particularly disintegrating symptom where the emphasis falls so markedly on institutions and dogma as is the case in Catholicism; the thing itself is there.

In the National Church the Movement has brought about a notable increase of ecclesiasticism—in ceremonial, in teaching, and generally in atmosphere. Part of this development is æsthetic—the old services were frankly wearisome; part historic—the Protestant tradition, as it stood, was untenable; part religious—pre-Tractarian Anglicanism was hard, cold, and dry. The ill-judged ritual prosecutions, encouraged by the Victorian bishops, defeated their own purpose. Deprivation might have met the case; but the imprisonment of good, if wrong-headed, men for the violation of a rubric was felt to be intolerable; the penalty was out of proportion to the offence. This sense of injustice, combined with clerical *esprit de corps*, did much to unite the Ritualists with the traditional High Churchmen into the "Church Party"—a party now dominant in and aiming at the exclusive exploitation of the Church. Its notes are insistence on Episcopacy, the accentuation of mediæval dogma and ritual, belief in the magical powers of the priesthood, and impatience of State control. These notes vary in intensity; the torrid climate of the *Church Times* differs from the temperate zone of the *Guardian*. But the moderate section follows the lead of the militant, and the party acts as a whole. Its organization has enabled it to impose itself on the bishops, whose first thought is to keep the Church together; and through them on the Government and on public opinion. The tendency among politicians is to regard the Church as a backwater, and to leave it to manage its own

¹ II, 425.

business in its own way. *Hoc Ithacus velit*. But the feeling is that Disestablishment, though not imminent, is inevitable; that in religious affairs it is safer for a Ministry to take the line of least resistance; and perhaps that there is a certain incongruity in the intervention of indifferent or sceptical statesmen in Church affairs. Those who stand outside the compromises imposed by party politics see the matter in another light. The supremacy of the Crown effectively exercised through its responsible ministers, through Parliament, and through the Courts of Law, represents better than either a synod mixed or clerical, or, under our circumstances, than a direct popular vote, that *consensus populi* which was from the first held essential to any corporate action of the Church.¹ For it is the genuine popular voice that is needed, not that of the clerically-minded layman, who is less a layman than a clergyman in lay dress. Religion is too important a part of civilization to be left to develop one-sidedly; the interests of a national Church are those of the nation, which cannot safely suffer it to fall into the hands of a faction. For while the majority of the clergy and an appreciable and energetic minority of the laity act with the Church Party, the nation and the great mass even of Churchmen is on the other side. Were the question one of toleration, the solution would be easy. The Church is comprehensive and knowledge grows. But it is one of incompatible principles. The freedom of the Church, as the Zanzibar school understands it, is freedom to exclude opponents. There can be no terms between truth and error. While one Protestant remains in the Anglican communion the end of the Catholic revival is unattained.² The recent Kikuyu controversy and the anti-Modernist campaign, which smoulder in the clerical press and which a spark might fan to flame, make the radical divergence of standpoint unmistakable; and were the English mind logical, which it fortunately is not, it is difficult to see how the Tudor settlement of religion, to which the country owes so much, could remain in its existing form. *Spero fore* is M. Thureau-Dangin's answer to the question, Will the Catholic Revival end in Roman Catholicism?³ He will perhaps be found to have underrated the English genius for compromise, the reason latent in unreason, and the atmosphere created, even for those who live outside them, by ideas.

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¹ Acts 15²².

² II, 600.

³ II, 603.

A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN SCOTLAND. Vol. I. ALEX. R. MAC-
EWEN, D.D. Hodder & Stoughton. Pp. xviii, 487. \$3.00.

In this book the modern reader will welcome the first adequate account of the history of the Scottish Church before the Reformation. Dr. MacEwen's work comes more than half a century after that of his nearest predecessors writing in English. Cunningham's *Church History of Scotland* first appeared in 1859, and Grub's *Ecclesiastical History of Scotland* was published in 1861. Besides a slightly revised edition of Cunningham, the only important treatise since produced is Bellesheim's *Geschichte der Katholischen Kirche in Schottland* (1883), an accurate and exhaustive work from the Catholic point of view, which has been viciously translated in the interests of Catholicism by Father Hunter Blair. But while general treatises have been lacking, a large amount of research work has been done in various departments of the general subject, and the data thus accumulated form a not inconsiderable sum. In the period of the Celtic Church, for example, our author is able to speak with far greater assurance than was possible to the historian of half a century ago. It is time for a synthesis of the ascertained facts about the Celtic Church as a whole. This has been attempted by Zimmer (*Realencyclopädie*, Vol. 10); but owing to the obsession of this writer's mind with a fine-spun and highly improbable theory of the "Patrick-Legend," his essay is an unsafe guide. The Celtic Church of Ireland has been ably treated by G. F. Stokes and others, and that of Wales exhaustively by Hugh Williams (*Early Christianity in Britain*, 1912). Dr. MacEwen's discussion of the Celtic period in the Scottish Church leaves little to be desired; but his emphasis on the national character of that Church rather obscures the common elements of, and the reciprocal relations between, the British and the Scoto-Irish Christianity of the period.

The author keeps his readers constantly aware of the trend of events in the history of the Catholic Church. While the distinctive features of Celtic monasticism are set forth with minute attention to detail, not many students will fully concur in the generalization that "detachment from normal Church activities was a characteristic of early Latin and Greek monachism, whereas identification with the whole life of the Church was an essential of the monachism of the Scots." It was during the very period to which this statement refers (the Second Period of the *Catalogue of Irish Saints*, i.e., about 534-572) that the Irish Church produced such detached monastics as Columbanus and Brendan the Voyager. The main thesis developed here is that, at the particular stage at which the Church of Ireland branched into Scotland, "all the clergy

were monks," and that as a result the Scottish Church throughout the Celtic period was characterized by a purely monastic ministry. This view is consistently upheld in an interesting chapter on the period of the Culdees. Dr. MacEwen ably controverts Skene's theory of the foreign origin of the Culdees from the Rule of Chrodegang, Bishop of Metz, and argues that they were simply "the monastic clergy who were the only ministers of the *Ecclesia Scoticana*." The question "Were the Culdees celibate?" is replied to in a brief note, the answer given being an uncertain negative: "It is probable that they were allowed to marry with restrictions." No doubt the author here takes us as far as the historical materials warrant. But it would be interesting to know how he conceives of the transition from the strictly celibate monachism of the Church of Columba to this vastly different system. The transition is the more difficult to imagine in view of the fact that the tendency of Catholic Christianity was in the opposite direction.

For the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Dr. MacEwen has availed himself of the recently published *Calendar of Papal Registers*, and from this source an interesting, though unfavorable, light is cast on the pre-Reformation Church in Scotland. There is evidence of a large measure of papal interference, particularly in appointments to church offices. Italian and French candidates frequently obtained remunerative charges, and these were usually held in absence. The country was despoiled by the exactions of selfish prelates, who gave no attention to the cure of souls.

Dr. MacEwen is a true Scot and a true Presbyterian. He has recently been elected to the Moderatorship of the General Assembly of the United Free Church. But his book bears few if any traces of his church allegiance; none, I believe, of national prejudice. Perhaps some will suspect him of partisanship in a few paragraphs, *e.g.*, in his remarks on the latter part of the career of St. Cuthbert; but such objections would be likely to be taken by some readers to any possible treatment of so difficult a subject as the history of the Scottish Church. The main impression made by the work is that of mature and able scholarship, faithful research, and clear judgment; and we may safely assume that these qualities will place it in a position of authority for some time to come. The footnotes refer the reader to a multitude and variety of authors and sources. It is to be hoped that in another edition the author will repent of his refusal to append a bibliographical list. More serious is the absence of an index, but we look for this with the second volume.

JOHN T. MCNEILL.

VANCOUVER, B.C.

A HISTORY OF CREEDS AND CONFESSIONS OF FAITH IN CHRISTENDOM AND BEYOND, WITH HISTORICAL TABLES. WILLIAM A. CURTIS, D.LITT.
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. Pp. xx, 502.

The purpose of the author is indicated when he says, in his preface, that there is room for a book which shall supply the general reader as well as the scholar with accurate information for an intelligent appreciation of the history and literature of dogma. In his introduction the author tells us, "Undogmatic religion is, strictly speaking, a contradiction in terms. Every religion has enshrined a creed, and in some fashion has given voice to a confession of the faith by which it lives. The intellect and the life of man have their own sacrifice and tribute to offer on the altar of faith." He also tells us in his introduction, "Religion only betrays an instinct which is universal when it gives utterance, in language as august as lips can frame, to its mature convictions." The earliest confessions of faith, possibly the best, our author tells us, were avowals of faith in a Person, not narrowly intellectual. An excellent analysis is given of the origin and purpose of creeds, which may be summarized as follows: (1) Spontaneous utterances of new-found conviction. (2) A natural evolution of the consciousness of the Christian community. As an illustration of this he cites the *Te Deum*, which he very correctly calls a lyric creed. (3) Creeds formed for liturgical use. (4) Those formed for purpose of catechizing professed converts. Among these is placed the Apostles' Creed. (5) For public testimony, not merely before the church but before the world. (6) To make plain the religious belief, so as to remove misconception. For illustration, many of the great Confessions of the Reformation. (7) To settle controversy. (8) To form a bond of union; for example, the Westminster Confession. (9) To secure a standard of orthodoxy either for church members or for church officers.

The author does not confine himself to Christian beliefs but devotes two chapters to Confessions of non-Christian religions. With regard to these it may be said that they are liable to leave a somewhat erroneous impression, because the creed of most heathen religions occupies a relatively small place, and in some cases these Confessions have certainly found expression after and in relation to the Christian religion. The creed of Islam is, like that of the ancient religion of Israel, exceedingly short. To some extent the Hebrews have regarded themselves as having a creedless religion, but the author says, "The true creed of Israel in the Old Testament is, 'Hear, O Israel; Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord, is one.'" But this certainly would not express the sum total of

Israelitish belief in the days of Jesus. And from the days of Philo, as our author shows, there has been a tendency to amplify this creed. The Christian's creed is found to commence with the simple acknowledgment that Jesus is the Christ. Later this is made to include the doctrine of his divinity, which later involves the doctrine of the Trinity. That the Trinitarian formula has justification in the teaching of Paul is easily shown. Professor Curtis takes up and considers with care and with equal clearness the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene, the Creed of Constantinople, of Chalcedon, and the so-called Athanasian Creed. It is very acceptable to find place given, too brief in fact, to the *Gloria* and the *Te Deum*, for the latter especially deserves to rank as perhaps the best creed to which the Church has ever given expression. There is room for difference of opinion concerning the Apostles' Creed, and our author does not always agree with other students of this symbol. But the whole discussion of all these creeds, together with the texts, is illuminating.

We cannot follow in detail the author's treatment of the creeds which found confession in the Greek and Oriental churches, and also those of the churches of the Reformation. His work in these Confessions is done carefully and in a fair, historical spirit. The subject is brought well up to date, in that it includes a summary of beliefs in use in the Salvation Army, and even takes into consideration the tenets which Mrs. Eddy, of Christian Science, submitted to the world's Parliament of Religion in 1893. Of course no discussion is given of these items of supposed belief. Mormonism also presents a creed, consisting of the Thirteen Articles of Joseph Smith, dating from 1840; in which however much that is distinctly Mormon does not appear. Not the least interesting and valuable part of the book is a review of the history of the creeds, their general necessity and value, and the ethical significance of subscription. There is much in the treatment of this last topic which is noteworthy. We can give but one sentence: "Allowance must be made for the element of legitimate compromise inseparable from all great organizations."

On the whole, it is not saying too much when we credit the author with having realized the purpose which he announces in the beginning: "To review with honesty, fairness, and charity the great dogmatic systems of the Christian world, to exhibit their contents without prejudice and distortion, and to glance with sympathy across the Christian boundary at kindred documents beyond, so far as they are known." There are points at which one might depart from Professor Curtis's position. For instance, the relation of the

old Roman creed is not satisfactorily traced. Whether the Apostles' Creed was originally in the East as well as in the West is possible but by no means sure. The introduction of some personal creeds, like that of Tolstoy, for instance, and that of Mrs. Eddy, hardly adds to the dignity of the volume and little to its value. The volume closes with appendices which tabulate the variations in the evolution of the Christian Creeds, and with an index which leaves little to be desired. Without question Professor Curtis has given us a book which, while it does not throw much light on matters critically in dispute, yet makes relatively easy and agreeable an acquisition of the knowledge of the intellectual forms through which the Christian religion has passed. For this, therefore, he places all readers in his debt, and readers, considering the merit of the book, should be many.

ALLEN MACY DULLES.

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

VINCENT DE PAUL, PRIEST AND PHILANTHROPIST. E. K. SANDERS.
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 419. \$4.00.

Mr. Sanders in his introduction seeks to make plain that Vincent de Paul was first of all a priest and that his motives and ideals were those of his order. He was imbued with the ideas of sanctity which have been characteristic of the Catholic Church. He would have had no sympathy with social service apart from the sanctions of an authoritative and ascetic religion. But in spite of this disclaimer, the reader who follows the story is most attracted and held by the modernness of St. Vincent's methods and points of view. As a priest this man of the seventeenth century may have been like the other good priests of his day, but as a philanthropist he is akin to those of the twentieth century. In a complex character we have a right to choose those elements which have the most significance for our own time.

The significance of St. Vincent de Paul lay in those things upon which he himself may have put least emphasis. Unlike most men of his order, he looked upon poverty not as a means of grace but as a definite evil to be dealt with by organized effort. He was not satisfied with mere almsgiving. He sought to train a body of social workers, who should give themselves with absolute consecration to work for the destitute. His system of relief and of friendly visiting was based on knowledge of actual conditions. He was wonderfully successful in enlisting the wealthy classes in voluntary service, but

he saw the limitations of these people. In the Sisters of Charity he had a body of trained workers on which he could rely.

Some of the most interesting chapters in Mr. Sanders's book are those in which he gives us glimpses of other forms of philanthropy in that day which had no connection with the church. Renaudot, the friend of the poor, stands out as the type of the social reformer with which we are familiar. Renaudot's Bureau was both in its ideal and method an anticipation of our Charity Organization Societies. The Bureau did not actually dispense charity, but formed a means of communication between the charitably disposed and those who needed specific help.

At the present time, when so many ministers and churches are perplexed over the multiplicity of modern demands, there is help in the experience of the past. St. Vincent de Paul is an example of the way in which the most fervent piety manifests itself in practical philanthropy.

SAMUEL McC. CROTHERS.

CAMBRIDGE.

MYSTICISM AND MODERN LIFE. JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM, D.D. The Abingdon Press. 1915. Pp. 256. \$1.00.

MYSTICISM AND THE CREED. W. F. COBB, D.D. Macmillan & Co. 1914. Pp. xxi, 559. 10s. 6d.

The wide diversity of opinion and attitude which is included in the present "revival" of mysticism is well shown in these two books. The first is a careful and in many respects successful effort to apply the special methods and discoveries of the mystics to the spiritual needs of modern men. The second presents mysticism—or, more accurately, gnostic symbolism—as offering a relief from the difficulties of dogmatic theology.

It need hardly be said that the point of view represented by Dr. Buckham is more in harmony with the principles of traditional Christian mysticism than that which is so ably defended by Dr. Cobb; though here too the wide sweep of the author's net includes many things which the great contemplatives would hardly have looked upon as branches of their "Science of Love," while omitting others which they would certainly have considered to be essential to it. In Dr. Buckham's book amongst much that is admirable we find traces of that defective conception which mars nearly all modern writings upon mysticism, with the exception of Baron von Hügel's great and noble work—the conception which regards man as the first term and God as the second term, and which studies the

mystical process with a view to the profit which man's soul can get from it, in the way of illumination, peace, strength, holiness.

This glaring error of current spirituality, seen at its worst in the "New Thought" and "Higher Health" movements, is no new thing in mysticism. It has arisen at intervals in the history of Christianity, and whenever it has arisen it has been popular. It was described and condemned in the fourteenth century by the great mystic Ruysbroeck as "commercial spirituality," and is of course the exact opposite of that "perfect self-abandonment," seeking nothing in return, which is the real secret of the saints. I do not suggest that Dr. Buckham approves this heresy in the crude form in which it appears in Christian Science or "joy philosophy." Yet his endorsement of the advice to "avail ourselves of the Infinite" as "rational, logical, and *thoroughly worth while*" (p. 65) goes a long way in that direction. The emphasis in his pages lies rather on self-fulfilment than on self-surrender. He represents mystical experience as (a) something which we can get for ourselves, and (b) something from which we reap moral, spiritual, perhaps even physical advantage. Now as regards the voluntarist character of mystic apprehension, though the large amount we can do for ourselves in developing the spiritual consciousness should certainly be realized, yet no account of the unfolding of that consciousness can be complete which ignores the part played by that strange "power other than ourselves" which is technically called "grace." The mystical process is best understood when regarded as a "give and take" between our free will and love and God's free will and love. The self-long ethical and religious training does not ensure the Divine communication but merely makes it possible; as its attitude of still receptivity in contemplation—which must not be confused with the mere limpness of quietism—is but the preparation of an experience which it cannot of itself either induce or control.

As regards the "advantages" of mysticism, the swift illuminations and renewals of the spirit which it often brings, these are the accidents, not the substance, of the spiritual life. They more often fall to the lot of beginners than those who are advanced in the way. Dr. Buckham says (p. 92), "Without the freshness and zest which they give to life, existence might grow ashen and dreary—a meaningless leer, or a tragic shadow-play." Yet nothing is more certain than the fact that the greatest of the mystics were deprived, sometimes for years together, of these heavenly glimpses; that for them existence did grow ashen and dreary, and that they regarded this as a normal and healthful episode of the spiritual life, an opportunity for perfect

renunciation. Those who sought the "vision splendid" for its own sake they described as "spiritual gluttons," who mistook, as the Sufis would say, the Wayside Tavern for the goal of the quest. For them, in fact, the Mystic Way was something far more austere and costing than the gracious religious idealism of which Dr. Buckham writes. Where they were Christians, their life was centred on the cross; their joyousness and serenity were tested in bitter sufferings, sufferings which they welcomed with an eagerness which seems morbid to our modern world. If, however, that modern world is to enter into the heritage of the mystics in any real sense, it must accept the hard side with the soft; and its teachers must be persuaded to offer it, not the sponge cakes and jam of spirituality but the "strong food of the men of God."

Though on this side *Mysticism and Modern Life* may seem defective, yet on the other hand it contains chapters for which the reader can feel nothing but sympathy and gratitude. Especially admirable is the way in which the strictly normal character of the mystical life is insisted upon; the stages of the Mystic Way being shown as permanent factors in all religious growth, which must progress from purification of character through interior enlightenment to that harmony with Reality which corresponds with the contemplative's Unitive Way. Thus the mystic becomes, not a holy freak, but a man among men, developing in accordance with laws operative over the whole race; and his special experiences are seen as intense forms of a spiritual apprehension possessed in a rudimentary degree by countless ordinary people, and probably potentially present in us all. Since Dr. Buckham is specially concerned with the extent to which mystical apprehension can enter into the experience of the ordinary man, there is here little discussion of its higher and rarer forms. He dwells almost entirely upon that enhanced consciousness of the spiritual which the mystics themselves call the Way of Illumination—the direct intuitive Vision of Reality, "above reason but not without reason," possessed by so many poets and artists as well as by the contemplative saints. Perhaps the most interesting section of his book, from the point of view of the student, is that in which he deals with the nature of this mystical intuition, and vindicates its strictly rational character. Emotionalists on the one hand and intellectualists on the other will here find much that they can ponder to advantage.

Finally, the summary of the qualities which distinguish a sane and valid Christian mysticism, and the defects to which it is most inclined, is a useful corrective to much loose writing on this subject.

Mysticism is only normal, says Dr. Buckham most justly, when it is (1) empirical rather than speculative, (2) active in service, (3) moderate and reverent in expression, (4) free from all taint of occultism, (5) theistic, not pantheistic, (6) Christocentric. Its special failings are (1) an uncontrolled individualism, resulting in a certain contempt for institutions, (2) extravagance in doctrine, in asceticism, and in emotional expression, (3) a tendency to minimize evil, (4) a lack of historical sense. We may add that these errors are seen most often in the "heretical" mystics, who have cast off the restraint of authority and are left without any standard by which to check their own vagrant intuitions. The best and sanest mystical lives have ever been those which were lived within the boundaries of religious institutions, accepting the deep human need of a social and corporate as well as an individual life.

Hermann's notorious and unfair definition of mysticism as "piety which feels that which is historical in the positive religion to be burdensome and so rejects it," receives considerable support from Dr. Cobb's learned and elaborate work. The gist of his argument, in his own words, is this: that "in the interpretation of the Creed, we ought to proceed on the ground of the priority, *both in time and in value*, of the mystical element over the historical" (p. 31). That is to say, the articles of the Creed may or may not be true in fact; in any event, this is a secondary consideration. What really matters is their symbolic meaning, the way in which they express eternal truths of the spirit. The obvious danger of this sort of interpretation is that there is no formula in the world which cannot be made to yield a symbolic sense. Every religion in turn has taken refuge in allegory when striving to preserve doctrines of which the historical truth has been called into question. Nor need the process end with religion; a mind addicted to symbolism could extract spiritual nourishment from the Admiralty Time-tables. That Dr. Cobb should find allegorical meanings in every article of the Creed, and be able to point to others who have enjoyed similar good hunting in the past, is therefore not surprising; though probably the makers of these creeds would read some of his results with astonishment.

He brings to his task much learning and enthusiasm, and a profound belief in the eternal and life-giving power of the revelation of Christ. Yet his book, suggestive though it is in many respects, leaves on the mind that feeling of bewilderment which comes from long wrestling with the *Pistis Sophia*, or the tiresome enigmas of the Spiritual Alchemists. Here everything means something else, and sometimes several things at once. The one word "buried," for

instance, is persuaded to yield three separate theological meanings. In places the symbols seem rather mixed, as in the strange statement (p. 152) that "Eve must become Mary, and her Son the St. George bruising the serpent's head."

Dr. Cobb's Christology is peculiar. Apparently a firm believer in reincarnation—a doctrine to which he makes frequent reference—he regards the human personality of Christ as the perfected result of many previous incarnations (p. 264). His work as a whole represents the survival or renaissance of that gnostic element which was present almost from the beginning in Christianity, has even left its mark on the New Testament itself, and has been the inspiration of countless heresies. Though we cannot deny the primitive character of this Christian gnosticism, or the extent to which poetry and symbolism entered into the composition of the earliest Christian literature, this does not mean, as Dr. Cobb would like to persuade us, that these things represent the true tradition, the faith delivered to the saints. On the contrary, it was surely a right instinct which urged the Catholic Church to resist the encroachments of the gnostic element, and insist—as the creed-makers certainly did insist—on the primal value of historical fact as the basis of Christian belief. There will probably always be persons to whom the ingenious speculations of Christian gnosticism are attractive; who can more easily believe in the Incarnation when it is described as a descent through the aeons, and find an agreeable spaciousness in the statement (p. 153) that "the Heavenly Mother, the Divine Wisdom, the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the *Ewig-weibliche*, are synonymous." To these "cunning clerks," as the old mystics would have called them, Dr. Cobb's ably written book will appeal; but it is doubtful whether the religion they will learn from it will be either specifically Christian or specifically mystical, in the sense in which the great Christian mystics have understood both terms. We miss here that special atmosphere, that clarity and fragrance of the Gospel, accessible to the simplest as well as the most learned souls, which made the mystic Suso acclaim Christ as a "sweet wild flower." It is no exchange for this to be assured (p. 143) that "at Christmas the sun, who is, as it were, being born again, may be said to be born of Virgo, who is then in the East"; or (p. 115) that "the whole universe as the cosmic Son of God is focussed in the historical Jesus Christ." These are not the things which the man hungry for God either needs or desires to be told. "By love He may be gotten and holden; by thought never."

EVELYN UNDERHILL.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY. GILBERT MURRAY, LL.D., D.Litt. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1915. Pp. 74. 75 cents.

Professor Murray cannot write what is uninteresting. So the audience which listened to this Conway Memorial Lecture, delivered in London, March 16, 1915, must have been swept along by the Oxford Professor's easy, flowing style; in spite of the Introduction by the unnamed Chairman, which is, as reported here, all that an introduction ought not to be.

Stoicism, according to Professor Murray, declared that nothing matters in human life but goodness. Consequently, a man is independent of circumstances and carries the values of life in himself. When you asked what goodness is, the Stoic said it was acting according to nature or *φύσις*; this Phusis being not merely the nature of each individual man but the nature of things, that spirit which orders the world and makes it grow. Acting according to this necessitates sympathy with the Whole, which Professor Murray does not hesitate to call harmony with the will of God. It may be questioned whether he does not import too much of modern thought into his conception of *φύσις*. But he is just in showing the permanence of the thought of the Stoics. He has a remarkable power of vitalizing the past, so that the actors in it seem as real as if they lived in the next street. No one can read this Lecture without feeling how near to the present was the thought of the ancient world. The ease with which Professor Murray presents it here is likely to obscure the weight of this brilliant interpretation.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

METEMPSYCHOSIS. GEORGE FOOT MOORE, D.D., LL.D. The Ingersoll Lecture, 1914. Harvard University Press. 1914. Pp. 84.

Two questions have long vexed reflective man: What is the fate of the soul after death? and Whence does the soul come? To this mystery—for the two questions are inseparable—one answer has been given by the different beliefs in metempsychosis; they are the subject which Professor George Foot Moore chose for the fourteenth annual Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality.

The wide and accurate learning of the lecturer enables him to treat the varied forms of the doctrine of rebirth among many peoples and over a long range of time, beginning with the oldest parts of the Indian Upanishads and ending with that extraordinary combination of modern biology and astrology with ancient notions which was made by the mind of Louis Figuier. The greater part

of the lecture is naturally given to "classic" forms of the belief in India and Greece.

The Indian Upanishads represent an advanced stage of reflective thought; their basic doctrine is the identity of the individual soul with the world-soul. True knowledge, according to the teaching, consists in recognition of this fact. Now in the oldest parts of the Upanishads the doctrine has a moral value, for the nature of the soul's new birth is made to depend on the individual's conduct in his former life; evil begets an evil destiny, good a good. In other parts knowledge also is a determining factor; evil is made primarily false knowledge, the illusion that the finite has any individuality by itself—a notion which causes an estrangement of the soul from its true origin and destiny. But if one recognizes his true position and frees himself from all passion and desire, then he is at once Brahman. In similar fashion the various schools of India inculcated a necessity of true knowledge and the obligation to subdue the passions, all to the end that the round of rebirths might end and Nirvana be attained. Yet in the Buddhist school of the Mahayana reincarnation became an ideal, that the individual might thereby attain to perfection and become a Buddha, giving true revelation to his time.

The similarity between the doctrines of the Upanishads and those of the Orphics and Pythagoreans in Greece is striking, and has misled many in modern times to think that the Greek beliefs were borrowed from some Indian source, as the ancients thought they were derived from Egypt. To escape the fearful punishments between incarnations, to end the round of rebirths, and to attain a happy immortality, were the purposes of the prescriptions imposed by the Orphic life and by the Pythagorean discipline. In India the round of rebirths due to sin might be endless, but the Greeks believed that the soul's guilt could be purged by discipline, purification, and expiation, and so the cycle be completed. Plato adopted the Orphic-Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis, but made philosophy the means of the soul's purification. According to him, that soul which had devoted itself to philosophy and thrice, at the end of successive millennia, had chosen the philosophical life, would return to the world from which it originally descended.

After discussing these matters, Professor Moore traces the revival of the belief in metempsychosis from the first century before our era in various schools through Neoplatonism, indicates its influence through Plotinus on Christian theology, and closes this part of his lecture with a valuable comparison of the doctrines in the East and the West, incidentally disposing of the notion that the Greeks got

their ideas from India—a notion which still unworthily survives. The concluding portion of the lecture touches on the survivals of the doctrine of rebirths in the religion of Mani, among the Moslems, the Druses, and various other sects down to our own time.

But it is unnecessary to speak further in detail. Those who would be instructed must read this learned and illuminating little book.

CLIFFORD H. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

OLD TESTAMENT HISTORY. ISMAR J. PERITZ. The Abingdon Press. 1915. Pp. 336. \$1.50.

The appearance of this volume is a welcome sign of the times. It forms part of a series designed to supply "a more complete and comprehensive study of the Bible" than that usually offered to Sunday-school teachers and other lay students. When one compares it with the intellectual pabulum served to such students not so many years ago, one is equally surprised and delighted at the change. Dr. Peritz is a master of his subject, and he places the full resources of his knowledge at the service of those he seeks to help. The student is thus put *en rapport* with the best-accredited results of scientific research.

An astonishing amount of information is compressed within the 336 pages of the book. The history of Israel is traced from its primeval dawn to the period of Roman rule under Herod the Great. Movements of tribes and nations, factions and sects, are followed with fine discernment and skill. Apart from the facts of history, too, pictures are drawn of Palestinian scenery and social customs, personalities are set in relief, the principles of literary criticism are unfolded, emphasis is laid upon the religious complexion of the history, and the literature is studied on the background of the times. The style is easy, and the type pleasant and carefully read, though we observe mis-spellings of the names Xerxes (p. 251) and Apollonius (p. 300).

The critical standpoint throughout is moderate. While Dr. Peritz acknowledges that the patriarchal stories are legendary, he finds beneath them a witness to real historical personalities and movements. Moses is accorded the supreme place in the religious history of his people, little difficulty being experienced in ascribing to him the substance of the Decalogue in Ex. 20. In his treatment of the later prophets, the author is free from the eschatological schematism of Gressmann and his school, the eschatological patches

being naturally referred to Apocalyptic Judaism and the prophets portrayed as the moral and religious teachers of their own age. He defends, however, the Messianic prophecies of Isaiah, the early relation of Jeremiah to the Deuteronomic Reformation, and the authenticity of his prophecy of the New Covenant. As more novel in point of view we note the suggestion that the tragedy supposed to be adumbrated in Hos. 1 is but a midrash of the editor's, "expanding the elements contained in the other two sections," and the well-marshalled arguments for the dating of Ezra's first visit to Jerusalem in the seventh year of the reign of Artaxerxes II, that is, 397 B.C. (pp. 260 f.).

ALEXANDER R. GORDON.

PRESBYTERIAN THEOLOGICAL COLLEGE, MONTREAL.

JUDAISM AND ST. PAUL. C. G. MONTEFIORE. E. P. Dutton & Co. 1915. Pp. iv, 240. \$1.25.

Mr. Montefiore has attempted in this book to face a problem which has received far too little attention both from Christian and Jewish scholars. It may be stated shortly as follows: If one reads the Epistles of Paul with the intention of comparing them with Jewish writings of the Rabbinical type represented by the Talmud, one is struck by the fact that Paul does not so much controvert Jewish teaching as ignore it, and that what he controverts is seriously different from Rabbinical Judaism. Of course many writers on Paul have surmounted this obvious difficulty by the simple process of first assuming that Paul must have been controverting the general Jewish doctrine which he had learned at Jerusalem, and then reconstructing this Judaism by claiming for it everything which Paul denies. That is the origin of a great many Christian presentations of Rabbinical Judaism. Unfortunately, when one turns to any of the Jewish writings of that time, or of the periods succeeding, he finds no trace of this reconstructed Judaism. That is a very curious result, and it was taken advantage of by van Manen to support his theory that the Pauline Epistles were not written by Paul. His position was that we know that Paul had originally been a Jew and was educated in the Rabbinical doctrines of Jerusalem; if therefore he wrote theological treatises or letters attacking Judaism, he might be supposed to show accurate knowledge of that which he attacks.¹

¹ Dr. Foakes-Jackson writes to me: "I remember addressing a Jewish audience in the vestry of one of the London synagogues on Josephus. In the discussion several scholars of distinction, among them Drs. Büchler and Friedländer, maintained that Josephus showed evident ignorance of the Rabbinic teaching of his age and could not have been, as he so loudly professes, an expert in the law and religion of his countrymen."

Documents purporting to be his but not showing this knowledge cannot be genuine; as therefore the Pauline Epistles do not show this knowledge they are not genuine. This argument was the only really strong point in van Manen's position, and it met with too little consideration from most Christian students of Early Christian literature.

Jewish writers, on the whole, have not seriously faced the problem any more than Christian writers have done. They, of course, have recognized the essential difference between that which Paul attacks and Rabbinical Judaism, but in the main they have contented themselves with shrugging their shoulders and expressing their opinion, in various degrees of politeness, that Paul talked nonsense.

Mr. Montefiore is the first scholar who has really attacked the problem with adequate knowledge and a sympathetic understanding both of Paul and Judaism. It is interesting to notice that he adopts a position which in some ways repeats and in others reverses the attitude of van Manen. He first draws a picture of Rabbinical Judaism, and then argues that this is so different from anything controverted by Paul that Paul can never have really belonged to that type of Judaism. So far he and van Manen agree. But he also assumes that the Epistles are genuine, and solves the problem by denying that Paul was ever a Rabbinical Jew of Jerusalem—thus reversing van Manen's result.

Mr. Montefiore grasps with complete candor the reason why neither his nor any other work on the subject will ever be completely final. We do not really know the Judaism of the time of Paul, and there is an inherent weakness in the position which Mr. Montefiore adopts (of necessity rather than inclination) when he reconstructs the Rabbinical Judaism of a much later period and assumes that the Judaism of the time of Paul was really very much the same thing. He points this out himself again and again, and though I think he is probably right in believing that he has allowed sufficiently for the difference between the Judaism of the year A.D. 50 and the Judaism of the year A.D. 500, after all, the difference is there, and it is that which renders the problem incapable of a complete solution. He concludes from this comparison between Paul and the Rabbis that Paul can never have lived as a Rabbinical Jew of Jerusalem, and then goes on to consider various factors which may have affected Judaism outside of Palestine, raising the question whether these are sufficient to leave room for the existence of Paul. His conclusion is that on the whole they are sufficient, and in this view he is, I believe, on the right line. Moreover it is entirely

probable, as he argues, that the Judaism of the Dispersion was not so good a *religion* as that of the Judaism of Jerusalem, though personally I should add the *caveat* that it may have been a better *theology*. I am not sure that this is not another way of stating the fact that, although we prefer the philosophy of Greece and polity of Rome, the more "modern" we are the more we go back to Palestine for our religion. It is the parable of the Prodigal Son, which is typically Jewish in its doctrine of forgiveness, rather than the Pauline doctrine of the Atonement, which appeals to us and seems to us to be true.

But suppose we accept Mr. Montefiore's conclusions, and say that it is extremely improbable that Paul was ever a Jew of Jerusalem. Does not this conflict entirely with the Biblical facts about Paul? The answer is that it does conflict with the speeches in the Acts, but that it agrees very surprisingly with Paul's own statement in the Epistle to the Galatians, in a passage which has been usually either overlooked or explained away. In Galatians Paul says that after his conversion he did not confer with flesh and blood but "returned" to Damascus. Critics have paid too little attention to the fact that this implies that Damascus and not Jerusalem was his real centre. We always read the story of Acts as though it meant that Paul was a Jew of Jerusalem who was sent by the High Priest to Damascus. In all probability the writer of Acts did interpret the tradition in that manner. But Paul's own words suggest that he belonged to Damascus; and it is hardly necessary to emphasize the fact that in Galatians and — apart from the speeches — in the "we"-sections of the Acts there is nothing to suggest that Paul was a person who was well known in Jerusalem. When he is tried before the High Priest there is no suggestion that he was well known, and his own statement that he was a Pharisee seems to have taken the court by surprise. These facts are of course perfectly well known to every one, but they have been curiously neglected by most writers, and I venture to suggest that one of the secondary services which will be accomplished by Mr. Montefiore's fascinating book will be to draw renewed attention to this side of the evidence of the Epistles.

Finally, I should like to recommend the reading of Mr. Montefiore's description of Rabbinical Judaism to all who wish to have any sympathetic knowledge of the real nature of that religion. He writes on this subject with the understanding of a born Jew, the skill of an artist, and the sympathy of a man in whom a wide education has deepened the springs of a religious life, which is not the less Jewish because it is liberal; and it should be remembered

that the test of the value of a religion, as distinct from the truth of a theology, is its effect on its adherents rather than the judgment of its opponents.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE MAN OF NAZARETH. FREDERICK LINCOLN ANDERSON. Macmillan & Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 226. \$1.00.

Professor Anderson of the Baptist Theological Seminary at Newton, Mass., has given for general readers a reverent, sympathetic, fresh, and incisive "treatment of the most important problems about Jesus and his career," based on sound learning and good acquaintance with current discussion. After a lucid description of "the situation in which Jesus found himself," he discusses Jesus' belief in his own messiahship, and his positive teaching about the Law and God and duty and the future. The chapter on "The Character of Jesus" is impressive and moving. The point of view is that of a thoroughly conservative "liberalism"; accepting the accounts of the Gospels, believing that Jesus, a consistent human character, is Christ and Lord, not wholly satisfied with the statements and definitions of the Church about the secret of his personality, confessing its faith thus: "This Jesus, so strangely and uniquely full of God, is Lord in a sphere beyond the reach of our highest thought. He therefore demands and deserves the wonder, reverence, love, and supreme devotion of every human being."

JAMES HARDY ROPES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

ST. PAUL AND JUSTIFICATION. Being an Exposition of the Teaching in the Epistles to Rome and Galatia. FREDERICK BROOKE WESTCOTT, Trinity College, Cambridge. Macmillan & Co. 1913. Pp. viii, 397. \$1.75.

"The purpose of this short Essay," so the author begins, "is to expound certain passages in the writings of St. Paul dealing with a religious question which occupied him largely during one period of his career." The question, it is presently said, was this: "How shall I become right with God — right once for all?" The passages expounded include nearly all of the Epistle to the Galatians, and all of the doctrinal part of that to the Romans (Chapters 1-11). As chapters nine, ten, and eleven of the latter Epistle form a separate section dealing with a distinct subject, our author has evidently carried his task beyond the limits which he prescribed for himself.

This departure he naively owns and justifies at the close of his discussion: "One more question, it may be, will suggest itself. 'Why have you roamed so far? Why deal with all the chapters from 1 to 11?' Ah! that is just the difficulty. With St. Paul, when you once begin, you simply cannot stop. His vivid personality, his own overpowering interest in that of which he discourses, carry you on from point to point."

Mr. Westcott modestly suggests that those who read his essay remember that it was not written by one whose life has been given to New Testament studies. "Of erudition in these pages very little will be found." He has read and been greatly influenced by Lightfoot's *Galatians*, and Sanday and Headlam's *Romans*, and apparently only these. "The reading of endless commentaries (not to mention tracts innumerable) has for him who writes these words, exiguous attraction." The study of Paulinism, of which his book is the fruit, was, he intimates, suggested by his teaching of the New Testament in school. "When I was a schoolmaster . . . there was no department of my work which pleased me more than the teaching of the New Testament. . . . Years of teaching . . . have shown him [the author] that even the young are not without a desire to have St. Paul expounded, however imperfectly."

A reader soon finds that Mr. Westcott brings to his task two important qualifications — a sound knowledge of classical Greek and a high standard of exegetical thoroughness. When he has read the essay through, he is likely to put a higher estimate upon it than its author has done at its close. "If any one should say, 'What in your opinion is the teaching of St. Paul?' I should answer, 'Read and see.' This little and trivial book is an attempt to make such reading more easy and more profitable."

The essay is scholarly and within a limited sphere helpful. But its limitations must be frankly pointed out. Its value as an exposition of Paul's thought is seriously lessened by its exaggeration of the place which the thought of justification had in Paul's mind. This overestimate appears in the author's statement of his task quoted above. To say that the Epistle to the Galatians and that to the Romans dealt with the question, "How shall I become right with God," is to give an inaccurate description of both. The question discussed in Galatians was whether in addition to faith in Christ submission to the Jewish Law was necessary to salvation. The theme of Romans was the content of the Gospel which set forth God's gracious treatment of the world. In both Epistles the subjective side of Christianity, the divine work in man, appears

(of course with much greater prominence in Romans). Accordingly we should expect an exposition of these writings entitled *St. Paul and Justification* to be one-sided. And such the reader will find the exposition to be. Little help is given towards the comprehension of the subjective side of Paul's teaching. The author's regret for the meagreness of his equipment was, one feels, so far as this part of his task was concerned, not due to excessive modesty. Study of recent New Testament literature, and reflection on the coincidences between the Pauline and the Hellenistic thought, would have enabled Mr. Westcott to give a far more adequate and helpful exposition of Romans — chapters six, seven, and eight — than is found in his pages.

EDWARD Y. HINCKS.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

BIBLICAL LIBRARIES. A Sketch of Library History from 3400 B.C. to A.D.
150. ERNEST CUSHING RICHARDSON. Princeton University Press.
1914. Pp. xvi, 251. \$1.25.

This little book, nominally on Biblical Libraries, is better described by its second title as a general sketch of library history in early times. Though it goes back to 3400 B.C. this is by no means the earliest date to which the author's researches extend. He has already written on Antediluvian Libraries, and has issued another book covering the "legendary, prehistoric, and primitive period before 3400 B.C." A librarian himself, he uses the word "libraries" in its very broadest meaning to include not only collections of books in the usual sense, but also collections or deposits of any kind of records, documents, or inscriptions. In his introduction he justifies the use of the word in this way and the use of "archive" to mean a particular kind of library, rather than the use of the word "library" as a particular kind of archive, which is the fashion of the Assyriologists. But there are few solid facts to build upon in the earlier centuries in regard to either archives or libraries. In Babylon there were vast stores of tablets which related not only to the affairs of the temples and the government, but to private business and family records, and included school texts, writing exercises, multiplication tables, etc. The great library of Assurbanipal at Nineveh, the archives of Ecbatana and of Susa, stand out with relative distinctness, and the author claims that in Egypt at the time of the Exodus there were millions of documents or books, and hundreds of organized collections in palaces, temples, public archives, and even in private hands. Conditions in Palestine, however, can only be inferred

from the close connection of the people at different periods with Egypt and Mesopotamia. The ark of the testimony was itself a sort of book-chest, and the Old Testament scriptures have many references to the preservation of recorded annals; but for anything more precise the Israelites have to be identified with the Egyptians on the one hand, and with Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia on the other, so that the author's statements are introduced with many a "We may easily believe," "It may be inferred," "There is every reason to suppose," and so on. It is at least clear that Israel adopted not the clay tablets of Assyria, but the rolls of leather or papyrus of Persia and Egypt. Even in the time of the Maccabees specific facts are few, but there is a fine field for inference from the conditions of contemporary Greek libraries, about which the author is well informed. The library at Pergamon had a strong influence on other libraries both in Greece and in Palestine.

Under Herod and Augustus several distinct kinds of libraries can be fairly well made out in Palestine—temple libraries, public archives, central and local, public Greek libraries, synagogue libraries, the libraries of the Essene monks, and private libraries; yet here also one has to trust to the interpretation of casual references and to a comparison with contemporary Roman libraries rather than to any direct record of the subject. Roman libraries are treated with some fulness because the travels of the Apostles led them to most of the great cities of the Roman Empire, and here the information available is more abundant and more interesting than in the case of any others. The concluding chapter is a bibliography—not a bibliography of the formal type, but what the author characterizes as "a sort of first aid to the interested."

One general criticism naturally occurs to the reader—the author makes "Biblical Libraries" his central subject; yet the substance of his book relates to other libraries, all, however, treated primarily with a view to what can be inferred from them in regard to the libraries of Palestine. This gives an air of vagueness to the whole. If he had set out to give us a sketch of libraries in ancient times, as he is well equipped to do, and had let the libraries of Palestine occupy a subordinate chapter in that sketch, the result would have been better knit and more tangible. But in a little book of this kind we must remember that every author delights to ride his own hobby.

WILLIAM COOLIDGE LANE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY LIBRARY.

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- THE CHAPLAIN AND THE WAR.** *By J. Esslemont Adams.* T. & T. Clark. 1915. Pp. 61. 6d.
- THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. MARK.** With Introduction and Notes. *By W. C. Allen.* The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xvi+214. 7s. 6d.
- SOCIAL ADAPTATION** (Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. XIV.). *By Lucius M. Bristol.* Harvard University Press. 1915. Pp. xii+356.
- MISCELLANEOUS INSCRIPTIONS IN THE YALE BABYLONIAN COLLECTION.** *By Albert T. Clay.* Yale University Press. 1915. Pp. xii+112. Plates 55. \$5.00.
- SUB CORONA.** Sermons preached in the University Chapel of King's College, Aberdeen, by Principals and Professors of Theological Faculties in Scotland. *By Henry Cowan and James Hastings (Eds.).* T. & T. Clark. 1915. Pp. x+297.
- THE BOOK OF REVELATION.** *By John T. Dean.* Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. 191.
- SOME SPIRITUAL LESSONS OF THE WAR.** *By Henry P. Denison.* The Young Churchman Co. 1915. Pp. 67. 60 cents.
- "FATHER PAYNE."** (*Anonymous.*) G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1916. Pp. x+422. \$1.50.
- AN APPLICATION OF THE TEACHINGS OF CHRIST TO THE AMERICAN JAPANESE PROBLEM.** *By Herbert Flint.* University of Kansas Press. 1915. Pp. 39.
- THEOLOGY IN CHURCH AND STATE.** *By Peter T. Forsyth.* George H. Doran Co. 1915. Pp. xxvi+328. \$1.25.
- THE BLACKEST PAGE OF MODERN HISTORY. ARMENIAN EVENTS OF 1915.** *By Herbert A. Gibbons.* G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1916. Pp. 71. 75 cents.
- A BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS IN ENGLISH, SPANISH, AND PORTUGUESE, RELATING TO THE REPUBLICS COMMONLY CALLED LATIN-AMERICAN.** With Comments. *By Peter H. Goldsmith.* The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xx+107.
- THE BIBLE AND MODERN CRITICISM.** *By Francis J. Hall.* The Young Churchman Co. 1915. Pp. 42. 25 cents.
- DICTIONARY OF THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH.** Vol. I.—Aaron-Lystra. *By James Hastings (Ed.).* Charles Scribner's Sons. 1916. Pp. xiv+729. \$6.00.
- THE BOOK OF WORSHIP OF THE CHURCH SCHOOL.** *By Hugh Hartshorne.* Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. Pp. iv+170. 55 cents.
- MANUAL FOR TRAINING IN WORSHIP.** *By Hugh Hartshorne.* Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. Pp. vi+152. \$1.00.
- SO AS BY FIRE. NOTES ON THE WAR.** *By Henry Scott Holland.* The Young Churchman Co. Pp. 120. 40 cents.

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- THE FREUDIAN WISH, AND ITS PLACE IN ETHICS.** *By Edwin B. Holt.* Henry Holt & Co. 1915. Pp. x+212. \$1.25.
- THE RENAISSANCE, THE PROTESTANT REVOLUTION, AND THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE.** *By Edward M. Hulme.* The Century Co. 1915. Pp. 629.
- COMPARATIVE RELIGION, ITS ADJUNCTS AND ALLIES.** *By Louis H. Jordan.* Oxford University Press. 1915. Pp. xxxii+575. 12s.
- A HISTORY OF BABYLON FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE MONARCHY TO THE PERSIAN CONQUEST.** *By Leonard W. King.* Frederick A. Stokes Co. (n. d.) Pp. xxiv+340.
- SOCRATES, MASTER OF LIFE.** *By William E. Leonard.* The Open Court Publishing Co. 1915. Pp. viii+118. \$1.00.
- THE LIVING CHURCH ANNUAL AND CHURCHMAN'S ALMANAC.** The Young Churchman Co. 1916. Pp. xxxii+528. 50 cents.
- LES PROTESTANTS ANGLAIS RÉFUGIÉS À GENÈVE AU TEMPS DE CALVIN, 1555-1560.** *By Charles Martin.* A. Jullien, Genève. 1915. Pp. xiv+354. 7fr. 50c.
- CURIOSITIES IN PROVERBS. A Collection of Unusual Adages, Maxims, Aphorisms, Phrases, and Other Popular Dicta from Many Lands.** *By Dwight E. Marvin.* G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1916. Pp. xii+428. \$1.75.
- THE BEARING OF RECENT DISCOVERY ON THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT (The James Sprunt Lectures).** *By Sir W. M. Ramsay.* Hodder & Stoughton. 1915. Pp. xiv+427.
- SUGGESTIONS FOR CONDUCTING A CHURCH CLASS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY.** *By C. Bertram Runnalls.* The Young Churchman Co. 1915. Pp. x+75. 75 cents.
- THE SOCIAL LEGISLATION OF THE PRIMITIVE SEMITES.** *By Henry Schaeffer.* Yale University Press. 1915. Pp. xvi+245. \$2.35.
- THE DRAMA OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE.** *By Annie L. Sears.* The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xxvi+495. \$3.00.
- ATLAS OF THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE HOLY LAND.** *By Geo. A. Smith and J. G. Bartholomew.* George H. Doran Co. 1915. Pp. xxxvii+73. \$7.50.
- CONVERSATIONS WITH LUTHER.** *By Preserved Smith and Herbert P. Galinger.* The Pilgrim Press. 1915. Pp. xxviii+260. \$1.00.
- APOTHEOSIS AND AFTER LIFE.** *By Mrs. Arthur Strong.* Constable & Co. 1915. Pp. xxii+293. 8s. 6d.
- THE HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH.** *By Henry B. Swete.* The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. x+265. \$1.25.
- PUBLIC SPEAKING. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE.** *By James A. Winans.* The Sewell Publishing Co., Ithaca, N.Y. 1915. Pp. xvi+476.
- THE YOGA-SYSTEM OF PATAÑJALI (The Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 17).** *By James H. Woods.* The Harvard University Press. 1914. Pp. xlii+384.

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DRIVER AND WELLHAUSEN

G. A. COOKE

CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD

More than two years have passed since Dr. Driver died (26 Feb., 1914), the greatest Hebraist of his generation, recognized both in England and in America as a master among Old Testament scholars. The time has come when we may attempt, more calmly perhaps than was possible before, to take a survey of his work as a whole, and to consider what are his permanent contributions to Biblical science.

Early in his career he won reputation as a grammarian. The word is indeed too narrow to describe the author of *The Use of the Tenses in Hebrew* (1874, revised and enlarged in 1881 and 1894); we should call him rather an interpreter of the genius and spirit of the Hebrew language. In this work, for the first time in English, appeared a treatment of Hebrew syntax which was at once philosophical in conception and ruled by the methods of scientific philology. Ewald, with a fine instinct for language, had formulated the higher grammatical laws, and Driver owed much to the work of his predecessor; but he developed it in a way which was altogether his own, with an accuracy and a wealth of illustration such as Ewald never attempted. Moreover he made a large use

of the comparative principle. Thirty years ago the value of comparative grammar was little understood; Driver was one of the first English scholars to apply it systematically to the explanation of Hebrew forms and usage. Thus the *Tenses* marked an epoch in the modern study of Hebrew; the student will always keep it at his side even after he has mastered its main conclusions. It is quite the most interesting book ever written on the subject, intellectually satisfying to a rare degree by its inductive method and combination of breadth with exactness in detail. It remains in many respects Driver's most original and enduring piece of work.

Along with the *Tenses* must be placed his *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel* (1887, 2nd edn. enlarged 1913). No better discipline can be recommended to the would-be Hebraist than to put himself to school with this book. He will gain a thorough grounding in the idiom of the language, and at the same time serve a useful apprenticeship in textual criticism. For the latter branch of study it is essential to know something of the external changes which the Hebrew text has undergone, and to illustrate these Driver introduces us to the fascinating documents of Semitic epigraphy. He also works out, with copious illustrations in detail, the canons which must control the use of the Versions as witnesses to an earlier stage of the Hebrew text than the Massoretic. His chapters on these topics have done much to lift textual criticism out of the region of guesswork into a system of orderly research. In connexion with his grammatical writings we may note his contributions to the Hebrew Lexicon, which he edited in partnership with Dr. Francis Brown and the late Dr. Briggs. Driver furnished the backbone of the *corpus*, the articles on the pronouns, prepositions, adverbs, conjunctions, etc.; he put into them his strongest work; they are models of lucid and exhaustive treatment.

Herein then lay his greatness. He possessed the genius of a grammarian, a sense of values in language. No one could speak with more authority when a question of exact scholarship was involved. It would not be true to describe him an Orientalist pure and simple; he had not the range of Nöldeke, for example, among the Semitic languages; but as a Hebraist he was unsurpassed.

It is significant of his general aim that Driver laid a solid foundation of linguistic study before he took up the higher criticism. He was grammarian first, critic and commentator second. And this was the order which he always insisted upon. A great deal is written upon Old Testament criticism, the text is freely emended, and metrical schemes are applied to poetical passages, by those who betray a very imperfect acquaintance with the original language. Both by his own example and constantly in his teaching Driver aimed at securing the foundations. Accurate scholarship must be the starting-point of all else; a great deal of patient drudgery with grammar, lexicon, and concordance must go to the making of a sound interpreter of the higher sense of the sacred texts. Such is perhaps the chief moral of Driver's life-work; may it long exercise its warning influence upon English and American students!

His mental habit as a grammarian may be said to have determined his method as a critic. He proceeds cautiously on inductive lines after a close observation of facts. He sets out the critical process in detail, tabulates the distinctive features of style and usage, and, where no certain conclusion appears to be possible, he is careful to indicate the degrees of probability; with a natural leaning towards a conservative position, he prefers to suspend rather than pronounce his judgment. It is these qualities of sobriety, common-sense, and fair-mindedness which have won for his *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament* (1891, 9th edn. 1913)

a place of its own among the books most valued by the student. We may allow that the *Introduction* has its limitations. When it first came out it was regarded in some quarters as a compromise with conservatism. Thus a distinguished Oxford colleague, Dr. Cheyne, expressed himself dissatisfied; the author did not take sufficiently high ground; "an inspiring introductory book on the Old Testament from the point of view of the critic and a progressive evangelical theologian" was declared to be the desideratum. Yet the kind of work which Driver did was exactly the work required at the time; the preliminaries had to be made sure if the forward march was to advance in the right direction. And "compromise" is not the word to apply to his attitude. He always went just as far as the facts seemed to lead him. By temperament he was more inclined to secure the position already won than to seek adventures. His caution had its roots in intellectual honesty, not in fear; hence "there is no revolt from his teaching today, nor ever will be," to quote a discerning remark made about him after his death.

The truth is that his critical work was mainly objective in character. His strength lay in dealing with the facts, and so long as we can be content with these we find him extraordinarily satisfying. For example, he spared no pains to discover accurate information on the geography, the natural history, the archæology of the Old Testament; but when we look in his commentaries for inspiration or for vision we are apt to be disappointed. The latest theory, from which we hoped so much, is faithfully dealt with, and his verdict often acts like a douche of cold water to ardent spirits. He brings us back to the facts; no one knew better how to call a hypothesis by its right name. Yet it must not be imagined that he was incapable of appreciating the higher values. Those who have read his *Isaiah* (1888, 2nd edn.

1893), or the third sermon in *Ideals of the Prophets* (1915), are not likely to forget his description of the crisis in Jerusalem in 701 B.C., and of the part which Isaiah played; the description is none the less effective because it is conveyed in his restrained, undecorated style.

One of the aims which he kept constantly before him was to popularize the results of the new learning. He had no popular gifts himself, but he did his best to make known through the pulpit and the newspapers the teaching which he gave in his lecture-room and writings. Accordingly he never hesitated to engage in controversies, not from any love of disputation, but because he felt it to be his duty to defend the religious public from misleading views, and to encourage a sane understanding of the Bible. Moreover, as we survey his work as a whole, we cannot fail to be impressed by the convictions which lay behind it; they were never obtruded, but they colored all he did. He lived through a period of transition; and it has been mainly through his influence that the transition has taken place, with its inevitable changes indeed, but with a deeper insight into the religious significance and permanent worth of the Old Testament. There was a time when historical criticism seemed to threaten the strongholds of religion; Dr. Driver proved that, on the contrary, it is the trusty ally, the *angelus interpres*, of those who regard the Bible as the record of a divine revelation. We can hardly overestimate his services to the Church in England and America. "He taught the faithful criticism and the critics faith," wrote an eminent Jewish scholar.

Dr. Driver's active career filled the interval from 1871 to 1914. Almost exactly the same period is covered by the published work of Julius Wellhausen: his first book appeared in 1870; he celebrated his 70th birthday in May, 1914, and is now, we believe, enjoying a well-earned respite from the duties of his professorship. We

are conscious of a change of atmosphere when we turn from the English to the German scholar, whose influence upon the reinterpretation of the Bible has been equally far-reaching and even more creative. In the eighties and nineties he was widely read in England and America, and many younger men from both countries have attended his lectures at Marburg and Göttingen, and cherish a grateful recollection of his genial friendliness and of the stimulus that he gave to their studies. In Old Testament criticism his great achievement has been to establish, on lines laid down by Graf, the order and date of the documents which compose the Hexateuch, with all the reconstruction which this involves in our estimate of the history and religion of Israel. The classical exposition of his theory was given in *Die Composition des Hexateuchs* (1876, 1885, 2nd edn. 1889, 3rd edn. 1899), and in his historical treatises: *Geschichte Israels*, Vol. I, 1878, later expanded under the title *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*, 1883, 6th edn. 1905; the article "Israel" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, edn. IX, 1881; *Israelitische u. jüdische Geschichte*, 1894, 7th edn. 1914. The *Geschichte Israels*, Vol. I, when it first appeared, made a profound impression throughout Europe. Its main thesis that "the Mosaic history is the starting-point not for the history of Israel, but for the history of Judaism" was maintained by such powerful arguments that most of the leading scholars on the continent declared themselves convinced. The general movement of investigation had been converging in this direction. Wellhausen's position had been reached independently by Vatke, Reuss, Lagarde, Graf, Kuenen. The ascendancy of the last-named scholar was rising, especially in academic circles; but Wellhausen possessed the art of reaching a wider public. In Pfeiderer's words, "he removed Old Testament criticism from the rank of a subordinate question to the centre of theological discussion." He was fortu-

nate in securing a first-rate English translation of the *Prolegomena* by Drs. J. S. Black and A. Menzies, with a preface by Robertson Smith (1885), which thus carried into England and America the impression produced in Europe. It is a brilliant piece of constructive work, full of vivacity and human interest, and remarkable for its sureness of touch and for the directness with which it goes straight to the point; here and there, we must admit, it strikes English readers as wanting in reverence. The key to the providential course of Israel's history had been discovered, and in Wellhausen's hands it was used with masterful effect to open the treasury and let in the light for all to see. This achievement has stood the test of time and of repeated and searching examination. In details it has been modified to some extent; but in its main positions Wellhausen's theory has proved unassailable, and nearly all modern scholars start from it, the latest notable convert being Rudolf Kittel in his *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, 2nd edn. 1909-1912.

In England Dr. Driver did not at once declare his adhesion to the new school. With habitual caution he worked over the field for himself and slowly matured his judgment. He published in 1882 an elaborate article in the *Journal of Philology* on "Some Alleged Linguistic Affinities of the Elohist." It was a close criticism of Giesebrecht's contention that the language of the Priestly Code has much in common with that of the post-exilic writers. Driver did not attempt to determine the date of P; at the same time he conveyed the idea that, while accepting the critical analysis of the Hexateuch, he was not convinced by the Graf-Wellhausen theory. Yet he was steadily advancing towards it, as appeared from some critical notes on the Pentateuch, published in 1887 by Scribner's Sons, New York. In the summer term of 1889 he gave a course of lectures in Oxford on "the structure and origin of the Historical Books," and printed for the

use of his class a set of analytical tables to show the characteristics and arrangement of the various elements which compose the Hexateuch; these are all incorporated in the *Introduction* (1891). Here for the first time he made known his complete acceptance of Wellhausen's scheme, and set out in full the critical process upon which it is based. He was always attracted by Wellhausen's sanity and clear judgment. The *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel* owed much to Wellhausen's early work, *Der Text der Bücher Samuels untersucht* (1871), which at once raised the standard of textual criticism, not only in the emendation of the Hebrew text but in the critical use of the Greek Versions. It was here (pages 221-224) that Wellhausen first called attention to the value of the recension which is now generally known as Lucian's.

In the constructive work of Hexateuch criticism and historical restatement we see Wellhausen at his best. With a scholarship that can always be trusted he combines the imagination and large humanity of the historian who knows how to breathe a living spirit into the dry bones of the past. He has not the prophetic outlook of Ewald, nor Driver's sense of responsibility, but he surpasses them both in the breadth and originality of his work.

Old Testament criticism, however, is not Wellhausen's only interest; we cannot fail to be impressed by the comprehensiveness of his learning. In what may be called his middle period he devoted himself mainly to Arabic studies. He has thrown much light, in his series of *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten* (1884-1899, six vols.; numbers 2 and 5 deal with O. T. subjects) on the history and beliefs of the heathen Arabs. He wrote the life of Mohammed for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1883. Among other works, mention may be made of his important book on the fall of the Arab kingdom, *Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz*, 1902. In his third period he has returned

to a study which he took up in his earliest days, that of New Testament criticism, especially the criticism of the Gospels and Acts (*Das Evangelium Marci*, 1903; *Matthaei, Lucae*, 1904; *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, 1905, 2nd edn. 1911; *Johannis*, 1908). In these books he pursues fresh lines of investigation with the same independence and boldness as before, though his views have not met with the same approval. On several points, however, such as the significance of the title "Son of Man" in the Gospels, he has raised a discussion from which much has been learned.

Each of the great scholars whom we have been considering holds his distinctive place of honor, each has made his invaluable contribution to the study of the Bible; let us think of them as fellow-workers in the cause of truth. It is one of the most powerful bonds of union between men and nations. The highest interests of mankind are common interests; the *respublica litterarum* has its counterpart in the Universal Church. Divisions prevail in both; rightly regarded they do but give life and color to the unity which belongs to the inner constitution of each society. At present it is the divisions which loom largest. But we look forward to the time when, by God's mercy, the war will be over, and our fellowship in a common cause be restored, when the only strife we know will be a rivalry in great achievements and in the single-minded love of truth.

CONFUCIANISM AND THE NEW CHINA

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Confucianism, with its elaborate ritual, its bloody sacrifices, its antiquated symbolism, and its fine ethical teaching, has again been made the State religion of China. Several recent mandates by the President, Yüan Shih-k'ai, have restored to it in the school, in the civil service, and in the army, the authority which previous to the revolution it had held almost uninterruptedly for two thousand years.

It is easy to misunderstand the significance of this action. It has been condemned as thoroughly reactionary, and an abridgment of the religious liberty guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic. The President in offering the sacrifices has been accused of aping the Emperor, and the re-establishment of the State religion is said to portend the return to a monarchical form of government.

The suspicions implied in these charges appear at first glance to be not unreasonable; but a more careful examination of the facts will show that the restoration of Confucianism to its old-time status has no necessary connection with any imperial aspirations that may be entertained by the President, and is not intended to abridge the constitutional rights of the adherents of other faiths, but has its origin in quite other and laudable though perhaps mistaken motives.

When the China-Japanese war of 1894 and 1895 had revealed to the Peking Government the utter weakness of the country, the inability of its three hundred and

twenty millions to cope with a nation of only one-eighth of its population, the wise men in the capital and the provinces began to seek for the source of this weakness. They discovered that the material civilization of the West, the despised learning of the "barbarians," had made Japan powerful in arms, and one Viceroy, Chang Chih-tung, had the courage in his yamen at Wuchang to write a pamphlet on the "new learning," urging the Imperial Court to accept the lesson of the war and, by mastering the sciences of the western world, acquire the ability to equip itself with the modern engines of war and the machinery for developing the resources of the country, and thus prepare to defend its heritage. In that pamphlet, however, he pointed out what he believed to be the defect of the western system of education, that is to say, its neglect of moral training. He feared that the study of the western sciences might lead to a neglect of the sacred books of Confucianism and their ethical teachings, and thus to a deterioration in morals. He warned the Government therefore against the abandonment of the national religion. His tract stirred the minds of many, but it had very little practical effect at the time.

Two years later, in 1898, the aggressive action of Germany, Russia, France, and Great Britain, each of whom had demanded and obtained from China the lease of a port, followed later by attempts to define spheres of interest in China for their respective nationals, led to a discussion of the possible partition of China. This excited intense indignation in the breasts of the Chinese people. Thereupon a patriotic society, mis-called "the Boxers," was organized. Its original aim was the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, whose degenerate representatives in the Forbidden City were held responsible for the defenceless condition of the Empire and the consequent aggression of the western

powers. With considerable skill the Manchu rulers were able to divert these attacks upon the Government and persuade the "Boxer" leaders to direct their efforts towards the punishment of the offending foreigners. The humiliating defeat of China, the flight of the Court, and the hard terms made by the victorious allies, aroused even the most stupid and reactionary officials to a realization of the inefficiency of their government and the urgent need of reform.

It had been a common saying among the Chinese that the men of the West were very clever in their invention of machinery but that they lacked culture. The Court still affected to despise the learning of the foreigner as being of an inferior sort; but since the culture of China could not save it, two reforms were immediately projected—military reorganization, and the establishment of a public school system. With the former we are not particularly concerned. The task of arranging a course of public instruction and submitting regulations for the control of the schools was intrusted to the two foremost scholars of the Empire—Chang Chih-tung, the Viceroy mentioned above, and Chang Po-hsi, a Cabinet Minister in Peking. Previous to this undertaking there had been no public school system in China, but a system of public examinations only. Education had been left to private enterprise.

The report of the two Commissioners was made in 1904 and filled eight volumes. It provided a complete system of instruction, beginning with the kindergarten and crowned by a national university. Place was made too for special schools, such as those for teaching handicrafts and for preparing students to enter the learned professions. In the regulations submitted, the Viceroy of the Hukuang Provinces was able to embody the recommendations which he had offered and which had been rejected in 1896. The sciences of the West were

given a prominent place in the curriculum; but great stress was laid upon the need of supplementing this instruction with a thorough course in the Chinese sacred scriptures and by a regular observance of the rites of the national religion. The schools were required, therefore, to make provision for the worship by the students at stated times of the great sage, Confucius.

The report of the two Changs received the approval of the vermilion pencil; but the old system of public examinations for admission to the civil service still remained, and so long as this door to official preferment was left open, the new school system received scant recognition, for education was not made compulsory. In 1906, therefore, the old-time examinations were abolished and the new schools began to be opened everywhere.

In order to provide still more carefully against any abandonment of the literature and religion of China, the Government in 1907 issued a decree establishing at Chüfu¹—the birthplace and burial-place of Confucius—a college for the study of the sacred books, in order that there might never be a lack of classical scholars able to interpret these books and to give ethical instruction to the young. At the same time by another decree the rank of Confucius in the pantheon was raised and the same sacrifices ordered to be made to his spirit as were offered to the Most High. This latter edict may have been suggested perhaps by the teaching of the Christian missionaries with respect to their Teacher, who was held to be one with God and was worshipped as a divine being.

A few months after the issue of these two decrees, Duke Yen, the lineal descendant of Confucius in the seventy-sixth generation, came to Peking to make

¹ Chüfu is a small town in the heart of Shantung Province, and is to be distinguished from the treaty port, Chefoo, in the same province.

acknowledgment to the Empress Dowager of his gratitude for the honor done to his ancestor, and while kneeling in audience begged Her Imperial Majesty to transform the proposed school at Chüfu, his home, into a college for the teaching of foreign languages, the sciences, international law, and political economy. The request did credit to his mind, but it was of course refused. The proposed classical school was, however, never established. This, like many other enterprises planned by the Manchus, remains to be accomplished by the Republic. The matter is under consideration now, a petition for the establishment of such a school having recently been sent to the President.

The transfer of Confucius to the first rank in the Chinese pantheon made necessary a revision of the ritual used in his worship. This work had just been done, and the temple to the sage in Peking was being improved when the revolution broke out.

The immediate effect of the revolution upon religion was not unlike that which was seen at Paris at the beginning of the French Revolution. The sacrifices to Confucius at the capital and in the provinces were neglected. The temples were abandoned. Their courts grew up in weeds, left, as one writer laments, to be gathered by the peasants for fuel. The Temple of Heaven, the most sacred enclosure in China, which had never been entered by Manchu or Chinese except by the Emperor, the nobles and highest officials with their attendants, was thrown open to the populace. Ribald inscriptions were chalked upon the walls, and the high marble altar, dedicated to the worship of the Most High God, was desecrated by the erection of booths thereon for the sale of food, cigarettes, and other articles. The Temple to the Earth was converted into a barracks, and the Field of God, which the Emperor ploughed in person and planted with grain to be offered upon the State altars,

became a show ground for acrobats and jugglers, while the hall of the Year Star was turned into a museum where the sacred vessels of the sanctuary were exhibited to the curious upon payment of an admission fee of two cents. Protests were not wanting of course, but they met with little notice at first. One of the leaders of the revolution declared that the Republic had nothing to do with religion. The Government seriously considered the proposal to convert the Temple of Heaven, which contains 737 acres, into an agricultural experiment station.

It was not the State religion alone that suffered; the Buddhist and Taoist temples also shared in the neglect and profanation. In some cities the idols were taken out and thrown into the rubbish heaps and the halls put to use as schoolrooms.

Gradually, however, the protests against the neglect and desecration of the altars grew louder and more numerous. After a year of irreligion, accompanied by considerable immorality, a reaction began to be evident. Some urged the re-establishment of Confucianism as the State religion; others advocated the adoption of Buddhism. One of the most ardent supporters of the latter proposal was a monk, known as Ming Ching, Abbot of a monastery in the southwestern part of the Tartar City of Peking. He was a brilliant scholar and joint author of a history in Chinese of the Buddhist religion in India, China, and Japan. He had studied in Japan, where he had adopted the views of the reformed Buddhists,² who have endeavored to adjust the teachings of Buddha to the conditions of the modern world. In

² In Japan known as the Shin Jodo or New Jodo, an offshoot of the Jodo, in Chinese pronounced Ching T'u, the Pure Land Sect established in China in the second century of our era and introduced into Japan in the thirteenth century. The New Jodo dates from 1262 A.D. The Pure Land Sect is the most popular of Buddhist sects in China. The reformed branch in Japan, that is to say, the New Jodo, permits the marriage of the clergy and the eating of meat, and otherwise adapts itself to modern conditions. Travellers in Japan often attend its services at the Nishi Hongwanji in Kyoto.

1906 he opened at his own expense two modern schools in Peking where the new government curriculum was taught. At the same time he endeavored unsuccessfully to organize a committee representative of all religions—Christian, Mohammedan, Taoist, Confucianist, and Buddhist—to promote friendly relations and adjust any difficulties that might arise among their various adherents. In 1912 he was influential in organizing a society for the promotion of Buddhism, which petitioned the Republican Parliament to establish that religion as the State religion. He had already lost his sight when this movement was inaugurated, and a year later, weakened by age and saddened by his blindness, he laid down his work and entered his nirvana.

The Buddhist society is still doing much to revive Buddhism in China, but the Government paid slight attention to its efforts to make that religion the official religion of the State. The Confucianists were more successful.

Lest it may be thought that the movement for the restoration of Confucianism is merely a political one, originating with those in authority and engineered by them for their own selfish purposes, it is important to emphasize the fact that the protagonist of the cause is Ch'en Huang-chang, a graduate of the University of California and a Doctor of Philosophy of Columbia University, a man who has never held office either under the Empire or the Republic. Among all who were shocked by the abandonment of the Confucian altars, no one was more earnest than he in efforts to restore the religion to its old-time status. He gathered about him a few men of like mind and organized the Confucian Association. Being a native of the province of Chekiang, he endeavored first to interest the officials and gentry of that region. Later he spent much time in Peking, where his high standing as a graduate of an

American university gave him considerable influence among the progressive young men who came to the front during the revolution. The sympathy of many in high official position was enlisted, but the movement itself was entirely non-official. By the end of 1912 Dr. Ch'en had enrolled in the Association men of every province in the Republic. Branch societies were established in the provincial capitals and in most other important cities. In 1913 the publication was begun of a monthly magazine, called *The Confucian Association Monthly*, a very creditable review of 150 pages.

The Association and its branches then began a campaign to influence the Government. Telegrams from all parts of the country poured into Peking, some addressed to the President, more of them to the two houses of Parliament, which were in session throughout the greater part of that year. The supporters of the movement were found not only among the gentry but among the merchants as well. Many of the chambers of commerce became interested and added their appeals to those of the associations. In so far as it is possible for any cause to have popular support in a country where so few are educated, the effort to make Confucianism the established religion of the Republic may be said to represent a very general desire among the people. Even the masses of the people, uneducated though they may be, are accustomed to observe in their family and social relations the ceremonies and regulations prescribed by Confucianism, and they have a jealous regard for the name and the teachings of the great sage. There is no doubt but that the Republic would be discredited in the eyes of the people if it should appear that the worship required by the old State religion was to be permanently abandoned and all the traditions of the past forgotten.

It was not difficult, therefore, to win the support of the officials for the programme of the Association. The

Governor of Chekiang was one of the first to yield to the request of so influential an organization. He is a young man of far more than ordinary ability, who came suddenly into prominence during the revolution and made himself Governor of his native province. He was quick to see that the Republic would overcome much of the passive resistance of the people against which it had to struggle, if it could appear to be no less pious than the Empire and just as ardent in its attachment to the old religion which for a hundred generations had held the affections of their forefathers. Governor Chu's telegram to the Senate and House of Representatives contains about eight hundred Chinese characters and cannot therefore be given in full in this article. His argument is that without the restraints of religion men are no better than wild beasts in their relations one with another; that no nation ever existed without a religion; that China has been especially blest by Heaven in being the birthplace of Confucius; that in the ancient scriptures edited by him are found all the principles of modern philosophy, science, law, and other branches of learning; that Sakyamuni, Jesus, and Mohammed, although unhampered, made no such record; that modern scholarship casts no doubt upon the teachings of Confucius; that Confucianism is the only national religion in China, and that its overthrow would mean the relaxation of all the social restraints and the increase of vice and crime; that truth and virtue would not be able to flourish, and, although men might talk of military and financial reform, disorders and corruption would inevitably increase, "liberty, equality, and fraternity" become impossible, and the Republic cease to exist.

He begs Parliament to behold the desecration of the sacred places, and prays it to heed the petition of the Confucian Association and restore Confucianism to its former position of authority as the State religion. He

appeals to the respect which the members of Parliament must feel for the tomb of Confucius, and declares that the restoration of his religion will mean the triumph of truth and the suppression of violence.

The great leader of the abortive attempt at reform in 1898, K'ang Yu-wei, also pleaded for the restoration of the old religion, saying that, although Christianity taught the worship of God and the love of man, it could never hope to persuade the four hundred millions of Chinese to abandon the worship of their ancestors.

One of the telegrams addressed to the President urged that the worship of Confucius in the schools be made compulsory. To this the President replied in a mandate issued on June 22d, 1913, in which he approved of the restoration of Confucianism as the State religion, but declined to acquiesce in the proposal of the telegram until he could obtain the opinions of the various provincial authorities. He took occasion, however, to point out that the monarchy, in order to bolster up its authority, had emphasized one side only of the teaching of the sage—the right of the sovereign to command and the duty of the subject to obey; whereas this relationship was subordinated by the great teacher himself to the establishment of justice, which is the most essential bond of society. He declared that this partial teaching had resulted in arbitrary government, oppression, and violence.

He noted too that this misinterpretation of the Confucian teaching had led some to doubt the fitness of that religion to become the State religion of the Republic, and that it had induced them recklessly to propose the abolition of the sacrifices. He endeavored to show that Confucius, in pointing out the disorders of past periods as recorded in the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, had directed attention to the wickedness of absolute rulers, and had intimated that popular government was

the original form of government. "The aromatic spirits poured out to the sage in libation," he declares, "are old, but their fragrance is none the less still pleasing to-day. Heaven's ancient gift to the world of Confucius was not meant merely for that distant age but for all times. It was a gift that foreshadowed the end of monarchical rule and the coming of a day when the virtuous and capable should have dominion through their election by the will of the people." He referred also to the extravagant notions of the radicals who had precipitated the rising of 1913, as being opposed to the will of the people. "So long as the sun and moon endure, so long as the rivers and streams continue to flow," he affirms, "so long shall the Republic preserve the sovereignty of the people; for there can never be union nor peace while the desire for liberty is unsatisfied. The rebellious seem to think that non-conformity is equality and that lack of reverence is liberty. There is but one way of preserving the State—the way of religion, morality, and economy." It was to the restoration of religion that he looked, he said, for the correction of men's hearts and the moulding of their conduct, and through this he hoped for the preservation of the Republic. A later mandate was issued making the study of the sacred books obligatory in the public schools and urging the observance of the old religion as essential to the moral training of the young.

The work of the Confucian Association culminated in the assembling of a great national convention in September, 1913, at Chüfu, Shantung, the ancient home of Confucius and the site of his tomb. This was probably the first time in history that such a convention was ever held, and its significance is increased by the fact that it was summoned not by national or provincial authority but entirely independent of the Government, by the action of private citizens interested in the preser-

vation of their ancient faith. The convention met, according to the old calendar, on the 24th day of the Eighth Moon in the 2,464th Year of Confucius, that is to say, September 24th, 1913. The 27th day of that moon is the traditional birthday of the sage. This was the high day of the festival, which lasted a week, closing on the last day of the moon. Duke Yen, of whom I have spoken above, the head of the Confucian family, attended the meetings and participated in the discussions. The autumn sacrifice to Confucius was offered in Peking that year and in many of the provincial capitals, but the President did not participate until the vernal equinox of 1914.

The return to the ancient practices of the religion has been quite gradual and is not yet entirely accomplished. Probably there never will be a complete return. A change of dynasty has often been accompanied by a modification of the ritual. In the present case the abandonment of the monarchical form of government calls for a more marked revision. The modification thus far made is announced to be a return to the simpler forms of ancient times while as yet the sceptre was not hereditary. It was not until the winter solstice of 1914 that the great service at the Altar to Heaven was resumed. This service was conducted by the President in person, and seems to have lacked somewhat the impressiveness that attended the worship by the Emperor under the old régime.

Under the Empire civil officials worshipped in the temple of Confucius; the military were required to attend in the temple of the so-called God of War. This was a deified warrior, Kuan Yu.³ Another hero of an-

³ Kuan Yu was a distinguished military leader in the period known as that of the Three Kingdoms, near the close of the second century of our era. He was canonized in the twelfth century, and near the close of the Ming Dynasty in the sixteenth century was raised to the rank of the gods as Kuan Ti, the title by which he is commonly known to-day.

cient times worshipped by the soldier was Yo Fei.⁴ The worship of these two patron saints of the military class has recently been restored. On the 6th of March, 1915, the Ministry of War at Peking issued instructions to all commanders of troops both in Peking and in the provinces, to the effect that henceforth all officers and men in the army and in the navy must present themselves at the temple of Kuan Yu and Yo Fei to take the oath of allegiance to the President as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the Republic. This order was issued in response to a recommendation of the Governor of Chekiang. The latter, however, requested that other heroes of the past might be added to the list to be worshipped, but the Council of State objected and the President sustained the objection.

These mandates of President Yüan Shih-k'ai, restoring the State sacrifices, have met with considerable hostile criticism from those who are not Confucianists, particularly the Christians and their missionary friends. The chief objections urged are two: first that the State sacrifices were a part of the monarchical system, that the offering to Heaven in particular could only be made by the Emperor as the Son of Heaven, and that the restoration of this service, therefore, will be regarded by the people as an assumption of the Imperial dignity by Yüan Shih-k'ai; secondly, that the establishment of a State religion necessarily places the adherents of other faiths under certain disabilities, and to that extent abridges the freedom of worship guaranteed by the constitution.

To the first objection it is replied that the ancient theory of government in China was that the Emperor

⁴ Yo Fei was a general during the closing years of the Sung Dynasty, and distinguished himself in service against the Kin Tartars. He was finally put to death by his Emperor at the instigation of a Minister of State who desired to make peace with the Tartars. Yo Fei has ever since been regarded as a martyr by the Chinese. He was canonized in the thirteenth century.

derived his authority from the consent of the governed, that the mandate of Heaven was given to him who was chosen by the will of the people. The ancient Classic of History says: "Heaven sees as the people see; Heaven hears as the people hear." It is held, therefore, that the Emperor worshipped the Most High as the representative of the people, and that, if an Emperor could so represent the people, a President elected by the people was much better qualified to officiate in that capacity. Hence in issuing his proclamation for the revival of the worship at the Altar to Heaven at the winter solstice of 1914, President Yüan said:

"Since the revolution, all kinds of opinions have been expressed. Some have said that the worship of Heaven originated with the monarchy and that the sacrifices ought not to be retained by the Republic. . . . As a result, the sacrifice of bullocks has been neglected and the altars made a heap of ruins. . . . 'Heaven sees as the people see; Heaven hears as the people hear.' Anything which the people ask will be granted by Heaven. Therefore in ancient times the sovereigns governed the people in the name of Heaven. Such a sentiment corresponds exactly with the spirit of republicanism. . . . The 23d of December will be the winter solstice, at which time the ceremonies attending the worship of Heaven should be observed. On that day, therefore, I, the President, will engage in this service in person at the head of the national officials of the Republic in the capacity of the representative of the people. The local authorities, as representatives of the people whom they govern, are hereby directed to offer sacrifices in their respective localities. Thus the ancient tradition will be preserved and great blessing from Heaven may be anticipated."

As to the second objection, the President has repeatedly given assurance that full religious liberty will be preserved, and it has been pointed out very forcibly by those who have urged the restoration of the State worship that a State establishment does not mean that any one is to be coerced into an observance of the State rites; that England, for instance, supports an Established Church, and that, notwithstanding this, every

man in England is permitted to worship according to his own convictions and suffers from no political disabilities.

There has been misunderstanding upon both sides with respect to this controversy. Some Christian missionaries have feared that their converts would be placed at a disadvantage in competing for official honors, and the Confucianists have thought that the Christians were unwilling for the Confucian rites to be observed at all. What the Christians have opposed is the support of the religion by the State and the offering of the sacrifices by the officials, since conceivably some Christian chosen to office would be unable conscientiously to engage in such worship. Thus the Christians would labor under disabilities. It is to be remembered, however, that Confucianism has no paid ministry or priesthood, and that the sacrifices have always been offered by the officials and paid for by the State. There exists no organization that can take over this service, so that, unless the State does make provision for it, the costly public worship must cease.

That the Government has no desire to compel anyone against his will to participate in the Confucian worship is shown by the action taken in the case of the military and naval officers who recently declined to worship at the temple of Kuan Yu and Yo Fei as commanded in the order mentioned above. The President, when informed of their unwillingness, immediately issued an order permitting those who could not conscientiously engage in such worship to take the oath of allegiance in accordance with the rites of their own religion. The Christian officers thereupon met together and drew up a ritual for observance at the Altar to the Most High in the Temple of Heaven, and there with Christian ceremonies they gave their allegiance to the President. It still remains true, however, that a Christian will be ineligible to the

Presidency so long as the offering of the Confucian sacrifices is made an obligation of that office. But to be fair to the Chinese we should not forget that, despite the religious liberty of the British, the heir to the British throne at once becomes ineligible if he finds himself unable to accept the Protestant faith. The question of Christian ineligibility to the Presidency is of course at present merely an academic one, for the Christians in China as yet constitute an insignificant part of the whole population; but their number is increasing rapidly and they already occupy in the public service positions of great influence and importance out of all proportion to their numbers.

In view of the facts recited it seems worth while to consider what there is in Confucianism that gives it such a hold upon the affections of the Chinese people, what relation the religion sustains to their moral standards, what adaptability it shows to the needs of modern life, whether or not there are any elements in it worth preserving. Confucianism profoundly influences the life of every individual in China. As a child the Chinese is taught to bow reverently to the tablet of the sage when he enters and leaves the schoolroom. The sacred scriptures edited by Confucius are the text-books given him to study, and these he learns by heart. The ritual prescribes the ceremonies to be observed when he attains his majority, the worship of Heaven and Earth and his ancestors when he is married, the solemn service of mourning for the dead, the offerings to be made in the hall at the winter solstice and those at the grave in the spring. As a member of the community he joins in the service at the Confucian temple at the new and the full moon and particularly at the vernal and autumnal equinoxes. As an official he must sacrifice not only to the great teacher and his disciples, but he must worship also at the local altar to the spirits of the land and the

harvest, and in the temples to the various patron saints and heroes of the State. Like other religions, Confucianism has its private and its public worship; those suited to the individual, or rather the family life, and those intended for the community and the nation.

The public worship, particularly at the State altars in Peking, is very impressive. The spiritual beings who receive this homage from the State were divided under the late Manchu dynasty into three ranks. In the first rank were placed Shang Ti or the Most High God, the Imperial Ancestors, the Earth and the Guardian Spirits of the Land and the Harvests. Since the establishment of the Republic the imperial ancestors are of course omitted. In 1907, as stated above, Confucius, formerly placed in the second rank, was raised to the first grade, and still retains that position, receiving the same worship as that paid to the Most High. In the second rank were the Sun and Moon, the sovereigns of earlier dynasties, the patron saint of Agriculture, the patroness of Sericulture, and the Year Star, i.e., Jupiter. In the third rank were the patron saint of Medicine, the God of War, the God of Literature, the North Star, the Eastern Peak—i.e., Mt. T'ai in Shantung—the tutelary of Peking, the Gods of Fire and Artillery, the patron of Mechanic Arts, the God of the Furnace, the God of the Granary, and a multitude of other deities and saints increasing from generation to generation.

The religious calendar was determined by the Court of Sacrificial Worship with great care and announced a year in advance. This was made necessary by the fact that until 1912 China used a lunar calendar. The College of Astronomy had therefore to prepare an almanac showing when the winter and summer solstices would occur, whether or not there would be an intercalary moon, if so, when it was to be added, how many days were to be allowed to each month in the next year, and the exact

time when the new and full moons would occur; so that, while the times and seasons for sacrifice were known in a general way, the exact dates had to be determined.

Worship of the various gods and saints consisted in bathing, fasting, prostrations, prayers and thanksgiving, offerings of incense, lighted candles, gems, fruits, cooked food, salted vegetables and shew bread, libations of wine, sacrifices of whole oxen, sheep, and pigs, sometimes of deer and other game, and on certain occasions a burnt sacrifice of a whole bullock. The worship was accompanied by music and posturing or dancing. All sacrifices of the first grade had to be preceded by three days of fasting; those of the second grade by two days of abstinence. Warning notices were posted in all the palaces and yamens throughout the country. Fasting did not mean entire abstinence from food, but from flesh and strong-smelling vegetables, such as garlic, leeks, and onions, and also from wine and all strong drink. No criminal proceedings were to be held by the courts, and no invitations to feasts issued or accepted. There could be no music, no inquiries after the sick, and no mourning for the dead. One was especially forbidden to enter the death chamber of a woman, to sacrifice to the spirits of the family, or to visit the tombs. All association with the sick and the mourner was forbidden to those participating in the State worship. These prohibitions remind us of those enforced in connection with the Hebrew sacrifices, which forbade Aaron and his sons to drink any wine or strong drink when about to go into the tabernacle, and warned them not to mourn for the dead when serving there. The prayers offered were written and read and then burned. Those offered at the Altar to Heaven were written on blue paper in vermilion ink. This practice still prevails under the Republic.

Color, form, and number all play an important part in the construction of the temples and their furniture and in all the ceremonies connected with the worship. The prevailing color at the Temple of Heaven is blue—the azure of the sky. But the word for blue which is used is one of those primitive words which may mean blue or green. Primitive man evidently considered these as two shades of one color, for we find that in several languages one word is used for both colors. The Chinese word *Ch'ing* may mean the blue of the sky or the green of the grass. The jade emblem offered to Shang Ti is translated “the azure jade,” but can just as well be translated green jade, and as a matter of fact the piece in use in recent years is green. The tiles of the pavilions at the Altar to Heaven are blue, but those on some of the other buildings in the temple are green; the silk offered is blue, and all the pottery is of a blue color. Yellow, the color of the soil in North China, is the prevailing color at the Temple of the Earth, and the gem offered is yellow. The prayer is written on yellow paper and the silk offered is yellow. Red is the prevailing color at the Altar to the Sun, and the gem is red, as is the silk also. The prayer is written on vermillion paper. At the Altar to the Moon the gem and the silk are white. The Sheh Chi T'ang, or the Altar to the Spirits of the Land and the Harvest, is peculiar in that it is made of soil of five colors: yellow in the centre, blue on the east, red on the south, white on the west, and black on the north. The glazed brick walls surrounding the court of the altar are colored in the same way. You will note that these are the five colors of the new Chinese flag. They are what the Chinese regard as the primary colors. The flag, however, is not a new one, but was often seen on Chinese gunboats long before the revolution. Originally it had no relation to the five races. The arrangement of colors is

as old as Chinese history and is mentioned in the Book of History. The five colors are correlated with the five directions—north, south, east, west, and centre; with the five tones of the old pentatonic scale, and with the five virtues—mercy, justice, piety, wisdom, and sincerity. Since the establishment of the Republic this combination of colors has been given a new symbolical meaning and made to represent the five races included in the Republic—Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Turki, and Tibetan.

The circle is appropriate to Heaven; hence the Altar to Heaven and all its vessels are round. In the old cosmogony the earth was considered square, and so the Altar to the Earth and all its vessels are square. Odd numbers belong to Heaven and even ones to earth. Three is the key-number of the Temple of Heaven. There are three terraces on the altar, three flag-staffs, three times three steps from the ground to the first terrace and from one terrace to another, three times three stones in the first circle of paving stones around the central stone of the top terrace, and a multiple of three in each circle. There were three times three kotows¹ in the worship there, three times three pieces of music, and three sorts of beings worshipped—Heaven, Earth, and Man. Four and eight are the prevailing numbers at the Altar to the Earth, seven at the Altar to the Sun, and six at that to the Moon. Direction, posture, and time also have their meaning. At the Altar to Heaven one worships toward the north, the side of darkness, on the longest night in the year; at the Altar to the Earth, on the longest day in the year, in the daylight and facing the south; at the Altar to the Sun in the spring at sunrise facing the east, and after sunset in autumn at the Altar to the Moon, facing the west.

¹ The recent revision of the ritual by the Republic appears to have ignored this numerical symbolism, since the three kneelings and nine kotows have been replaced by four bows.

Color, direction, posture, and the use of gems, as we know, are all common to many religions. We have but to mention the cardinal's robe and the bishop's purple; the worship of the Moslems towards Mecca, of the Jews towards Jerusalem, and of many Christians towards the east; the orientation of many churches; the use of gems in the ephod of the Jewish High Priest and in the bishop's ring, and the play upon numbers in ecclesiastical architecture and liturgy.

The sacrifice of animals, accompanied by offerings of wine and incense, lighted lamps or candles, and cooked food and fruits, is common to many religions. What was the meaning of animal sacrifice in the State religion of China? For that we must turn to the ancient Chinese classics: "Sacrifice is for prayer, for thanksgiving, and to ward off calamity." So we read in the *Book of Rites*. It has been said that there is no idea of expiation in Chinese sacrifice but only that of propitiation. This is probably correct; but we must remember that calamities, personal or national, in China are all regarded as punishments for sins committed, and the sacrifice is not merely a charm to ward off evil but is sometimes accompanied by a confession and intended to placate the divine being. Probably the conception of substitution did not occur to them, but there is a significant passage in the *Li Ki* which says, "The blood was offered because it contained the life (or breath)." This is a near approach to the passage in the book of Leviticus: "The life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls." It is to be noted too that a difference is to be made between the animals offered on the marble altar and those consumed on the altar of burnt offering. The former were a part of a sacrificial feast, a communion. The animals had to be without spot or blemish. The sacrifice to Shang

Ti was a young bullock. The killing was a matter of importance, and in all sacrifices of the first grade had to be witnessed by the Emperor in person or by his delegate. In the *Book of Rites* we read: "The sacrifice to God in the suburb is the highest act of worship; the offerings in the ancestral temple form the highest expression of human relationship." Just as in the Hebrew ritual "the bodies of those beasts whose blood was brought into the sanctuary by the High Priest for sin" "were burned without the camp," or, in later Jewish history, "outside the gate of the city," so also the bullock sacrificed at the Altar to Heaven as a solitary burnt offering to God was burned outside the city gate.

There has never been in China but one recognized altar to Shang Ti, the Most High God. To erect a second was as great an act of treason as among the Hebrews it was to raise an altar to Jehovah anywhere else than in Jerusalem. In both cases the worship of the Most High was centralized at the capital. The large park in the southern suburb of Peking known as the Temple of Heaven consists of a series of courts one within another. Admission to the outer court can be had only upon the west side. There are gates to the inner court on the east, west, and south, but none on the north, which the Chinese call the side of darkness. The inner court is divided into two sections. The northern contains the beautiful triple-roofed pavilion where prayers were offered every spring for a good harvest, but the most important part of the temple is the southern section. In the midst of this is a smaller court, the square court of the altar, within which is a circular court, containing the open, circular, white marble altar. This altar is composed of three terraces. Four flights of steps, one from each cardinal point of the compass, give ascent. On the topmost terrace, on its northern side, there was erected a tabernacle of boards fitted

together with tenons and sockets, which was in imperial days lined with yellow satin and covered outside with blue silk. Within this on a throne was placed the tablet inscribed with the words, "The Most High God of Imperial Heaven." The altar of burnt offering is in the southeast corner of the square court. It is built of green tiles and has steps for ascent on the east, west, and south.

On the day preceding the sacrifice the Emperor was carried in his palanquin from his palace to the temple. Every house and shop along his route was closed and curtains cut off all view from the cross-streets. Guards lined the street on either side, but all other persons were forbidden to use the street. The trains were forbidden to enter or leave the city, and a sabbath-like stillness prevailed in that quarter of the capital. The sacrifice was offered just before daylight. The Emperor had to enter the inner court on foot and from the south. Just outside the southern gate of the square court of the altar a tent was placed in which he exchanged his imperial dress for the high-priestly robe. On emerging he was met by attendants with ewer and basin and washed his hands before ascending the altar. The Jewish priests too, we remember, bathed in the laver before offering sacrifice. The circular court was filled with musicians and posturers. Bells, drums, cymbals, stringed and wind instruments, were arranged on either side of the central way. The Emperor ascended the high altar from the south, facing the north, as the Jewish High Priest also did when sacrificing in the temple. Five pedestals stood in the middle of the uppermost terrace. They were of white marble delicately carved. Upon the central one was the golden censer; on either side of it a golden candlestick. The outermost pair supported vases with gilded flowers. Just before the tabernacle of the Most High there was placed a trencher con-

taining the body of a bullock, flayed. A table at one side received the offerings of wine, jade, and silk; upon another the imperial prayer was placed. After the various offerings and libations, the prayer was read and the Emperor, kneeling, partook of the meat offering and wine, thus communing with the Most High and with his ancestors. When this service was completed, he faced the altar of burnt offering and watched the bullock there being consumed.

The service as conducted by the President last December made very few changes in this ritual. One published account, however, says that the burnt offering was omitted. It is to be noted too that the President did not leave his palace until the morning of the sacrifice, and drove there in a motor car.

In the very incomplete description of the Confucian worship just given certain similarities will have been noticed between the ceremonies of the Chinese and those of the ancient Hebrews; others might be pointed out. There is a strong temptation, therefore, to find some connection between them. If we accept the theory of the western origin of the Chinese, it is not difficult to believe that the two religions may have had a common origin; but we should not allow our desire to find a monotheism in ancient China to blind us to the real character of the Chinese State religion.

The relation of the Confucian religion to the moral standards of the people is a very intimate one. The Confucian classics, which are the sacred books, hold ever before the Chinese student a high ideal of character. Justice, mercy, self-denial, sincerity, moral courage, filial and fraternal affection—all these virtues are repeatedly emphasized. It aims to strengthen the three bonds of society—that is to say, those between parent and child, husband and wife, and between ruler and subject. Thus it seeks to provide peace in the home and order in the

State. It insists upon the worship of the spirits, but it teaches that virtuous living is a condition of acceptance with God. "The spirits are not always favorable," *The Classic of History* says; "they accept only the worship of the sincere." These scriptures teach that sickness, poverty, drought, pestilence, and war are all calamities sent as a punishment for sin. They tell us that "the ways of Shang Ti are not invariable. Upon the good he bestows blessings, upon the evil-doer he sends down calamities."

It is natural, therefore, for the Chinese to feel that the moral law finds its sanction in the national religion, and equally natural to fear that an abandonment of the national religion might lead to a deterioration in morals. When the moral standards of society are supposed to find their only sanction in religion, if that religion be abandoned, there is indeed grave danger that the less thoughtful will imagine that moral requirements have lost their authority. In such a society, unless there be stringent legislation and a strong public opinion to secure its enforcement, the individual without religion is apt to fall a prey to vice, social bonds to become relaxed, and government corrupt and inefficient.

On the whole, the influence of Confucianism has undoubtedly been beneficial. Its disestablishment would not, however, as its friends profess to believe, have necessarily meant the disintegration of society or the deterioration of the individual. The experience of the United States is just to the contrary. Religion is less formal and more powerful where it is supported not by State authority but by the free-will offerings of those who believe in it. Our country is not less religious than those which maintain established churches. The difficulty with the Confucianist has been that he cannot conceive of his religion as independent of the State. It is true that there is no organization at present except

the State, authorized to conduct its services; but the Confucian Association might have made itself such an organization, and Confucianism would undoubtedly be more influential if none but those who are its sincere adherents participated in its worship and contributed to its support. This was pointed out to Dr. Ch'en in the summer and autumn of 1913, but without effect. It might be difficult for the Confucian Association to bear the cost of the sacrifices, but these might well be abandoned. Judaism long since gave up its bloody sacrifices, yet its ethical influence is perhaps greater than ever before in its history. Dr. Ch'en contends that this might do for vegetarians, but not for meat-eaters; for he says if we omit the flesh from the sacrificial meal or communion, we withhold from those whom we worship that which we ourselves consider the most important article of diet for ourselves, that is to say, we are offering less than our best.

The feast is still today an important social function, and even in some Christian countries food is placed upon the graves of the departed upon the eve of All Souls' Day. But the progress of learning is leading men to more refined testimonials of their affection for the dead. China unfortunately has never had a prophet Micah to proclaim the worthlessness of forms and to sum up true worship in justice, mercy, and pity. There are, it is true, texts which teach that sacrifice without virtuous living is vain, but there are none which intimate that the sacrifices may be omitted. Everywhere the rites are insisted upon as important. China needs a St. Paul to reduce the rites to symbols and give an allegorical interpretation to the old ritual, and thus to substitute spiritual living for material offerings. But we must not be too exacting. The burning of incense is still practised in some Christian churches, and all retain the sacred meal of bread and wine. If it be true that

President Yüan has given up the burnt offering, he has already reduced the principal service to a sacred communion with the spirits, and there is no reason to doubt that in time the most objectionable features of the Confucian worship will be removed. The orchestral music, the paeon of praise, and the prayer will remain. The worship of the dead even now to the highly educated means no more than our own memorial-day service does to us. The dead can no more detect the beauty and fragrance of the flowers than they can the flavor of the rice and wine. Above all, the excellent moral teaching of the Confucian sacred books will remain to inspire and to guide the young. The establishment of the public schools and the introduction of modern science must lead to a recognition of the world as a universe, ruled by one Divine Being, and thus the worship of the various powers of nature will die a natural death and be supplanted by the worship of Shang Ti alone.

Confucianism has always allowed the widest latitude in philosophical speculation. It has never formulated an authoritative creed. Its adherents, therefore, have no obstacle of this sort to prevent their acceptance of the conclusions of modern science. But the masses of China have never been satisfied with the intellectual recognition of God and His justice; they want something more consoling and hopeful. Hence they have supplemented their Confucianism with the mysticism and magic of Taoism and the comforting message of Buddhism, or, more properly, of that form of Buddhism which largely prevails in China—Amidism⁶, which professes faith in One almighty Ruler above all the Buddhas, and which directs the sorrowing and sinful to Amida-Buddha for help and salvation, and holds out the hope, not of an unconscious nirvana, but of immortality in a paradise of happiness in the western heaven.

⁶ The Ching T'u Sect referred to above.

The Chinese have the reputation of being indifferent to speculative thought, wanting in sentiment, and lacking in religious emotion; but the success of numerous native sects in Shantung and elsewhere shows that the people readily yield to religious appeals, and the gathering of multitudes in recent years to listen to the preaching of Christian evangelists is enough to prove that the struggle for bread has not entirely destroyed the hunger and thirst of the spirit.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MEDICAL ETHICS

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[This is the third of a series of articles on the ethical standards prevalent in different occupations. The first, by Mr. John F. Moors, on "Ethics in Modern Business," appeared in the January number of *THE REVIEW*. The second, by ex-President Harris of Amherst College, on "The Ethics of College Students," appeared in the April number.—Ed.]

The growth and shape of a human skeleton are determined, not solely by inheritance and nutrition, but partly also by what its possessor does with his bones. They become compressed here, enlarged there, in response to tugging muscles or sagging burdens.

So with medical ethics. The codes and standards of the physician depend in part on the peculiar strains and stresses, the special irritations and inspirations of his professional work. He may turn away from them all, unbranded and undeveloped by his lot. If so, he remains the exceptional man to whom the conclusions of this essay have no application.

To some extent of course every man is exceptional. His reactions to experience are in part unique, and to that extent he cuts down the truth of any generalization about him. On the other hand, he behaves in part not as a doctor or even as an American doctor but simply as an American. In this degree he develops his ethics in racial and geographic rather than in professional grooves. Nevertheless there remains such a thing as a doctor's type, a group of habits characteristic of men who have practised medicine actively and in the open

for a number of years. The doctor's ethics or habitual standards of behavior then take on a greater interest if we view them not merely as his peculiarities but as his responses to the world's call.

Now the world's call to him is something like a fire alarm. His work has somewhat the aspect of a perpetual emergency in which he must be cool and keep his head. Hence he is schooled to the control of emotion, to the repression of all instinctive impulses, disgusts, horrors, and enthusiasms. Dignity is therefore one of his traditions; although the modern doctor has thrown off, along with the frock coat, white tie, and high hat of his predecessor, much of the rigidity and stateliness which accompanied the dignity of our medical forefathers. In the modern doctor dignity takes the form of emotional reserve. He avoids the heights and depths and treads an even road. This makes him reliable when action is the cue, annoying when an adequate responsiveness is what we chiefly desire. To let oneself out of one's own grip may be all right, he thinks, for a stock-broker or a clergyman, but it is bad form for a doctor.

He often develops in this way an unusual control of temper. In emergencies it will never do to let the hand or the brain be joggled by even a pardonable thrust of anger. The layman thinks he has a right to "get mad" sometimes, but the doctor, while on duty, never, with his patient and the family, never. Of course doctors break their own rules in this as in other matters. Nevertheless the rules are there to break, clearly distinguished from the standards of "the laity."

This emotional neutrality is sometimes very annoying and even unnatural. The doctor has had to face so many horrors unmoved (in order that he may do his part in mitigating them) that he may lose the capacity to be horrified. He may become *spiritually muscle-*

bound by his incessant practical and motor activities, so that his mind never recoils, never revolts, never throws caution to the winds. And since there are seasons when the swift reactions of horror and revolt are every man's duty, the professional rigidity of the doctor may be his undoing. He may suffer the insufferable and be blind to the entrance of the devil himself.

Courage is bred strong in him for certain situations, weak for others. To risk his life in fighting disease he will rarely hesitate, and in this he has no self-consciousness or strut. It is a matter of course, and any member of the profession who shirks such an opportunity and refuses to play the game gets the strongest condemnation from his fellows. On the other hand, there has been until recent times little or no professional condemnation of the doctor who is too cowardly to confess his mistake on finding that he has done a wrong operation or made a disastrously wrong diagnosis. "What would be the good? We don't want to get everybody down on all of us," is the sort of thought that runs in medical minds at such a time if they are friendly to the coward. Even if they are unfriendly, they will rarely regard it as his duty to confess.

Veracity is tempered in the doctor's mind by his dominant desire to help and comfort the patient, above all things to do no harm. He is unwilling to make a fetish of truth-speaking and very keenly aware that he may not possess "the truth" at all. There was much good-natured chuckling in medical circles a few years ago when a hide-bound medical truth-teller steeled himself to the task and broke to a sick confrère the awful news that he had tuberculosis—only to discover a week later that the supposed truth was false. The sick doctor rapidly convalesced and readily forgave the mistake, but the wise pundits of the medical profession ended their chuckling with grave warnings about "You see what it

comes to—this truth business. We don't know it all by a good deal yet."

The distinction between veracity and correctness is blurred among all sorts and conditions, but perhaps nowhere so persistently as in medical ethics. That the most ignorant and therefore incorrect speaker may be utterly truthful and honest is a distinction which is ignored by many, especially when one is trying to defend the benevolent lies of the kindly doctor. In general, medical standards demand that the doctor shall never lie for his own benefit, but that in dealing with patients he shall be governed only by the patient's best interests. If those interests seem to the doctor to demand that the truth be colored, shaded, or suppressed, it is then deemed right for him to save the patient rather than the truth—especially remembering (as he muddles accuracy with honesty) that the unpleasant truth which is suppressed may turn out to be no "truth" at all.

Against this dominant tendency of medical ethics to subordinate everything—even honesty—to the patient's private interests (as the doctor sees them), two slight counter currents are beginning to make themselves felt. Both of them mark, as I see it, the direction of a force which makes for the doctor's emancipation from a servile dependence on his patient. Modern surgery and modern scientific medicine (invading the field of *traditional* medicine) tend to breed in the physician a habit of looking for truth and depending on the verdict of reality, whatever his own or others' wishes may say. The surgical incision brings him face to face with the truth or falsity of his thoughts. Extraordinarily dramatic and vivid is this relief to the mind's tension. All in a moment he is proved right or wrong, reaches the goal of his endeavor and is satisfied. Faith and groping are transformed to sight. Whatever he finds, whether his beliefs are supported or overthrown, he wins, because

once having committed and submitted himself to the arbitrament of reality, he wants that, whatever it is.

Surgery then—even bad surgery—makes for mental clearness, and mental clearness is a potent aid to veracity. Even a moderately truthful man is tempted into strict veracity of statement if the picture within his mind as he speaks is sharp cut and brightly colored. Veracity may then become the path of least resistance, so that even powerful counter motives fail to swerve it. On the other hand, in a mind full of fog, the desire to be honest easily loses its way.

This fog is dispelled and veracity strengthened not only by surgical disclosures but by the use of exact methods in diagnosis. Common to all these methods is the sort of passivity implied in *reading off a result*. As one reads the clinical thermometer, the blood-pressure instrument, the X-ray plate, one soon gets the habit of *reading aloud*—that is, of transforming what one sees immediately into speech or writing for the use of others. One lets the facts use one's tongue.

Now this mental habit (despite certain drawbacks) is a very convenient one in a doctor whose patients want to know what he finds wrong with them, and want this information undiluted and uncolored by his regard for what he considers their inability to bear the truth. A man who is in the habit of getting at facts by such a process of "reading," accustoms his mind to a kind of helpless dependence on facts. He loses the habit of freely manipulating and shaping his statements to fit what he thinks the patient wants to hear. He grows almost hypnotized by the truth as he sees it and, like Luther, "can do no other" than report it.

So I find the doctor's ethics being shaped unconsciously by the revelations of surgery and by the habit of reading off measurements on a scale. Thus he is being weaned from an undue dependence on private persons and

nourished by dependence on observed fact. But there is another new factor which begins perceptibly to reshape his ethics. I mean the recognition of public good. Formerly the doctor who could not win the favor of his neighbors, when they called him in sickness, must starve or seek other work. If the sick man and his family were afraid of open windows, the windows must be kept shut even in pneumonia, when the open window is the patient's best medicine. The "*malade imaginaire*," if she chance to be importunate and rich, could hardly be shaken off or told the bracing truths which her condition demands. The doctor must "satisfy" his patients, even if he has to humor their whims and weaknesses in a rather humiliating way. Until recently there was no money in serving the public good, and there is not much even yet, but, for reasons next to be given, a little goes a long way to change medical ethics. For even one or two public health officers, paid to disseminate the unvarnished truth about open windows, imaginary diseases, and useless drugs, get the ear of the public as no "private" doctor can and thereby make it easier for the private doctor to work straight for his patient's good, without bowing to hampering superstition. Thus the privately paid doctor grows bolder. He finds less temptation to act like a hired servant who must humor his master on pain of discharge if he doesn't. He finds it easier to make his patient listen, obey, and be educated. Thus the doctor's ethical temper becomes less servile and more independent.

American political leaders have seen of late the wisdom of appealing to the public against the tyranny of their political associates. Doctors are just beginning to use the same manœuvre. Until very recently—say within twenty years—it was highly unethical for a physician to write about health and disease in newspapers and magazines. Such publicity was considered "self-adver-

tising," which was and still is condemned as wrong by medical opinion. A man must not exploit himself and his capacities by advertising. But with the advent of the "public health movement," all this was changed. Any doctor who writes to spread generally recognized truth about the public health and about the means of preserving and improving it, is now perfectly "ethical" in the eyes of his professional brethren. He must not exploit in the public press his own discoveries nor recommend his own methods so that people shall come to him for help. That is still highly "unethical" and brings expulsion from all reputable medical societies. But whatever can properly be brought under the head of public health it is now ethical to expound when and wherever one can get a hearing.

In this way the ethical independence of the doctor is being considerably strengthened. He can appeal to the public against the "class spirit" of his more short-sighted brethren. For example, many medical societies have gone on record against "contract practice," i.e. have voted that it is unethical for a physician to hire himself out for a salary which binds him to attend, without further fee, all cases of illness in the group of persons who pay him. Despite such votes, many physicians have signed such contracts and are now doing "contract practice," sometimes for salaries so small that good work is impossible, sometimes for excellent salaries and under conditions ensuring unusually good work. But the reproach of being "unethical" in contract practice has been considerably lightened of late years by the fact that one can explain in the public press exactly the advantages to public health that come from putting the doctor and the patient on the same side against the disease, instead of having the doctor earn most when disease flourishes. It is now several years since medical societies (within my circle of knowledge) have

condemned contract practice as unethical. A doctor of my acquaintance recently said in public what every doctor says in private—that there are too many surgical operations performed by men who have not the skill to make the operation of benefit to the patient, with the result that many necessary operations are *not* done because so many people have come to distrust all or nearly all surgeons. Soon after this he was officially reprimanded by his local medical society for unethical conduct. Such statements—though no one denies their truth—should not be made to lay audiences, the society said. They diminish the public's confidence in the medical profession.

The incident illustrates the shade of truth in Bernard Shaw's remark that the medical profession (like every other profession) is a conspiracy against the public. It is impossible to advocate any medical reform in public without saying or implying that medical habits are not all they ought to be. This can be construed as an attack on the medical profession, and the profession as an organization wishes to defend itself, not selfishly, I think, but with the sincere and fallacious belief that all reforms should "come from within." When a doctor says that reforms should come from within alone, he is, I think, to a certain extent conspiring against the public which desires to see reforms fostered, like trade or thought or art, both from within and from without.

Yet this "private-spiritedness" of the medical profession, which until recent years has shaped its ethics, has in it much that is noble. It has encouraged modesty; it has curbed shameless advertising; it has preserved valuable traditions and kept the relation of doctor and patient (at their best) upon a high plane. Into this atmosphere a blast of publicity has now come and brought evil as well as good into the standards of the profession. Scientific methods, public and preventive

medicine, medical writing in newspapers and magazines, have thrown light upon dark places and opened up the doctor's activities to the public gaze. The doctor and his ethics get thereby the advantage and support of public interest. Subservience to private against public good is less tempting. Courage and independence are easier, veracity less costly.

On the other hand, it is not good for the doctor to be so much in the lime-light, to find himself the hero of so many novels, to hear his friends so glib with the slang of medical horrors and medical privacies. Something of the nobility described in *Beside the Bonnie Briar Bush* was bound up with the isolated and patriarchal position occupied by the best type of country doctor. As medicine becomes urban, public, democratic, the intimate personal relation of doctor and patient, the benefits of confession without absolution, may be diminished. Yet I think that the gain will outweigh the loss.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROFESSOR HOWISON TO CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

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In a previous article in *The Harvard Theological Review* the writer presented an estimate of the contribution of Professor Royce to Christian thought.¹ In the present article he endeavors to do the same with respect to another American philosopher of great significance to Christian theology, George Holmes Howison.

Among American philosophers there is none perhaps whose conception of personality is so closely bound up with the Christian Ideal as that of the eminent protagonist of Personal Idealism, whose "original and lucid thought," as Professor George Herbert Palmer once said publicly of him, "will be a factor in shaping the philosophic judgment of our time."

If Professor Royce's contribution to Christian thought is "rich, profound, and extensive," that of Professor Howison—while it too is profound—may be characterized as exceptionally stimulating and illuminating. It offers in many respects an antithesis to that of the author of *The World and the Individual*, yet both help to bring out essential truths and values of Christianity.

It is neither the proper office nor the purpose of the writer to attempt an estimate of Professor Howison's philosophy as such. It is my less ambitious purpose to endeavor to set forth, so far as the limits of such a paper will permit, its relation to Christian theology.

One can hardly approach the task from this viewpoint without noting how largely the philosophy of Professor

¹ April, 1915.

Howison, like that of his contemporaries Professors Royce and James and Dr. William T. Harris, was moulded by the earnestly religious atmosphere in which he was reared. Brought up in a Christian home in Marietta, Ohio, he graduated from Marietta College and Lane Theological Seminary. Throughout his career as a teacher he has kept in close touch with the movement of religious as well as of philosophic thought and has brought his virile mind forcibly to bear upon the higher life of his time, especially upon the Pacific Coast. Coming to the University of California in 1884 he occupied for twenty-five years the Mills chair of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity, becoming Professor Emeritus in 1909. Thus he became the founder of a real though unheralded school of philosophic thought upon the Pacific Coast which—however divergent its members may be from the system of the master—will continue to bear the impress of his ideals and of his personality. The "Philosophical Union" which he founded in 1889 has in its twenty-five years of vigorous life witnessed to the interest in philosophy which he created and maintained in Berkeley. His pupils occupy many of the leading chairs of philosophy in the universities and colleges of America.

It was in a theological atmosphere, as has been said, that he began his thinking. Stirred by religious problems, he found himself confronted with the demands of an intellectual life that had outgrown unyielding forms and demanded ampler and more adequate expression. To be at once philosopher and Christian required new wine-skins for the new wine which a severe mental discipline presses from the unfailing vintage of the enquiring spirit. A marked singleness and sincerity has characterized his thought. From the first he followed faithfully the white light of truth with unfaltering step. Certain clear and well-conceived truths have taken

shape in his mind; and these he has heralded and defended, expounded and amplified, with all the force and conviction of one who never turns back, never wavers, and never compromises. If Professor Royce's philosophy is a philosophy of loyalty, Professor Howison's is one—to use the term which he prefers to loyalty—of fealty. Sincere, undaunted, undefeated, he has maintained his principles against all comers and made himself heard far as the curse of philosophic doubt and obscurity is found.

Professor Howison came to Berkeley a Hegelian. To Hegel, as he said, he owed “many years of light and guidance.”² But Hegelianism proved too indiscriminating and all-embracing for him. He saw that there are wrinkles in truth, like those in the California hills, that cannot be smoothed out, moral heights too great to be brought down to the level of mere monism, and chasms that yawn too deep to be filled in with complaisant developmentalism. A passing word of criticism upon a public address of his by an Oakland theologian brought his doubts to a focus and drove him to deeper foundations and the gradual construction of a system based partly on Kantian principles and having a certain resemblance to Berkeleyanism, but essentially his own. This system he has termed “Personal Idealism,” or “Harmonic Pluralism.” The latter term must not be allowed to confuse his system with empirical Pluralism and its universe of radically disjunct particulars, from which it is as far removed as possible.

His system of thought is clearly and succinctly set forth in his well-known volume *The Limits of Evolution*, published in 1901 and revised and much enlarged in a second edition issued in 1905.³ The volume was received with an attention even more marked in

² *The Limits of Evolution*; Preface, p. xxvi. The citations are all from the second edition.

³ A third edition is now in course of preparation.

Great Britain than in America. The *Athenaeum* found in it evidence of the "unquenchable energy" of American philosophy. The *Scotsman* regarded it as "singularly instructive and impressive," and Dr. McTaggart of the University of Cambridge spoke of it in *Mind* as a "most remarkable work." Besides this volume he contributed to, as well as edited, the volume *The Conception of God*, published in 1897. These two collections of writings, with a *Treatise on Analytical Geometry*, 1869, constitute the sum of his publications in separate books. To them should be added his address at the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science in 1904, *Philosophy: Its Fundamental Conceptions and Its Methods*, printed in Volume I of the Publications of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition and several review articles upon educational as well as philosophical subjects.⁴ He has been one of the associate editors of *The Hibbert Journal* from its foundation.

The best presentation of Professor Howison's contribution to theology may perhaps be made through three fundamental ideas which have been outstanding in his teaching,—God, Freedom, and Immortality. The earnestness of his emphasis upon this Kantian triad suggests the close kinship of his thought with that of Kant—an obligation which he himself freely acknowledges.⁵ And yet, Kantian as he is, not only in the type of his thought but also in the temper of his mind and the strength of his emphasis upon duty, he is too good a student of Kant and too original a thinker to be merely a follower. He has his own interpretation and defences of the three great "postulates" in many respects in advance of those of the seer of Königsberg.

His Theism—to begin with that—is very definite and personal. God is conceived by him as the Perfect

⁴ Especially noteworthy is a brief but striking paper on "The Origin of Concepts."

⁵ *The Limits of Evolution*; Preface, p. xix ff.

Person, whose existence is capable of demonstration and whose relation to ourselves is that of Final Cause or Goal. In Him reason and will are one. He is the central member of the universal society of intelligences, or persons, an All-directing Intelligence "without encumbrances" and thus Perfect Love. "The worth of God is not in what He does," he declares, "but in what He is."

Conceptions of God that undermine or obscure the divine personality he confronts with all the weapons of reason and rebuke. Whether in the guise of Cosmic Consciousness or All-inclusive Absolute, these pantheistic conceptions seem to him to affront intelligence and to contradict morality. In the notable philosophical debate of 1895 at the University of California, he contended with force and skill against both of these tendencies. The first, as represented by Professor Joseph LeConte he met with the question: "So long as man remains a term in nature, how can he escape from that causal embrace in which Nature is held immanent in God?"⁶ To the second, as advocated by Professor Royce, he advanced this objection:

"If the Infinite Self *includes* us all, and all our experiences—sensations and sins, as well as the rest—in the unity of one life, and includes us and them *directly*; if there is but one and the same final Self for us each and all; then with a literalness indeed appalling He is we, and we are He, nay, He is *I* and *I* am He. . . . Or, if we read the conception in the second way, what becomes of *Him*? Then, surely, He is but another name for *me*; or for any of you, if you will. And how can there be talk of a Moral Order, since there is but a single mind in the case? We cannot legitimately call that mind a *person*."⁷

This is but a single instance of the pointedness and vigor with which he has indefatigably challenged what he has been wont to call the "almighty mix" of the Hegelian conception of God in all its phases. "God,"

⁶ The Conception of God; p. 117.

⁷ Ibid. pp. 98, 99.

he affirms, "is not an intermeddler; He is omniscient because He does not leave any other mind out. About the fate of every one He is intensely concerned; yet He respects the integrity and autonomy which is the sacred possession of each."

In uncompromising hostility to the philosophy of the unknowable, or agnosticism, to the Cosmic Consciousness of naturalism and to the Universal Self of monism,⁸ Professor Howison has taken the field in behalf of the "Perfect Guide and Friend," the "Impersonated Love," of whom Jesus taught, the "Father in Heaven" who is Personal Perfection. The God who is thus the "Centre of reference," the "Living Bond" for all selves, is according to this view under moral obligations to other persons, just as they are to Him. Reciprocal personality, the "reciprocity of first causes"—for which there is no room in monism—is the only personality that is genuine:

"For the very quality of personality is, that a person is a being who recognizes others as having a reality as unquestionable as his own, and who thus sees himself as a member of a moral republic, standing to other persons in an immutable relationship of reciprocal duties and rights, himself endowed with dignity and acknowledging the dignity of all the rest."⁹

One of the chief obstacles to the understanding of the nature and reality of personality has been that it has been defined over against the world merely as the *not-self*, rather than in terms of its relation to other persons. Professor Howison has done much to correct this point of view.

The existence of this Supreme Instance, personally conceived, he regards as involving strict demonstrability. The demonstration may be formulated thus: The idea

⁸ A most careful and illuminating discussion of the relation of the One to the Many may be found in Professor Howison's paper at the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science, in which he contrasts the unity of harmony with that of absorption.

⁹ The Limits of Evolution; p. 7.

of self involves in the last resort the idea of God, as the One Perfect Self by final reference to whom each self defines itself as imperfect or "finite." Every member of the republic of persons, though indeed defining himself against each of his fellows, must define himself, in ultimate logic, against the Supreme Instance, and so in terms of God.¹⁰ Put in syllogistic form, the argument runs as follows:

"The *idea* of every self and the *idea* of God are inseparably connected, so that if any self exists then God also must exist; but any and every self demonstrably exists, for (as *apud Cartesium*) the very doubt of its existence implies its existence; and therefore God really exists." ¹¹

One of his most luminous and characteristic terms in defining the realm of persons—or "the city of God," as he calls it, with Augustine and the Stoics—is *recognition*. He uses it constantly and designedly to describe God's attitude toward other persons. The very perfection of God, he declares, "lies in his giving complete recognition to all other spirits."¹² What more than this simple act of recognition—one cannot but ask—is needed to assure us, upon our part, of His existence? Yet Professor Howison is not content with this, but constantly insists upon the necessity of rational *demonstration*. Such demonstration of God doubtless has its place and value, but the genius of Personalism gives it secondary rather than primary importance. Indeed we must not too hastily confound the Personal Idealism of Professor Howison with more spiritual forms of Personalism. It is throughout a philosophy of knowledge rather than of communion. In other words, it lacks the element of mysticism which, as it seems to me, is inseparable from a complete Personalism.

With what has seemed to many—perhaps to most—of his readers and pupils an inexplicable rigor, he has

¹⁰ The Limits of Evolution; p. 355. ¹¹ Ibid. p. 359. ¹² See also Ibid. p. 258 ff.

maintained that God, being the final cause, cannot be the efficient cause, either of the natural universe or of the republic of persons. God cannot be the creator of persons, because every self is, he asserts, by the very nature of selfhood, a *causa sui*; its relation to God is a logical, not a material relation. Nor can the outer world be the creation of God. It is too unlike Him. Its very imperfection and evil, our author declared in an article in *The Hibbert Journal* discussing the disaster of Mont Pelée,¹³ proves that it cannot be the work of a beneficent and omnipotent Creator. "It cannot be Eternal Love that bursts forth and scorches and suffocates from a Mont Pelée." Yet the world cannot be a *self-existent* material reality, for there is no such reality. "All existence is either the existence of *minds*, or the existence of the *items* and *order* of *their experience*."¹⁴ No; the outer world is the creation, or rather the *derivative*, of all the minds other than God, acting together, the bad as well as the good. Hence the imperfection and evil manifest within it.

This critique of orthodox mechanical creationism is too forceful to be set aside. The question is, however, whether it does not deny too much—more than the author's own theory requires or warrants. He holds final cause to be "the originating and organizing member of the system of causes."¹⁵ Why not then the originating cause of the selves? Indeed it is difficult to separate final cause and originating cause. Does not final causality carry with it origination? He who is our end can hardly be less than our origin also.¹⁶ And yet, this insistence upon final causation is extremely pertinent. There is more occasion for the transference of emphasis from efficient to final causality than appears upon the surface. Whoever is concerned for the higher conception

¹³ *Hibbert Journal*; vol. i, no. 1.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.* p. xii.

¹⁵ P. 365.

¹⁶ A criticism of Dr. Howison's theory of creation may be found in Professor James Ward's well-known volume, "The Realm of Ends"; pp. 455-460.

of God can but approve the endeavor to reduce efficient cause "from that supreme place in philosophy which this has hitherto held and give the highest, the organizing place to Final Cause instead."¹⁷

But granted that Professor Howison's insistence upon the *priority* of final cause is right; is he warranted in denying all other causality to God? According to his own account, the world is derived from *minds*. Can it be then that it is the product solely of minds other than God? The growing conception of co-operant creation—according to which God is the origin and ground of a developing universe in which all minds, yes, all forms of life, have a subordinate but contributory part—fulfils the substance of his contention.¹⁸ This creative agency increases in scope as the scale of being ascends toward selfhood. The self is thus chiefly responsible for the character (though not necessarily for the possibility) of its own existence.

The second cardinal principle of the system—freedom—is conceived and defended with all of its author's characteristic clarity of thought, skill of argument, and pungency of statement. Freedom, from his point of view, is grounded, not in the will as a faculty of the mind, but in the self, whose very nature it is to be self-existent and free. Underived, autonomous, inviolable (save by itself), according to personal idealism, is the self. It lays its own imperative upon itself. Complex, not simple, the self is yet a unit. "Every rational being is a self-referred being. Self-reference is of the very essence of reason." The self is impenetrable. He is full of scorn for what he calls "the glory in gregariousness" so rampant today. While not denying the mutual influence of the selves upon one another, he rejects the idea of interpenetration. Immanence he regards as inconsonant

¹⁷ Op. cit. Preface; p. xvii.

¹⁸ In fact, Professor Howison has himself, in one place at least, recognized this principle of creative co-operation (p. 199) which he elsewhere so explicitly rejects.

with personality. "No self can get into another and operate there. Neither the devil nor God can get into us. Nothing is more despicable than the idea that someone else is working in you." "Unless I am autonomous I can't be right."¹⁹

This recognition of the individuality of selfhood is as much needed as it is true to consciousness. Without the violation of freedom, however, the intimacy and potency of our personal relations, both with one another and with God, is such, it seems to me, as to require no less a term than immanence—used of course in a symbolic sense. Yet Professor Howison is no solipsist. Not less certain than the truth that the self is and must be a reality *in* itself is the complementary truth, of which he makes much, that the self is not and cannot be alone, by itself. Selfhood is social as truly as it is autonomous. "In thinking itself as eternally real, each spirit inherently thinks the reality of all other spirits."²⁰ Emphasis upon the social nature of selfhood is so strong as to remove personal idealism as far as possible from being bare individualism, radical egoism. It is as truly a social idealism as a personal idealism. The members of the Eternal Republic "exist only in and through their mutually thought correlation, their eternal 'City,' and out of it would be non-existent." Thus is personal idealism completely saved from solipsism. "A mind thinking 'I' inevitably correlates the thought *thou and they*." The very core of morality is to recognize other persons. "Righteousness is the faithful recognition of other persons as ends."²¹

¹⁹ From notes taken at one of a series of informal talks upon philosophy given to a small group of his friends at his home in the spring of 1914. A number of other quoted statements are either from these talks or from private conversations.

²⁰ *The Limits of Evolution*; p. 353.

²¹ It would be difficult to overstate this saving emphasis of Professor Howison upon Otherhood. He once said to the writer that he regarded the reciprocal nature of personality as the main factor in his philosophy. "Reciprocity might be taken as its one supreme watchword."

But freedom is not the only fact of experience. It is offset by determinism. How can freedom and determinism be reconciled? Professor Howison essays this Herculean task in his essay, *The Harmony of Determinism and Freedom*. It is impossible here to do more than allude to this closely wrought and remarkable piece of philosophical analysis. It must suffice to state that the solution of the problem is secured by the absolute exclusion of the idea of an external determinism imposed upon the soul either by nature or by God. Indeed, all the determinism we really know is resolvable into that law of definiteness which the rational mind itself imposes upon its experience. "Freedom and determinism are only the obverse and the reverse of the two-faced fact of rational self-activity. Freedom is the thought-action of the self, defining its specific identity, and determinism means nothing but the definite character which the rational nature of the action involves."²² Whether this drawing of the fangs of determinism settles the great enigma or not, it certainly contributes to its solution a factor hitherto too far overlooked—the rationality of determinism as well as of freedom.

Side by side with the truths of God and Freedom Professor Howison places Immortality. From his confidence in the truth and supreme significance of Immortality this defender of the dignity of the soul never for a moment wavers. In an age of hesitant non-committalism such a rational confidence is reassuring. For it rests upon no mere sentimental desire or vagrant imagining, but upon a conviction that has been matured by long reflection and that has weathered many seasons of besieging question and popular dismay.

The essay entitled "Human Immortality" in *The Limits of Evolution*, consists of a clear exposition and brilliant criticism of Professor James's Ingersoll lecture

²² Op. cit. p. 375.

on Immortality, in which the *brain transmission* theory of the latter is taken up at precisely the point at which it begins to lose value and cogency and is carried forward into an application which redeems it from the vague impersonalism in which James leaves it. In place of the immortality of a differentiated "Mother Sea of consciousness," Howison offers us the definiteness of a genuinely personal and ethical individual immortality. The argument may appear to some to pause too long over the theory of parallelism, but as a matter of fact, the discussion of the theory of parallelism is but incidental to the main argument, which is based upon the "imperishable self-resource of the individual spirit."²³

The argument turns largely upon proving time to be "a consciousness *a priori*; that is, an act of the soul, of the individual mind, in the spontaneous unity of its existence."²⁴ This established,

"our discussion in proving Time to be an expression of each mind's spontaneous activity, proves the self-active existence of every mind as such, and so establishes the eternity of the individual spirit in the only ultimate meaning of eternity; since, as the ground and source of Time itself, the being of the soul must transcend time, though including time."²⁵

From this point the argument moves on to include space and cause as trophies of the immortal soul:

"Thus we conclude to the dependence of Nature upon *us*, taken in our primary and active being, instead of our derivative dependence upon Nature. In the place then of death's ending *us*—death, but one item in the being of the natural world, the whole of which is conditioned upon the central self-consciousness—we arrive at the settled and logically immovable conception that we are ourselves the changeless ground of that transition in experience into which death thus gets interpreted."²⁶

This conception of immortality manifestly involves,

²³ Op. cit. p. 308.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 301.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 304.

²⁶ Ibid. p. 306.

as does his entire theory of personality, the super-existence of persons. This is not pre-existence, nor is it to be construed as in any way involving metempsychosis or transmigration in any form. It is rather an affirmation of the essential superiority of the soul to time, a protest against the incongruous notion that as persons we can have a beginning in time. If time is in any sense a postulate of the mind itself, it is indeed incongruous to think of the soul as having a beginning in that which has no existence apart from the mind's own activity. One can be born into the already existent time-world of other minds, but so far as the individual is concerned time takes its rise in him rather than he in time. As a matter of fact, the time concept is seen, upon careful thought, to be in itself irrelevant to the idea of the origin of the spirit. The term "pre-existent" as applied to the soul is as irrelevant as time-existent. The only strictly relevant issue here is that between the self-existence of the soul and its existence as deriving from the Supreme Person. I find myself, as I have already indicated, unable to follow Professor Howison in ascribing self-origination to human persons. Consciousness seems to me to witness to a receptive-active process by which finite personality comes to be what it is—a process of continuous appropriation from a personal source. This may be called an eternity-process rather than a time-process, in that it has no direct relation to time.²⁷ Yet this difference of interpretation does not modify the real force of the argument for immortality here presented, nor leave it less than one of the noblest and most impressive utterances upon this theme which Philosophy has put forth.

At a time of uncertainty and readjustment in Christian thought this philosopher of trained mind and clear vision

²⁷ By "time" as here used is meant, not Bergson's "*la durée*," which suggests the idea of eternity, but time in the sense of "the fleeting world of phenomena." See Professor Howison's address at the St. Louis Congress, p. 185 ff.

has produced what he has called a "new apologetic," whose profoundly Christian character and cogency have not yet been realized. This new apologetic was admirably set forth (under the questionable term "rationalism") in the address before the Congress of Religion in San Francisco in 1894.²⁸ He presents it as not only rationally demonstrable but as clearly taught by Jesus. It is a predominantly ethical apologetic. The ethical note is, in fact, dominant in all his teaching,²⁹ lending it a reality and virility which have given to his classroom in Ethics and to all his contact with his friends and with the community a wholesome atmosphere of tonic sincerity. Indeed, this spirit of integrity and of fealty to the ideal have made his personality a tower of strength and an example of uprightness of inestimable worth to all who know him. In his devotion to Duty he resembles Kant. "You cannot read Kant," he once said to a company of teachers of philosophy, "without a conviction of sin. You should not live too much with any book that does not induce this in you."

Fault-finders have maintained that there is no place in this system for the great Christian doctrines of regeneration, the Holy Spirit, and atonement. If it were a system of theology instead of a philosophy, this might be a just criticism. The recognition of the mystical and revelatory nature of truth is indeed somewhat lacking in the system, which sometimes gives the impression of clear, cold intellectualism. Yet there are many passages in *The Limits of Evolution*, especially in the essay on "The Art-Principle in Poetry," not only full of profound insight but rich in æsthetic and spiritual feeling. The author's sense of the creative nature of art, of "joy in the ideal," and his sympathetic

²⁸ "The Right Relation of Reason to Religion," *The Limits of Evolution*; p. 217 ff.

²⁹ Dr. McGiffert recognizes this in his survey of Howison's philosophy in his recent volume, "The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas"; pp. 231-233.

appreciation of Emerson evince this intuitive and imaginative spirit. The term "intelligence," which he most frequently employs to designate the organ of truth, conveys the impression of truth-discovery as a purely intellectual and ratiocinative process; but a more careful study of his use of "intelligence" discloses the fact that he intends by it "primarily moral cognition." Indeed, in the address upon "The Right Relation of Reason to Religion," he states that he means by reason "the human powers of insight in their completest scope, and not merely the faculty of 'reasoning,' or consistent and consecutive syllogizing, or 'explaining' and 'proving' in this mechanical sense."³⁰ He also speaks with approval of the evidence of personal experience, "the evidence not of mere reasoning, but of the large and deep rational nature as a whole."³¹ Such words are to be taken, not as in any sense disparaging the logical faculty or the function of demonstration, of which he is the unflinching champion, but as showing the breadth and depth of his conception of our intelligence, which he has always contended is of the same generic nature as that of God Himself. "The infinite of the soul is mightier than the finite in it."³²

Another serious misunderstanding of Professor Howison, on the part of certain objectors, has been the notion that he underrates the Bible. It is a superficial conclusion, drawn chiefly from his thorough sympathy with the method and results of Higher Criticism, the pathway which for so many modern minds has led to a new and deeper appreciation of the Bible, both as literature and as doctrine of life. In a speech at a dinner given in honor of Dr. Henry Van Dyke at the University Club in San Francisco, he declared with earnestness: "I certainly deal with the Bible in my classes, and I will never cease until the Regents compel me"; and that

³⁰ Op. cit. p. 231.

³¹ Ibid. p. 265.

³² Ibid. p. 373.

could only be—as all his friends knew well—by the compulsion of removal. The mind of Paul is, in most respects, especially congenial to him, with the exception of the Rabbinism, and what he regards as the ambiguous declaration in the Mars Hill speech—"For in Him we live and move and have our being"; which he thinks (if really Paul's and not Luke's) has been naturally taken as pantheistic, though probably not so intended by Paul. The doctrine of election he regards as essentially foreign to Paul, declaring that if Paul should return, he would exclaim, "How in the world did you get that doctrine of election from me?"

If at times in combative moods and upon occasions in which it has seemed to him to be his duty to hew the Agag of unthinking orthodoxy in pieces, he has shown an excessive aggressivism, at other times, especially in smaller circles, he speaks with a calm, an eloquence, and an insight that have earned for him among his friends the reputation of being one of the most fascinating and impressive of conversationalists, an American Coleridge with less of the rhapsodical.

So convinced and thoroughgoing an idealism as that of Professor Howison stands in sharp contrast with the questioning, inconclusive doctrinaire philosophy now in vogue. It gives him in these his ripened years a certain Socratic character. One is aware that he has convictions—of whose reality and worth he is so sure that he would fain make you, also, sure of them. This imparts to him too an atmosphere, not of aloofness from the events occurring about him but of a genuine elevation above them, as if he were regarding them *sub specie eternitatis*. When he remarks, for instance, that "history is a succession of fits, out of which man comes with pain and suffering," one realizes that this is not quite the sort of observation that he hears from the man on the street. The calm though serious opti-

mism of the thinker invests him, revealing the reasoned foundation upon which his every-day thought and life are built. With the timid and hesitant character of so much modern thinking he has no sympathy, declaring that we have no business to be so unstable and unsure. He admits the presence of perplexities, but affirms that "all our uncertainties are embosomed in certainties."

The published material constituting Professor Howison's contribution to religious thought, though small, is exceedingly significant. It is a treasure of refined gold. It may be doubted if anyone in the field either of philosophy or of theology has so clearly and firmly apprehended or so succinctly and enduringly stated that central truth of Christian philosophy—the determinative reality and complete mutuality of personality.

The indebtedness of the philosophical and theological world to the philosophy of Professor Howison is far greater than is generally understood. Indications of the impression it has made upon thoughtful minds can hardly have escaped the attention of the observant reader of recent English and American philosophy and theology. This influence, though it may not be fully recognized for a long time, is almost certain to continue and to deepen.

Divested of some of its more extraneous polemic and contemporary features, *The Limits of Evolution* (the title is too limited) presents, as Professor Caldecott has said, "a powerful brief for the ethical type of theism," and is not unlikely to become a classic of idealistic and Christian philosophy, standing as one of the luminous achievements among the philosophic interpretations of the life of the spirit. It has a certain maturity and conclusiveness that cannot fail to beget conviction and deepen assurance in the great abiding realities of God and the soul. When Philosophy takes itself in as high and serious a spirit as in the case of Professor Howison,

fronting the great issues of life and truth with an earnest and courageous freedom, it can hardly fail to throw light upon the true character and mission of Christianity. For Christianity is no narrow creed for despairing minds. It is as deep as the human soul and as wide and varied as are the boundless needs of man.

“The aim of such a religion is not merely to ‘glorify God’; rather it is to glorify all souls, as all in the image of God; to glorify them by fulfilling for every one of them its vocation to repeat in a new way the life of universal love that is the life of God, and thus to attain, through the universal greatening, such a real glorification of God as other religions seek after in vain.”²²

²² Op. cit. p. 255.

THE EFFECT UPON THE CHURCHES OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT

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LOS ANGELES

For a generation or so the world has been tending to regard life from a social, an organic point of view, and this has developed into Socialism, strictly so called. The Churches have endeavored to meet this sometimes by opposing the principle and addressing themselves still to the individual, and sometimes by adopting it and becoming benevolent institutions for the ameliorating of the conditions of living. What is in general the result, not so much upon the world as upon themselves? Is the social motive likely to be profound and permanent? Is it, as some claim, the Gospel; or, as others claim, distinctly not the Gospel? These interesting questions were propounded to several hundred leading clergymen of different denominations throughout the country, and some of the answers are as follows:

(1.) "The social motive is bound to have a very profound and permanent influence in the shaping of the Christian message as well as in the formation of Christian living. I believe there will be more rather than less emphasis upon this for at least a decade. Already elements in society are beginning to feel the influence of this accent, and more and more men of prominence, who were indifferent to such a word formerly, are coming to see the advisability and the value of giving it heed, realizing that it has a tremendous effect upon, as well as a very large place in, the life of society. I believe, however, that the tendency has been, especially with leaders of a one-sided type of mind, to exaggerate the matter, and by extravagance of language, method, and purpose, to alienate many and distinctly to hamper the progress of a very desirable movement. This, however, is but incidental to advance along any lines, and will in the end be discounted at its proper value. I am, however, not so keen for this socialization of the religious appeal as some,

feeling that there is an inclination, much to be regretted, to neglect what I believe is the fundamental element—the individual appeal and conduct. It is impossible for a church to get away from this, and my observation has led me to feel that those churches or institutions which seemed to have dropped this in the interest of the special social message, have distinctly weakened their life and influence. My own belief is that the increase of emphasis on the social message will make for the larger realization of the place and aim of the individual, and that already our sanest and strongest leaders are seeing this fact.”

(2.) “We believe that the people need to be supernaturally regenerated, and subsequently sanctified wholly. That when thus saved from *all* sin, they enjoy the happiest and most useful life here and have an assurance of heaven. In my humble judgment, too much emphasis on ‘Social Service’ has a tendency to *materialize* the gospel and lead the churches away from the gospel’s supernatural power. The Bible nowhere commands men to do, do, do; but to *be, be, be*. *Be filled with the Spirit*, and Christian activity naturally follows.”

(3.) “My own view is that the social message of the gospel has an important place in the work of the Kingdom, but not the primary place. So long as it is kept tributary to the spiritual and eternal interests of men, it is well and must not be neglected. But if it be given first place and made the real end of the gospel message, it must necessarily give to the minds of men a very inadequate and distorted view of the whole subject. Philanthropy and social betterment are excellent, as the outgrowth of Christianity, but cannot successfully be made substitutes for it, though many seem to be trying to do so. Honesty, for example, is one of the results of regeneration, but can never be a real substitute for it. There has never been any real and lasting social betterment in the world except that which was produced by Christianity in the hearts and lives of men. Men must be brought into right relation to God before they can ever be in right relation to their fellow men. Love to God comes first, and then love to neighbors follows. Both phases of the gospel are important. The important thing is to keep them in right relation to each other, giving to each its due share of emphasis.”

(4.) “The effect upon the churches of the social movement is altogether good. On the other hand, the social movement is in need of the fellowship, sympathy, and religious inspiration of the churches. The social movement needs the vitalization of genuine

Christianity, and the churches as representing Christianity need the humanizing and utilitarian quickening which is indicated by the current social movement. I believe the correct attitude for the Church is the adoption of the socialistic principle, and the direction of it sanely and joyfully into concrete application in the solution of the perplexing problems that are indicated in the present social order. I believe that the social movement is destined to be powerful and permanent, for it is genuinely Christ-like."

(5.) "Where the Church lays all its emphasis upon the individual, it gets out of touch, antiquated, and lags behind in the world-march. Where the Church lays stress only upon the social conditions of the day and gets absorbed in righting the social wrongs, it forgets the individual and his personal relationship to a saving gospel. The ideal Church is the one that strikes a balance between the two, reaching the individual to reach society and touching the social conditions to develop the individual. This is the gospel in its outreach. So far as I have found, there are so many different views on socialistic problems that the condition has not yet been reached where we can call the motive profound and permanent, although it may be moving fast toward that stage. Just now it is more divided than the Church into sects, and that is its great weakness. Its program is not yet deep enough or profound enough to grip with a lasting grip the lives and hearts of all men. I find that the antagonism against the Church is growing less, that it is recognized as a helpful factor in need; but I also find that with but few exceptions, little is added to the Church beyond the consciousness of having responded to a need. Socialism is not the gospel. The gospel is not Socialism. But certain phases of Socialism are the outgrowth of the gospel seeking to translate itself into terms of Christian life."

(6.) "The reaction upon the Church of the new social emphasis in religion has already proved profoundly beneficial, as a corrective of its earlier preoccupation with the problems of the individual. It has been a return to the spirit of its Lord and Master, and as such cannot but be reviving and helpful. Long ago, however, signs appeared of an equally injurious preoccupation with this new aspect of religious activity, in the attempt to push the social motive into the forefront and to try to find in the social message a gospel that replaces the gospel of Divine Love. Until one can reverse the two great commandments and build the second upon the first, all such efforts must be hurtful to the Church's life. As Peabody justly says: 'Jesus' social teaching was a by-product of his religious mes-

sage. . . . Behind all the teachings of Jesus Christ concerning problems of . . . ethics, lies his supreme concern for the individual life to which he may give power.' The forgetfulness of this primary emphasis of the teaching of Jesus is involving a considerable section of our church in barrenness and superficiality."

(7.) "The current emphasis on the social motive of the gospel is of great value but is temporary. The apparent failure of individual Christians to carry into the social life the teaching of the gospel as revealed in existing social injustices has gripped the soul of religious leaders of a certain type. The presentation of these social problems by those who sought to discredit Christianity thereby has inspired action; consequently the social note became dominant in many churches. It is well. But it will not be permanently dominant in the churches, for the true motive is personal righteousness. This is the core of the gospel, and upon its acceptance depends a righteous society. The result upon the churches of the social movement has, upon the whole, been good. It aroused many who acted as though this world were a negligible quantity, the only desirable goal being the spiritual life entered into at death. The social movement emphasized the thought, thoroughly characteristic of the New Testament, that this earth is to be the scene of the Kingdom of God. This so far has not bulked very large because of its misunderstanding by many Christians. It will result in giving the gospel a larger place in the life of organized society, and the churches a recognized place in the forces that make for righteousness."

(8.) "The social movement seems to me to be the coming factor in the mighty movement for 'Freedom' or for 'Democracy' which is beginning to reveal the outline of a new civilization. It began in the demand for spiritual freedom. Martin Luther was the best exponent of it. It was followed by the demand for intellectual freedom. The scientific spirit with its amazing reconstructive energy is the best expression of that. It produced the demand for political freedom. The French Revolution and the American Revolution were clear and unmistakable expressions of that. Already the spirit of Democracy is recreating the political world. The latest expression of it is the demand for 'Social,' i.e. industrial, economic freedom. Socialism is one great expression of that. It was inevitable, and is prophetic of a great new day. It has profoundly influenced our conception of the gospel, and our view of the task of the Church in at least three particulars: First, it has made it clear that the religion of Jesus has to do primarily with the transformation of this present life, not with the prepara-

tion for another and totally different life. The field of our effort is the world—business—industrial, political, social, educational. The church is not a ferry-boat nor a fire insurance company. Its abiding prayer is 'Thy Kingdom come on earth.' Secondly, it has led us to put great faith in the law of growth as the method of the Kingdom. We trust not so much as our fathers to the startling, 'miraculous,' unforeseen, but to the steady, patient, diligent planting of ideas, ideals, inspirations, believing that our social order is the expression of our social spirit. Thirdly, we are just beginning to regain the sense of the value of the person as the instrument through whom the new order is to come. At this point we gather up the imperishable values of the gospel that our fathers proclaimed and relate them to the new great task by which we are confronted."

(9.) "I believe that the new social motive is sure to prove profound and permanent. It is not a substitute for the gospel, nor is it a new gospel, but it is a fresh and vital application of the gospel itself. For me it is a clue for understanding the Old Testament, especially the prophets, and for comprehending the message and the spirit of Jesus. I am sure the number of men for whom this is true is rapidly increasing. The social message colors all we have to say. It affects our theology and our ideals of practical church-work. Personally, I do not find that our congregations desire specific instruction on economic and social questions, and whatever my own interest, I do not find them suited for presentation from the pulpit save by way of illustration. Also I do not find that institutional work, or the enlistment of the members of our churches as such in special reforms or charities, is coming to displace the older type of church-work. I believe, instead, that it is the chief business of the Church to furnish the inspiration for the social task of religion, leaving the individual absolutely free to determine in what fields and in pursuance of what programs their service shall be rendered. Of course I recognize with profound appreciation the value of those institutional churches which have developed along the lines of the specific needs of their constituencies. The heroic effort which is put into many of these enterprises is deserving of all praise; but I am constrained to believe that most of our churches will serve the interests of the Kingdom of Christ best, not by becoming social centres, but by work more nearly along the lines of the traditional Church."

(10.) "First, the social movement has laid enormous emphasis on man's physical well-being, and thrust into the background the

more vital and fundamental issues that have to do with his spiritual well-being. It is remarkable how this age is interpreting religion in the terms of a materialistic humanitarianism. The churches have suffered much in spiritual redemptive power because of this new and one-sided emphasis. Secondly, this movement has tended to influence the Church to lose sight of the individual and to treat society as the organized unit with which it has to deal. The individual method of winning and saving souls has in large measure been abandoned, and we are afflicted with an endless number of general wholesale efforts to better mankind on the surface rather than in the mainsprings of the heart, where the seat of all evil lies. Christian effort has in consequence been much generalized and weakened, and not individualized, which is the Saviour's method of dealing with souls. Thirdly, that the Church has in large measure lost the redemptive fire cannot be doubted. Man's relations to God have become obscured because of the one-sided emphasis of his relation to man. We are creating an imposing superstructure of humanitarian love and neglecting the foundation of Christ's love upon which it should be built."

(11.) "The social movement is a fruit of Christianity and its growth, a sign of progress in the Church and the world. The social motive is coming continually to larger recognition in our churches, as is indicated by the very large proportion of church members among so-called social workers. I regret the disposition in some quarters to make social service the whole of religion; to omit from Micah 6 8 the 'walk with God,' which affords both light and inspiration for walking with men in justice and mercy. Religion has its root in personal relations with God. It is essentially individual. It means the welcome of God into heart and life as Sovereign and Friend. But His companionship works transformation into His spirit, and 'the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace,' and the rest—the social fruitage hanging thick upon the bough. Humanitarianism has but shallow roots. Morley's testimony is significant: 'We have all been upon the wrong track, and the result is that the whole of us have less to show for our work than that one man, Booth. Herbert Spencer, Matthew Arnold, Frederick Harrison, and the rest of us who have spent our lives in endeavoring to dispel superstition and to bring in a new era, have to admit that Booth has had more direct effect upon this generation than all of us put together. He has evoked the potent sentiment of brotherhood.' The gospel concerning man is inseparable from the gospel concerning God. Man is the child of God and the sacrifice of Christ the measure of

man's worth. And in that teaching lies the only adequate inspiration for human service. Apart from that teaching, we are likely to be satisfied with making men comfortable, while leaving their deepest needs unmet. Feeding, housing, and a fair wage are imperative demands to which the Church must not be deaf. But man's deepest need can be met only as men are brought, one by one, into harmony with the will of God."

(12.) "I am still enough of an individualist to believe that the dynamic for new life comes from getting the soul into right relations with the Supreme. Single tax and better housing and the abolition of child labor will not perform a magic and transform the earth into heaven. Neither are they all that the individual man needs. I side with Kipling, that 'the sin they do by two and two they must pay for one by one.' Each man must get right with God. The social movement as an interpretation and application of the meaning of the gospel is something that must never be lost by the Church until the need for social improvement is over; but if the social interest supplants the interest in the saving of the individual, it will be disastrous to the Church. The primary duty of the Church is to give spiritual food to the souls of men. I take this position after many years of study of social movements, and not a little activity in some forms of social service. The Church is not complete without both the social passion and the old passion for souls. The social passion is simply the interest that Christian people ought to take in the life of the rest of the world; it is the Golden Rule and the second Great Commandment brought out of the rear rank and put into the fighting line. The effect of it, when properly balanced by the other great passion—the passion for saving individuals—is to make the Church more efficient for doing Christ's work. Personally, I should not be happy if I were not engaged in some form of social work; but the condition in my own community well illustrates how the specific form and amount of the Church's activity is modified by what the rest of the community is doing. When we tried to have industrial classes and such things, we found that settlements, industrial schools, and similar efforts already under way made that form of activity for the most part unnecessary by us. The Church could best help there by co-operation. But the Church is sorely needed in the community to do the specifically spiritual work. The activities of any church should be guided by the community-needs; but for the most part, I believe, the Church will do best to inspire social activities, and to lay its own emphasis upon spiritual work."

(13.) "It seems to me that it is the new social emphasis which is thoroughly responsible for the present-day revival in religion, and I believe that the reaction of such an emphasis is very favorably evident in the churches themselves. It seems to me entirely healthy that people should no longer ask, 'What must I do to be saved,' but, 'What can I do to help save somebody else?' So far as my own experience goes, I feel that the new point of view makes churches less self-centred, and makes the Christian himself much more efficient, and therefore much more Christian. I do not see how the social motive can prove anything but profound and permanent, because it is being woven so completely into all the texture of our religious life; it certainly is the gospel, to my way of thinking, though of course not the gospel by itself. I do not think that we can ever forget or entirely overlook the individual emphasis. It wouldn't be human nature to do so. In the churches that I have had the good fortune to be associated with, the two go very essentially hand in hand; in fact, are about as inseparable as the right hand and the left, and about as necessary for a complete and well-developed life. The church I now serve is one that I suppose would be called an old-fashioned church; and yet I find that the social leaven has very thoroughly got into it, and, in my judgment, is making it a better church and more Christ-like than it ever was."

(14.) "You ask what in general is the result of the social movement upon the churches? I believe the result is to broaden the ethical message of the pulpit, until it tends more to touch all life and especially to convince the individual that he must carry his Christianity into his impersonal human relations as well as into his personal relations. Then I believe it is broadening greatly the work of the Church itself by teaching it that whatever is good for humanity is a legitimate work for the Church to undertake. As an illustration: If it is a part of the Church's work to console the mourning, it is also a part of its work to save children from dying and thus save people from the necessity of mourning. This illustration could be multiplied by scores. In the third place, I believe it is the broad ground upon which the churches are being and will be drawn into some sort of a working unity. So long as we discuss our intellectual differences, we shall tend toward more dense individualism and an atomic type of organization; but in the measure that we strive to work together we shall sink opinions and personal notions in the one motive of helping the world."

(15.) "I rather believe that the ministers have been quicker to

respond to the social movement than the average layman in the churches, but that, on the whole, while much is yet to be accomplished, the social duty of the Church is much more strongly felt than a few years ago. As might be expected, it has found expression in humanitarian and charitable work rather than in the broader conception of Christianizing the social order. There are a good many who very cheerfully accept responsibility for charity who are inclined to oppose changes in the social order which would make charity less necessary. To use the old expression, there are many who are much more interested in furnishing an ambulance than in building a fence about the precipice. It is easy to call social changes Socialism; but I believe the time is coming when the heaven will work still further, and the churches will see the necessity of treating causes rather than ameliorating consequences. But just this last thing: I do not think that the churches will grow away from the conviction of the profound social influence of personal righteousness."

(16.) "The perilous part of the whole situation lies in the law of antithesis. Just as it was faith over against works in the New Testament and has been asceticism over against almost Epicureanism in many quarters since, free will over against predestination, etc., so the difficulty is for the Church to do her whole duty to the social movement and yet to keep a perfect poise, and to remain true to her great function, namely, the implanting and cultivation of the spiritual life. As human nature is, it is hardly to be expected that any particular church, local or denominational, or the Church as a whole, will keep a perfect poise. Therefore one should exercise charitable judgment and should see the whole subject by and large. Now on the credit side for the social movement, it is to be said first of all, that the Church has largely originated it, has inspired it, and has wonderfully nourished it. Chalmers in Scotland; Maurice, Kingsley, Hughes in England; Beecher, Brooks, Gladden, and a multitude of others, stand out in the forefront herein. Moreover the great army of social workers is mainly nearer or more remotely of church lineage. This not only shows how powerfully the Church has accelerated the movement but also suggests the tremendous reaction of all this, and a favorable reaction, on the Church itself. Finally, there can be no sort of doubt that the Church makes a huge mistake if it undertakes mainly to conduct and to constitute the social movement. The social movement is for all people to get into, just as agriculture and manufacture are for citizens to undertake; and as the government should not undertake the bulk of

agriculture and manufacture, so the Church should not undertake the bulk of the social movement. It should be friendly and intelligent toward it. It should encourage and inspire it. It should perform part of the actual service. But that is not the Church's chief business. It is not to leave the Word of God and serve tables. Therefore all honor to those churches and to that spirit in the churches which puts first things first—Christ, His salvation, bringing men to Christ, deepening the spiritual life, comforting and inspiring God's people, and sending them out aflame to serve men both individually and socially. And comprehensively speaking, the supreme reaction of the social movement on the Church has been, partly by the inevitable lack of poise thus far, to set the Church thinking, to cause it to discriminate, and to deepen in its great leaders and in its general temper the purpose to magnify its own true function while inspiring and doing its share in the other functions."

The foregoing quotations fairly represent the judgment not only of the hundreds of clergymen who responded by letter to the questions propounded to them, but scores of others, clergymen and laymen, who were interviewed personally. The general judgment is that the social motive is profound and permanent, that it is the gospel though not all of the gospel, and that its effect upon the churches has been to harmonize and broaden them.

Life may be compared to an ellipse with two foci. One focus may represent the individual; the other society. If the individual sees only himself, if life is egoistic, self-centred, and grossly individualistic, then the ellipse is at an end. It is a mark of childhood that it sees only itself. The period of storm and stress appears when the child is passing from a self-centred life to another centre, and becomes aware of others. The change from childhood to youth is like the change from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican theory of the universe. If, on the other hand, society says that the individual is nothing, or but a means to an end, a cog in the wheel, and the individual soul is lost in Nirvana, then again the ellipse is incomplete. In the full-orbed

life, the two foci come closer and closer together, until one can say, "For their sakes I sanctify myself."

There are but two kinds of people in the world—good and bad, children of light and children of darkness, those who render social Christian service and those who live and die to themselves alone. The judgment of Jesus as portrayed in Matt. 25 31-46 is a social judgment. This is distinctively the age of social problems in Church and State. The Church is the temple of God, the individual Christians are the living stones from which it is built. Christ is the foundation on which it rests. If the Church would become God's holy temple, its members must unite themselves ever more closely with Christ, who was "not an economist, not a reformer, but a revealer," and "his social teachings are a by-product of his religious teachings." The Church is a living organization in the unity of all who love the Lord Jesus Christ and belong to those of the "Way." The remark of Irenaeus—"Where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church; and where the Church is, there is the Spirit of God"—should be strictly true of the Church today.

The Church stands primarily for worship. It is the first instinct which it satisfies. Through its relation to the time, place, and method of its services, the Church represents worship. The Lord's Day is the day of worship and the day of the Church. The meeting-place of the Church is arranged for worship, prayer, and praise. It may have its parlors as aids to fellowship, its gymnasium and workshops as helps for the development of the physical nature, its libraries, reading-rooms, and educational classes for the culture of the mind; but the prevailing idea of the Church is worship. It is more and other than a social settlement. As it stands for worship, the Church is greater than its building, its services, its preacher, or any choir it may have. The

Church includes all of these but is more than these. A beautiful building, impressive services, earnest preaching, good singing—all these are means to the higher end; yet the Church is more than these. It is the inspired personalities of the men, women, and children who make the Church.

While the Church uses the Sabbath and is greater than the Sabbath and is not to be conditioned by the Sabbath, which was made for man and most truly for the religious man, for worship, the Church should boldly defend the Sabbath from desecration, for it is the day above all others, set apart for worship and rest. And yet the Church should make itself felt every day in the week. The very sacredness of the Sabbath reveals to us the sacredness of all time. Even so the service of the sanctuary ought to influence men all through the week. The Church should stand for worship every day, and the meeting-house should be open every day for worship and service. Thus it may reach those who cannot attend the services of the Sabbath. The Roman Catholic Church is wiser than the Protestant; for with a force of men competent to meet the demands, the Cathedral is open for worship every day and makes itself felt through the week, with open doors and burning altars. It were a good thing if the Protestant Churches everywhere should teach the lesson emphatically that they are not "Sunday buildings," full of light and warmth on Sunday, and cold, dark, and damp, with closed blinds and locked doors, a very tomb, the rest of the week. When the church-building is always open, inviting worshippers into its sacred enclosures, not only on the Sabbath but always, when the young and old, on their way to school and work, will go through the open door of the church, where God is wont to meet and bless His people, and there offer a word of gratitude and a word of prayer for help in the day's

duties, then the Church will have a power it never had before. If it restricts its worship to the Sabbath and limits itself to the ordinary pastorate, the Protestant Church cannot do its best work. The great progress and power of the Roman Catholic Church lies partly in the fact that it touches the life and all of the life and every moment of the life of so many of its adherents. It does this largely by the concentration and unity of its work, employing three men ordinarily in its ministry where the Protestant Church has one. The Church worships because it cannot help worshipping. "My soul thirsts for God and I am restless till I find Him." Worship also gives the worshippers an opportunity for testimony, for the Church is set apart to bear witness to the Truth. "Ye are my witnesses." It gives this opportunity through the sacraments, its creed, and all its services.

The purpose of the Church is also to express fellowship. Here a community of interest is aroused through a common faith and hope. Because we have one Lord and one faith, we should be brotherly, having a common fellowship. A member of the local church becomes a member of the Holy Catholic Church, whose membership is both in heaven and earth. This thought of our intimate connection with all the saints in heaven and earth, this "communion of the saints," is an inspiring thought.

A great change is no doubt going on in the social conditions of our country—the drift of the population into the cities and the large towns, the alienation of many of the wage-earners from the Church, the strife between employer and employed, capital and labor. We may deplore many of the changes; still they go on. Here and now is the opportunity of the Church. It must not stand in the way of social progress; otherwise it will be stranded. The Church must be in the van of every onward movement. We must adapt ourselves very

quickly to changed conditions. Too often the Church has never yielded anything until forced to do so, and so has lost the respect and confidence of those whom it should have helped. As Christ went among publicans and sinners, as He helped the woman taken in adultery, healed this and that disease, and drove out the unclean spirits, so must the Church go forth to save the world, even if it has to adopt new ways of approach. In many ways the Church has lost her leadership of the world's advance movements, because she has lost her hold on the simple, strong, manly teaching of Jesus. The Christ who went to the individual also had compassion on the multitude and fed them. The Church has a work to save the individual; it has a very important work in the renovation of society; the work is individual and social. She needs a "sense of the organic."

The battle of civic righteousness, good government, and political integrity is to be fought in the cities of our nations as the storm-centres. The realm of city politics must become of definite concern to all, and the Church and its ministry must feel responsibility for the ethical ordering of the city. Education, charity, the home, the neighborhood have been Christianized to a certain extent, but the distinctively Christian motive has hardly entered into politics, either national or international. Social service belongs to politics, and the men who go into city politics, into public office, must go with the same spirit that animates every true Christian missionary. The future of Christianity depends on its controlling the world and the politics of the world; and the Christian clergymen and laymen who refuse, neglect, or delay to bring their gifts to the altar, to go out to cleanse the Augean stables of party politics and purify the city by their leavening influence, are recreant to their highest duties. "We want," says Mr. Robert A. Woods, "a body of social Christian voters who will not be content with a

beautiful private life but will want a healthful, beautiful public life." As Christ sent out His people into the common street to heal the sick, to help the needy, to purify the city; as Pentecost sent out the praying saints to the number of one hundred and twenty into the common streets of the city; so Christ, who though rich became poor for our sakes, sends out His disciples still to lose themselves for others in order that they may find themselves again. The Church is not the controlling force in the city, because, while preparing men for the life to come, it has not inspired them to live the life that now is to the glory of God and the service of their fellows. While promising them mansions in the skies, it has not aroused them to the necessity of a Christian home on earth. While saving the soul from the fires of hell, it has not sent out saved men into the burning heat of business, social, and political life, to redeem all life to God.

The Christian motive has scarcely touched the Christian voters in their dealings with each other. Great as the social message of the gospel has been during the last twenty years, it has as yet not vitally affected the churches in relation to public, political, and industrial questions. Salvation is by fellowship, not by institutionalism. We must be saved or lost together. The modern concern of Christianity centres about the work of men and their collective life, and Christianity must concern itself with such problems as charity, education, work, democracy, capital and labor, and the world-wide relations of the people and nations. The trust and the Labor Union alike are socializing forces, and the Church must keep her hand on the lever. The institutional church has rendered the world a service in showing us that the real concern of the Christian Church is to realize the life of God in the lives of men. The institutional church marked the transition from the

old to the new era in church work. It was temporary and distracting, and the pioneer—Berkeley Temple in Boston—has passed into a moving-picture show. The Church is an institution, but the emphasis is not on its institutional features. It must be primarily a prophet, an inspirer, a guide, showing the Way. The Church must be inspirational, social, and Christ must loom large. Because religion is social the Church must be social. The Church must be a friendly society, a co-operative commonwealth, where friendship shall be dominant. It must have such a fraternity that it will impress all to remark, "Behold, how they love one another."

The Church is far from having purified the amusements of the community and has scarcely introduced the religious motive into education. It has made its appeal to individual editors and reporters, but has not yet made its influence strongly felt on the press. It cannot Christianize the press by publishing journals of its own, or by stopping subscriptions, but rather by building up a body of Christian editors. It has not yet developed a body of Christian customers at the shops and stores, who can themselves regulate the sweat-shops, the hours of closing, and the rate of wages. The Christian motive does not yet prevail in the councils of denominational leaders, when they plant churches without regard to others and substitute for good-will the spirit of pride and denominational ambition.

The effect upon the churches of the social message of the gospel has been good so far as it has gone. The Church and its ministry, like some business men, want large and quick returns, and when the expected returns do not materialize immediately, there is a revulsion or new experiment. When the social message of the gospel has been heralded for a century in the dark places of the earth and the Christian motive has invaded the councils of nations and sects, it will be time enough to

condemn the social emphasis if it has not succeeded. Certainly the old individualistic appeal has not produced a Christian society or state. I believe in a new and social revival, different from any revival that has preceded, a revival of civic righteousness. A certain kind of socialist says, "Let the better world come by economic law." The Christian socialists, like Maurice and Kingsley, say, "Let the better world come by law and grace." The one force works from without, the other from within. Both should co-operate. The social question is a religious question, and all religious men and influences should co-operate. The universal solvent for the social and economic problems of the day is love and good-will. The remedy for the present sad state of affairs must be a radical one. The only remedy for the inordinate lust of wealth, the transformation of men into mere "hands," the exploitation of the unskilled and ignorant by the selfish and designing, is first to seek the Kingdom of God and His righteousness. The worship of God alone can overthrow the worship of gold.

Better than the dreams of the past, a necessity to interpret the realities of the present, is the vision of the City Beautiful that is to come, when men and women of every race worship God in the beauty of holiness; "when there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free"; when each man is the equal and complement of every other man with the freest opportunity for self-expression and self-realization, and with every possible inducement to do the right; when the boys and girls may play with perfect safety, if not in the streets at least in their playgrounds, and the aged may lean on their staves with the happy children gathered about them, as they say, like St. John in the market-place, "Little children, love one another"; when the youth will have time to grow in grace and in knowledge, and not be ground under

the wheels of the modern Juggernaut before they have passed the storm and stress of early adolescence; when the strong men of action, the "captains of industry," will bear each other's burdens and "do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with God"; when all employers and employed, rich and poor, Gentile and Jew, foreigner and native, male and female, shall be one, working with God and with one another. New men, inspired from on high, will make new conditions. The confusion of tongues which pride and selfishness caused on the plains of Shinar is changed into harmony and peace at the Pentecost of love and good-will in the Holy City.

A problem as great as that of slavery confronts us. What forces are to rule in the cities of America? Will self-seeking, the inordinate love of pleasure, the worship of gold instead of God, miserliness, and extravagance rule? or will love and good-will, devotion to the good, the true and the beautiful, the spirit of social service, and the socialization of wealth (coined service), ability, and strength? Every city may yet be the "City Beautiful," if all its people will unite heartily to make it such. Every city can be what she wants to be, and have what she wants to have. "Be of good cheer, and let us play the men for our people and for the cities of our God" (2 Sam. 10 12). That is a social message, needed today in the cities of America and the nations of the world. The social Gospel has come to stay. It needs to be preached in the courts of Europe and the city-halls of America.

BOOK REVIEWS

HISTORY OF THE HEBREWS. FRANK KNIGHT SANDERS. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1914. Pp. xiv, 367.

The worth of this book is guaranteed by the author's recognized standing in the field of Biblical literature. The volume seems to us in some regards the most significant book that Dr. Sanders has yet published. Its exact scope is well expressed by the title taken together with the sub-title: "History of the Hebrews; their political, social, and religious development and their contribution to world betterment." Its real aim and spirit and limitations are admirably set forth in the Foreword:

"This volume seeks to make clear the important place of the Hebrew people in the history of nations and to justify the selection of their history, as set forth in the Old Testament, as an introduction to the larger subject. . . . There seems to be a place for a compact, comprehensive outline of Biblical history and literature, simple enough in its expression and execution to hold the attention of the growing mind, and yet complete enough to meet the reasonable needs of any mind. . . . The supreme defect of the religious thinking of the average man or woman today is its narrowness. Every religiously minded person needs to be familiar with the whole Bible and with the Bible as a whole. This knowledge need not be reserved for ministers or scholars. It may be the possession of any thoughtful student of religion. The writer has aimed to produce a useful book. It does not profess to be a contribution to original scholarship. The only originality that is feasible in a work of this sort is that of method."

In this book Dr. Sanders has placed his broad scholarship at the service of the Church. It is a book for Bible teachers and students. It is an admirable history, interestingly developed, with a true sense of proportion and of religious values. The method of organizing the material into chapters, sub-divisions, and themes, reveals the view-point of the teacher and will delight teachers who use the book as a text for classes. The large print, the outstanding themes in full-faced type, the maps and charts, and the excellent workmanship of the book-maker, will all commend it to the teacher and the student of the Old Testament.

The book admirably realizes the author's aim, and will prove an immensely valuable contribution to religious education, in which field the author has already done distinguished service.

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

HERBERT ALDEN YOUTZ.

DAS BUCH JESAJA. BERNHARD DUHM. Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht. Göttingen. 1914. Pp. xxiv, 459. 9m.

The third edition of Duhm's Commentary on Isaiah does not differ materially from its predecessor; the few corrections and additions introduced do not affect its main positions. Duhm's wealth of grammatical, critical, and exegetical matter makes his commentary an indispensable aid in the study of the mass of writings that goes under the name of "the Book of Isaiah," and the volume offers abundant opportunity for the dissenting remarks that are to be expected in dealing with a modern expository work which covers a large period of ancient life.

CRAWFORD H. TOY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

JEWISH MYSTICISM. J. ABELSON, D.Litt. The Macmillan Co. 1913. Pp. x, 184. \$1.00.

At a time when in every form of thought, belief, and expression the intuitive and the immediate seem to have carried the day, it is nothing but natural that Jewish scholars should endeavor to hold up for special emphasis the mystical elements of Judaism. During the previous century, similar attempts were made with regard to its rationalistic elements, and mysticism, then decried as a false and superstitious doctrine, was deprecated as an excrescence on the body of Judaism. The reverse contention, however, of the present-day writers, and of the author of this work especially, seems to be weak in one important point. Too much attention is given to the study of books, and too little to that of persons. For to show that certain sets of ideas, generally identified in the history of thought with mysticism, have found expression in Jewish literature, does not prove the existence of a genuine type of native Jewish mysticism, unless it can be equally shown, by a study of the personal records of the reputed Jewish mystics, that the acceptance of such ideas was the result of some kind of mystical experience. Mysticism, after all, cannot be identified with any definite system of thought or belief; it is rather descriptive of a certain attitude of mind. In itself, the idea of an immanent God, for instance, is not more mystical than that of a God transcendent, neither is a theory of emanation more mystical than a theory of creation. That in the history of religion we find that men of truly mystical experience showed a decided bent towards one set of doctrines rather than to another is indeed significant; but it is equally significant that whenever

in the course of time those ideas which we associate with mysticism found their way into the all-absorbing and indiscriminate body of orthodox belief, they failed to foster true mysticism. In later-day Judaism, to mention but one example, many Cabbalistic doctrines and practices filtered into the orthodox creed and ritual without, however, affecting, for aught we know, the religious outlook of its adherents. The distinction between the dealer and the artist is by no means restricted to art alone. In mysticism too he who merely deals in it is not necessarily a mystic.

In this small volume Dr. Abelson describes Jewish mysticism at certain high states of its being rather than in the process of its becoming. About one-half of the book is devoted to the earliest period. Beginning with a brief characterization of the Essenes, in whom Jewish mysticism for the first time found articulate expression, the author passes over to a more detailed discussion of the vague references recorded in the Talmudic writings as to the existence of some indistinguishable, esoteric sects within Palestinian Judaism at the beginning of the Christian Era. He reproduces some concrete examples of their mystical doctrines, which he compares with analogous views which have come down to us in the writings of the protagonists of Hellenistic Judaism. The fifth chapter of the book takes up the *Sefer Yetzira*, which, we may assume, the author has selected as the best example of the mystical literature of the Geonic period. Although the date of the authorship of the *Sefer Yetzira* is a moot point, some placing it even as far back as the second century, historically it belongs no doubt to the Geonic period, for it was not until then that we find any definite traces of its influence as a book in the mystic literature. In the last three chapters, the author briefly sketches the contents of the *Zohar*, a book which is a syncretism of the diverse elements of the thirteenth-century Cabbalah rather than a culmination thereof. It would have added considerably to the value of the book had the author dealt more fully with the Cabbalah, its development, its divergent tendencies, its relation to the rationalistic strain within the Judaism of the time on the one hand, and to the Talmudic traditional strain on the other. The book, however, contains an exceptionally lucid statement of certain well-selected phases of Jewish mysticism. Intended for popular reading, it has the chief merit of being exceedingly well written; and while by its nature it had to confine itself to generalizations, it is blameless on the whole of any dogmatic and unsustained assertions. I can recollect only one exception. In his attempt to prove that the phrase "*lishkat hashaim*" refers to some

mystic sect (pp. 21-22), the author seems to have overshot the mark. The phrase, as translated by the author himself, literally means "chamber of the silent (or secret) ones," and is described in the Mishna (Shekalim V, 6) as a place in the temple where "fearers of sin secretly deposited their alms, from which members of the impoverished aristocracy secretly supported themselves." There is nothing in the terms "fearers of sin" and "secret" to justify the author's contention that they refer to some members of a mystic sect. The rabbinic interpretation of the scriptural verse, "a gift in secret pacifieth anger" (Prov. 21 14; Sota 5a, Baba Bathra 9 b), will sufficiently explain the application of the phrase "fearers of sin" to those who had been thus averse to make their donations in public. And as for the meaning of the term "secret" or "silent" by which the donors are called, it refers to a kind of secrecy that is akin to "anonymity" rather than to "mysticism."

H. A. WOLFSON.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

IRENÆUS OF LUGDUNUM, A STUDY OF HIS TEACHING. F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK, M.A., D.D. With a Foreword by H. B. SWETE, D.D. Cambridge University Press. 1914. Pp. 367. 9s.

The importance of Irenæus of Lyons among early Christian writers can scarcely be exaggerated. The period of his activity as a writer (the last quarter of the 2nd century) in which Gnosticism had reached its zenith, the compass of the work that he produced in refutation of the heretical thought of his time, together with his marked ability, render him a conspicuous and important figure in the history of the early Church. His work, to quote from Professor Swete's foreword to the volume under review, "is a first effort to grapple on a large scale with the problems of the rising faith and to construct the outlines of a Christian theology. It is a storehouse of materials for the early history of the canon, the creed, and the episcopate." Irenæus' work was constructive in regard to the positive teachings of the Christian faith as well as a destructive attack on Gnostic teachings. This double attitude of his work renders it of inestimable value to the student of the Church in the early centuries.

The plan of Dr. Hitchcock's book is at once simple and natural. The opening chapter gives a sketch of the life of Irenæus, as far as his life can be constructed from the comparatively few facts that are known of him. In this part of his work the author has made

no new contribution to our knowledge. The second chapter deals with the teachers of Irenæus, and of these Justin Martyr is found to be the most important and influential. A chapter is then taken up with an account of Irenæus' *magnum opus*—the *Treatise against Heresies*. In this chapter there is a scholarly and painstaking discussion of the work, its place in history, the extant Latin translations, and an indication as to where these may be found. In the chapter on the purpose of human life, much is made of the fact that for him life is regarded as an opportunity for education and not merely as a probation. In this education, not only the fall but even sin itself may be of value. Thus the view-point of the second-century bishop on this matter was thoroughly modern as well as thoroughly sane and practical.

In his estimate of the doctrine of the Trinity as found in Irenæus the writer differs somewhat from Harnack's conclusions, particularly in reference to the eternity of the Son and Holy Spirit. "Irenæus' doctrine," says our author, "may be summed up as a belief in One and the Same God, manifested to men in a threefold Personality, absolute, eternal, co-ordinated essentially as touching the Divine nature, but admitting of historical subordination as touching the Divine office" (p. 125). "He does not contemplate a time when either was not, nor does he hesitate to regard either as Divine" (p. 128). From this treatment of the Trinity the writer naturally passes to a consideration of Irenæus' treatment of "the Incarnate Word." While Irenæus did not have to deal with Arian tendencies of thought regarding the eternity of the Son of God, yet he appears to have taken for granted that He was, according to scriptural teaching, "begotten of the Father before all worlds." Whether this position includes that of absolute eternity is a debatable question. But apart from this historical question, which was scarcely raised in Irenæus' time, it is clearly shown that for him the Incarnation was a central truth. "With Irenæus . . . the religion of the Incarnation was not a mere adherence to a rational idea; it was faith in a Divine Person as well; it was not solely a *modus vivendi* between Christian doctrine and philosophy, but it was also the motive and inspiration of life; it was less the argument of a Divine thought than the influence of a Divine power, and so was a religion rather than a gnosis. We therefore give him no less than his due when we acknowledge that he was not only the first of the great ecclesiastical writers who assigned its due significance to the Person of Christ, but also the first who made his Christology the centre of a systematic cosmology, anthropology, and theology" (p. 128).

Further, in discussing the teaching of Irenæus on the Incarnation, the author offers some simple comparisons between his attitude and that of Ritschl on the Person of Christ (pp. 134, 148). He finds some real inconsistencies in the teachings of Irenæus, but stands firmly by the fact that he clearly grasped the purposes of the Incarnation. "The Incarnation is represented by Irenæus as fulfilling two supreme purposes with regard to the Father: (1) the revelation of His character and love to man, and (2) the realization of His original purpose in the creation of the race by the restoration of man to His image and likeness in the Son, which is incorruption and immortal life and sonship in the Father" (pp. 155-6). It might have added somewhat to the clarity of the author's meaning in this chapter, had he added a paragraph summarizing what he has so carefully worked out at considerable length.

In regard to the Atonement, "Irenæus proceeds to show that the human life of the Incarnate Word, consummated by the crucifixion, confers salvation, freedom, and divinity upon man. The work of the Atonement is identified more or less with the progress and process of His incarnate life. Every act of that life is regarded as of saving value, and the whole life as a work of salvation. . . . The Crucifixion marked for him the consummation of the Incarnation; but he did not restrict the work of the Atonement to the one transcendent experience in the incarnate life" (p. 159). The chapter also makes a careful comparison of the teaching of Irenæus regarding the Atonement with that of Tertullian (a propitiation and satisfaction made to God), and with that of Origen (a compensation paid to the devil). Over against this latter theory our author finely sums up what he considers to be the theory of Irenæus: "The debt which was owed, but which Christ did not owe, was to the eternal law of holiness; and therefore our redemption was effected by persuasion (*secundum suadela*m), not by force (*cum vi*); the captives of sin being drawn out of its sphere and power by the spiritual attraction of the Christ, the incarnate Word" (pp. 168-9). So he dismisses all thought that Irenæus agreed with Origen, but is not so sure that he may not have had sympathy with Anselm's "Satisfaction" theory. But, "he does not indeed insist on either compensation or satisfaction in the usually applied sense. . . . By the Son's obedience the law of holiness was fulfilled. It was to the law that compensation was given and satisfaction made" (p. 173).

Chapter xiv, on the Ministry, discusses the contentious question of the relation of the bishop to the presbyter in the early Church. The author thus states the position of Irenæus: "His use of the word

'presbyter,' however, is broad and was intended to apply to bishops as well as priests. For while he regarded every bishop as a presbyter, it cannot be shown that he looked on every presbyter as a bishop" (pp. 255-6). He notes the error made by Irenæus in saying (*Hær.* III, xiv. 2) that St. Paul at Miletus called together the bishops *and* presbyters of Ephesus *and the neighboring churches*, and concludes by showing that "Irenæus did not regard Apostolic succession as the title-deed of an exclusive hierarchy, but as the safeguard of the Scriptures and of the Christian faith and ministry" (p. 262). In the ministerial system as it was understood by Irenæus there was nothing "mechanical or sacerdotal." The discussion on the two sacraments (Chap. xv) is short and to the point. Of Baptism the teaching of Irenæus is thus explicitly summarized: "He regarded it as a rite to be administered to infants, who, as well as adults, are therein reborn unto God, and as a means of grace conveying regeneration, or a death unto sin and a new birth unto righteousness" (p. 267). As to the Eucharist, the author finds the source of Irenæus teaching in Justin Martyr's *Apologia* (C. 65, 66). "Irenæus did not speak of any physical change in the elements, or conceive Christ as present in any corporeal manner in the Eucharist" (p. 277). In pages 278-81 the order of the administration of the Communion in the days of Irenæus is clearly portrayed. Of Salvation the author says, "Salvation in this system included the full realization of all that God intended man to become in body, soul, and spirit" (p. 316). If this is so, how truly does the best thought of the twentieth century echo that of the second-century bishop!

As a conclusion the author attempts to reconstruct the beliefs of Irenæus into a creed. The attempt is certainly well made and of peculiar interest. The creed as stated by Dr. Hitchcock is remarkably Nicene in form and expression. Attention is called to the fact that the word "homoousios," "which figures so prominently in the Nicene Creed, was frequently used by Irenæus" (p. 342). A scholarly footnote shows the sources in the writings of Irenæus from which each clause of this reconstructed creed has been derived. It is no small tribute to the worth of this early Bishop of Lyons that Dr. Hitchcock can close his scholarly examination with the declaration, "He ever strove for unity in the Church and uniformity in doctrine and organization; and his mind and temper were of the sort that reconciles." The mind of the author seems to be cast in the same broad, irenical mould as was that of the early bishop.

A valuable *Excursus* on the Latin Translation of Irenæus closes the volume. The ample footnotes throughout will be an invaluable

help to every student who desires to master the teaching and thought of this early apologist. A full bibliography of the secondary material used by the writer will also be found useful. A carefully prepared, analytical index forms the conclusion of a volume that has been written by an accurate scholar for scholarly readers.

OSWALD W. HOWARD.

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BASIL THE GREAT. A STUDY IN MONASTICISM. W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.
Cambridge University Press. 1913. Pp. xii, 176. 7s. 6d.

It has been all too customary to speak of the Church in the East either in vague terms or in sweeping generalities. We have had little careful modern study of the history and institutions of that important part of Christendom. It has been a *terra incognita*, except to a few enthusiasts, and the real conditions have remained unknown even to many of them. Except in doctrinal matters, yet in them only to a limited extent and in quite conventional lines, there is little in English of much value on that part of the Church. Even German scholarship has had little interest in the subject. In spite of the difficulties connected with the study of ecclesiastical affairs in the East, the outlook for a more satisfactory study of Oriental Christianity is improving. The present work may be regarded as one more evidence of a rising interest; and it is a welcome addition to our limited stock of works on monasticism of a scholarly character, even if it touches at many points matters discussed by E. F. Morrison in his *St. Basil and his Rule* (Oxford, 1912).

The present work, although brief, is a piece of scholarly investigation, with the results presented in a compact and lucid manner. Mr. Clarke, an Anglican clergyman, writes with sympathy for the ascetic life in the Church, at least as expressed in St. Basil's Rules, appreciating the elements in the religious life that make for asceticism and recognizing its place in the work of the Church. Here the author appears to some extent as a follower of Harnack, who has done so much to rehabilitate monasticism among Protestant students of history.

The aim of the book is to present the main features of the Rules of St. Basil in their historical setting. Accordingly, there is given a brief study of the monasticism in the century before Basil, and especially of the Rule of Pachomius. This study includes the experience of Basil himself and the conditions of the Church in Cappadocia.

All this is introductory to an examination of the ascetic writings of Basil with an appreciation of the ideals embodied in them. The conclusion is appropriately given to a statement of the influence of Basil's Rules upon monasticism in the East, and through the Rule of St. Benedict of Nursia upon the monastic life of the West. Mr. Clarke finds the advance made by Basil upon Pachomius, his only forerunner, to consist mainly in three points: a consistently and successfully carried-out cenobitism, in which Pachomius, in spite of his vast establishments at Tabennisi, failed; the close connection between monasticism and the Church, whereby the monks became the great support of the Church in the later Roman Empire; and the insistence upon works of mercy and benevolence, including schools, as a part of the monastic system. In this last particular we would add that Basil was far in advance of all monastic rules in the West for centuries. As a matter of fact, there is no monastic rule in the West before the thirteenth century that lays down the duty of maintaining a school in connection with a monastery. The author, in his brief sketch of monasticism in the East, corrects the popular impression that all Eastern monks are Basilians in any sense of the term that resembles the terms Franciscans, Dominicans, or Carthusians. There is strictly speaking no order of Basilian monks. The influence of the Rules upon later ascetic life in the East varied greatly in different places and at different times. Not a few of the ideals for which they stood have been quite lost. Yet Basil remains as the father of organized monachism in the East. It is hardly necessary to add that the whole work is strictly *quellenmässig*.

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CAN WE STILL BE CHRISTIANS? RUDOLF EUCKEN. Translated by Lucy Judge Gibson. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. 218. \$1.25.

The change that has come over the face of the world since this book appeared, even in its English dress, raises the question whether already it possesses more than historical significance. Nevertheless, the volume is an earnest attempt to solve world-problems that antedated the gigantic struggle and will outlast it. In the reconstruction of religious thought and of church organization, which wars and rumors of war may hinder but cannot permanently turn aside, Eucken's contribution deserves its place as that of one who has some real vision of the future.

In eight chapters of condensed but not obscure statement, the

author gives a survey of the nature and requirements of Christianity, of the resistance it encounters today from naturalistic and subjectivistic modes of thought, and of the reasons for retaining its essentials, largely modified to meet the changed intellectual temper of the times. Whether or not all readers alike will assent to the irreducible minimum that he would keep, no reader can lay aside the book without feeling himself instructed as to the perplexities of a growing number of alert and thoughtful minds regarding the traditional teachings of the Christian churches, and finding much frank dealing with religious systems as they were in Germany and Western Europe just before the great cataclysm. The volume has the characteristic merits and defects of Eucken's style, rendered into excellent English. Its handling is of broad currents of opinion, rather than of clear-cut issues. Everywhere the outlines are large and luminous, although, as in the wall-paintings of Puvis de Chavannes, there is a lack of precise detail. Eucken constantly writes as if at antagonists whom he seeks to refute, but without naming them or referring to their works. In this way a good deal of saturated knowledge is expected of the reader, who does not always get the guidance he needs. Yet the substance of the book is straightforward, and repays an attentive reading. As a whole, it is an impressive piece of spiritual diagnosis.

Diagnosis being the essential preliminary to any lasting cure, men of every phase of belief would do well to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest what is here offered for the relief of their estate—the radicals, who would revolutionize things to the extent of discarding the Christian past, that they may see how deep-rooted its principles are in the nature of man and of all spiritual reality; and the conservatives, who would keep it forever the same, that they may realize how completely some of their doctrines (as the Incarnation, pages 29 ff.) are out of accord, not with superficial doubt only, but, what is far more serious, with the entire trend of modern thinking. It is because Eucken is a layman and a philosopher, not a churchman or a theologian, that his counsels are of weight. For forty years and over, he has been a teacher, dealing intimately with modern youth in their formative period. He is also free to lay bare his real opinions. He admits his inability, from his early life, notwithstanding his keen interest in religious problems, ever to come into sympathetic relations with the existing churches. This in itself is an indictment, not to be successfully disposed of by retorting that it is typical of German university professors. Recurring again and again in his thought and writings to questions of Christian

belief and organization, he resolved at last to utter himself fully on these matters, since the time seemed ripe for speaking out and age was coming on, with the night when no man can work.

Space is wanting in which to discuss Eucken's conception of Christianity, and his chapter on "What Resistance does Christianity encounter Today?" easily the most remarkable in the book. The chief reason offered for not rejecting Christianity is that, after all, we have nothing to put in its place. Beneath all surface currents of opposition to religion today, there is a strong and irresistible trend toward spiritual life, both in its more general manifestation and in the particular form of religion. The deepening of religious feeling in Europe as the war progresses confirms this. Eucken's statement of the positive claims of Christianity on the modern world is one to be read with uplift of heart. His application is made to the churches "with which we Germans and Western Europeans generally are mainly concerned, viz. Catholicism and Protestantism." By Protestantism, he means principally the State Church of Germany. The chapter-heading, "The Impossibility of a Reform within the Existing Churches," states his conclusion, to which it is not a little significant that a thinker of Eucken's undoubted standing should have come. Nothing is said of Modernism in the Church of Rome, though the seeds of the future may be there. Conservative Lutheranism is held to be as alien to present needs as Catholicism. What calls itself Liberal Protestantism in Germany seems to our author lacking in force and resolution. He argues that there must be a new Christianity, root and branch. Here, where definite suggestion might be looked for, he fails us, being no prophet or religious genius. As is consistent with his professed "activism," he does not outline the coming doctrine or church order, doubtless thinking this may best be left to the working of vital tendencies that cannot be resisted.

The heart of the book is in the glowing statement on pages 124 ff. Whatever opposition religion encounters today, man must ever hark back to it for his spiritual self-preservation. The world which religion opens transcends nature and civilization alike, carrying with it a complete reversal of first impressions and sensuous values. The values of religion are absolute. It is not enough for Eucken, apparently, that religion shall be one element in a varied life, working harmoniously with its compeers, in democratic equality and mutual co-operation. Religion must have unquestioned supremacy. Nature, humanity, civilization, may stand around as obedient subjects in the imperial presence, but let them not dream of claiming

equality! Give religion this place of supremacy, and it will lift all life to a higher level. The effect of thus exalting religion to the highest place is not, however, as in the ancient and mediæval schemes, to set men wishing for a Beyond, but to lift human life into conscious and joyful participation in an "independent spiritual order, transcending alike the world and time," and conceived as revealing the ultimate depths of reality. The lack of definiteness in Eucken's setting forth of this leading concept is hard to excuse, as in the study of his larger works. The result of accepting the spiritual as supreme is a "complete reversal of valuation." In thus emphasizing religion as concerned primarily with values, Eucken ranges himself with the Ritschlians, and gives a handle to those critics who insist that his philosophy is incurably romantic.

One's doubts regarding this stimulating book are doubts that arise concerning Eucken's position in philosophy as a whole. His wavering and indistinct treatment of such controlling concepts as nature and humanity, and, above all, the "spiritual life"; his lack of concrete reference, making the checking of many statements impossible; his acknowledged irrationalism and mystical absolutism; force one who has been an admirer and who acknowledges a great debt to question whether his day is not already past, with that of Fichte and Hegel. A more relativistic and realistic type of thinking is coming to the front, which will be more specific in its routing of old ghosts from their places in the superstitious reverence of the multitude. Well will it be for this coming philosophy if it can stir conviction and arouse the impulse to action with as noble zeal and high fervor as did, in its long and stirring day, the absolutism of the great disciples of Kant, of whom Eucken is doubtless not the last and surely not the least.

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FATED OR FREE. A DIALOGUE ON DESTINY. PRESTON WILLIAM SLOSSON. Sherman, French, & Co. 1914. Pp. vi, 89.

This dialogue aims to be a fair presentation of the arguments in favor of and against free will. The sympathies of the author are evidently on the side of the indeterminist, who stands quite alone in the little drama against the professor of logic, the professor of physics, the professor of sociology, the Presbyterian minister, the novelist, the warden of the State penitentiary, and the man of practical affairs, all of whom proclaim the arguments of determinism

Of course, the denial of freedom which the physicist develops is very different from that of the minister and again from that of the criminologist, but all agree that freedom of the will is an impossible doctrine. Everyone of these opponents of free will—Professor Huxley Kohlenstoff, Dr. Clifford Denker, Rev. Edwards C. Gottlieb, Mr. Javerts Lawes, Mr. Meredith Riter—receives his eloquent reply from Mr. James B. Freeman the indeterminist. The questions which they try to settle begin with the naturalistic problem of whether there can be cause and effect if the will is free, and whether the reality of free will would affect natural science. Then they discuss the inner experience of freedom and the psychology of the will. From here they turn to the influence of heredity and environment. The following question refers to the practical importance of the belief in free will. Finally we stand before the religious inquiry: Can God rule if man is free?

The author does not claim to discuss the great question with the fulness it deserves or any special originality in the arguments on either side. But it may be acknowledged that he presents more or less familiar arguments in a lucid and interesting form. The irony of the book, however, lies in the fact that the objections to free will are far better presented than the case for freedom, which is evidently the side on which the author himself wishes to take his stand. The book makes us believe that James B. Freeman has effectively answered the arguments of his opponents. No doubt, he has answered some and has swept aside some others by enthusiasm and an expression of faith in freedom, but he has probably convinced neither Mr. Kohlenstoff nor Mr. Gottlieb nor even Mr. Lawes.

Yet is that really the fault of the cause which he defends? It seems rather a hopeless undertaking to make a fight for freedom if the idea of freedom is taken in the narrow and unsatisfactory sense in which the author proclaims it. To him the free will is a kind of psychological energy which the organisms have acquired at a late stage of natural evolution. He says directly: "The indeterminism of today is a critical philosophy which would not have been possible before Darwin, and most of the arguments for it depend upon the progress in psychology during the past twenty-five years." Hence the whole discussion starts on both sides alike with the epistemological presupposition that reality as the natural scientist describes it to us is the only possible object of interest and perception the only form of experience. A freedom which is a break in the chain of causality in the midst of a causal world is certainly contrary to the presuppositions of thought itself. If we start to conceive our world of impres-

sions under the thought-form of causality, it would be contradictory to accept as a part of this world a process which is on principle without causes. If we want to reach the world of freedom we must certainly go back to the fundamental conditions of experience, and recognize that reality seen under the category of causality is not the only form of existence. We know our own will and the will of our neighbors primarily in an entirely different form. We know it not by perceiving it but by willing it. In an attitude of affirming and denying we are aware of a reality which is absolutely different from that of the objects of awareness, and we reach the will of others not by perceiving them but by acknowledging them, by agreeing or disagreeing with them. A world of will-relations opens itself, in which the objects of nature come in question only as material for the will, as means and as ends. This is the true world of our historical and our practical life. In this world of will-relations are lying our logical, ethical, æsthetic, and religious ideals and obligations. It is a world that is just as complete in itself as that which the scientist builds up by his conceptional reconstruction of the impressions. But it is a world which cannot possibly be brought under the categories of causality; and just because there is no meaning in asking for the causes of the will in such a teleological world, the will as part of this true world of historical existence is free. At various points the arguments of the determinists and of the indeterminist in Slosson's book hint at this true world of freedom. But they completely fail to see its fundamental meaning, and therefore remain on principle at a level of thought at which freedom is fundamentally a problem for the biological laboratory-student and not for the philosopher.

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

BIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. GEORGE H. PARKER. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. Pp. xx, 130. \$1.10.

This volume presents in book form the William Brewster Clark Memorial Lectures delivered at Amherst College in 1914, by the Professor of Zoölogy in Harvard University. The first chapter deals with the structure and function of the nervous system, concerning which Professor Parker is a leading American authority. The second chapter emphasizes the importance of internal secretions or hormones upon the nervous and other functions, supplementing the action of the nervous system and affecting the temperament of the individual. The third chapter summarizes the more important recent discoveries in heredity, and points out the bearing of these

upon the problems of race improvement; while in the last chapter the factors in organic evolution are discussed and certain important conclusions drawn.

The author finds himself in accord with the program of the eugenicists "so far as it is directed toward the complete elimination of reproduction in the irresponsible defective." The inheritance of acquired characteristics being excluded as a factor in social evolution, the latter is to be effected by better environment (especially educational environment) for the individual, and by limited eugenic selection. The conscious control of evolution therefore, according to Dr. Parker, involves the education of the cerebral cortex and the elimination of defective germ-plasm. However unexpected (in a course of lectures upon social evolution) may appear this association of nervous, glandular, and reproductive functions, the conclusions of the writer will seem sound and convincing so far as they are limited to the physical side of social life, i.e., to the sphere of mechanism. There are certain assertions, however, made by Dr. Parker which transgress the field of mechanism and which will appear to many readers uncritical.

Examples of such assertions are that "human personality is an almost impalpable product of the cerebral cortex"; "memory is a function of the nervous system"; "the activities of the cortex include all our conscious states"; "our most profound activities are of a purely materialistic nature." Although Dr. Parker does not state the philosophical view-point from which such assertions are made, there is no doubt that they transgress the bounds of sound mechanism, and they will suggest to many readers assumptions which have been long since philosophically discredited. As a whole, however, the book is characterized by scientific accuracy and cautiousness of conclusions, and forms a valuable addition to the literature dealing with the science of social control or "conscious evolution," notwithstanding the failure of the writer to suggest that the "conscious control" of evolution involves other factors than the purely physical or mechanistic.

HERBERT V. NEAL.

TUFTS COLLEGE.

THE UNFOLDING UNIVERSE. EDGAR L. HEERMANCE. The Pilgrim Press. 1915. Pp. xxiv, 463. \$1.50.

In an earnest and interesting manner Mr. Heermance has brought together a large number of scientific facts from the physical, biological, psychical, and spiritual fields in an attempt to prove the

existence of God by the use of the modern scientific method of investigation and inductive reasoning. From man's religious experience the author infers the existence of an objective "cosmic mind," which works through man's subconscious self in the regulation of organic, nervous, physical, social, psychical, and spiritual growth with purposeful activity. This cosmic mind is God, and the end to be attained "the perfection of the mind of the total human personality as a social unit." Perhaps the scientist would hardly go as far as Mr. Heermance in saying that "as the physical universe exists for the solar system, the solar system exists for our planet. Man would then become the central fact in the plan and purpose of the universe." Nevertheless, the modern preacher of every denomination should find in the pages of *The Unfolding Universe* many scientific facts in a new setting, many philosophical truths in a new light, and many valuable suggestions for new lines of thought.

FREDERIC PALMER, JR.

Haverford College.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF FAITH. BERTRAM BREWSTER. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. 201. \$1.20.

The author of this work maintains the position that the logical faculty or understanding has its legitimate place and function in life but does not cover the whole of life, and particularly is it inadequate to deal with the deeper experiences in the philosophic grasp of truth, the aesthetic appreciation of beauty, and the ethical and religious love of the good. The world of life is greater than the realm of rationalism. He endeavors to give us a philosophy of faith. Philosophy finds that there are psychological and social causes of faith. Instinct, impulse, and experience play their part in its creation. The grounds of faith are thus psychologically well established. It is the task of philosophy to criticise this faith, to modify it, to purify it, and to relate it to the whole content of religious experience and the ordered world. Considerable stress is laid on the voluntary nature of faith and the obligation to cherish it. With such a conception of his task the author discusses in successive chapters such ideas as truth, virtue, freedom, beauty, and the highest good. The book is a good type of the more thoughtful popular philosophical treatise, which makes it appeal to persons who have an intelligent interest in the greatest subjects of thought; and to such the book may be commended.

DANIEL EVANS.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS. CHARLES HENRY ROBINSON, D.D.
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. Pp. xiv, 533. \$2.50.

The first impression of this book and the impression that abides is that it undertakes what cannot be done. To crowd the story of foreign missions into a single volume, even of five hundred solid pages, is impossible. The author recognizes the difficulty and in the opening sentences of his preface disavows the purpose to attempt any such recital. Instead he will only venture upon an outline sketch which may set forth in correct perspective the fields that invite separate and particular study.

In spite of this modest disclaimer the book stands, both in its title and in its make-up, as a record of the origin and progress of the modern missionary enterprise, as tracing from the birth of the new evangelizing impulse the gradual appearance of missionary societies, great and small, "Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Protestant," their several locations and fields of work, their contacts with the manifold races and religions of the non-Christian world, their developing lines of activity and, last but not least, as furnishing some adequate portrayal of the adventures and achievements which have marked this pathway of human endeavor.

The scheme of the volume is simple and orderly. Seventeen of its twenty-four chapters (IV-XX) deal with so many great lands of the world from India to the Isles of the Pacific. Chapters XXI and XXII treat of missions to Moslems and to Jews, peoples who, while one in their religion, are yet of many races and of many lands. Chapter XXIII, dealing with missionary societies, is practically a list of names and years, valuable for reference, but needing Chapter XXIV on the Outlook in order that the volume may close with such uplift and inspiration as the theme and the author warrant us to expect. For Canon Robinson is admirably qualified to write effectively upon the missionary enterprise. His knowledge is wide and comprehensive; his sympathies are broad; his judgment notably discriminating; his temper fair; his outlook courageous and Christian. The first three chapters of the book reveal the quality of its author. The opening or introductory chapter contains a sober yet strong setting forth of the universality of Christianity, what makes it both in its intent and in its effect a missionary religion. Chapter II sketches briefly but with firm hand the various methods of work employed from Paul's day to this more complex present, with its medical and educational lines of approach and its department of women's work. Chapter III furnishes the link that binds the

modern missionary movement to the era of the Reformation. These earlier chapters, being less burdened with detail, are among the most readable portions of the book.

The fact is that from the body of the work the juice is well nigh squeezed out through the terrific compression required and the obligation the author seems to have felt to name all the forces at work in each land with the statistics that mark their outstanding dates, their numbers, and extent of influence. These data, gathered with infinite pains as they must have been, yet, as they have been drawn from many sources, are often so dissimilar in their terms and classification as to leave a confused impression on the mind of the reader, who closes one chapter only to find the experience repeated in another field.

If one is really to feel the force of the foreign missionary movement of the last century, he needs to see with some vividness the habits of life and thought in the missionary lands, the soil into which the missionary message has been cast; to note its different reception in these unlike situations; to watch the variety in approach and in method by which it gradually won its way, and the marvellous result whereby has appeared out of so dissimilar conditions the normal Christian character and type of life. Something of the bulk and irresistible lift of the missionary enterprise, as thus suggested, seems to be lost to sight in these close-packed chapters and paragraphs; we are in danger of not seeing the forest for the trees.

The lack is made all the more evident from the fact that here and there through the book the author pauses in his enumeration of places, societies, and statistics to sketch some missionary hero, to characterize an epoch, or to portray a striking situation. In these passages he is at his best; informing, judicious, and sympathetic; able to value aright and to depict with appreciation the significance of the event on which he dwells. The work of Alexander Duff in India (pp. 88-90), the romance of Uganda in Africa's missionary history (pp. 347-456), and the description of events leading to the conference of three religions in Japan (pp. 237-240), are examples of these most satisfying oases in the dry and hurried march of the history. The frank yet impartial discussion of the unfortunate controversies between the different schools of Roman Catholic missions in China (pp. 179-180); or the outspoken criticism of Roman Catholic missions in South America (pp. 409-412)—the more noteworthy in that Canon Robinson is editorial secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, which represents the High Church party of the Anglican com-

munion—the estimate of the worth of mass movements in India (p. 127), and the trenchant comment upon the folly of the independent missionary (p. 305), illustrate both the author's knowledge in the field of which he writes and his firm and sound judgment in appraising its phenomena.

The following paragraph, quoted from the closing page of the book, reveals the author's sanity of mind and breadth of spirit. It shows his genius for seeing the heart of the missionary enterprise and his comparative disregard for the external forms and procedures:

“For the successful prosecution of the missionary campaign character is of greater importance than method. Many a missionary whose intellectual and other qualifications have been small, has exerted what to onlookers has appeared to be a miraculous influence by the life which he has lived in a non-Christian land. Many a mission which has adopted physical methods of propagating Christianity which appear to be wholly inconsistent with the Spirit of Christ, has achieved spiritual results which other missions that have been conducted upon the most approved lines have failed to accomplish. In both instances the influence exerted by the personal character of the individual missionary has been so strong that the wisdom or unwisdom of the methods which he has adopted has become a matter of secondary importance. It is St. Paul's character even more than his missionary methods which the missionary of to-day needs to imitate and to make his own.”

It was inevitable that a volume crowded with facts and figures, many of them comparatively unimportant, should contain inaccuracies. If the writer may judge from the pages dealing with matters with which he is particularly familiar, there are altogether a good many such slips. The American Board has no missions in South America (p. 484), and has never handed over any work in Ceylon to Singalese (p. 146); its work is altogether among Tamils. And its 322 ordained native preachers are not called missionaries (p. 484).

The volume appears as one in the series of the International Theological Library. It is therefore designed primarily for students, a work of learning and leadership for the thought of those who would survey missions as a whole and analyze their progress with scientific precision. This fact accounts, no doubt, for the method of treatment of the subject, and justifies much that would be questioned if the book were intended for the general reader. It is not planned to awaken an interest in foreign missions, or to provide the preacher with telling missionary incidents. It is not a popular treatment of a big subject. But it is a great book, worthy to stand with its

mates in the Theological Library, justifying the assignment of a volume to this theme, and presenting what is now, and we may believe for long will be, the most comprehensive and informing history of foreign missions in the English tongue; and this without forgetting Robson's translation of Warneck's *History of Protestant Missions*. One cannot read this History through, despite all its pages of mere chronology, without appreciating the vitality and the achievement of the missionary enterprise and without coming to honor the devotion, versatility, and heroism of its promoters.

WILLIAM E. STRONG.

A. B. C. F. M., BOSTON.

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- LA CONTROVERSE DE MARTIN MARPRELATE, 1588-1590.** *By G. Bonnard.* A. Jullien. Genève. 1916. Pp. xvi+237. 4fr.
- ILLUSTRATIONS OF POSITIVISM.** *By J. H. Bridges.* The Open Court Publishing Co. 1915. Pp. xiv+480. \$1.50.
- THE LAW OF HUMAN LIFE. THE SCRIPTURES IN THE LIGHT OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY.** *By Elijah V. Brookshire.* G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1916. Pp. xliiv+471. \$2.50.
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A REVIEW OF ITALIAN MODERNISM

GIORGIO LA PIANA

The future historian of Modernism will be much embarrassed by the contradictory appreciations and misjudgments which are to be found in our contemporary literature on this subject. One book presents Modernism as a movement of the Latin mind, distrusting individualism and laying stress upon the corporate element in religion; another writer, on the contrary, characterizes Modernism as "a spirit of anarchy, of individualism, of personal distinction and culture." To some writers Modernism is the greatest spiritual movement ever produced inside the Catholic Church, while to others it is an insignificant and useless dream of a few not completely developed minds. Consequently some of them outline the development of Modernism as an anecdotic history without a real unity in purpose, while others conceive of it as of a system of theology derived from certain fixed and definite philosophic premises.

On the whole, little attention has been paid to the facts upon which the development of modernist ideas depends. Especially the history of Italian Modernism has been greatly miscalculated on account of this lack of appreciation of the historical ground and the environment in which the movement was born and developed. A com-

prehensive history of Modernism has not yet been written; but so far as it concerns Italy, only by going back to the history of the intellectual and moral life of the Italian clergy since the last quarter of the nineteenth century shall we be able to understand the true nature and the true spirit of Italian Modernism and to value its importance in the history of the Roman Church.

The fall of the temporal kingdom of the papacy completed Italy's political unity, but rendered for a time more difficult the achievement of the moral unity of the nation. The Catholic clergy, numerous, rich, and very influential with the populace, were of course openly hostile to the new régime, especially in the provinces of Southern Italy. Closely connected with the clergy was the great majority of the aristocracy — all the bishoprics and the highest ecclesiastical offices being filled with cadets of noble families; and this alliance between the Church and the highest social classes had shaped the customs of the ecclesiastical hierarchy into a peculiar aristocratic type. The new government, already struggling hard to overwhelm the divergent tendencies of the Italian provinces, so different among themselves in economic and moral standards, in traditions and interests of all kinds, had also to reckon with a clergy in open or covert hostility toward it.

Extreme measures were adopted. The Piedmontese law was passed by the national Parliament, abolishing religious orders and ecclesiastical benefices in no connection with cure of souls, and transferring all their estates to the public domain, with the purpose of establishing schools and other educational institutions in behalf of the people. It is interesting to notice that such a fierce blow to the Church was considered by many — and the best members of the clergy itself — as a punishment of God for the deep corruption of religious life in convents and parishes. In a book which belonged to

a Sicilian convent one of the friars, heart-broken, wrote before his leaving the convent forever, the following words:

“Manus Domini cecidit super nos; iniquitates nostrae supergressae sunt cacumina montium et nos facti sumus sicut filii maledictionis et irae. Semitas rectas non calcavimus et cum meretricibus panem nostrum comedimus. Aurum et argentum, ingluviem et voluptates, dileximus nimis; propterea Dominus oblitus est nostri, derelinquens nos in potestate inimici. Justum est judicium tuum Domine. Amen.”

The first effect of the abolition of the religious orders was the breaking of the link of interests that had bound the aristocracy to the Church. There were many convents in Italy reserved exclusively for the members of the aristocracy. It was impossible to be accepted as a monk (to live the life of humility and penitence!) in those convents unless a title of nobility could be shown. Those places were veritable *vivaria* for bishops and high prelates, who were supposed to be educated and trained through the hard trials of monastic discipline. But in fact life in those convents was easy, and this ecclesiastical aristocracy remained feudal in its spirit and oppressive in its forms; excessively proud of ancestors and titles, by which they believed themselves to bestow honor upon the ecclesiastical offices instead of being honored by them.

Extremely jealous of their prerogatives, those bishops of noble families transformed their residences into little courts, with all the rigid ceremonial of Spanish aristocracy, the same extravagant display of servants and liveries, besides a complicated system of kneeling down and bowing and hand-kissing, to which more or less valuable indulgences were attached. But as soon as the Church lost its temporal power, and the alliance between the throne and the altar was dissolved, the aristocracy deserted the Church party, so that today very few members

of that class are to be found on the list of Italian bishops and prelates. Even the pontifical diplomatic body, until a few years ago exclusively reserved for the ecclesiastical aristocracy, is now contaminated with many upstarts from the lower classes. This progressive disappearance of the aristocracy from the ranks of the Italian clergy is to be considered as an important fact in connection with the new mentality of the clergy of the next period.

The withdrawal of the aristocracy was, for various reasons, gradually imitated by the well-to-do people, and today the Italian clergy is almost entirely recruited from the rural classes. One of these reasons — which is of capital importance in preparing the basis of the Modernism to come — was the action of the government in taking over the administration of public schools and public education and freeing it from clerical interference. During the old régime there were two kinds of educational institutions: the *Seminaria clericorum*, one in each diocese, under the control of the bishop, and the *Colleges* of the Jesuits or of other religious orders. The teachers were all members of the secular or the regular clergy, and even the universities were under the direct or indirect control of the Church.

The new government secularized the universities, even abolishing theological Faculties, closed all the Colleges of the religious orders and reduced the *Seminaria* to the condition of private institutions, whose diplomas were deprived of any value as titles for admission to public offices or public liberal professions. The *Seminaria*, though established by the Council of Trent for the education of the clergy, had been for a long time institutions of a broader scope. In the absence of other secondary schools, most young men desiring to enter a liberal profession there received their classical and philosophical education, so that clergy and laymen had

the same mental training without divergence in their spiritual culture. The new law on public education cut off such a connection. While the public schools under the new régime of liberty were open to all modern ideas and scientific methods, the *Seminaria* not only stood by their old methods, but through an inevitable reaction against the irreligious spirit of the public schools became even more conservative, thus fixing an enormous gulf between the mentality of the new clergy of the *Seminaria* and the young laymen growing up in the public schools. This breaking of relations between the ecclesiastical and the lay culture is another mile-stone in the history of Italian Modernism.

The Italian clergy that came up in the difficult years between 1870 and 1880 developed a higher moral standard under adversity than their predecessors. A kind of ascetic renaissance was visible among the young priests, monks, and friars. These last were trying under enormous difficulties, in the face of poverty and the open hostility of the law, to reorganize their religious families from the foundations. Many members of this young clergy found a compensation for the lost influence in public education, in work of a social-charitable character. Some of them were very successful in establishing orphanages, hospitals, and asylums for old people unable to work. Don Giovanni Bosco in Turin, Fr. Ludovico da Casoria in Naples, Don Giacomo Cusumano in Palermo, were three very remarkable men who founded, besides numerous charitable institutions, the religious congregations of *Salesiani*, *Frati Bigi*, and *Boccone del Povero*, for the assistance and the education of the people whom they had gathered in their asylums.

But the rise of the moral level of the younger Italian clergy was accompanied by a decline of interest in culture. All participation in the political life of the nation had been severely forbidden to the clergy, and in general

to all Italian Catholics, by Pope Pius IX. The young clergy faithfully followed these pontifical instructions, while many rebels were to be found among the ranks of the older clergy. It seems strange that those young Italian priests and friars should have been more conservative than their older brothers educated in the revolutionary period; but it was logical enough. An unbroken tradition of liberalism has never failed to have some — and valiant — representatives among the Italian clergy. Even in the worst periods of decadence there were among them high-minded persons, who not only did not share the retrogressive spirit of their environment but anticipated their time, and in their writings outlined some of the modern religious views. During the nineteenth century, Gioberti (*La Riforma Cattolica*), Rosmini (*Le Sette Piaghe della Chiesa*), Lambruschini (*Lettere*), Curci (*Il Vaticano Regio*), to quote only the most famous names, were splendid illustrations of the everlasting vitality among the Italian clergy of a spirit of liberty and of reaction against the oppression of minds and of consciences. In the revolutionary period, during the hard and long struggle for national independence, many liberal priests and friars gave their life or their best activity for the patriotic cause.

When the war was over, this liberal clergy was rewarded by the government with good positions, either in public schools or in ecclesiastical offices dependent upon civil authority. But for the same reason they were very unwelcome at the Vatican, which did not dare to molest them for fear of complications with the government, but constantly barred them from any higher ecclesiastical offices, like the bishoprics, and above all from the teaching staff of seminaries and other ecclesiastical schools. The new clergy had been thus educated by the most conservative element, and had been taught that Garibaldi was a brigand, Cavour a cheat, Victor Emmanuel an ex-

communicated king, that the new kingdom was ephemeral, and that in a few years the old régime would be completely restored. Their knowledge of the history of the Church was limited to a general outline presented by some compilations lacking not only scientific spirit but even common sense. In many seminaries, especially of Southern Italy, Church history was not taught at all. Most of these theological schools had only three courses: dogmatic theology, moral theology, and elementary ecclesiastical law—no history, no biblical studies, not even the reading of the Bible itself. Hundreds of students of these schools reached the priesthood without knowing the names of the books of the Old and the New Testament.

The philosophical education of that clergy was not very conspicuous. The text-book adopted in many seminaries was a compilation by the Oratorian priest Valla, a strange mixture of Cartesianism and theology. The reconciliation between empiricism in dialectic, innatism in theodicy, and dualism in psychology — between that Cartesianism and Catholic dogma defined in scholastic terms, was reached through a series of compromises which certainly did not offer a very solid base for a systematic theology. Here was a real danger, of which most of those ecclesiastical teachers were, for lack of scientific training, unaware. The result was that the few men among the Italian clergy with a true philosophical mind who tried to find a reconciliation between faith and philosophy lost their faith, becoming either skeptics like Ausonio Franchi or positivists like Roberto Ardigo. In the meanwhile, the storm of Positivism had broken over Italian Universities. It was supported by men of great authority, like Siciliani, Lombroso, Angiullo, Corleo, and especially the former priest just mentioned, R. Ardigo. Positivism became the philosophy of the day, taking also the character of a strong protest against

clericalism and the Church of Rome. Thus politics and philosophy were united in the effort to minimize the power of the Church, accused, as it was, of obscurantism and suspected of continuous machinations to destroy the unity of the young kingdom. So between the mental attitude of the clergy and that of the cultured classes the gulf became wider. No reconciliation was possible between reactionary clericalism and irreligious positivism; both dogmatic, both intolerant; the former holding firmly to the Syllabus of Pius IX, the latter to the new gospel of Haeckel and Moleschott.

From 1880 to 1890 things changed a great deal. Leo XIII began his pontificate with a definite programme—the restoration of the temporal and the spiritual authority of the papacy. First of all, a strong centralization of clerical powers was necessary. Conditions were extremely favorable. The new clergy had been educated to belief in the dogma of infallibility. Furthermore, the Italian revolution, in breaking the bond between the Church and the State and depriving the Church of many privileges, gave up many of the rights of the State in ecclesiastical matters which had been based on the old concordats between the Roman Curia and the former Italian princes. Thus the Church acquired a free hand in the appointment of bishops. Under the old régime, with most of the Italian bishoprics under the *Jus patronatus* of princes and kings, prelates who received their appointment from the civil authority were likely to be more devoted to the interests of the dynasties than to the interests of the papacy, and not infrequently the bishops took a haughty attitude, almost of rebellion, against the popes.

When Leo was elected, the Italian bishops were more closely united to the papal See than ever in the history of the papacy. This unity of discipline, however, was to be strengthened by a closer moral and

intellectual unity. Leo wanted a clergy unified in aims and will with him, so as to be not only a docile but also an intelligent instrument for the realization of his plan. The first step towards this unification was the imposition of scholastic philosophy as the only philosophy to be accepted and professed by the clergy.

Pope Leo was obeyed. In a few years all the teachers of philosophy and theology in Italian seminaries threw away their Cartesianism, and the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas became the new gospel of the clerical schools. The Pope knew well how to keep alive the enthusiasm for the official philosophy of the Vatican by appointing into the cardinalate three or four among the most fervent Thomists and filling the staffs of pontifical universities and other clerical schools with their followers. Unknown men in a few years reached the top of the Roman hierarchy, only on account of some mediocre handbook of scholastic philosophy or some volume of *Theologia dogmatica ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis*. Thus every Italian seminarist learned that it was possible to find a red hat among the pages of the *Summa Theologica*.

Certainly in comparison with the indecision of the philosophy of the preceding period, the scholastic method seemed to be a strong mental discipline, a kind of intellectual gymnastic; but it was rather a gymnastic of formulas than of thoughts and ideas. The hunting of fallacies was the most important part of the game in those schoolrooms, and when the fallacy was found and the syllogism built in accordance with the rules upon ingenious distinctions and subdistinctions, then the work was done, and students were as proud as an entomologist who, having caught a rare insect, fixes it in his box in the right place required by a rigorous classification. And what else was philosophy for those young students but a box in which to fix the truth with a pin, according to a dogmatic classification? Before the philosophic

problems brought up by the new renaissance of idealism, which in this period drove out positivism from Italian universities, the neo-scholastic philosophy, as it was taught in ecclesiastical schools, remained imperturbable. A few words in their handbooks were enough to dismiss Kant, Hegel, and the others. Generally such systems were characterized as "*somnia dementium*," and the moral value of modern philosophy was summarized in a pious quotation: "*Deus quos vult perdere dementat*."

The intellectual unification of the Italian clergy was thus achieved. Pope Leo then went a step further; he wanted Italian Catholics organized in a strongly disciplined political party. While securing political alliances at large, urging Catholics in France to rally to the Republic and in Germany to the central Prussian monarchy, Leo did not forget that the key of the position was at home; the restoration of the papal kingdom was to be principally founded on the feelings of the Italian people. A Catholic majority was to be organized and politically educated under pontifical directions. The policy of abstentionism that had been the *credo* of Italian Catholics, expressed in the words, "Neither electing nor elected," was slightly modified: "Organize to become both when the time is ripe." The motto of the clergy had been, "Far from public affairs!"; the new motto was, "*Fuori di sacrestia* — Out from the sacristy!" Thus under the control of the Vatican, the *Opera dei Congressi* was organized and rapidly spread in all the Italian provinces, with a large system of *Comitati diocesani* (diocesan committees) and *Comitati parrocchiali* (parish committees). The immediate purpose of this organization of Catholic forces on a uniform scheme was the gradual conquest of public powers.

Young priests and friars in their enthusiasm for proselytism began to spread their ideas through conferences, lectures, newspapers, and magazines; having confidence

in themselves and in the righteousness of their cause, they were inspired by the generous desire of enlightening the entire world. They were men of good will. Their teachers had taught them, that "beyond St. Thomas there was but the immediate vision of God, and outside the Roman Church there is no salvation"; therefore they felt it their duty to bring the world to St. Thomas and to the Roman Church.

In the meanwhile, Italian bishops thought of another conquest — public schools. Italian law does not bar any man—even a priest—graduated from an Italian Royal University from being appointed, after regular examination, to teach in the public schools. As in most of the Italian dioceses priests were more numerous than needed by the religious life of the people, many bishops thought that there was a good opportunity to send intelligent young priests to follow the regular courses in the Royal Universities, in order to graduate and fill positions in public schools. Thus they intended through these priests to acquire an indirect control over public education. It cannot be denied that the general plan outlined by Pope Leo was imposing and clever; but its execution was confided almost entirely to the Italian clergy, supported in the beginning only by a few laymen belonging to the cultured classes, or rather to the old aristocracy remaining faithful to the Vatican. Pope Leo had great confidence that his clergy, educated in clerical seminaries far from worldly interferences and thoroughly fed with scholastic philosophy, was well fitted and ready for the hard task to be accomplished. Was he justified in his confidence? The history of the papacy never registered a more complete and miserable failure of a pontifical programme of religious and political restoration.

The last twelve years (1890–1902) of the pontificate of Leo XIII saw the blossoming of all this long-prepared activity. The Italian clergy, in spite of the uniformity

in the educational methods of the clerical seminaries, was far from homogeneous; various groups were to be distinguished. To the first belonged many priests neither intelligent nor ambitious, who had no farther aspiration than parish work as assistants in some village or country town, where they might live peacefully between a religious service in the morning and a game of cards in the drug store with old friends in the evening. Others, ambitious and intelligent, were desirous to make a career. They knew by tradition that frequently in the church true merit is not rewarded and that true culture is not always the best way for a rapid career. They became easily familiar with intrigues and learned thoroughly the way of acquiring valuable connections; but either they did not care to go beyond that external and apparent culture which hides the interior poverty and the wide desert of the soul, or they put their culture at the service of their ambition, thinking — or feigning to think — with the brains of their ecclesiastical superiors. Obviously these groups were conservative in their tendencies and were closely united to the old-fashioned clergy in their stubborn opposition to every innovation in the Church.

But there were two other groups whose mental attitude, shaped in a different way, was anxious to find new lines of activity in their ministerial work. The first of them and the more numerous involved a considerable number of young priests deeply sincere in their desire to devote their life to the service of people; priests who, either for lack of mental training or on account of natural tendencies, preferred to scientific work in schools and libraries a practical work in social fields or in religious administration. The other group, smaller in number but very remarkable in quality, consisted of some intelligent young priests ready to devote themselves not only to the duties of ecclesiastical offices but also to religious

scientific work, with a pure, sincere desire to serve truth and goodness in the Church of Christ for the progress of mankind.

All these priests, sincere and insincere, intelligent and unintelligent, under the impulse of the papal voice came out from the sacristies and began their work in the world. It did not take long for many of them to feel their unpreparedness to meet a conflict with modern thought and modern social organization. They became aware that their language was not understood, and that they themselves were unable to understand the language of the world. The new Catholic organization found arrayed against it not only the old liberalism of freemasonry but also the young and already vigorous Socialist party, revolutionary and anti-religious in spirit. In the logomachies of the schools these young priests had been told that Socialism was but a Utopia, a theory which was going to be dissolved as soon as it came in contact with reality. Instead, they found that Socialism was already a strong political party, well organized through all Italy and rapidly spreading among the rural classes, in towns and villages till then considered the strongholds of Catholicism. Even greater was their disappointment in the realm of learning. They believed that their philosophy and their history were the only ones in the world, and they found that there was something else besides their knowledge, something that must be taken seriously and could not be dismissed with a single gesture of contempt.

In the following events we have to distinguish two different movements, which frequently are connected but never to be identified as they have been in the history of Italian Modernism—the politico-social movement, commonly known as *Democrazia cristiana*, and the religious scientific movement, to which the name of Modernism is especially applied. The first—*Demo-*

crazia cristiana—was started not only with the consent of the Vatican but even under its impulsion, and for some time developed under its direction; the second—Modernism—arose from the natural development of minds and consciences, not without the impulse of foreign influences, beyond, or rather against, the will and the intentions of the Vatican. It would be untrue to say that the second exerted a great influence on the first; strange as it may seem, it was rather the first which favored the development of the second.

The attempt to organize Italian Catholics on a political basis brought them into a close struggle with Socialism. A number of economic institutions, such as rural banks, coöperative stores, workingmen's leagues, rural coöperative associations, all strictly sectarian, were rapidly organized by the Catholics, who in a couple of years acquired through them a large body of clients and supporters, especially in rural districts. But Socialism was not only a political organization; it was also a doctrine, which on account of its appeal for a radical solution of the problem of poverty, was enthusiastically accepted by the lower classes. For the new Social-Catholic party it was comparatively easy to oppose Socialist institutions with other institutions, banks with new banks, and leagues with new leagues. But could they oppose to the Socialist doctrine an equally inviting doctrine, something more efficacious than the much-abused idea of Christian charity? The people wanted justice and no longer charity. Was there room for a true democracy in a Catholic society? At this point, quarrels began. The old conservative party of the *Opera dei Congressi*, prelates and aristocrats in touch with the Vatican, who wanted only an organization of electors faithfully obeying orders, did not understand why the young Catholics desired a democracy which would almost adopt the language and methods of the

enemy—the Socialists. Day by day the quarrels grew, until this disagreement became a serious danger to the vitality of the Catholic party itself. Both parties appealed to the Pope.

Leo XIII had lived in the expectation of international complications in European politics, from which he expected the opportunity for the restoration of his temporal kingdom. All his political activity had been a long preparation for that event, but by little and little he was realizing that his hopes were ill founded and that the development of that policy was too slow, while his life was near the end. He was anxious to accomplish something great in that direction before his death, and with his characteristic obstinacy and his decided will, he resolved to run the chance offered by the democratic tendencies of the young Catholic element. Moreover he was afraid of the Socialist propaganda that was daily gaining ground, and he was intelligent enough to understand that against organized Socialism, the work of the old leaders of the *Opera dei Congressi*, with its mollycoddish and microcephalous aristocrats, was useless and inefficacious. Thus "Christian Democracy" was christened, and the Encyclical "*Rerum novarum*" was its Magna Charta. Leo XIII liked to act for effect; to make "*un bel gesto*" from time to time was one of his weaknesses; but we have to recognize that almost always he chose the opportune moment. The Encyclical "*Rerum novarum*," besides its positive value and its special purpose, was a very remarkable "*bel gesto*," intended to prove to all the world that modern tendencies in social politics are not in opposition with the ideals and tendencies of the Church of Rome; that on the contrary, they find in that very Church their strongest support and their wisest leadership when the time is ripe for them.

This formal acknowledgment of the *Democrazia cristiana* on the part of the Pope was astonishing, es-

pecially as coming from a man of his age, of his aristocratic tendencies, and up to a certain point influenced by the Vatican environment. There are two reasons which explain how it was possible for a Pope like Leo to recognize the legitimacy of a democracy. First, he believed that he could control such a democracy, relying too much on the consciousness of his personal ascendancy and of the authority of his will and his words upon Italian Catholics. In the second place, the idea of democracy which Leo cherished and practically desired was something different from what we call democracy. He wanted a democracy blindly obedient to the papal direction. He did not realize that it was merely a paradox to try to organize a democracy with a social, economic, and political programme of its own, and at the same time to keep such a democracy under the strict control of an irresponsible and infallible authority. Christian democracy as outlined by Leo was based on a misconception. It was not a Christian but a papal democracy that Leo wished, and he did not remember that while the papacy is synonymous with the divine autocratic will, democracy is synonymous with the people's changeable mind; he did not understand that papal democracy was a contradiction in terms, and that no reconciliation on that basis was possible. He thought that a few concessions (more apparent than substantial) would be enough to satisfy the popular demand of the new Catholic democracy, and felt that it was a good bargain at that price to buy its support and its faithfulness for the development of his plan of political restoration. Very early this contradiction of principles was strongly felt in practice, and Christian democracy in its logical development disregarded papal directions, and more and more loudly advanced its claims for the liberty of fixing by itself its limits and its methods.

Was that Modernism? If it was, nobody was responsible for it but Pope Leo himself. Christian democrats, however, were not Modernists in the actual meaning of the word. Murri himself, the leader of the movement, remained faithful to his scholastic philosophy almost to the day when, excommunicated by the Church and defamed by clericals, he jumped to the extreme radicalism of his later career. They were not Modernists; but certainly they were no longer as their teachers had moulded them in the shade of clerical seminaries. They had changed a great deal; their activity in economic organizations, their political connections, their daily struggle against conservatives and socialists at once, their participation in public offices, had developed eminently in them the spirit of initiative, of self-confidence, and had given them a more dignified idea of their rights and their duties. They were no longer men who could be brought to act by imposing upon them in the name of obedience; they were already men for whom obedience had to be regulated by reason and conscience, and not reason and conscience by obedience.

By and by the Pope understood that instead of a democracy adapting itself to Christianity in conformity with the interest of the papacy, he had favored a democracy which was going to adapt to itself the Christian ideals as against the papal interests. The terms were reversed, and Leo, discovering that a democracy, even a Christian democracy, is not so easily governed as an order of friars, realized that the *Democrazia cristiana*, far from paving the way to a restoration of the temporal power, was becoming itself the greatest stumbling-block for any future attempt in that direction. In the last years of his pontificate, Pope Leo took several steps backward, but he did not pronounce the definitive condemnation of democracy. It would have been a public confession of failure, and he was too much possessed

by the consciousness of his infallibility, even in things having no connection with faith and dogma. Nevertheless, at his death everything was ready for the execution of Christian democracy; in regard to that Pius X was but the testamentary trustee of Leo XIII.

The social movement of Christian democracy was undoubtedly accompanied by a gradual development of new tendencies in connection with religious and spiritual life. The attempt to harmonize Catholicism and democracy necessarily brought minds to consider the problem of the nature and the constitution of the Church from a point of view different from the traditional one taught in clerical schools. Certainly not all of those young priests were much worried about it. The happiest men in the world when Christian democracy was read out of the Church were the young priests anxious to make a career. They had been working in the direction of democracy very unwillingly and only because it was the will of the Pope; but they were longing to return to their peaceful life of the sacristy, to their delicate intrigues of confessional and cure, to their miserable competitions for offices, distinctions, and wealthy benefices. For them no problem existed except their career. Many others who had no serious mental preparation for theoretical questions considered the problem in a practical way, reducing it to its simplest terms. Why, they asked, is there this contradiction between the spirit of Christianity and the spirit of democracy? A superficial inquiry led them to the dangerous distinction between religion and church, between Christianity and Catholicism. Farther with that analysis they did not dare to go. They remained faithful to the Roman Church. But something was dead in their souls—their enthusiasm. They lost the energy that comes from a faith backed by strong conviction, and though fulfilling their duty, they could not forget the dream of their first years of

priesthood. Their doubt was not strong enough to conquer their faith, but their faith was not living enough to give them peace of conscience.

The last group went through a different series of experiences. Many of them had attended and had been graduated from public universities, and had acquired a thorough knowledge of modern thought. They realized that the history of the Church could be judged from a different point of view from that of a divine revelation. "Does the history of the Church justify the postulate of a divine revelation?" It was the first fundamental question. They found that it was denied by modern thought, and in the old armory of the classical apologetic, they did not find a good weapon to oppose to such a denial, based, as it was, upon new historical ascertainment or new valuation of religious experiences. And again, "If the postulate of a divine revelation is not justified, does that mean that the Catholic Church is a useless institution, and that all the treasures of spiritual traditions and of spiritual life involved in its tradition and in its life must be thrown away like faded flowers?"

At this stage Italian Modernism was strongly influenced by French and English Modernism, and its further development is closely connected with the general history of the Modernist attempt for a reconciliation between Catholic faith and modern science. It is beyond the limits of this article to give even an outline of that history. It is to be observed, however, that among Italian Modernists there was a greater variety of mental attitudes and tendencies than among Modernists of other nationalities. This fact was due to the peculiar conditions of the Italian clergy. There were not among them men of such authority as Loisy and Tyrrell. Italian Modernists were almost all young men, belonging to the generation educated in seminaries from 1890 to 1900;

many of them were fresh from theological schools and universities. Among the priests of the preceding generation there were no Modernists. Some of them who, having a liberal mind, had left the Church, had become rationalists; in any case they were no longer interested in religious life and religious problems.

The tradition of the liberal Catholicism of Gioberti and Rosmini had been broken by the abolition of theological Faculties in public universities. There was no teaching of religious sciences of any kind in Italian public schools; therefore no opportunity was given to anyone to be interested in religious studies except in clerical seminaries, where nothing but doctrine "*ad mentem S. Thomae*" was allowed. Furthermore, French, German, and English Modernists were united in their resentment against what was called the "Italianization of the papacy." On this point some of the Italian Modernists were too much dominated by national feelings to approve with all their heart those anti-Italian tendencies.

The abandonment of the teaching of religious sciences in Royal Italian Universities accounts also for the small number of Italian Catholic laymen who became Modernists. It is true, however, that this small group contained very valuable men, who in the last period of Modernism showed for a while an unexpected vitality, especially through the famous review *Il Rinascimento*. But it was too late, and their attempt was unsuccessful.

What became of Italian Modernism after the condemnation? The social-political movement of the *Democrazia cristiana*, embodied in its last stage in the *Lega Nazionale* of Romolo Murri, gradually took a more radical character, till it reached a programme of Christian Socialism and asked to be incorporated into the Socialist party as a distinct branch. But the Italian Socialists, not less intolerant than the Roman Curia, refused the

collaboration of the *Lega Nazionale*, which was afterwards dissolved.

The intellectual movement among the new clergy was checked. Modernism had not yet reached such a stage of maturity that it was dangerous for the Church to throttle it. Rather than a movement with a definite purpose, Modernism was still a tendency, a preparation for a movement. Some of these Modernists who had been converted to the Neo-Kantian philosophy found in the shadow of the practical reason a private solution of all contradiction between the ideal and the historical development of the Church. They are still members of the Roman Church, some even holding important offices in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and some teaching scholastic philosophy or theology *ad mentem S. Thomae* in clerical seminaries. Others were attracted by the Neo-Hegelian doctrines, then in great favor in Italian universities, and found in that philosophy their true and only religion. They left the Church, and many are today teaching classics or philosophy in public schools. Others, finally, took a different path. They were the followers of the philosophy of immanence, which Pius X in his Encyclical attributes to all the Modernists. The book of Blondel, *La philosophie de l'action*, had been the new gospel for their spiritual life. But they were not blind. They were aware that the path of immanence was not without danger. They understood that it was not very easy to harmonize the intellectual idea of the transcendent God of Catholicism with the subjectivism of the doctrine of immanence, as it was a hard task to reconcile the historicism of Loisy with the *a priorism* of faith and revelation. But after all, were they not justified in thinking that those logical oppositions could be transcended in the realm of practical activity, if upon those postulates it was possible to develop a new spiritual activity?

It was clear that this process was not itself a definitive solution, neither of the historical nor of the philosophical problem, but it was the only way through which most of the spiritual values of Catholicism could be preserved and utilized. Was it a compromise? But what solution of religious problem is not a compromise? Philosophers of idealism, whose philosophy is the only religion of their spirit, do they not live themselves in constant compromise between their theories and the practical philosophy of life, which is not at all their ideal philosophy but with which they have to reckon at any moment? Was it an illusion? But is it not through illusions and through audacious attempts that human progress moves towards the realization of a higher ideal? And for these ideals Italian Modernists faced the greatest sacrifices. They knew that they were spoiling their life. Young, intelligent, cultured, irreproachable in their public and private life, as Pius X himself attested in his Encyclical, they were highly gifted for the offices and dignities of the Church; but their love of truth was stronger than their ambition. They knew what was to follow; the examples of Lamennais, of Döllinger, of Loyson, and hundreds of others were present before their spirit. They knew that a condemnation was the irreparable issue of the movement, and that after a condemnation their names would remain forever engraved on the list of reprobates, in spite of repentances and apologies.

The Roman Church may forget all sins except the sin of thinking in a way different from its own. Monsignor Bonomelli never was a cardinal, though he deserved that dignity more than a hundred other Italian prelates. Monsignor Ireland never will obtain the red hat, in spite of his repentance and his later undemocratic utterances in favor of the temporal kingdom of the papacy. Modernists knew that, and they — the men accused by

the Pope of curiosity and pride as the sole source of their spiritual activity — they persisted in their attitude till the end came. Certainly, in their ranks there were many unprepared or inspired by less noble and pure reasons; there were even traitors among them. But every movement carries with itself evil as well as good, men of bad faith together with men of pure ideals. At any rate, the dead waters had begun to move, and in the movement was life, hope, resurrection. Their motto was "*laboremus*" — work for the intellectual and moral elevation of the clergy, of the people; work in all directions, scientific, social, political; work with the aim of reaching a higher and purer conception of religious life, not through philosophical speculation or theological subtleties but through righteousness and good will. They were not the representatives of a system of philosophy, they were not a sect, nor an organized body of reformers. Modernism was but a spiritual attitude, a strong faith and a vivid enthusiasm, trying to galvanize the dead religious spirit of the Italian people.

But the end came earlier than was expected. Was the Pope justified in condemning Modernism in all its forms and in all its manifestations? Certainly Pius X was logical; but do we not also call logical the German governor of Belgium who executed Miss Cavell, guilty of patriotism? *Summum jus, summa injuria*. Condemned and persecuted, what could Modernists do? They could but choose between two issues: either try to organize a new church in opposition to the Roman Curia, or, putting aside the idea of a collective activity, resolve individually the problem of their future life. The first way was impracticable. As I have said, Modernism was not of the nature of a sect; Modernists themselves were far from united on a common programme. Furthermore, they knew that their activity had not yet aroused a deep interest or an effective in-

fluence on the consciences of the Italian people. Old Liberals through their sectarian spirit, Radicals through diffidence, Socialists through their irreligious *a priorism*, the Government party through its tradition of compromises with the Vatican, the common people through their indifference, all through their spirit of hopeless skepticism, did not understand what Modernism was. They did not appreciate its spiritual value, and considered it as an unimportant new chapter of the history of theological quarrels; and, what was worse, the common people conceived of Modernism as a movement of young priests who, tired of their loneliness, wanted to take wives.

The individual solution was left. It became more urgent after the imposition of the papal oath against Modernism. There is hardly to be found in the history of the papacy an act of more refined cruelty than that oath urged upon thousands of young priests, guilty only of having minds of their own and of being sincere and loyal to their consciences. This was the last drop that made the cup run over. Many lost their only hope, and their faith in the Church was broken down forever. Some of them resigned their positions, left the Church, and are living with their Christian faith, as laymen, outside of every religious movement. They left their ranks after long hesitation and anguish of spirit, left their ecclesiastical life with the deepest regret and unforgettable sorrow, like one who leaves the beloved person to whom all the enthusiasm of youth was dedicated but with whom it is no longer possible to live, because in the house of adultery there is no more room for him. And they went through the world, sometimes despised, often underestimated, always struggling hard to make their living, because it is not easy and not even always possible for a man who begins his life anew at an age when he ought to be at the highest success, to find con-

genial work in conformity with his tendencies and his intellectual training.

Some others among the Modernists kept their places in the Catholic Church and in the ministry. They pronounced with their lips the oath that their souls refused, and they are living now in the Church in lower offices, in the shadow; they are the penitents praying under the porch, waiting the opening of the doors. They know that the reasons of the spirit are higher than all other reasons, but they could not free themselves. Men cannot live by logic, any more than by bread alone. They were called cowards and hypocrites; they were obliged to hide themselves, to keep silent, to bow before the idols of the Curia; and they are still there, waiting the day of resurrection and of light. It may be that their presence in the Church, even in the shadow and in scorn, is necessary. We do not dare to judge consciences so fiercely tested. We know that there are subtle shades of feeling with which we have to reckon in our spiritual as well as in our material life, and as we do not praise, neither do we condemn them.

However the Modernists resolved their spiritual problem, we own a deep sense of respect and sympathy for these men who knew the anguish of doubt and the joy of illusions, who so enthusiastically lived their faith, and for their faith and their spiritual liberty are suffering in the path of the world or in the shadow of the Church.

AN ITALIAN MODERNIST'S HOPE FOR THE FUTURE

ROMOLO MURRI

The religious propaganda carried on in Italy by the Protestant churches has not, we must confess, yielded the results they presumably hoped for. It is not that they have achieved no practical result. Doubtless they have done good to scattered groups of believers. But the result has had no national importance. It has not been felt as a vital force in the world of Italian culture, nor as creating a spring of living, genuine religious feeling such as could exercise a noticeable influence on the further development of the religious consciousness of the country.

Nor have attempts at a religious revival originating within the country itself been more successful. The movements in favor of Liberal Catholicism, Christian Democracy, Modernism, important and vigorous as they were, seem to have passed by and to be over. They have left hardly any trace of having existed; in a sense the fact of their non-success has left matters rather worse than before.

Perhaps until now it has never been sufficiently realized how difficult is this question of a religious revival in Italy; the keenest observers have overlooked the difficulties. The saying of Erasmus, "*Itali omnes athei*," is just as true, and as false, as it was at the time of the Renaissance. But we might with almost equal truth say, "*Itali omnes clerici*." No modern nation has had less of an inner religious life; and yet no modern people has a civil history so closely bound up with its religious

history. The civil history of Italy centres round the papacy; Italy was always either obeying or resisting her popes. While she obeyed them, she was also occupied in judging and criticising; we need only recall, among others, the names of Dante, Petrarch, and Savonarola. When she was fighting the papacy, she yet in her heart of hearts respected and loved it, only wishing to see it improved. To this rule there are only trifling exceptions; the papacy was felt to be an entirely Italian institution.

To put the matter in other words, the Italians have never viewed religion as a personal inner relationship between man and God; of this they have not been capable. They have never taken any real interest in efforts on behalf of religion when these seemed to them to be only of a limited and local kind. The idea of religion for them involves universality; its spirit must find a historical expression in symbols, ceremonies, and some instituted form of ecclesiastical authority.

We are not mentioning this as a point in their favor. No; we are fully conscious that it is this fact that has been a tremendous drawback in the national life. Owing to it, our country has been left behind in religious progress, to rank with Spain and Greece in this respect. Religious institutions, whatever they may become in the future, had to pass, after the Middle Ages, through a period of criticism, of inner development, of individualism and non-conformity. Italy has not yet definitely reached this period of development. The papacy is still strong enough today to maintain its position; it holds its own in spite of the vapid indifferentism which surrounds it. The most thankless task, the most wearisome and ill-fated, is that of trying to interest our fellow-countrymen in the problems of their moral and religious faith. Our appeal is everywhere met by that hypocritical spirit of opposition which is to be found all over Italy.

Will the war alter all this? If the truth must be told, we are bound to admit that, at least so far, the war has not stirred the hearts of the Italians to their depths, as it has in the other countries engaged. No; from first to last, the only noticeable feature has been the Catholic revival. It has been accompanied by the presence and the pomp of its chaplains and by an æsthetic form of mysticism of a Catholic type, whose high priest, Gabriele D'Annunzio, has hitherto been a writer of the fleshly school.

But the Italians are partly old in scepticism, partly ingenuous as children; and most of them have not as yet fully grasped the tragic gravity of the war upon which they have — so justly — entered. They are only beginning to realize the extent of the sacrifices it involves. They will not have learnt spiritual wisdom for some time yet; for they have still to meditate upon all the historical reasons for the war and to feel the burdens of those new and arduous duties that it brings.

But some change is beginning to make itself felt in rather less profound regions of thought. Our public life of yesterday, for instance, near as it is and far away as it already seems, is remembered by some with a keen sense of repulsion. They do not know what it will be tomorrow; they feel it cannot be as it was yesterday. And another sign of the times is that others — even those who were yesterday the most ardent upholders of external forms of civilization, those who fought for some cause connected with material progress — are now speaking of moral energies, spiritual values, and of faith. Much is also to be hoped from the present return to the living traditions of our nation, the liberation, that is, from foreign, and especially from German, influences, which have been with us too long, and marred our national genius.

At the end of the war there will therefore in all probability be an excellent opportunity, but a brief and fleeting one, for attempts at a national religious revival that may be lasting.

But we shall have to keep clear of the errors of the past. We shall still have to face the Italian instinctive dislike of narrow religious movements and small religious bodies. This feeling is too deeply rooted in our national culture for it to disappear altogether. Italian Catholics will still cling to the forms and symbols of their Church—that which comprises so much that is human history and at the same time is a compendium of so much of our national history. There will be no interest or attraction for cultured Italians in a movement where they find no germ of a new spiritual and religious synthesis such as may embrace all humanity while including and absorbing the religious forms of the past. The last great Italian in whom we have the expression of Italian religious feeling was, though he stood outside the older Churches, Giuseppe Mazzini, preacher of a God whose worshippers have still to be found. It is we who were the first to call for a return to his faith, proclaiming him not as a republican or a conspirator or a patriot, but as a soul deeply, intensely imbued with the religious spirit.

For the future, therefore, I see only two possible forms of practical religious effort. The first is a liberal form of Catholicism, which while it would be excommunicated by the Pope, would not respond by excommunicating him; while not actually denying anything in the old Catholicism, it would permit of its free development. This is the Modernist idea as it has existed from the time of Lambruschini and Gioberti down to today. The second form would be a religious movement for cultured minds, and would judge of things strictly by their essential spiritual value. It would be Unitarian, and,

not so much because it tended to polemics as because it would keep an open mind, its attitude would be critical.

Educative as regards spiritual liberty, it would be able to embrace all forms of faith by rising above them to a new synthesis; from this point of view, such forms are seen to be stepping-stones, stages, means of development in one great faith, a faith which accepts the idea of the unity of the world, and of the world's history under the guidance of God, and takes its stand on the spiritual value of things.

If the Italians are more inclined, after the war, to accept both of these movements, they will find that they have not strength to carry them out. Individual initiative is as yet too weak; it hardly exists as far as religious subjects are concerned. The coalition against the innovators is also too strong.

As regards culture and the religious studies which would be necessary to prepare any religious revival, students are lacking. Against similar studies the Church sets her face; and the State, being afraid of getting wrong with theology, has suppressed every kind of scientific teaching of philosophy, or of the history of religion, in the lycées and universities.

This state of things, the tendency of Italians to seek religious satisfaction in those forms which have historic or cultural and universal importance and value, ought to induce other nations in whom the religious sense is keener, to interest themselves more and with increased judgment and discernment, in the state of religious thought in Italy. We ought to provide ourselves with all that is necessary to make war on mediæval ecclesiasticism in Rome, the centre of this religious thought. As far as one can see, Rome is intended to be the seat of a new spirit of universal religion which shall take the place of the old, and have the power to assert itself and

triumph over the present mechanical, formal civilization. The first thing to be done is to provide books, lectures, and clubs of religious culture, and if it were possible, to found a free university of religious studies in Rome. All these things would lead Italians to value that spirit of liberty which should be the foundation and the guiding rule of all research and of all true religious life. The scientific study of religion ought to be revived in Italy. We ought to get into touch with the more living centres of religious activity, specially in England and America.

These are the main lines of our programme. On these lines we hope to work when the war is over. But this can only be done as far as we are enabled to do so by the help and collaboration we find in other countries outside Italy.

THE "SON" AS ORGAN OF REVELATION

BENJAMIN W. BACON

Among the most notable contributions of recent years by classical philologists to New Testament interpretation is E. Norden's *Agnostos Theos* (Berlin, 1913), a comparison of the Lukan account of Paul's missionary career and preaching with Hellenistic parallels, more particularly the biography by Philostratus of Apollonius of Tyana. As a further example of the same method of literary parallels Norden appends a discussion in the last chapter of this book (Schlussbetrachtung, pp. 277-308) of the famous *logion*, or saying of Jesus, from the Second Source (Q) on the Son's Knowing the Father and being Known of Him (Mt. 11 25-30 = Lk. 10 21-22).

Parallels from Hellenistic literature put the 'Johannine passage' in a new light. We recognize it in any event as a fragment; for the antecedent of ταῦτα ("these things") is wanting both in Matthew and Luke. But Norden proves it lyric poetry. Its opening clause "I thank thee, Father" (ἐξομολογούμεαι σοι, πάτερ) leads him to designate it a hymn of thanksgiving for divine revelation. He divides it according to literary type into three strophes, each consisting of four corresponding lines:

- I. a I thank thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth
 b Because thou didst hide these things from the wise and
 understanding
 c And didst reveal them unto babes
 d Yea, Father, for such was the Good-pleasure in thy sight.

- II. a All things were revealed to me by my Father
 b And none hath known the Son save the Father
 c Neither hath any known the Father save the Son
 d And he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him.

- III. *a* Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden
b Take my yoke upon you and learn of me
c And ye shall find rest for your souls
d For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.

Subject, contents, and rhythmic structure confirm Norden's judgment based on the opening words of the lyric, and the judgment receives further corroboration from the formula by which our third evangelist introduces it. The words *ἠγαλλίασατο τῷ πνεύματι ἀγῶ* are the substantial equivalent of those previously employed for lyric citations in Lk. 1 41-44 and 67, and might fairly be rendered "He broke into inspired song."

If the 'Johannine *logion*' is really a quoted hymn of thanksgiving for divine revelation belonging to a specific type of religious lyric, interpreters who thus far have been content merely to point out its general dependence in thought and phraseology on Ecclus. 50-51, will need to revise their judgments. At least the present writer, whose article entitled "Jesus the Son of God" in the *Harvard Theological Review* for July, 1909 (II, 3)¹ endeavored to interpret the *logion* "in harmony with the rest of Synoptic tradition," feels now a double obligation; first, to express deep indebtedness, second, to point out if possible how profoundly all questions of Christology are affected by the evidence connecting this most fundamental of all Christological passages with a whole series of kindred poems.

The Synoptic context of the *logion* (Mt. 11 20-24 = Lk. 10 13 f.) is an upbraiding of the unrepentant cities of Galilee. As pointed out in our former article, the evangelists seem to take the "wise and understanding" as meaning the Jewish scribes, boastful of their knowledge of God (Rom. 2 17-20). Wisdom's children, the "babes," are the repentant "little ones" of Galilee. The hidden mystery revealed to them is the true tradition of right religion, "all things" being used in the

¹ Subsequently republished under the same title in a volume of essays in Christology by the Yale University Press (1911).

sense "all truth." Since this right knowledge is accessible only to him who has the filial attitude and spirit, Jesus as the son (generic) can alone truly reveal the Father.

This interpretation fulfils at least the important requirement of relating a passage so unique in Synoptic literature as to have earned the designation "the Johannine passage"² to its Synoptic context. It at least looks toward the truth, and will be seen to coincide in important respects with Norden's. But the new developments reveal its inadequacy. The vital questions remain: What was the original application and meaning of the hymn? Is its 'Johannine' character and style to be explained by the currency of 'Johannine' *logia* of Jesus; or is it an erratic block, like the quotation from "the Wisdom of God" in Lk. 11 49-51; 13 34 f.=Mt. 23 34-39, representing a mode of thought and speech antecedent to the Johannine? In that case it is not the fourth Gospel which should be used to interpret the *logion*, but the *logion* and its connections which should be used to interpret the fourth Gospel. For the theme of the Johannine writer is no other than this same saving *gnosis* which comes to the world through the Son's revelation of the Father.

Apropos of literary affinities it will be remembered that the *logion* was shown to have connection with the *agraphon* "My mystery belongs to me and to the sons of my household"³ as well as with Mk. 4 11, "To you is given the mystery," &c. It was further brought into parallelism with a number of Pauline passages including 1 Cor. 1 18-3 2, where we hear of the wisdom hidden by God in a mystery from the wise of the world but revealed through the Spirit of Christ.

² So e.g. in Schmiedel's article "Die Johanneische Stelle bei Matthäus und Lukas" in Prot. Monatshefte, IV (1900), 15 ff.

³ Clem. Al. Strom. v, 10, 69. In Clem. Hom. xix, 20 it appears in the form "Keep the mysteries for me and the children of my household"; cf. Odes of Sol. viii. 11. Theodotion's rendering in Is. 24 16 was τὸ μυστήριόν μου ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς τέτοις (Vlg., secretum meum mihi). This probably represents a pre-Christian targumic tradition the common source of all these variants.

What now remains to be shown (and can be shown with the aid of Norden's contribution) is that the fundamental connection of the *logion* with 'Johannine' conceptions is indirect. The common roots of both are in that mystical literature which we may designate Lyric Wisdom, whereof classic examples are to be found in the 'Songs' of Prov. 1 7-9 18, Eccclus. 24, Wisdom of Solomon entire, and Bar. 3 9-5 9. The material has recently been vastly enriched by the discovery of the so-called *Odes of Solomon*.

The fourth evangelist cannot, of course, have failed to know the *logion* as quoted by Matthew and Luke. But it is its spirit rather than its mere language which he reproduces, and for this deeper relation he cannot have been solely dependent on this single fragment of Q material. Light dawns when we discover the *logion* to be one of many hymns of Wisdom, whose common root is the idea of Israel as the People of Revelation. For (as stated in the article referred to) "To be the Son of God by knowing and doing his will is the Pharisee's ideal for his people." Indeed, however unique the terms 'Son' and 'Father' may sound in modern ears in this application, they are in reality the characteristic generalities of Lyric Wisdom. A series of Jewish parallels will disclose the facts; for the *logion* in its fundamental ideas, if not in actual composition, is certainly pre-Christian.

A preliminary look at certain contemporary pagan conceptions will be desirable; for the literature of theosophic mysticism exploited by Norden has much light to throw on the *logion*, as a typical utterance of the many "revealers of the Unknown Father."⁴

Plato himself willingly avowed dependence on the "revelations" of Orphic poets. Plutarch's search for "the oldest" religion shows the same wide-spread idea of an original divine revelation dissipated among the

⁴ The phrase is typically Gnostic. Cf. Cerinthus, ap. Irenaeus, *Haer.* I, xxvi, 1, as quoted below.

world's many religions. The various mysteries and cults of the Empire were exploiting this idea to the utmost, as Reitzenstein and Cumont set forth. But Norden has told us very little of the Jewish adaptation of the idea. That it should be seized upon both in Palestine and Alexandria was inevitable. Nothing could be more congenial to the thought of this people, whose sole hope and distinction was its unique religious literature, than the ideal of Israel as mystagogue of the nations, the people of revelation, of *torah*, or, as the Greek would say, of *gnosis*. And this adoption has a vital bearing on the interpretation of the *Q logion*. Its key-words are the terms 'Son' and 'Father,' and while Norden has fully illustrated the employment of these in the literature of pagan mysticism he has passed over much that was at least equally instructive in the literature of contemporary Jewish mysticism. Thus in pagan mysticism 'Son' is the term for the recipient and transmitter of the revelation, the *μύστης* of the mystery religions. In Lyric Wisdom the Son is Israel, chosen as the predestined organ of divine revelation to the world. Israel is the world's hierophant, the Son that is "known" of God in order that he may make God known.

Two postulates are indispensable to right understanding of the facts. We take them respectively from Norden and from R. H. Charles.

(1) The *logion* is primarily concerned with the claim of the Son (*i.e.* in the evangelist's understanding, Jesus) to be the mouth-piece of divine revelation. It deals with the *παράδοσις τῆς γνώσεως θεοῦ*.

Norden's parallels are here decisive. He summarizes for example the typical Hermetic 'Thanksgiving' as follows:

"I believe and testify. Praise to thee, Father.

Thou transmittest to me, thy son, the whole fulness of thine authority.

For thou didst reveal thyself and thus becamest known.

This knowledge at thy command I transmit to my fellowmen who are worthy.

The unworthy harden themselves against it."⁵

The agreement of this schematic form with the *logion* is obvious, and the coincidence in substance is mutually illuminating.

(2) The title 'the Son' in Jewish literature is messianic, and like all the messianic titles, Servant, Son, Beloved, First-born, Only-begotten, Elect, Saint, Just One, &c., is of primary application to *Israel* collectively. *Israel* is the 'Son,' 'First-born,' &c., whom Jehovah elected to adoption and brought out of Egypt. The application to the Messiah, as representative of Israel, Jehovah's agent in accomplishing the national destiny, is secondary. This principle has been so clearly stated by R. H. Charles, and is so well established, that we may properly build upon it. As classical examples of the application to Israel of the particular titles First-born, Only-begotten, Beloved Son, we may refer to 2 Esdr. 6 58 and *Pirke Aboth*, iii, 19. On these titles and their significance more hereafter. We have first to consider the limits of our material.

It is gratifying to obtain the support of Norden against two such eminent authorities as Wellhausen and Harnack for the authenticity of the received text. On purely internal grounds Wellhausen had argued against the authenticity of clause *b* of Strophe II, "No man knoweth the Son save the Father." This he declared irrelevant and interrupting. Harnack had reinforced the objection⁶ by citing a single variant, the Old Latin codex *a*, which in Luke (not in Matthew) has the reading: "Omnia mihi tradita sunt a patre, et nemo novit quis est pater nisi filius, et cuicumque voluerit filius revelavit." This unique variant of the Old Latin

⁵ Op. cit., p. 293.

⁶ *Evang. Matthæi*, Berlin, 1904, p. 57 f. Harnack, *Sprüche u. Reden*, p. 204. Per contra, Bacon, op. cit., § iv.

has the value of proving how the Western mind experienced in ancient times the same sense of interruption of the context which leads Wellhausen to reject the clause. But it has no other value, and in view of many parallels it will be apparent that the difficulty is with the Western mind and not with the text.

On the point of relevancy (which must be judged not from our point of view, but the writer's) the parallels are decisive. We may take first those already cited in the essay referred to as "examples from the Pauline writings (Gal. 4 9; 1 Cor. 13 12; 2 Tim. 2 19), which show what was the primitive treatment of the complementary principles of 'knowing' and 'being known of' God."⁷ In Gal. 4 9 the same antithesis is employed concerning the Adoption of the Spirit. By it we come "to know God, *or rather to be known of God.*" That is, the relation of sonship is not an acquisition of human wisdom, but an election, or adoption, a gracious admission by God into the confidential relations of His household. The verb to 'know' is used in this pregnant sense of 'recognize,' 'acknowledge,' in 1 Thess. 5 12, "We beseech you *to know* them that labor among you, and are over you." So in 1 Cor. 13 12 the ideal gift of *gnosis* is "to know *even as I have been known.*" Previously in the same epistle (8 2 f.) we have a similar subordination of the 'knowledge' of God (γνῶσις θεοῦ) to the greater gift of 'love,' with the same contrast of the terms 'knowing' and 'being known' of God: "If any man seemeth to have attained 'knowledge' (ἐγνώκειναι) of anything, he hath not yet come to 'know' (ἐγνώ) as he ought. But if any man *love* God the same *hath been 'known'* (ἐγνωσται = adopted into the relation of *familiaris*) by Him."⁸

To these Pauline parallels to the antithesis of 'knowing' and 'being known' of God a few may now be added which tend to show that the idea of adoption *vs. gnosis* is

⁷ § IV. Knowing and Being Known of God. Reprint, p. 16.

⁸ Cf. Lk. 7 47.

part of the general Jewish insistence upon its own divine Election (under the condition of obedience) over against heathen religion or philosophy. Thus the Pauline thought of 1 Cor. 8 2 f. is closely reproduced by the Johannine writer in 1 Jn. 4 7 ff. in protest against a doctrine of salvation by *gnosis* apart from obedience to the one 'new commandment': "Beloved, let us *love* one another, for *love* is of God, and everyone that *loveth* is 'begotten of God' and 'knoweth' God" (γινώσκει τὸν θεόν). Like Paul, moreover, this writer keenly emphasizes the *priority* of the divine Election: "Herein is the love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son, &c. . . . We 'know' and have believed the love which God hath in our case. God is love, and he that abideth in love abideth in God and God abideth in him. . . . We love because he *first* loved us." And this doctrine is not exclusively Johannine nor even exclusively Christian. Ode iii of the *Odes of Solomon* gives expression to the same thought on behalf of Israel, God's Beloved:

"On His members do I hang, and He loves me.

For I should not have known how to love the Lord if He had not loved me.

For who is able to distinguish love save the one that is loved?

I love the Beloved, and my soul loves Him."

And the odist adds, as if in express denial of the pretensions of heathen *gnosis*:

"This is the Spirit of the Lord which doth not lie.

Which teacheth the sons of men to know His ways.

Be wise and understanding and vigilant. Hallelujah."

The closing line has the typical exhortations of contemporary religious mysticism (σωφρονήσατε, νοήσατε, νήψατε); but Ode iv, 9 is perhaps closer still to 1 John:

"Thou hast given us thy fellowship.

It was not that thou wast in need of us, but that we are in need of thee."

Of the *Odes of Solomon* and their Jewish theme of Israel as the people of revelation, God's Chosen and Beloved, entrusted with his *torah* (i.e. 'teaching'), we shall have more to say presently. The Jewish mystic's affirmation is that the true *gnosis* rests solely on a divine Election in love by sovereign grace. With the destruction of Israel's political ambitions, and the substitution after the Exile of the Isaian ideals of the Servant bringing an evangelized world to the worship of Jehovah, the idea of the prerogative of Sonship necessarily underwent a change. The proof of it is found in Israel's special revelation, in written or unwritten *torah*, in the Spirit of the divine Wisdom abiding with the Servant, fitting him for his world-redemptive task.

From this age-long Jewish sense of Israel's divine prerogative, an adoption in love to be a revealer of the Father to a darkened world, springs both the Pauline and the Johannine *gnosis*. The relation of filial love—obedience to the new commandment—this and not purblind philosophy qualifies Jehovah's messenger. The Johannine point of view, like that of Paul which it reproduces, is therefore not merely Christian, but (in Jewish form) pre-Christian. It appears no less clearly in the Johannine Gospel than in the Epistle, as e.g. Jn. 15 11–15, where the confidential relation of the "friend who knoweth what his lord doeth"⁹ is contrasted with the slave's. Here again election and obedience are the real theme. Moreover the succeeding verses (16 f.) emphasize as before the priority of the divine choice ("Ye did not choose me, but I chose you," &c.), and insist on the condition of obedience to the commandment of love (ver. 14, 17). Similarly in Jn. 8 31–59 the debate concerns the claim of the Jews to be Sons of God (ver. 41) by having knowledge of the truth (ver. 31 f.). Against this, as in Gal. 4 21–5 1, freedom and

⁹ Cf. Sap. 7 27: "Wisdom . . . entering into holy souls makes men to be friends of God and prophets."

sonship are claimed for Christians only. They will "abide in the house" as true heirs of Abraham when the "bondslaves" are cast out. The claim of the Jews to be Abraham's sons is as false as their pretense never to have been in bondage. Their murderous purpose proves them sons of Satan and slaves of sin. The Johannine contention is that the election to sonship is through *gnosis*; but that this 'knowledge' is morally conditioned. The dialogue has indeed more real connection with the *logion* than Jn. 10 15, which Norden cites.

It recalls the protest of 2 Tim. 2 19 (a writing of the same region and period) against a similar non-moral *gnosis*. The Paulinist uses two complementary 'faithful sayings' as the 'seal' engraved on the foundation of God. The two-fold basis of God's building is: (1) divine election (2) human obedience. On the divine side: "The Lord 'knoweth' them that are his"; on the human: "He that nameth the name of the Lord, let him depart from iniquity." As against 'sons' who profess to 'reveal the unknown Father' by virtue of acquired *gnosis*, the 'Son' (whose good works support his claim) relies upon a divine election. None hath known (acknowledged) him save the Father who 'foreknew' and predestined him in His own eternal 'good-pleasure.'

But clause *b* of Strophe II also asserts on the negative side the world's ignoring of the bearers of divine revelation. In reality this is but another aspect of the familiar plaint of Wisdom at men's senseless refusal of her, a literary form as old as the prologue of Heraclitus. If Wisdom be spurned (as experience proves but too often the case), it can only be in the person of her exponents and representatives. Hence in Deutero-Isaiah and the kindred psalms of complaint of national ill-treatment, such as Ps. 22,¹⁰ the Servant is both witness and martyr.

¹⁰ For the close connection of this and kindred Psalms of Martyrdom with the Deutero-Isaian songs of the Suffering Servant, see Cheyne, *The Prophecies of Isaiah* (1884), II, pp. 202-204.

Wisdom of Solomon tinctures the Isaian figure of the Servant with colors borrowed from the persecuted "wise man" of Plato's *Republic* and the Stoic ideal Wise man who witnesses before an unheeding world. This plaint of Wisdom is a normal development in lyric Wisdom, including the *Odes of Solomon*, of the Isaian theme of the Servant "whom man despiseth, whom the nations abhor."¹¹ A typical Wisdom plaint is taken up in the form of a *logion* of Jesus in the Oxyrhynchus Fragment (*Log.* IV). Here it was originally Wisdom, but Wisdom incarnate in the person of the bearer (or bearers) of divine revelation, who complained:

"I stood in the midst of the world
And in the flesh was I seen of them"¹²
And I found all men drunken
And none found I athirst.

And my heart was grieved for the children of men
Because they are blind in heart and see not,
Poor, and know not their poverty."

The adoption of the plaint as a saying of Jesus is paralleled in the Wisdom plaint of Lk. 11 49-51; 13 34 f. = Mt. 23 34-39.

The world's ignoring of the messenger is likewise a theme of the *Odes of Solomon*, as for example xxx, 6, which says of "the fountain of the Lord":

"It came infinitely and invisibly,
And until it was set in the midst men did not know it."

To contemporary Jewish feeling, accordingly, the world's ignoring of the bearer of divine revelation is not irrelevant. On the contrary, it is complementary to the 'knowing' (*i.e.* admission to intimacy) of the Son by the

¹¹ Is. 49 7; 50 6; 53 3; cf. Sap. 2 12-3 9; and *Odes* xxviii and xxxi.

¹² Cf. Bar. 3 37 of the incarnation of Wisdom in Israel. The verse is suspected, though already quoted by Irenaeus. But no suspicion attaches to Sap. 6-9; 10 16, &c., where Wisdom "enters the soul" of Moses, Solomon, and other "friends of God and prophets," and makes Israel the chosen "Son" her abiding-place.

Father. The election in the 'good-pleasure' is expressed in the phrase of Am. 3 2, "You only have I known of all the families of the earth." Its complement is to be "despised and rejected of men."

From the period of Deuteronomy and Deutero-Isaiah the election, or adoption, of Israel is constantly declared to be for the purpose of extending *knowledge of the true God* to all the nations. The Servant was chosen and filled with Jehovah's Spirit for the purpose of 'witnessing' for Him, and "to bring forth true religion (*mishpât*) to the Gentiles" (Is. 42 1-4). He receives the title of Jehovah's "First-born," originally applied in a different sense (Ex. 4 22 f.), because of his adoption to this special function of 'witnessing,' and in view of his destination to be the Heir. This conception is chiefly developed as we might expect in the Wisdom literature. Indeed the later Jewish literature, both Alexandrian and Talmudic, takes this title of 'First-born' in a transcendental sense of predestination before the creation. Israel was *fore-known* before the foundation of the world and chosen from all eternity. The world was created on Israel's account, other nations being admitted to joint-heirship only as younger sons, and through Israel's mediation. It is in this sense that the *Odes of Solomon* claim not merely priority for Jehovah's chosen sanctuary of Zion before other sanctuaries, on the ground that He designed it "before He made places,"¹³ but priority of origin for Israel over Gentile peoples. Israel is persecuted and hated in spite of its philanthropic mission to the Gentiles, but

"I did not perish, for I was not their brother nor was my birth like theirs,
And they sought for my death and did not find it; for I was older than the memorial of them.
And vainly did they make attack upon me and those who followed me.

¹³ Ode iv, 1-4 and xxii, 12.

To no purpose they sought to destroy the memorial of him who was before them.

For the thought of the Most High cannot be forestalled
And His heart is superior to all cunning. Hallelujah." ¹⁴

Moreover when Israel has fulfilled its mission of glorifying Jehovah before the world, He also will glorify them. Thus the 'knowing' of the Son is not merely as in *Psal. Sal.* xvii, 30, that Jehovah "takes knowledge of them that they be all the sons of their God," but this being 'known' becomes a formal acknowledgment in the presence even of angels. Thus in Jubilees 1 25,

"They all shall be called children of the living God and every angel and every spirit shall know, yea they shall know, that these are my children and that I am their Father, in uprightness and righteousness, and that I love them."

In Christian form this becomes a divine acknowledgment of "the adoption" in the presence of "the principalities and powers in the heavenly places." The eternal purpose of God is made known to these proud powers "through the church." In Rom. 8 15-21 the "manifestation of the sons of God" is the goal and dénouement of the creative mystery; earthly and supernal powers seek in vain to separate the "heirs" from the goal of His redeeming love.¹⁵

The need to vindicate the clause "No man knoweth the Son save the Father" as authentic has led us to anticipate. The parallels, Jewish and Christian, do more than prove its relevance. They show how the Jewish consciousness of higher religious insight had laid hold of the current mystic phraseology of *gnosis* to base upon it the claim to a national election, a sovereign act of the Creator's foreordaining love, a pre-creative divine *placuit* or good-pleasure (*rātsōn*, *εὐδοκία*). To the Jew this Son

¹⁴ Ode xxviii, 14-18; cf. xli, 8 f.

¹⁵ Rom. 8 33-39 employs Is. 50 8 f. With this compare Ode Sal. xxviii, 5 f. and Eph. 3 10 f.; 6 12; Col. 2 15.

who alone knows the Father is Israel, the people of revelation. Israel's *gnosis*, however, is not the wisdom of Gentile philosophy, but a gracious revelation bestowed by God on the 'beloved' people who though despised and ignored by the world are 'known' by Him as His 'witnesses.' For the revelation of the Father has its purpose. It is not for the Son alone, but for him also "to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him." As between Jew and Christian the question is only as to which exhibits that filial disposition which justifies a relation of "love."

But a further question still affects the limits of our material. Strophe III of the Ode (Mt. 11 29 f.) fails to appear in the Lukan parallel. It is that which Norden designates "The Appeal to Men," very properly adducing as parallels the exhortations of Wisdom in the Wisdom lyrics generally, but especially Ecclus. 51-52, and of the "pure virgin" in Ode xxxiii of the *Odes of Solomon*.

In § III of the Essay already referred to (p. 13) the present writer yielded to the more conservative critical judgment which excludes Strophe III from the common source (Q), mainly because grounds for its omission by Luke are difficult to define. Norden now advances strong reasons for regarding it as a genuine stanza of the hymn. This, however, is not decisive as to its having been contained in the Second Source, a fundamentally Christian writing. For if the poem be an excerpt from some unknown 'Wisdom' ode like the 'Wisdom' excerpt Mt. 23 34-39 = Lk. 11 49 f.; 13 34 f., it is quite conceivable that our first evangelist should have restored its missing stanza from the original (Jewish) source, just as Lk. 3 5 f. supplies from Is. 40 4 f. the remainder of the sentence given in truncated form by Mk. 1 3. But first as to authenticity.

Norden's division by *kola* and *kommata* is not arbitrary but is dictated by the sense, and Strophe III corre-

sponds in all respects with Strophes I and II. This symmetry of structure (*cf. e.g.* Ps. 23 in *Intern. Crit. Comm.* p. 207), and the fact that the coincidences with Ecclus. 51 cover not only Strophe III but also Strophe I (*cf.* Ecclus. 51 1-12 ἐξομολογήσομαι σοι, κύριε, βασιλεῦ, κτλ.), give irresistible evidence that Matthew's fuller form is the more authentic. This will be true whether Luke or the Second Source be responsible for the omission, a point on which Norden's opinion is difficult to make out. True, he says (p. 301):

"The question whether Strophe III of the *logion*, which does not appear in Luke, belonged to the Q source, a question designated in the more recent discussions as still unsettled or unanswerable, is to be answered unconditionally in the affirmative."

But the only reason given is that

"the appeal which it contains forms a stereotyped element of the literary model."

This argues for authenticity in the Ode, but not necessarily in Q; for Norden adds quite frankly, "I cannot say for what reason Luke omitted this portion of his source," and (as we have seen) it is quite supposable that Luke gives all that his immediate source — the Q source — contained, while Matthew's addition of Strophe III might be a restoration from the original (Jewish) Wisdom hymn.

The point of chief importance, however, is that the original hymn contained all three strophes, each containing four corresponding lines; for (as Norden's parallels show) the normal form of the Wisdom song of this type is three-fold: Strophe I, Thanksgiving for the *Ἐυδοκία*; Strophe II, Reception of the *γνώσις*; Strophe III, Appeal to Men.

But once we bring under consideration the Christian and pre-Christian parallels to these three elements of the

hymn, its original application to *Israel* as the People of Revelation becomes unmistakable.

The distinctive feature of the Jewish doctrine of election as understood in lyric Wisdom is the divine 'good-pleasure' and this it is which is celebrated in Strophe I (*ὅτι οὕτως εὐδοκία ἐγένετο ἐμπροσθέν σου*).

According to the Deuteronomist, Deutero-Isaiah, the Wisdom writers, and the later synagogue generally, this good-pleasure of God was, as we saw, an election of Israel to be the people of *torah*, i.e. the revelation of God embodied in the Law.

"This (says the Deuteronomist) is your wisdom, and your understanding in the sight of the peoples, that shall hear all these statutes and say, 'Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.' For what great nation is there that hath a god so nigh unto them as Jehovah our God is whensoever we call upon him? And what great nation is there that hath statutes and ordinances so righteous as all this law, which I set before you this day?"¹⁸

The purpose of this choice of Israel and its endowment with *torah* is that all the ends of the earth may come to know Jehovah and to swear by His name. This people is designated His Servant; they are His 'witnesses' against the worshippers of idols, His 'messengers' to all far-off lands to proclaim the name and praise of the Maker of heaven and earth. This is the supreme message of Deutero-Isaiah. The chief difference between its development in the Wisdom literature (representing in the main the propaganda of Alexandria) and the Palestinian development under the scribes is that under the favoring auspices of Ptolemaic rule the Isaian ideal became liberal and *ex-tensive*, so that Israel's endowment was considered to be the living *Spirit* of the divine Wisdom, and Israel's calling the propagation of this *gnosis*; whereas in Palestine the bitter struggle against Hellenizing persecution compelled a more narrow and

¹⁸ Dt. 4 6-8.

in-tensive development, Israel's endowment being defined as the *written* Torah, and its calling to 'witness' becoming primarily a calling to martyrdom.

On the particular point of the mystery of the meaning and purpose of the creation a parallel between two nearly contemporary documents, one Jewish, the other Christian, will show the nearness of the relation. We may follow it with a few from rabbinic sources and from lyric Wisdom:

Assumptio Moysis 1 12-14 (7-30
A.D.).

"The Lord of the world hath created the world on behalf of His people. But it was not His 'good-pleasure' to reveal this purpose of creation from the foundation of the world, in order that the Gentiles might thereby be convicted, yea to their own humiliation might by (conflicting) arguments convict one another. Accordingly He designed and devised me (Moses), and He prepared me before the foundation of the world that I should be the mediator of His covenant (of the Inheritance)."

1 Cor. 1 20-3 1 (in abstract).

"For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God it was God's 'good-pleasure' to save believers through the foolishness of the preaching. . . . We speak God's wisdom in a mystery (revelation), even the hidden wisdom which God foreordained before the worlds unto our glory, which none of the (angelic) 'world rulers' hath known, but as it is written (quoting an unknown lyric source),

'Things which eye saw not and ear heard not
And which came not up into the heart of man,
Whatsoever things God prepared for those that love Him.'

But unto us God revealed them by the Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God. . . . Which things also we (preachers) speak, not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but the Spirit. . . . I spoke unto you as to 'babes' in Christ. I fed you with milk."

The literary affinity of 1 Cor. 1 18-3 1 with the Q *logion* has long been apparent, Pfeiderer and Harnack being among those who call attention to it. But the real point of connection is not with Q, where the application is to Jesus personally, but with the Hymn in its pre-Christian sense, where (as in Paul) God's *people* are the true hierophants as against the wisdom of "the (Gentile) world."

The doctrine that God created the world as an inheritance for his chosen and beloved people is, in fact, a commonplace of the later Jewish literature (*cf. e.g.* 2 Esdr. 6 55-58 and *Apoc. Bar.* xiv, 18 f.) which rests upon Gen. 1 24-26 and passes over into Christian teaching with a minimum of change (Rom. 4 13; 1 Cor. 3 22; Rev. 21 7; *Hermas Vis.* ii, 4 1 &c.). The *Assumptio Moysis*, as we see, boasts of the revelation of this secret to Moses over against the vain speculation of Gentile philosophers. Paul contends, however, that the Christian preacher possesses in 'the Spirit' the creative wisdom itself;¹⁷ for this, to Paul, is "the mind of Christ" and it knows the purpose of God "even as the spirit of a man knows what is in him." Thus the Christian evangelist becomes the true mystagogue. He reveals to the world the secret purpose of creation—"even the things which God prepared for them that love Him." This mystery was hid from former generations (Rom. 16 25; Eph. 3 3-5, 9-11) and even from angels (*cf.* 1 Pt. 1 12 and *Slav. Enoch* xxiv, 3), but is now revealed to God's holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit, and is ministered by them as 'milk' to 'babes.'¹⁸

This is not mere self-exaltation on the part of Paul and his fellow-preachers. His quotation of an unknown "scripture" shows that he is simply appropri-

¹⁷ Cf. in 2 Cor. 3 4-4 6 a similar comparison of the "ministry of the new covenant," and its revelation of the "*gnosis* of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ" with the revelation to Moses at Sinai.

¹⁸ Cf. *Odes of Sol.* viii, 17; xxxv, 6, &c.

ating the religious function of Israel according to the flesh for "the Israel of God." Akiba the martyr-rabbi and founder of Talmudic Judaism scarcely more than a generation later shows us the common basis. He is vindicating Israel's claim to be the Elect People, the Beloved Son, against both Christian and pagan *gnosis*, and makes a characteristic appeal to Scripture. All men in a sense are God's 'sons' (Mal. 2 10). All can in a sense claim His 'love.' But Scripture discriminates. Only Israel, the people gifted with *torah* (revelation), is in the highest sense God's 'Beloved Son.' This is the substance of Akiba's condensed argument from Gen. 9 6, Dt. 14 1, and Prov. 4 2, as given in *Pirke Aboth* iii, 19:

"Man is 'beloved' in that he was 'created in the image' (of God). But greater love is shown in the *revealing to him* that he was 'made in the image.' As it is said, 'In the image,' &c.

"Israel are 'beloved' in that they are called 'sons of God.' But greater love is shown *in revealing to them* that they were called sons of God, as it is said, 'Sons are ye to the Lord your God,' &c.

"Israel are 'beloved' in that to them was given the precious instrument wherewith the world was created (the divine Spirit of Wisdom). But greater love is shown *in revealing to them* that to them was given the precious instrument wherewith the world was created, as it is said, 'I have given you a good doctrine. Forsake ye not my *torah*,'" &c.

It is in the context of the last-named passage (Prov. 4 2 f.) that Akiba finds the titles 'Son' and 'Beloved,' which he claims in a unique sense for Israel, and claims them on the ground of revealed knowledge with particular reference to the creation. In Prov. 4 3 Israel is in fact addressed (by the divine Father according to Jewish interpretation) as 'Son,' and not only so but as God's "Beloved" and "Only-one" or "Only-begotten," as the Hebrew is rendered in the related passage 2 Esdr. 6 58.

We are here at the point of coincidence between Alexandrian Wisdom and rabbinic Judaism. For both these the election of Israel is an election to be the people of *torah*, their predestined function is to reveal God to the world. He is the Unknown Father. They are His 'only' Son, whom He chose in love before He founded the world, that they might reveal Him to such as are worthy. Hellenistic and Talmudic Judaism diverge in proportion as this endowment with *torah* is understood predominantly of the letter which killeth or the Spirit which giveth life. It is impossible to invert the relation and imagine that the Jewish conception of the Beloved Son who is chosen that he may reveal to the world the Unknown Father is borrowed from Christianity.

Appreciation of the significance and development of lyric Wisdom has received of very recent years an enormous impetus through the discovery of the *Odes of Solomon*. Whether they be fundamentally Jewish with merely superficial Christian adaptation (as the present writer still maintains), or Christian from the foundation, is a debated question. Even their date can only be determined as within about a century before or after 100 A.D. But both title and contents should at least make this point clear: The *Odes of Solomon* belong distinctively to lyric Wisdom, and have their basis in Jewish ideas. Their supreme value is that they enable us to trace the development of the Deutero-Isaian ideal of Israel as the Servant-Son, witness and martyr, through the Songs of Wisdom as known in Ben-Sirach, Wisdom of Solomon, Baruch, and elsewhere, down to and even beyond the dividing line of Christian Logos doctrine. Surely one of the first problems to which this great influx of new light should be applied is the problem of the great *logion* of the Son's revelation of the Father, the Hymn of Thanksgiving of the Q source.

If then we take first the subject of Strophe I of the *logion*, Jesus' thanksgiving for the 'Εὐδοκία, it should be apparent to all who have any familiarity with the *Odes of Solomon* that the theme is coincident. The opening poems exult in the election of the 'Son' as the Lord's 'Beloved,' the sharer of His 'secret,' His 'planting,' and the 'ministers' of the 'river' of His Spirit.

In the present Christian editorial adaptation of the *Odes* the speaker who constantly refers to himself as the 'Son,' the Lord's 'Beloved,' &c., and habitually employs the first person, might easily be taken for the individual poet. In spite of the entire absence from the *Odes* of any mention of the name of Jesus it is clear from the redaction that the poems have been given this individual application. But this ignores all the classic examples of Hebrew religious poetry. So familiar an instance as Ps. 23, whose theme is Jehovah's shepherding of Israel (cf. Is. 49 9 f.), or Ps. 18, celebrating Israel's deliverance in the Red Sea and conquest of Canaan, ought to teach us how constantly in Hebrew psalmody the personal pronoun in the first person singular has primary reference to *Israel*. The poet sings in the name of his people.

This is equally the case with lyric Wisdom, where Ecclus. 24 30-34 may serve as an example, and no less in Odes i, iii, and vii of the *Odes of Solomon*, which celebrate respectively the Crowning of Israel with the living Garland of divine Truth, its Union with Jehovah as his Beloved, and its Endowment with the Word of Knowledge. To make this certain we must scrutinize the imagery in the light of contemporary literature.

The Mishna, interpreting the *Song of Songs*, which is *Solomon's*, declares that "the day of espousals" (Cant. 3 11) was that of the giving of the Law at Sinai. This refers to a wide-spread tradition which explains the vows of the people's covenant to keep the law (Ex. 24 7 f.) as vows of betrothal to Jehovah. Accordingly

the stripping off of the ornaments to make the golden calf is interpreted to mean the stripping off of "the golden crown that was upon their head, whereon the NAME had been engraven and set forth at Mount Horeb."¹⁹ *Pesikta* thus connects Ezek. 16 12 ff., "I put a crown of beauty upon thy head," &c., with Ex. 24 7, and declares that when Israel accepted God's law "God gave them of the brightness of the Shechinah." The 'crown of the law' becomes thereafter a classic phrase for rabbinic Judaism to designate the knowledge of God which is at once Israel's supreme adornment and (like the bride's tiara) the token of loving obedience to her Lord. The 'brightness of the Shechinah' which is upon it makes it a "crown of light," in the Coptic paraphrase (*Pistis Sophia* 115-16), and this perhaps accounts for the references in the *Odes* (e.g. xlii. 11) to the sign or seal of 'the light' as set upon God's Beloved, and references to it in Talmudic literature as "brightness from the Shechinah," and in Wisdom as a "crown of glory."

But the *Odes* present the usual contrast of the symbolism of the sages with that of the scribes. The "crown of life," or "of glory," which the Lord promised to "those that love him" (Jas. 1 12) soon becomes a commonplace of the Wisdom literature, as in Sap. 5 16 f. the righteous are promised "the royal crown of comeliness and the diadem of beauty *from the hand of the Lord.*" But this is a weakening down of the Isaian original, in which (Is. 28 5) *the Lord himself becomes* "a crown of glory and a diadem of beauty to the residue of his people, a *spirit* of justice to its judges and a *spirit* of strength to its warriors." The Spirit of Jehovah suspended over His sanctuary like the pillar of fire and smoke above the altar²⁰ will be a living unfading chaplet in contrast with the fading wreaths on the heads of the drunkards of Ephraim. Wisdom's

¹⁹ Jer. Targ. on Ex. 32 25.

²⁰ Cf. Ode xxviii, 1 f. and Eccles. 24 4, 10 f.

song in Prov. 4 1-9 comes nearer this meaning, for Wisdom is the 'mother' that loves her sons, and keeps those that love her, of whom it is promised:

"She will give to thy head a chaplet of grace,
A crown of glory will she deliver to thee."

But only Ode i of the *Odes of Solomon* goes straight to the primitive Isaian sense, making Israel's living crown the Spirit of the Lord which gives knowledge of Himself. Only as speaking for Israel gifted with the *torah* of God can the Odist declare:

"The Lord is upon my head as a crown
And apart from Him I shall not be.
They wove for me the crown of Truth
And it caused Thy branches to bud in me.

"For it is not like a withered crown that buddeth not,
But Thou livest upon my head and hast blossomed on my head.
Thy fruits are full and perfect, full of Thy salvation."

The remainder of Ode i, all of Ode ii, and the beginning of Ode iii are unfortunately wanting. What remains of Ode iii easily proves it a Song in the vein of Canticles, a book always interpreted from the time of its reception into the canon as a nuptial song of Israel (in Christian interpretation, the Church) as Jehovah's Beloved and supposed to have been written by Solomon, to whom David had given the name Jedidiah, *i.e.* 'The Lord's Beloved.' From Ode iii we have already taken a parallel to the Pauline and Johannine doctrine of the 'sovereign grace' of the Election,²¹ an election whose purpose is to "teach the sons of men to know God's ways." We need only note that Baentsch's rejection as the gloss of a Christian scribe of the single word "the Son" in the line

"Because I shall love Him—the Son—I shall be a son,"

²¹ Above, p. 8.

is regarded by Harnack as indisputable.²² Certainly God and not "the Son" is the object of the love expressed in the Ode.

More akin to the thought of Strophe I of the New Testament hymn is Ode vii, a thanksgiving for endowment with the divine Spirit of Wisdom as the Way to God. We have space to quote but a few strophes:

"He (God) hath caused me to know his soul without grudging in His singleness,²³

For His loving-kindness hath made small His greatness.
Like my nature He became that I might learn to know Him,
And like my form that I might not turn away from Him.

"The Father of knowledge is the Word of knowledge.
He that created Wisdom is wiser than His works,
And He that created me knew when as yet I was not
What I should do when I came into being.

"For to knowledge He hath appointed its way.
He hath broadened and lengthened it and made it come to all fulness,
And He hath set upon it the footprints of His light,
And I have gone (therein) from the beginning to the end.²⁴

"For from Him it (*γνώσις*) was wrought, and it hath rest in the Son.
And for the sake of their redemption he (the Son) will lay hold
upon all things,
And the Most High shall be known through His saints
To bring [the good] tidings to such as have psalms of the Coming
of the Lord."

The strophe which tells of the condescending loving-kindness of the Lord in making Himself known gives at first the impression of a reference to the incarnation of Christ; but the impression is misleading, for as the poem proceeds it becomes evident that it is the Creator and

²² Meines Erachtens sicher.

²³ Greek ἀφθονῶς ἐν τῷ ἀπλότητι αὐτοῦ, i.e. generously in His liberality. The Syriac has taken ἀπλότητι literally as in Mt. 6 22.

²⁴ Cf. the claim of the revealing 'Son,' "All things are delivered to me of my Father."

Father of Wisdom — terms impossible to imagine applied to Christ by any writer of this period — of whose condescension the odist sings in the vein of Ps. 138, and Is. 57 15 and 66 1 f., while the revealing Son is seen in the closing lines to be “the people of the saints of the Most High.” But even were it granted for argument’s sake that the poem is a wholly Christian product, we are not so much concerned with the product as with the material; and the material, the basic ideas of election and predestination to the function of Leader in the Way of God for the redemption of the world, can be proved over and over again to be the prerogative of Israel, the revealing Son in pre-Christian lyric Wisdom.

In the Ode the speaker to whom God has stooped “that I might not turn away from Him” proceeds to refer to his own election in the divine foreknowledge. God has entrusted him with all the Way of *gnosis*. Its “rest” is “in the Son,” who “takes hold of all things for their redemption.” We shall need presently to enquire just what is meant by the ‘resting’ of Wisdom in the Son, but our first step should be to place alongside of Ode vii the Wisdom-song of Bar. 3 9-4 4, which similarly celebrates the Way of God whose keeping is committed to Israel:

“Hear, O Israel, the commandments of life;
Give ear to understand wisdom.

.

Thou hast forsaken the fountain of wisdom;
For if thou hadst walked in the Way of God
Thou shouldest have dwelt in peace forever.”

The poet then dwells upon the hiding of wisdom from the world in ancient and younger days:

“Younger men have seen the light and dwelt upon the earth,
But the Way of knowledge have they not known
Neither understood they the paths thereof.”

So further of the various great peoples of the past he repeats in turn:

"These did not God choose, neither gave He the Way of knowledge unto them;

So they perished because they had no wisdom,

They perished through their own folly.

Who hath gone up into heaven and taken her,

And brought her down from the clouds?

Who hath gone over the sea and found her,

And will bring her for choice gold?

There is none that knoweth her Way

Nor any that comprehendeth her path.

But He that knoweth all things knoweth her,

He found her out with His understanding.

He that sendeth forth the light and it goeth,

He called it, and it obeyed Him with fear.²⁵

"This is our God, none other shall be accounted of in comparison with Him

He hath found out all the Way of knowledge, and hath given it to Jacob His Servant

And to Israel that is His Beloved."

It is perhaps a later hand which attaches the ten concluding lines:

"This is the book of the commandments of God

And the Law that endureth forever.

All they that hold it fast obtain life,

But such as leave it shall die.

Turn thee, O Jacob, and take hold of it,

Walk towards her, shining in the presence of the light thereof.

Give not thy glory to another

Nor the things that profit thee to a strange nation.

O Israel, happy are we;

For the things that are pleasing to God are made known unto us."

²⁵ These verses of Bar. 3 33 f. should be compared also with Odes of Solomon xii and xvi, 12-16.

Paul in Rom. 10 6 f. applies the passage quoted from Deuteronomy by this poet (Dt. 30 12 f.) to Christ who as the Wisdom of God reaches from the height of heaven to nethermost abyss. But to this we can only advert in passing. The point which now concerns us is that the idea of Israel's election as the Son, the Beloved of God who makes known the Father, revealing the hidden Way of light and life, is adoptive in Christian literature, *and must therefore always be interpreted with reference to its derivation.* This is eminently true of the image of the 'resting' of the (Wisdom-) Spirit in the Son, by which the Jewish poet expresses the doctrine of the *plenary* endowment of Israel with divine revelation as against its hiding from (or rejection by) the Gentiles.

It would be easy to multiply Jewish parallels from lyric Wisdom, especially from the *Odes of Solomon*, concerning God's hiding from the world of the mystery of creative wisdom, that He might convey it to "babes" for their 'redemption' to eternal life through the ministration of His Son (Israel) the Beloved. We should especially direct attention to Ode vi, on the River of the Water of Life which "spreads over the face of the whole earth and fills everything,"²⁶ Israel being "the ministers of that draught, who are entrusted with that water of His," and invite comparison with the Wisdom-ode of Eccus. 24 30-34, where again the speaker is Israel, minister of the draught of water of life to all the nations.

Strophe II of the Q *logion* on the Son's revelation of the Unknown Father is especially susceptible of abundant illustration from these sources. But there is less need of this in view of parallels already cited in support of the clause, "No man knoweth the Son save the Father." Parallels to Strophe III, both from Ben-Sirach and the *Odes of Solomon*, have been already cited by Norden. Such space as we may still claim will be better applied, therefore, to the elucidation through

²⁶ Ode vi, 10, resting on Is. 11 9 and Ezek. 47.

parallels both Jewish and Christian of the conception of the divine good-pleasure (*eúdoxia*), the election of the Son to *fulness* of knowledge (*γνώσις*). "I thank Thee for election to *gnosis*. . . . All *gnosis* is delivered to me as sole revealer."

Norden justly remarks²⁷ that clause *a* of Strophe II is a typical claim to *complete gnosis*. We have seen in what sense Paul repeats the claim on behalf of himself and his fellow-evangelists in 1 Cor. 2 6-16, and may take occasion to supplement this by reference to the similar claim on behalf of all Spirit-endowed Christians in 1 Jn. 2 20, 27. The full endowment with *gnosis* here claimed on behalf of Christian preachers, and even of the brotherhood as a whole, is of course more directly claimed by primitive Christians in behalf of Christ, often with citation of Is. 11 2. The various charismatic gifts in the church are regarded as but partial endowments from the complete "mind of Christ." He was "full of grace and truth," and "of his fulness" all had received. The transfer was not begun in Christian literature. In *Eth. Enoch* xlvi, 1-xlix, 3 we already have the same transition with use of the same proof-text:

"In that place [the glorified Holy Land] I saw a fountain of righteousness which was inexhaustible; around it were many fountains of wisdom, and all the thirsty drank of them and were filled with wisdom, and had their dwellings with the righteous and holy and elect. . . . For wisdom is poured out like water, and glory faileth not before him ['the Anointed One'] for ever and ever. For he is mighty in all the secrets of righteousness, and unrighteousness will disappear as a shadow and have no continuance, because the Elect One standeth before the Lord of Spirits, and his glory is for ever and ever, and his might unto all generations. And in him dwells the spirit of wisdom, and the spirit of Him who gives knowledge, and the spirit of understanding and of might and the spirit of those who have fallen asleep in righteousness. And he will judge the secret things and no one will be able to utter a lying word before him; for he is the Elect One before the Lord of Spirits according to His good-pleasure."

²⁷ P. 288 f.

We shall have occasion presently to observe how this conception of the whole fountain of *gnosis* being committed to Israel and its Messiah passes over into Christian thought, but our present task is to show that the "resting" of the divine Spirit of Wisdom in Israel as the chosen Son is of the very essence of the Jewish doctrine of Israel's election as conceived in lyric Wisdom.

We have already had occasion to quote from *Odes of Solomon* vii, 18, "From Him it (wisdom) was wrought and it hath rest in the Son," as a claim of Israel to possess all (redemptive) wisdom. The claim is in fact a commonplace of this literature from Ben-Sirach's Song of Wisdom down. In Ecclus. 24 7 ff. Wisdom complains of her fruitless quest among the peoples for an abiding-place:

"With all these I sought rest,
And in whose inheritance shall I lodge?
Then the Creator of all things gave me a commandment
And He that created me made my tabernacle to rest,
And said, Let thy tabernacle be in Jacob
And thine inheritance in Israel."

As we have seen, Baruch 3 9 ff. also dwells upon the theme of Wisdom's finding no dwelling-place save in Israel, and even Talmudic literature presents its own characteristic variation on the theme in the legend of the rejection of 'the Law' by all other peoples, Israel alone welcoming it.

But Ben-Sirach's theme is itself only a development. In verses 10 ff. Wisdom continues:

"In the holy tabernacle I ministered before Him,
And so was I established in Zion;
In the beloved city likewise He gave me 'rest.'"

This is an elaboration of Ps. 132, where David sings as the ark is brought up from Kirjath Jearim:

"Arise, O Jehovah, into thy 'rest,'
 Thou, and the ark of thy strength.
 For Jehovah hath chosen Zion,
 He hath desired it for His habitation.
 This (saith He) is my 'rest' forever,
 Here will I dwell; for I have desired it."

Thus in lyric Wisdom the choosing of Zion as the 'resting-place' of Jehovah's spirit becomes coincident with the choosing of His First-born that the Spirit of Wisdom may 'rest' upon him in its fulness; and from an endowment of the elect people this inevitably becomes, both in Jewish and Christian thought, an endowment of Messiah their leader and representative.

It is in this Jewish doctrine of the plenary endowment of the elect *people* that we must trace the New Testament conception of the 'good-pleasure' which foreordains the Son as God's Beloved upon whom His Spirit 'rests.' According to Paul (Col. 1 15-20, 26 f.):

"It was the good-pleasure (εὐδόκησεν) that the whole 'fulness' should settle down (καταικῆσαι) upon the First-born, and that all things should be redeemed (ἀποκαταλλάξαι) in him."

In Christ accordingly "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." He is "the mystery (unveiled secret) of God." His spirit "in" the saints is a manifestation of "the mystery that hath been hid for ages and generations"; for in them as His witnesses "among the Gentiles" it is God's good-pleasure "to make known the wealth of the glory of this mystery."

What Paul means by the good-pleasure that the whole *pleroma* should settle down upon the First-born becomes apparent from the Gospel story of the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus at his baptism, with the Voice proclaiming the good-pleasure of the divine adoption (Mk. 1 10 f. and parallels).²³ Especially clear does it

²³ On the meaning of the voice from heaven at the baptism declaring the divine election of the Son, cf. Bacon, art. "The Aorist εὐδόκησα in Mk. 1 11," Journ. of Bibl. Lit. xvi (1897).

become in the peculiarly Jewish form of the story as quoted by Jerome from the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*:

“And it came to pass when the Lord had gone up out of the water that *the whole fountain* of the Holy Spirit descended and *rested* upon him and said to him: My son, in all the prophets I was waiting for thee that thou shouldst come and I should find *rest* in thee. For thou art my *rest*; thou art my First-born who shalt reign forever.”

The fragment is employing the same passage (Is. 42 1) which forms the basis of the baptism story in the canonical Gospels, but whereas these clearly follow a text corresponding to Mt. 12 18,

“Behold, my Servant whom I have chosen,
My Beloved, on whom my soul fixed her good-pleasure.
I will put my Spirit upon him,”

the uncanonical source follows a text corresponding to the Septuagint:

“Jacob my Servant, I will have compassion on him;
Israel my Elect, my soul *hath waited for him* (προσεδέξατο αὐτὸν ἡ ψυχὴ μου).”

Jerome's knowledge of the Aramaic source is probably derived from the commentary on Isaiah of Apollinarios of Laodicea, who had lived among the Aramaic speaking Jewish Christian community of northern Syria which used this gospel; for Jerome (who knew no Aramaic) gives the quotation in his comment on Is. 11 2:

“And the Spirit of Jehovah shall *rest* upon him—
The Spirit of wisdom and understanding,
The Spirit of counsel and might,
The Spirit of the knowledge and fear of Jehovah.”

Great significance attaches in other Christian interpreters much earlier than Jerome to the word ‘shall rest’ (Heb. *nachah*=LXX. ἀναπαύσεται). In the Wisdom-song of Eccclus. 24 5-7 it seems to have suggested the imagery of

the dove seeking 'rest' for the sole of her foot and finding none until she returns to Noah ("man of 'rest'") in the ark. To Justin Martyr (*Dial.* lxxxvii) it signifies the finality and completeness of the endowment of Jesus with the gifts of the Spirit. Trypho the Jew asks:

"Tell me, then, how, when the Scripture asserts by Isaiah, 'There shall come forth a shoot from the root of Jesse . . . and the Spirit of God shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and piety and the spirit of the fear of the Lord shall fill him,' how he can be demonstrated to be pre-existent who is filled with the powers of the Holy Spirit which the Scripture enumerates by Isaiah, as if he were in lack of them?"

Justin replies:

"The Scripture says that these enumerated powers of the Spirit came on him not because he stood in need of them but because they would *rest* in him, that is, would find their *completion* in him, so that there would be no more prophets in your nation . . . ; for after him no prophet has arisen among you. Now your prophets each received some one or two powers from God. Solomon possessed the spirit of wisdom, Daniel that of understanding and counsel, Moses that of might and piety, Elijah that of the fear (of God) and Isaiah that of knowledge (*γνῶσις*). And so with others, each possessed one power (of the Spirit). Accordingly it 'rested,' *that is, ceased*, when that One came after whom it was requisite that such gifts should cease from you, and having received their 'rest' in Him, should again become (separate) gifts which He imparts to those who believe on Him, according as he deems each man worthy."

Here is our complete definition of the doctrine of the 'pleroma' of the 'powers' or 'gifts of the Spirit' finding their 'rest' in the Son. The Jewish-Christian Gospel puts it in most succinct form: "The 'whole fountain' of the Spirit descended and 'rested' on Jesus at his baptism and said, 'My Son, I was waiting for thee in the prophets, but thou art my 'rest,' thou art my First-born.'" And this is the same doctrine declared by Paul to the Colossians as

"the revelation of the mystery hid from all ages and generations but now manifested unto the saints, to whom it was the good-pleasure of God to make known what is the riches of the glory of this mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ in (or among) you, the hope of glory."

For, as he had said in the preceding context, "We have our redemption in the Son of His love" (= Eph. 1 6, "the Beloved"), who is

"the First-born of all creation . . . for all things have been created through Him and unto Him, and He is before all things and in Him all things have their consistency. . . . For it was the good-pleasure that all the fulness should make its dwelling (κατοικῆσαι) upon Him."

The phraseology ("the Beloved," "the First-born," "mystery hid from the ages," "before the creation," "the good-pleasure," "the fulness," "manifest among the Gentiles") shows that Justin and the Jewish-Christian Gospel and Paul are all dealing with stereotyped conceptions common to Judaism and Christianity. Moreover there is an unmistakable affinity with the baptismal vision of Mk. 1 10 f. and its Synoptic parallels. The root-idea of both is the doctrine of the 'tabernacling' of the Logos in the midst of the chosen (Ecclus. 24 8), which in Jn. 1 14, 16 becomes a fulness (πλήρωμα) of grace and truth, a 'fulness' from which we all receive. The Pauline doctrine then is not derived from the Synoptic story of the election of the Son: The roots of both are in lyric Wisdom. Lyric Wisdom sings of a First-born of the creation, "the instrument by which the world was created, and which was given to Israel," that "spirit of the Lord which hath filled the world and holdeth all things together" (Sap. 1 7). Lyric Wisdom knows also how "in every generation entering into holy souls it maketh men to be prophets and friends of God," but declares that its 'rest' in its 'fulness' is in Israel the Beloved Son, and Israel's representative the Messiah.

The Pauline doctrine and the Synoptic are parallel developments from a common root. So also is the Logos doctrine of Jn. 1 14, 16-18, concerning the 'Only-begotten' Son endowed with the 'pleroma of grace and truth,' whose function is to 'declare the Father.' If the Pauline and Johannine conception of the election of the Son to be the Revealer of the Unknown Father can be said to have a Christian literary derivation, it will be an earlier form than the Synoptic enunciation of the good-pleasure. It will be the 'Hymn of Thanksgiving' of the Second Source, whose three strophes celebrate respectively: I, The Election of the Beloved in the divine Good-pleasure as custodian of the hidden Mystery; II, The Adoption to Sonship as Organ of Revelation; III, The Appeal to Men to accept the Easy Yoke. But the Pauline and Johannine developments are far too rich to be thus simply accounted for. They have behind them the copious elaboration of Isaian themes in Jewish and Alexandrian lyric Wisdom, whereof the *Odes of Solomon* form but the latest and most mystical development. In this literature it is that the transition is made by slow stages of advance from a nationalistic to an individualistic interpretation of the titles the 'Son,' the 'Beloved,' the 'First-born' and 'Only-begotten.'

The hymn of Mt. 11 25-30 = Lk. 10 21 f. is a lyric of the divine Wisdom, like those of the *Odes of Solomon*, and the Jewish and Hellenistic odes on which these rest. The present setting of both is Christian, and the degree and proportion of Christian coloration will doubtless long remain a subject of dispute. The vital point is that we now have the key to their interpretation, and that key is the pre-Christian doctrine of Election—the Chosen People the divine Organ of Revelation.

THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

JAMES H. LEUBA

The recent extension of scientific psychology to religious life could not leave the theologian unconcerned. "What theological problems can the psychological treatment of religion solve?" "According to what method must the psychology of religion proceed?" These and other questions have become, especially among German theologians, frequent topics of discussion.

The Ritschlians had solved the relation of science to religion by divorcing them. This significant tactical movement was in essence the outcome of the conviction to which theology had been driven, that all efforts at harmonizing science and religion had failed. Psychologists of mark have spoken in support of the Ritschlian opinion. Flournoy, for instance, voiced the belief in the independence of religion from science: "Never be afraid of science. . . . In particular do not fear its influence upon your faith, for science and faith are not of the same order. Science is neutral, silent, 'agnostic,' regarding the foundation of things and the final meaning of life. It is an unfair use of it which makes it proclaim any dogma whatsoever, whether materialistic or spiritualistic. And so, never ask of it arguments favoring your convictions; the support it might seem to lend you would be but a reed, which, should you lean upon it, would pierce your hand. But be equally certain that it does not speak in favor of antagonistic doctrines."¹

The opinion that theology is independent of science is usually found associated with another characteristic

¹ Th. Flournoy, *Le Génie Religieux*, a lecture to the Swiss Students' Christian Association, Sainte-Croix, 1904. P. 34.

tenet: "inner experience" is held to be the only source, or at least the ultimate source, of belief. It is indeed strange that most of those who adopt the independence-from-science theory should look to inner experience as the ultimate ground of belief. The theology of "inner experience" reopens the debate which Ritschl thought he had closed, since to regard the facts of the inner life as those upon which theology rests is to make it dependent upon psychological science.

Let it be understood, however, that the theologians with whom I am concerned—not even those who, like Wobbermin, point to a psychological method as *the* method of theology—have not the least intention of deriving the fundamental propositions of their system from a *scientific* treatment of religious experience. Wobbermin, for instance, affirms that the reality of the objects of faith, instead of being identical in kind with the reality of the objects of knowledge, is, on the contrary, "completely different both in qualitative and in quantitative respects." "God and divine things are not and cannot be objects of human knowledge (*Wissens und Erkennens*)"; they are objects of faith. The absolute value of religion is *given* with even greater certitude than is the reality of the objects of empirical experience.²

The divorce of theology from science is pronounced on one or both of two related grounds. Either God is said to be a transcendental object and therefore inaccessible to science; or religious knowledge is said to be a form of knowledge altogether different from scientific knowledge. We shall take up in succession these two claims.

² Georg Wobbermin, *Die Religionspsychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie*. Leipzig; Hinrich, 1913, pp. 388-391. This is the most formal effort made so far to set forth a psychological method for the use of theology. (Reviewed by the author in the *Psy. Bull.*, Dec. 15, pp. 462-470.)

1. *The object of religion (God) is a transcendental object, and is therefore inaccessible to science.* Every historical religion, with the exception of Comtism, is rooted in the belief in anthropopathic personal Power, or Powers, with whom man can maintain such direct personal relations as are implied in Christian worship. Replace that God by the Absolute of modern Idealism, and sacrifices, offerings, prayers, have lost their proper object; the Christian books of common prayer have become irrelevant. The relations that can be maintained by man with the Absolute of metaphysics and with the gods of religion, are different because these conceptions are different. They cannot be used interchangeably. Each may be used in its proper place, for different purposes. There are men who in critical, rationalistic moods entertain the idea of an Eternal Reason, an impersonal Creative Energy; and who, in times of pressing moral needs, apparently believe in a personal Being. In the latter alternative only can they conform to the demands of any religion. Here are instances in which this shift of conception is clearly realized. The first three are from an investigation, not yet published, on "The American College Students' Idea of God":

"God to my mind is an impersonal being; but whether for convenience or through sheer impotence, I pray to him as a personal being. I probably think of Christ when I pray."

"I think of God as both a personal and impersonal being. I think of him as personal when I feel the need of some support outside myself; a sympathy and understanding which no one else can give. I like to think of him as impersonal at other times; as a power like ether, which is infused through everything."

"In an agitated or excited state of mind, I think of God as a Personal Father who is ready to reward or punish. But generally I think of God as a mass of forces having certain effects follow from certain causes; the force that causes us to do good will bring with it its own reward, and *vice versa*."

A German well known by his psychological works writes:

"Fortunately, to know and to understand God, which is impossible, is not essential; but to feel and to 'live Him' is the crucial, necessary thing. To realize that entirely practical ideal, we must, in my opinion, believe in a personal God. For it seems to me impossible for man to be able to enter into ethical relations with an impersonal being. Is not this the most profound meaning of Christianity; the Divine One took flesh, He became man to reveal Himself a man, not in order to be understood but that He might be loved? I feel, therefore, that we have not only the right, but perhaps even the duty to represent to ourselves the Divine as a personal God. *But, at the same time, we must never forget that this idea corresponds not to the nature of the Divine, but only to the nature of man. It is only an expedient, but, as it seems to me, an indispensable expedient.*"¹

Men of surpassing intellectual power have done even as this German scientist, and not every one of them has been able to keep in mind the merely expedient character of the personal conception. St. Augustine recognized that the expression "mercy" could not properly be applied to the Absolute, since the word implies suffering through the suffering of others. Nevertheless, he thought himself justified in using the term in order "to save the ignorant from stumbling." The "ignorant!" The learned doctor himself found it impossible to believe only in the impersonal, infinite God. The *Confessions* show that, like less powerful intellects, St. Augustine maintained tender sentimental relations with his God; relations more dignified, to be sure, but of the same character as those described by the great love-sick Spanish mystic. Schleiermacher provides another illustrious instance of the existence side by side of two God-conceptions, each one used in turn according to the need of the moment. "To attribute mercy to

¹ *Le Divin, Expériences et Hypothèses*, Marcel Hebert, p. 130.

God," writes Schleiermacher, "were more appropriate to a homiletic or poetic manner of speaking than to the dogmatic."⁴

There should not be need of argumentation in defense of the affirmation that a God who does not stand in direct affective and intellectual relation with man is not the God of the Christian, nor of any other historical religion, save Comtism. I have in another place attempted to show with some fulness of detail that these two conceptions of the Divinity have had different origins, and that still other God-ideas have arisen from other sources. Here I can only say that under the urgency of different needs man formed several ideas of great, trans-human beings; and that the attributes ascribed to these beings were different with the different needs which instigated their discovery or creation. For instance, out of the logical necessity, in order to understand the universe, of stopping somewhere in the regression by which science passes from one phenomenon to another regarded as its cause, arises the so-called cosmological argument for the existence of a First Cause. A need quite different urges the Christian mystics to a belief in a quite different Being, the loving All-Father.

Now, a Being can legitimately possess only the attributes required in order to gratify the need from which he arose. Thus the Cosmological Being may properly be spoken of as the First Cause, the Absolute, the Principle of Unification, or even the "eternally Complete Consciousness," but he should not receive names denoting anthropopathic personality. To conceive of the First Cause as personal in that sense is to add elements foreign to those demanded by the logical necessity of stopping the regression of secondary causes. The Being which the metaphysical arguments seek to demonstrate for the gratification of our logical propensity

⁴ *Der Christliche Glaube*, p. 85.

must be conceived of as impassive, whereas the Being demanded by the Christian heart and conscience must above all else be a compassionate and righteous Being.

That the gods of metaphysics are not the gods of religion, is clearly acknowledged by Arthur J. Balfour in the last Gifford Lectures. "When in the course of these lectures," writes this philosopher, "I speak of God, I mean something other than an Identity wherein all differences vanish, or a Unity which includes but does not transcend the differences which it somehow holds in solution. I mean a God whom men can love, to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has purposes and preferences, whose attributes, howsoever conceived, leave unimpaired the possibility of a personal relation between Himself and those whom He has created."⁶

When one says in Hegelian phraseology that the Absolute is self-revealing, that the world and the finite consciousness of man are manifestations of God, and that man experiences the Absolute, one uses the terms "manifestation" and "revelation" in a sense quite different from that given to them by the practising Christian. The latter means by these terms an intervention of God's loving power, producing those selected inner experiences which seem to him specifically divine; whereas the philosopher means that the developing consciousness itself is, in its entirety, an expression of God. It should be evident to all that a God of whom the whole universe is the manifestation, and whose action is always in the form of law, is not the Being celebrated and invoked in any liturgy. The gods of the historical religions stand over against nature, and are powerful to alter the course of events at their good pleasure. That is the conception which pervades every form of established worship.

⁶ *Theism and Humanism*. 1914. Pp. 20-21. For an attempted demonstration of the correctness of this distinction, see chapter xi, especially pages 245 to 254, of my book, *A Psychological Study of Religion; its Origin, its Function, and its Future*. Macmillan, 1912.

If today not all Christians hear God in the thunder or see him otherwise manipulating physical nature, they are at least unanimous in affirming that God reveals himself in what is termed interchangeably "inner" or "spiritual" experience; "there," they say, "in my consciousness is manifested the truth of religion, the reality of God." Some hold that in these experiences God is directly "apprehended" or "perceived"; that is the mystical position. Others hold that spiritual experiences are only the data from which God is inferred; in both cases specific experiences are accepted as sufficient to prove the truth of religion. What are these specific "inner" or "spiritual" experiences? Here are two fairly typical quotations from which may be gathered both *that God is held to reveal himself* in inner experience and *what is the nature* of his supposed action.

A professor at the school of Protestant theology of Paris writes:

"God is not a phenomenon that we may observe apart from ourselves, or a truth demonstrable by logical reasoning. He who does not feel Him in his heart will never feel Him from without. The object of religious knowledge reveals itself only in the subject, by means of the religious phenomena themselves."⁶

Digamma of Oxford University rests his faith upon the induction made from the following facts. At twenty-one he found himself involved in circumstances that seemed as if they must lead to the ruin of his career. I quote:

"The circumstances of which I have spoken tended to produce extreme mental depression. A cloud had, as it were, descended upon my life. *But I noticed that after earnest prayer this depression was greatly relieved, and at times completely vanished.* That which struck me most in the phenomenon was its irrationality. What I mean is that the relief was experienced again and again without any consciousness of its cause. I could not attribute it to a feeling

⁶ Sabatier, A., *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, James Pott & Co., N.Y. 1902. P. 308.

of satisfaction at having performed a religious duty, for I noticed that the relief came in many cases when no such feeling of satisfaction was or had been present in my mind. The importance of the phenomenon in respect to one's life was such as to lead me to further observation of it; and this process of induction has with me extended over a period of more than twenty years. . . . In watching this phenomenon, therefore, I have carefully checked my observation and have excluded all instances in which some intermediary cause intervened between prayer and the mental happiness resulting from it. In the thousands of instances which have come under my observation, for the phenomenon is at least of daily occurrence, *I have never observed any case in which earnest prayer has not been answered (to use the ordinary word), by an increase of mental happiness.*

"I do not wish it to be supposed that my observation leads me to believe that a high level of mental happiness must always result from prayer. There are other factors, of course, in the calculation, and, above all, the factor of bodily condition. Still, I imagine, though I cannot say that I have ever realized, that this factor may be to a great extent eliminated by the action of that factor which we call prayer. 'The prayer of a righteous man availeth much,' is after all a saying which must be true if the power of prayer is in any sense admitted. But, nevertheless, even to one who, like myself, is but ordinary in respect to righteousness, the conviction has come after long years of observation, that *prayer does invariably raise the level of mental happiness. . . . Consequently my faith rests upon an empirical basis.* But time forbids my speaking of the deductions from this major premise. This at any rate I know, that God can be approached along those paths along which I was led in childhood."⁷

I may add that the chief purpose of William James in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* was to find facts pointing to the intervention in man of a super-human power or powers. His search was for a specific class of facts of inner experience. He had undertaken a *scientific*, not a metaphysical demonstration of the existence of a power of the kind necessary to religion.⁸

⁷ Digamma, *An Aspect of Prayer*, an Address before a "Society in a certain College in Oxford," Oxford, B. H. Blackwell. The italics are mine.

⁸ See Inter. Jr. of Ethics, 1904, vol. 14, pp. 323-339; or A Psychological Study of Religion, pp. 237-239; 272-274.

Without amplifying this too brief elucidation, I may conclude that the God of religion — not any God; not, for instance, the Absolute of modern Idealism — is known in “inner experiences,” *i.e.*, in the appearance in consciousness of particular states or processes. The knowledge of God derived from these experiences is an empirical knowledge. Remove these facts of consciousness and the God of religion may continue to exist, but he ceases to be an object of human knowledge.

2. *Religious knowledge is an altogether different sort of knowledge from scientific knowledge.* Here the limitation of religious psychology, instead of being found in the transcendental nature of God, is discovered in the nature of religious knowledge. Let me restate briefly the argument as it appears in Ritschlian literature.

Religion is concerned with judgments of value, expressive of the bond connecting man with the universe. The specifically religious function of the mind is, according to Ritschl, the formation of certain judgments or “perceptions” of value. These judgments proceed from the effect that certain ideas have upon man when he accepts them as true. For example, the idea of Jesus conceived as the only Son of God, produces in man experiences having a peculiar affective quality and significance. W. Herrmann considers that “the religious view is an answer to the question, ‘How must the world be judged if the highest good is to be real?’” “The concern of religion is to regard the multiplicity of the world as the orderly whole of means by which the highest value of the pious man, which is expressed in feeling, is realized.”

Religious knowledge is, in this view, an expression of the value, of the feeling-significance, to the individual of a certain category of facts, in particular of those in which man apprehends his relation to the universe. That

knowledge is, we are told, outside of the sphere of science, for values are experiences upon which science cannot do its work of analysis and causal explanation. It follows that religious and scientific knowledge cannot enter into conflict with each other; they move in altogether different spheres. This argument, grounded upon the assumption that religion is concerned with values and not with causal relations, has become the stock argument by which Ritschlians, as well as other theologians and even psychologists, defend the independence of religion from science.

If this argument were to be regarded as representing correctly and fully the nature of religion, causal relations and questions of objective existence would lie outside of theology. It could have nothing to say about the existence of God or of Christ, but only about the value to man of the God-idea. Ritschl has in fact been accused of affirming only the subjective and not the objective existence of God. However that may be, there is no lack of men who like Ritschl assume the rôle of defenders of the Christian religion, and yet declare openly that religious conceptions are only images. One reads, for instance, in a late number of the *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie* that the religious conceptions should not be regarded as descriptive of objective existences; they serve merely as means for the expression and development of the religious values; they are merely symbols, one may even call them poetical forms.⁹

The absurd length to which a symbolic interpretation of Christian dogma may be carried is exemplified in Hegel's philosophy of religion. He speaks of revealed religion, but he excludes from the meaning of that term any manifestation of God by a supernatural or miraculous channel; of the love of God, but the expression "God is love" means for him that in the Absolute contradictions

⁹ K. A. Busch, vol. 5, 1911, pp. 200-218.

are transcended, what is opposed to God is yet in union with him; of the Son, but the meaning of that metaphor is that "when we concentrate attention on the manifestation of God, as distinguished from his inner essence, we are dealing with God as the 'other' of Himself."¹⁰ However numerous the supporters of Christianity who affirm merely the symbolic or the poetic character of the Christian God-idea, it is the presence of realists which makes possible the continuance of the existing religious institutions. If all men were symbolists with regard to the religious conceptions, the ludicrousness of a company of worshippers assembled to repeat the Christian creeds, the litany, and the prayers of the books of Common Worship, would be overpowering. How long would the long-bearded St. Nicholases be on our street corners, if none of our children were naïve realists?¹¹

The Ritschlian argument just sketched is open to the two following objections:

(a) The nature of religion is stated so incompletely in that argument as to invalidate its conclusion. The formation of judgments of value is indeed a constituent

¹⁰ John Watson, *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*, I, p. 345.

¹¹ I am well aware that much of the religious and theological language is in a sense figurative even for those whom I have designated as naïve realists. But symbolism does not reach for them the more fundamental dogma of religion. I know also that there is a sense in which all speech can be said to be symbolic. But the realists of whom we speak give to the term another than that general meaning, for they discriminate in theological formulae between figurative and non-figurative expressions. One reads, for instance, in an *Outline of Christian Theology* by W. N. Clarke (15 ed., pp. 3, 65, 13) much used by students: "In a definition of God it is best as far as possible to avoid figurative language; for metaphors are ambiguous, and figurative language in a compact statement tends to destroy the proportion and draw undue attention to minor points." And the author proceeds to define God as a Personal Spirit, Infinite, Omnipresent, Omniscient, Immutable, Holy, and Loving. These terms are not for him symbolic. Nor should we take him as speaking figuratively when he says, "Revelation to Israel through Moses was not made in writing; it was made in small parts by speech, but mainly by action, for Israel was taught to know God and His will mainly in what He did among them."

Should I be criticised for a lack of historical sense, I should turn upon my critics with the remark that they suffer from an excessive wish to see likenesses and continuity. The philosopher should recognize both the likenesses and the differences characteristic of successive historical movements. There are points in social development separated by differences so important that to use the old terms in the new sense can lead only to misunderstanding.

part of religious life, but it is also a part of *every other form* of human activity.

Whether it be in business, in ethics, in art, or in religion, our behavior is conditioned by judgments of value. One does not come much nearer to the complete truth by making of a specific class of judgments of value — those referring to man's relation to God — the distinguishing mark of religion. The essential nature of religion cannot be described adequately in terms of value-judgments of any sort, for religion is not merely an appreciation of that which has (ultimate) value; *it is an expression of desire for that to which worth is ascribed.*

(b) In a being constituted as man is, a sense of value leads inevitably to a search for means of securing or preserving that which has value. The gods about whom religions were built had an experiential origin in the needs for the understanding of experience and for assistance in the struggle for physical and moral growth. *Therefore religious beliefs and practices constitute a system of means for the realization of values.* Thus religion is vitally concerned with causal relations.

For those who realize that the transcendental, impassive Absolute is not and never has been the God of any organized religion, the relation of science to theology may be stated as follows:

1. The gods of the religions, called into existence in human consciousness for the gratification of certain needs (logical, affective, ethical, and æsthetic), are now held to manifest themselves in and through their action upon the physical universe, or within man, or both. They have the value of empirical inductions, and are therefore objects of scientific research as much as and for the same reason as any scientific hypothesis.

2. The means and the methods by which man has learned to enter into relation with his gods involve, as a

matter of course, causal relations between him and the divinity. These means and methods fall therefore also within the field of scientific investigation.

3. In so far as doctrines are affirmations regarding the nature of the gods of religion, the nature of man, and the means and the conditions of saving intercourse with the divinity, they fall within the pale of science.

The greater number of these scientific theological problems is referable to psychology.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY. A Study in Moral Development. WILLIAM FREDERIC BADÉ. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1915. Pp. xxii, 326. \$1.75.

This is in the main a history of Israel's religious ideas and ethical practices down to the Exile. It contains, however, not only an account of the historical development of Israel's religio-ethical life but also a critical estimate of it in the light of modern thought. It is the latter fact that explains the title and gives to the volume its special interest and value.

The author's aim is positive and constructive. He seeks to "help students and teachers of the Old Testament to find a new and securer place for it in the religious thought of our time." But this apologetic purpose in no way interferes with the genuinely scientific character of the work. Indeed, in this regard the author walks so straight that, if anything, he leans backward. On most controverted points of Old Testament criticism and interpretation he takes the more radical view. Of the religion of the pre-prophetic period he evidently has a quite low opinion, though he admits that the dark picture he has drawn of it might easily be brightened by citing instances in which higher conceptions of God and duty came to expression. The decalogue, he holds, was "compiled after the great prophets had finished their work," and the origin of the seventh-day Sabbath is assigned to "about the time of the Exile." The eighth-century prophets were not monotheists; Jehovah was looked upon as "intramundane." There was also in their utterances no place for the messianic or eschatological. Not until we reach Jeremiah does "ethical as well as theoretical monotheism" appear. Deuteronomy was directed not against the worship of foreign gods but against "polyjahvism." The doctrine of the *shema* (Dt. 6, 4) is not monotheism but "monojahvism." Jeremiah was an opponent of the Deuteronomic reform, and Ezekiel represented a "priestly mis-development of Hebrew religion." As an offset to the tendency represented by some of these views the reader, who is not familiar with current Old Testament literature, would

do well to go carefully through *The Religion of Israel under the Kingdom* by A. C. Welch, one of the most significant books on the Old Testament that has appeared in English for a number of years.

In his comparison of the teaching of the Old Testament with modern thought Professor Badé seems more interested in pointing out the contrast between the two than in establishing points of affinity between them. This is due to his desire to exhibit the utter impossibility of holding to the traditional dogmatic conception of the Old Testament. Indeed, his book is to a certain extent a polemic against this dogmatic view, which he has apparently found unpleasantly prominent in his own immediate environment. The result is that here and there the author seems unduly severe in his criticism of certain aspects of Israelitic religion. He hardly gives adequate recognition to two principles which ought to be observed in all sympathetic study of the Old Testament. First, its teaching should be viewed against the background of heathenism rather than that of modern thought. And secondly, it should be borne in mind that there are many non-essential things in religion which are essential in order to make religion effective in the world. The latter truth is of special importance in our estimate of the priestly type of religion with its exclusiveness and other obsolete features. "An earnest protest," says our author, "should be entered against the widespread habit, in theological literature, of excusing this exclusiveness on the ground that it was necessary to preserve the identity of Judaism." But an equally earnest protest might well be registered against that impractical type of idealism, which is blind to the historically and psychologically necessary conditions of religious development.

But while the book is thus rather more negative in its attitude than seems necessary to the present reviewer, it is in every way a work of solid merit. Its scholarship is thorough and comprehensive. The author is perfectly at home with the literature of his subject. He has read widely, especially in the German, and his own conclusions give evidence of independent research and careful reflection. His style is all that could be desired, and the same may be said of the arrangement of his material. There is a wealth of interesting information in the book, and "for the tremendous, thrilling sweep of development" of the prophetic religion, especially as represented by Isaiah and Jeremiah, the author manifests a genuine enthusiasm. As a compact, scholarly, lucid, and critical exposition of Israel's religious development down to the Exile the

book has a distinct place of its own. Another volume dealing with the exilic and post-exilic period is promised us, which we shall await with interest.

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COMPARATIVE RELIGION; ITS ADJUNCTS AND ALLIES. LOUIS HENRY JORDAN. Oxford University Press. 1915. Pp. xxxii, 574.

Mr. Jordan's views about what he calls "Comparative Religion" have been set forth many times and in many places. It is — or must be made — "a separate and self-governing discipline," emancipated from its ancillary relation to theology, philosophy, or history, and sharply distinguished from anthropology, sociology, mythology, philology, psychology, and above all, from the history of religions, which are, in his classification, only subsidiary disciplines to Comparative Religion. This science, which as yet exists only as a programme, will be characterized by a systematic and thorough-going application of the comparative method to the material furnished by descriptive and historical studies of religions and religious phenomena, and will have for its distinctive end to discover the laws of religious development and to appraise the values of religions or particular aspects of religion — theology, ethics, ritual, and the like. This task has sometimes been taken to itself by the philosophy of religion, but Mr. Jordan denies alike its right and its competence to deal with such matters. How much more successfully the so-called "science" of Comparative Religion will deal with them remains to be seen.

The volume before us, devoted to the "Adjuncts and Allies" of Comparative Religion, contains reviews and observations upon the recent literature in anthropology and ethnology, sociology, archaeology, mythology, philology, psychology, the history of religions, and methods in the study of religion, with a conspectus of the publications of learned societies, encyclopædias, and periodicals, dealing with these subjects. In an introduction to each of these subdivisions, Mr. Jordan undertakes to define the proper scope of the discipline under consideration and its relation to Comparative Religion proper; and at the end of each group of reviews is a bibliographical list of other literature in the same field. The principal value of the book lies in this convenient and fairly comprehensive conspectus of the literature of the past six or eight years. The re-

views themselves have no great critical significance, but they will ordinarily serve to give the reader a reasonably correct impression of the character and contents of the work.

This is, however, not always the case. A conspicuous example is the relatively extended review of Roemer's book on the Babi-Bahai. Roemer digested with great diligence, so far as could be done without first-hand acquaintance with the Arabic and Persian texts, the historical sources from which our knowledge of this new religion is derived and the voluminous literature to which it has given rise; he presents in extremely condensed form the history and teaching of the Bab and of Baha Allah. It is one of those books which it is a penance to read, but the facts are there; and it is only just to Roemer to say that the errors in which Mr. Jordan's review abounds are derived from other sources. That the Bab was martyred in 1852 (*sic*), and that Subh-i-Ezel died in Cyprus in 1902, are slips not adapted to inspire confidence in Mr. Jordan's familiarity with the subject. Much more serious is the pervasive misapprehension of the character of the new religion. To think that the Babi sect "originated in an effort to reform Islam" is to misunderstand the movement from beginning to end. Equally erroneous is the assertion: "The central doctrine of Bahaism, as expounded in its current and latest form, is the essential unity of all religions. All men are brothers, and at root all religions are one. Hence the central aim of Bahaism is the spiritual unification of mankind. It is emphatically a missionary religion, and in theory at least it is a broadly democratic faith." For this definition the late Professor Cheyne is cited in the footnote; but Mr. Jordan might have learned from the translation which Roemer gives of the first sentence of the Bahai Scriptures, the Kitab Akdas, that the "central dogma" of Bahaism is something very different, namely, that God himself was manifest in a fuller and higher sense than ever before in the person of Baha Allah; he is the consummate manifestation — or, as we should say, incarnation — of the Godhead; and, *second*, that absolute submission of the intellect as well as of the will to this manifest Godhead is the condition *sine qua non* of salvation—"A man cannot take one without the other." When Mr. Jordan writes, therefore, "It is generally understood that Baha Allah regarded himself and is today to be regarded by the faithful as a veritable incarnation of God himself," he reduces the fundamental dogma of the religion to a pious, but supererogatory, opinion. The sentences, again, which speak of the tendency of Bahaism "to over-exalt Mohammed, and to put Jesus in a distinctly secondary place" show that the author has not comprehended the de-

pendence of Bahaism on the ultra-Shi'a doctrine of the serial progressive manifestations of the Supreme Intelligence. I have dwelt longer on this example than its intrinsic importance would demand, because, with Roemer's book in hand, Mr. Jordan repeats the common errors which Roemer labored so hard to eradicate. Bahaism is so interesting and important a phenomenon that it deserves better treatment than it receives from its opponents and particularly from its panegyrists.

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THE STUDY OF RELIGIONS. STANLEY A. COOK, Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, England. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. xxiv, 439.

The object of this volume is to examine general laws of the progress of religious thought and religions in the world. A partial epitome of the argument is given in the author's article, "The Evolution and Survival of Primitive Thought," in *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway* (Cambridge University Press, 1913). The two lines of thought dealt with are the development of religious ideas and the attitude of the individual toward these ideas, especially such as differ from his own. The main thesis of the work is the relation between the individual and his environment.

All progress is through individuals, and the environment is made up of individuals; but the individual is largely shaped by his environment, and this latter, by reason of the fusion of all elements in a community, has a character of its own and may be treated as, in a sort, a separate power. It moves forward as a whole, but its components have each its own rate and character of movement; one part may change considerably while another part may appear to remain stationary, though no part is really completely stationary. As the genesis of any body of thought goes back to an indefinite antiquity, it is necessary for the investigator of any one period to take into account and treat sympathetically all preceding stadia.

For example, what are called "survivals" are not to be regarded as ideas thrust inorganically into an advanced system; rather they are conceptions which, meeting some felt need, have maintained themselves, generally however under new forms. Thus, the old local gods appear in some forms of Christianity and Mohammedanism as saints, able to help and worthy to receive religious worship. So it is with certain cases of apparent retrogression, which are merely the retention of lower ideas by a community not yet prepared to

adopt the ideas of a superior community. A similar explanation applies to phenomena sometimes described as a return to early thought. What really happens is the recognition, always however under different forms, of the validity of certain conceptions as having their roots in human nature. The environment moves slowly and cautiously—men demand continuity in the experiences of life and wish to find their thoughts expressed in the remote past; legal fictions are invented in order to avoid a break with the past; ancient personages are invested with the ideas of later times, and speeches expressing the views of some late historian are put into their mouths.

By reason of the great power of the environment, Cook goes on to say, the influence of personalities is not so great as is sometimes assumed; for every reformer is the product of his social surroundings, and is successful only when these are favorable to his thought. As to the investigator, he must isolate himself, must work out his special point without restraint from others; he cannot, for example, permit himself to be deflected by consideration of the possible consequences of his results. But this isolation is itself a limitation. He, to be sure, is impelled by a force to carry on his researches, but there are other forces at work. Every special study is linked to many others; and just as *esprit de corps* is a psychical reality, so the consciousness of intellectual surroundings is a reality—ideal complete thought can be found only in an ideal individual. Regard for authority is not a survival, it is an element of human nature. And society is always divided into groups; every man belongs to some one group, and it is the extension of the mental areas of groups that tends to produce general harmony. No man can look on his own position as final. It does not follow that a non-religious attitude is the culmination of the advancing thought of an individual or of a nation.

These and kindred topics are illustrated by Mr. Cook from various communal and individual religious experiences. He does not discuss the origin of religion or the histories of systems of religion, nor does he indicate his own preferences beyond the statement that he is in sympathy with the doctrine of evolution and with the methods and results of modern criticism of the Old Testament, and beyond a suggestion that wide comparison may point to the superiority of Christianity over other religions. He inculcates the virtues of historical knowledge, self-knowledge, caution, honesty, and humility—qualities that are universally considered to be necessary to the critic, but are not always apparent in critical writings. The volume

has many interesting remarks, and will be found useful by all students of religions.

CRAWFORD H. TOY.

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THE RENAISSANCE, THE PROTESTANT REVOLUTION, AND THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE. EDWARD MASLIN HULME. The Century Co. 1915. Pp. 629.

This book has certain rather striking qualities. It is built upon a well-conceived ground-plan, for which the author expresses his obligations to Professor George L. Burr of Cornell. Its selection of topics to be treated with greater or less fulness shows care and judgment, though such selection is a matter about which no two scholars could ever entirely agree. The point of view is liberal and fair toward all varieties of human effort. On all the numerous subjects passed in review—politics, religion, economic problems, science, literature, art—the author shows a comprehension adequate for his purpose. His style is uncommonly good, clear, and concise, but at the same time enlivened by a prevailing sense of form. Only rarely is he betrayed into fine writing, and such betrayal only hints at the restraint he has elsewhere put upon himself. The general accuracy of statement is shown by frequent but not burdensome reference to authorities and by brief discussion of controverted points.

With all these virtues must be mentioned one or two equally pronounced faults. The plan, excellent as it is, is too complete. A book of this size built upon such a plan must be too inclusive to make an incisive impression. It is seldom worth while to try to say something about everything; but if one must do that, the only safe way is to limit the field. Here the field is very large, and for that reason the treatment, to be effective, should be by careful exposition of leading ideas and typical personalities rather than by any balancing of quantities. One feels that the author is better than his work, and would be glad to have him try his hand at a more specific task. Meanwhile, the volume fills a unique place in the current literature of the Reformation period, and cannot fail to be of service to readers who wish to gain a general view of causes and consequences in that momentous struggle.

EPHRAIM EMERTON.

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THE RISE OF MODERN RELIGIOUS IDEAS. ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT, D.D. The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xiv, 315. \$1.50.

This volume sketches the rise of modern religious ideas in two books—the first a brief one, pertaining to the disintegration of the old, and the second at much greater length presenting reconstruction and the introduction of the new. It has arisen out of a course of the Earl Lectures given at the Pacific Theological Seminary, and seems to indicate a change in the character of the lectureship from the more popular and practical to the more professional. It is marked by the comprehensive learning for which Professor McGiffert has been well known ever since his edition of Eusebius.

Under the head of disintegration, Dr. McGiffert tells the story of German pietism as personified in Spener. He then passes to the movement beginning about 1750 which is technically called the "Enlightenment." The chapter on Natural Science which follows is comprehensive and excellent, showing very plainly how the free use of the human faculties led, under the influence of the new discoveries, to a questioning principally of the miraculous element in the popular theology, not without tendencies to question also the existence of such a God as Christianity taught. Last comes a brief sketch of the critical philosophy from Descartes to Kant.

With the second book, upon Reconstruction, the author enters upon a more congenial task. Under the successive heads of the Emancipation of Religion, the Rebirth of Speculation, the Rehabilitation of Faith, Agnosticism, Evolution, Divine Immanence, Ethical Theism, the Character of God, the Social Emphasis, and Religious Authority, we are presented with a sketch of philosophical and doctrinal history in which the great names are brought forward in due order and the main great lines of thought are certainly indicated with clearness and often with considerable fulness of treatment. Possibly a sufficiently comprehensive idea of the actual contents and excellences of the work may be conveyed as we go on, if we proceed at once to particulars in respect to which certain criticism seems to be called for.

Perhaps we are mistaken in our understanding of the purpose of the book, but we suppose its theme to be American Modern Ideas. At least that would seem to be the proper subject of a book produced under the circumstances under which this was produced. And we cannot believe that we are wrong in understanding our author as laying chief stress, among such ideas, upon the rejection of external authority and the substitution for it of internal experience and con-

viction in religion, upon the rejection of the old view of the miraculous, and upon exaltation to a new plane of communion with God as the essence of religion. It is our conviction that with the genesis of *these* ideas, much that Dr. McGiffert brings before us has nothing to do, and much that is of the greatest actual importance in the history he has said nothing about. It is natural that one educated in Germany should believe in the supreme importance of German philosophical and theological development as the foundation of all present creative thinking. Have not the Germans themselves told us so, with an almost absolute ignoring of all thought not their own? But it is very doubtful whether the course of English and American thought has been seriously modified by many German thinkers who have, it is true, anticipated the formative ideas which have arisen among us but can scarcely be shown to have positively influenced us. William James once said that Kant himself had not seriously affected English philosophy, which was on the sure path to the attainment of all he produced even before his day, and which was compelled, as James phrased it, "to make its way around Kant, as the mountain stream makes its way around the boulder which has fallen into its channel and choked it." Emerson's actual indebtedness to German transcendentalism is rather mythical. Henry B. Smith, though he thought he was greatly influenced by Germany, and no doubt was, so far as scholarship is concerned, still gives little evidence in his published fragments of any important modification in the system of thought which he drew directly from his New England teachers. Dr. McGiffert has given us an excellent and appreciative account of the great formative ideas of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, the heads of the line of thought which he has for many years favored. In his treatment of Ritschl in particular he has given a clearer and juster view than we remember to have seen elsewhere. But it is doubtful whether either of these theologians has exercised much influence in America. Most of those who have talked about Ritschl have misunderstood him; and in this day we no longer hear much about him. Egbert Smyth in 1877 left the impression that Ritschl was a pillar of orthodoxy.

The great and important fact, which too remote historical discussion is only adapted to obscure, is that the main swelling stream of modern, reconstructive religious thought, so far as the English-speaking world is concerned, sprang from the publication in 1859 of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. Previous suggestions of evolution have an antiquarian interest, but they have little vital connection with the subsequent thinking. If the history of evolution in

America is to be told, then the hasty and blunt verdict upon it by Charles Hodge—"atheism"—the explanatory advocacy by Asa Gray, and the general hospitality towards it which was shown by Congregationalists, are of the first importance. But of these Dr. McGiffert says nothing. And it would seem as though it were not an unprofitable line of historical investigation to discuss why Congregationalists were as hospitable as they were. It would then appear that in the long development of "the New England Theology," technically so called, and in the Unitarian movement, Congregationalists had learned these great and liberating things—that the Calvinistic theology of Geneva was not final and authoritative, that much could be learned from adversaries, that the fundamental elements of religion are vital, spiritual processes (see N. W. Taylor, long anterior to Ritschl), and that progress in theology is to be expected and labored for. These were the preparation for evolution and biblical criticism, and for the dynamic rather than the static view of the universe.

We hope the book will pass to a second edition, and that Dr. McGiffert will extend his view to the fields suggested, and to others, and give us thus a still more vital history of the actual growth of our American system of thought, now in process of rapid development among us.

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THE SEQUEL TO CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION, 1830-1850. MONSIGNOR BERNARD WARD. Longmans & Co. 1915. Two Vols. Pp. Vol. I, xx, 296. Vol. II, viii, 328. \$6.00.

These volumes complete the *Memoires pour servir* in which the President of St. Edmund's has embodied the record of the English Catholics body from the death of Bishop Challoner (1781) to the establishment of the hierarchy (1850). The work has been done with accuracy, candor, and judgment. Mgr. Ward is to be congratulated on having brought to so successful an issue an undertaking which fills a gap in English Church history, and which both from his position and his family associations he was singularly qualified to carry out.

The political element in English Catholicism which had brought the Catholics into conflict with the Government disappeared after 1688. The disabilities under which they lay from an odious necessity had become an odious survival, injurious both to those who suffered under them and to those in whose supposed interest they were

maintained. The provincialism of English religion, Protestant and Catholic, not wholly extinct even to-day, is the result of the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and antagonism which prevailed among us for more than three hundred years. In 1829 the English Catholics were still, in the strict sense of the word, a missionary body. They were governed by four Vicars Apostolic, i.e. bishops holding delegate jurisdiction from the Pope and taking their titles from extinct sees *in partibus infidelium*—Dr. Wiseman e.g. was bishop of Melipotamus, a city in Crete erected into a bishopric in the ninth century—and these quaint appellations made them appear more foreign than in fact they were. In many ways, indeed, they were *ultra* English—Milner, the author of the *End of Controversy*, in spite of his outlandish style, Bishop of Castabala, was a typical Georgian Tory and John Bull. The clergy, who had been originally chaplains attached either to the embassies or the great Catholic families, though they performed parochial duties, had neither the status nor the security of tenure of parish priests; and this anomaly, though its removal formed part of the project for reorganization put forward in 1815 by Bishop Poynter, remains to the present time. There was a quiet goodness in this old English Catholicism which had, and has, a peculiar charm. The ways of the Vicars Apostolic were simple and their lives retired. W. H. Brockfield describes “the R. C. Bishop of London”—so he styles Dr. Griffiths—as carrying his bag from the Piccadilly omnibus to his house in Golden Square. “A very pleasing, venerable, episcopal-looking man, very much like any other Bishop; save that none of ours would touch a carpet bag with his little finger.” This last touch has perhaps ceased to apply. But the times had got beyond them. The Irish immigration; the convert movement; the greater facilities of communication with Rome, which increased centralization and made the intervention of Propaganda in English affairs more frequent than had formerly been possible—all this produced a situation with which these modest home-bred prelates were scarcely qualified to deal. Their want of acquaintance with the forms of the Roman Curia prejudiced them in the eyes of its officials; Dr. Griffiths, till he succeeded Bishop Bramston as Vicar Apostolic of the London District, had never been out of England in his life. And while they submitted themselves to the directions of “Hilltown”—as Rome was then called—they neither invited nor welcomed them. Their communications with Gregory XVI. suggest rather those between Innocent XI. and the Gallican prelates of his period than those which we may imagine to take place between a Pope and a diocesan bishop today. Gregory had

animadverted with asperity on a Pastoral Letter of Bishop Baines (1840); and, judging the Bishop's explanation inadequate, roundly charged him with "boasting and untruthfulness, from which great dishonour to the Apostolic See and the Christian religion may arise." The Bishop held his own, but with difficulty; for he narrowly, it seems, escaped deprivation. His example was held *in terrorem* over actual or possible delinquents however eminent. "It was the punishment of Bishop Baines to keep him at the door of Propaganda for a year," wrote Newman in 1863; adding — for he was in the worst possible odor at Rome at the time — "This is the prospect which I cannot but feel probable, did I say anything which one Bishop chose to speak against and report. Others have been killed before me." (*Life of Cardinal Newman*. Wilfrid Ward. I, 588.) Already under Gregory the weatherwise could foresee the tyranny which in the disastrous reign of Pius IX. swept away national and local usage, divorced the clerical from the lay mind, and under the pretext of unity made Catholicism a Roman rather than a world-wide or even a European force.

It was a time of stir and expansion. This was felt even in land-locked waters. What would come of it? Men saw visions and dreamed dreams. The Gothic revival was one of the many symbols of the prevailing enthusiasm. Pugin's *Architectural Contrasts* — a book which it should pay a modern publisher to reproduce, and from which Mgr. Ward gives us a characteristic illustration (that of the Chapels Royal at Windsor and at Brighton) — is a key to much that was in men's minds. Pugin was an enthusiast. He confused preference with principle. "How can you expect to convert England if you wear a cope like that?" he remonstrated with a friend who wore one of a Roman pattern; and the comment of a satirist on his extravagance was —

"The Catholic Church, she never knew
Till Mr. Pugin taught her
That true religion had to do
At all with bricks and mortar!"

He would tolerate none but Gothic furniture; and his cook made his creams and jellies in Gothic moulds. When his wife, to his great satisfaction, was received into the Catholic Church, "the ceremony was grand and awfully impressive," said the local paper. "From either extremity of the side-galleries was extended across the chapel a handsome and tasty festoon of flowerets, from the centre of which was suspended a crown of the same materials directly over the head

of the convert." It must have been a grotesque sight. But he was a great artist; and his principle — that of the decoration as opposed to the concealment of construction (compare the Gothic timber roof with the flat ceiling or double dome of a classical building) — was sound.

Mgr. Ward's readers will be frequently reminded that we live in changed times. The service at the consecration of Bishop Griffiths (1833) occupied five hours; the dinner after the opening of Pugin's cathedral at Birmingham six. Dr. Wiseman often preached for two hours on end. The Bavarian Chapel was known as "The Shilling Opera" — a shilling being the charge of admission to the principal Sunday mass. A Catholic journal (1839) describes the performance:

"Signor Rubini sang the admired *Quoniam* with great effect. It was more like the warbling of a bird than mere singing, for it must have astonished as well as delighted the whole congregation, among whom were many Protestants. To say the most of the *Credo* in a few words, it excelled the *Gloria*, and was supported by Madame Persiani and Signor Tamburini, who came in during the sermon."

The "Goths" protested; plain-song and the pointed arch were twin sisters, and the good sense of men of the type of Lingard demurred:

"Has it not been our fate to hear a soprano *Incarnatus* attempted in falsetto by the bass voice of an eminent comic singer, whose very face irresistibly called up associations of mirth and conviviality? Have we not seen with our own eyes eminent 'artistes' walk arm in arm, and with much seeming gravity and decorum, into the choir of a London Chapel, although these very parties were at the time labouring under the world's imputation of living together in a state unhallowed alike by the laws of God and man?"

Magis planctus quam cantus is St. Augustine's rule for church music. Perhaps there is something to be said even for plain-song! But we live in more decorous days.

Another type of absurdity was presented by the Romanizers. Faber spoke and wrote of the Blessed Virgin as "dearest Mamma"; the Anglican Church, whose ministers many of them had been, was "Mother Damnable"; its clergy were "Bonzes"; its Eucharist "the Bread and Wine." He wore the Oratorian dress in public: "I walk down the street in my habit; and I feel that I dispel invincible ignorance wherever I go." The cult was one of sheer brutality. One of Faber's disciples, hearing of the death of a Protestant relative, made the announcement, "My sister is jolly well damned." The comment of Anatole France on religion of this sort suggests itself:

"C'est ridicule; mais c'est odieux." Their indiscriminate idealizing brought "the ways of Rome" into contempt.

"The more extreme Romanizers even imitated the slovenliness prevalent there. They would celebrate mass in a rapid and careless manner, and would talk freely at the altar or in choir. Some even went such lengths as to spit in the Church, a practise which they said denoted the feeling of being at home there which a Catholic should have. One well-known convert allowed a small dog to run about his Church, declaring that the collar-bells had a devotional effect — his real reason being that in Rome dogs are not excluded from the churches."

From the Reformation downwards there has been a persistent though thin stream — perhaps a more accurate word would be dribble — of secessions to Rome. The larger body attracts the smaller; and Catholicism appeals to certain temperaments outside it very much as the Synagogue appealed to the "foolish Galatians" of the Apostolic age. Tractarianism was the outcome of this attraction. Great as was the contrast between the two, it had points of contact with the Evangelicalism of the previous generation — an infallible book demands an infallible interpreter; and the Romantic movement gave it impetus; *in Tiberim defluxit Orontes*; the muddy Tiber received the muddier waters of the Thames. There were Catholics who viewed the transformation of the National Church with suspicion; it was Satan transforming himself into an angel of light. There were others who welcomed it with enthusiasm, and saw in it the promise of a second Spring. The most extravagant expectations were formed; the return of England to the Church, it was believed, was imminent. Pretended prophecies passed from mouth to mouth. It was an age of stigmatized nuns and thaumaturgist friars, of omens, miracles, charms, and amulets; an orgy of spiritual exaltation set in. The Vicars Apostolic, to their credit, set themselves against these follies. A letter written by Dr. Griffiths to Prince Hohenlohe (1842) dwells upon what has been since called the "leakage" — "we annually lose many Catholics from neglect" — and adds that "when we look at the whole population and consider the progress of conversions, we cannot say that there is a reasonable prospect of England's return to the Church of Christ." And in a Pastoral (1841) — "Scarcely shall we find a body of schismatics returning with sincerity to the true faith." Gregory XVI., who, in the little leisure which the misgovernment of his subjects left him, dabbled in pietism, was indignant, and in a letter addressed to the London clergy allowed himself to apply the

"Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis"

of the poet to their Bishop. But the event demonstrated the fallibility of the Infallible. The Bishop was right, and the Pope wrong.

The converts were accustomed to draw invidious comparisons between the intellectual attainments which they believed themselves to possess and the alleged ignorance of the old Catholics. Such comparisons, the bad taste of which was obvious, were unjustified. The Oxford Movement as a whole lay outside the mind of its generation; the trained intellect of the time — the representatives of English speculation and science, the historians, the poets, the men of letters — passed it by. In the sense in which the word is used today neither the converts nor the old Catholics were educated; in its more restricted signification the advantage was at least not obviously on the side of the converts. Newman was the one great figure of whom they could boast; but, man of genius as he was, his knowledge, even for his time, was limited. Lingard, on the other hand, was a man of genuine learning; it is probable that he had forgotten more than all the converts put together had ever known. His opinion of the neophytes was poor. "Their Greek," he declared, "was confined to one branch of the language" — the composition of iambics — "and their Latin was as a rule beneath contempt."

In one respect the old Catholics were at a disadvantage. They had retained the less accentuated aspirate of an earlier generation; and their pronunciation was apt to degenerate, even in men of good social position, into the habitual omission of the letter H. The late excellent Bishop Ullathorne was an example. An ill-trained acolyte, being directed at a function to put on the mitre, himself assumed the episcopal headgear. The Bishop interposed: "Not on your 'ead; on my 'ead." Nor did he confine himself to the omission of this unfortunate letter where custom prescribes it; he would supply it where it was not required. He once found himself, it was said, in a railway carriage with Samuel Wilberforce, who, seeing his dress, remarked, "I think we are both Bishops." "*H*i am a Bishop," was the emphatic answer; and the conversation dropped. On Wiseman's death his name was spoken of in connection with the Archbishopric of Westminster; but Propaganda was informed that this trick of pronunciation would make the appointment undesirable. Cardinal Barnabò, then Prefect of Propaganda, enjoyed the joke hugely. "*C'* e una certa lettera *Acca*" (H), he went about saying, "*la mancanza di cui e un peccato mortale fra gli Inglesi*"; and, the Italian H being silent, he regarded this as an additional proof that the English were mad. But Manning got the preferment. "Events momentous spring from causes least." It is one of the

ironies of history that a possibly not unimportant factor in the Vatican Definition of Papal Infallibility, in which the convert Archbishop played so prominent a part, was Dr. Ullathorne's misplacement of the letter H.

A more important matter was the relation between English and Irish Catholics. During the struggle for emancipation they had, though not without difficulty, made common cause. After 1829 they fell apart; the English, with the majority of the converts, being conservatives, and the Irish, though not in any sense Liberals, democratic. The English Catholics bitterly opposed the land agitation in Ireland, and professed to be scandalized by the indifference of the Irish clergy to the crimes by which this agitation was accompanied; the Irish charged the English with ingratitude. The *Tablet* — *quantum mutatus!* — under Lucas denounced the Catholic families as "a corrupt heap of religious indifference, of half-faith, of cowardice, of selfishness, of unmanly impotence." This antagonism remains to this day; and, as the great majority of Catholics living in England are either Irish or of Irish origin, no little friction has been, and is, the result. At a meeting of a Catholic conference in a northern industrial centre it was thought impossible a few years ago to have the National Anthem played. In the present war the Irish, with few exceptions, are staunch in their support of the British Empire; and it may be hoped that under new conditions the division which separates the two sections of the Catholic community may be overcome. But tact is called for; and tact is a rare quality. It cannot be said that it has always been shown on either side.

The leading figure of Mgr. Ward's period (1830-50) is undoubtedly that of Dr. Wiseman. It is difficult for those whose knowledge of the Cardinal comes from the record of his later years, when his energy was impaired and his health failing, to realize how able and distinguished a man he was. Born in Spain of Anglo-Irish parents, educated at Waterford, at Ushaw, and finally at the English College at Rome, of which he was President (1828-40), his reputation for scholarship — he was an Orientalist of some distinction — brought him into contact with foreigners of note who visited Italy; and his duties as agent for the English Vicars Apostolic gave him a considerable acquaintance both with English Catholicism and in general with affairs. No preparation could have been better calculated to qualify him for the high office which he was to fill in later life. The various forces whose action and reaction affected the Catholic community in this country — Irish and English, Catholic and convert,

Gothic and Roman, foreign and domestic — he was at home with and had personal knowledge of them all. No one else could have held them in hand, and to no one man does English Catholicism owe so great a debt.

Browning's Bishop Blougram, of which he was the original, did him an injustice; he was a sincerely religious man. He had, however, certain palpable foibles—there was a lobster-salad side to him, it was said, as well as an ascetic; and his undisguised delight in the state and paraphernalia of the Cardinalate gave a certain plausibility to the picture, by which he was deeply mortified, and of whose unfairness those who knew him best were best aware. Perhaps no better illustration of his two sides could be given than, on the one hand, his famous pastoral "Out of the Flaminian Gate of Rome" (1850)—windy, bombastic, and pretentious; and on the other hand, his later *Appeal to the English People*, whose vigorous good sense went far to atone for the original error in taste and judgment.

The epigram of Robert Scott, the lexicographer, on the new hierarchy may be quoted in conclusion.

Cum Sapiente Pius nostras juravit in aras.
Impius, heu Sapiens! insipiensque Pius!

It may be thus Englished:

Pius and Wiseman 'gainst our altars rise.
Oh unwise Pius! and oh impious Wise!

With the establishment of the diocesan episcopate a new era opened; the traditions of "the persecuted remnant" were closed.

ALFRED FAWKES.

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LIVES OF THE ENGLISH MARTYRS. Second Series. The Martyrs declared Venerable. Vol. I. 1583-1588. Edited by EDWIN H. BURTON, D.D., and J. H. POLLEN, S.J. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Pp. xxxix, 588. \$2.50.

The men whose tragic fate is here described were certainly in a position of as great difficulty as have been any in the history of the church. Convinced of the necessity for salvation of Roman obedience and anxious to minister its sole life-giving sacraments, as they esteemed them, to the persecuted adherents of Rome in their native

land, they were willing to risk all for the fulfilment of the task. Yet their ecclesiastical sovereign, by a bull of 1570, had declared Queen Elizabeth excommunicate and deposed; in 1579 he had aided an Irish invasion; and eminent English Catholics on the Continent, like Robert Parsons, were doing their utmost to encourage an invasion of England by the forces of Philip II — an invasion which most observers, in England and outside, believed would be irresistible, till the destruction of the Armada in 1588 proved its futility. That King had shown his disposition, in 1584, by furthering the murder of William the Silent, and conspiracies against the life of Elizabeth were occasionally discovered. No wonder English Protestantism looked upon these missionaries with profound suspicion. Nor can one be surprised that, when apprehended, these priests were usually asked the "bloody question," which the editors of this volume declare to have been illegal. Whether illegal or not, it was the most natural of inquiries under the circumstances: "Should England be invaded in the interest of the Catholic faith, which side would you take, that of the Queen or of her enemies?" An answer satisfactory to Protestants was most difficult to an earnest Catholic of that age.

Yet it is now evident that the men whose lives and sufferings are so touchingly commemorated in this volume were, possibly without exception, no plotters against the government, and simply and sincerely interested in the cure of souls, as they understood it. Their complete success would have been, indeed, the overthrow of Elizabeth's rule; but that was, one may say, a by-product rather than their direct aim. Even a Protestant, in whose veins runs the blood of the Puritans, will not grudge his tribute of praise to a devotion which was faithful unto death and to which the preservation of the Roman Church in England was due. He may deem them mistaken, but he will hardly regret the title "Venerable" bestowed upon them by the late Pope Leo XIII.

The sketches are by many hands, but have been drawn with much painstaking accuracy, if from a decidedly Roman point of view. The Introduction reflects the well-known scholarship of its authors.

WILLISTON WALKER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE ENGLISH RITE. Being a Synopsis of the Sources and Revisions of the Book of Common Prayer. With an Introduction and an Appendix. F. E. BRIGHTMAN. Rivingtons. 1915. 2 Vols. Pp. Vol. I, ccxxx, 453. Vol. II, 454-1068. 42s.

These huge volumes contain a vast amount of valuable matter and witness to almost incalculable labor of an exacting kind. More than a thousand (to be exact, 1017) of the pages numbered in Arabic are devoted to a "synopsis" or parallel column view of three editions of the English Prayer Book, those of 1549, 1552, and 1661; a fourth column (which actually stands first) being devoted to "sources." The changes introduced into the book at the revisions of 1559 and 1604 are noted by reference numbers, as are also variations in different editions of the Elizabethan and Jacobean books, and the matter derived from the Scottish book of 1637 and from the collections and suggestions of Bishop Cosin and Bishop Wren and the non-conformists at the Savoy Conference. In the column of sources, the text of Latin originals and that of German originals is distinguished by a difference of type; Gothic letters indicate the particular Latin sources, and abbreviations tell of the earliest (extant) texts — Gelasian or Gregorian or Leonine or Menardian — in which each item is found, while antique letters refer the items from the German to their several originals. In the three columns of successive texts four styles of type are used, each in two sizes, for (1) matter other than translation from the Bible, which existed before 1549 in an independent form and was incorporated in the book of that date; (2) matter of 1549; (3) matter of 1552; (4) matter again other than translations from the Bible, of a date later than 1552. In all this we are reminded of Maskell's *Liturgiae Britannicae*; and the simpler arrangement and less particular form of the older book will seem to many students still to commend it for every practical use. Perhaps the example which is really the test of the book of 1559, the form of words at the administration of the consecrated elements in the Communion Office, shows best the difference in the methods of the two editors. Maskell, who put the books of 1552 and 1559 into one column and those of 1604 and 1637 (Scottish) into another, printed separately the simply commemorative forms of the second Edwardine book and the combined Elizabethan forms, making the change of words and its date perfectly clear; Brightman brings the words of 1549 over into the 1661 column, the numeral '1' before them and the asterisk after them indicating to the reader (who, if he does not remember their meaning, must turn back from

page 701 to page ii in the other volume,) that the restoration was really made in 1559, more than a century before the date at the head of the column. So it is with the additions to the Catechism; they stand under 1661, and only an inconspicuous "4" on page 787 and a "*" on page 791 tell us that they date from 1604. The reader recognizes that the most laborious pains have been taken to note every variation of typography, even printers' slips and irregularities of spelling and indications of personal equation and devices to secure "justification," most of which have not the slightest literary or historical meaning. And in this connection we have to note great waste of space. It is interesting indeed to read the epistles and gospels in the Great Bible version from which they were taken until 1661 and compare their wording with that of the King James version which was substituted for it at that date, and also to have before the eye the Vulgate text in which these Lessons were read in the Sarum Use, noting the differences in length and other variations; but to print all the epistles and gospels in English at full length, once for 1549 and once for 1552, where the variations, in large part due to carelessness or accident, were only those of two editions of the same English version, and to note every least divergence, appears unnecessarily "meticulous." And to print all the introits in full in the 1549 column, leaving (of course) the other columns blank, adds to the conviction that the book has been unnecessarily padded; for the collects, introits, epistles, and gospels of the week before Easter use up seventy-nine pages. The editor himself evidently felt that this fulness of printing must be in some wise restrained; for the Psalter is represented under 1661 by the title of the book, the title and the first verse of the first psalm, a line of dots, and the last verse of the one hundred and fiftieth psalm; and we have to look elsewhere for the original text of the whole book of Psalms.

Thus far what has been written by way of criticism may seem rather ungracious as spent upon the result of great labor on the part of a scholar who must have found delight in it. But something must be said as to the column of "sources," in which this work differs from that of Maskell, and which shows that it has a wider and more helpful purpose. Even here we are disappointed at finding that the source given in each instance is the proximate source rather than the original. The prayer of St. Chrysostom indeed is printed in the Greek; but the source of *Gloria in excelsis* is given as the Latin text in the missal with a note after *hominibus bonae voluntatis*, "S. Luk. ii. 14 unto men a good wyll," but no indication that the translation

in this phrase was from the Greek text of the time; and the Nicene Creed is given in Latin, not in Greek, though it seems certain, as Bishop Dowden has shown, that Cranmer was led by a faulty Greek text to omit "holy" from the marks of the Church. In the Burial of the Dead the sequence *Media vita* is given in Latin, with a reference for the first clause to Job xiv and to the lesson in the old office; but for the rest no source is given except the compline service of the third Sunday in Lent in Sarum Use, and we are not pointed to the Greek "Trisagion" from which "Agios o theos" was taken. We have no help for finding the biblical sources of the versicles and responses at Morning and Evening Prayer, or the biblical and patristic sources of the several parts of the *Te Deum*; while the attribution of the sources of the prayer of consecration in the Communion service is confused and unsatisfactory. But all the proximate attribution of sources is interesting; and in particular the inexperienced student will be surprised to see how much was derived from German (or, as the word was used then, Dutch) formularies; not indeed in matters relating to doctrine but in forms of words, especially exhortations and the like. (Again, it would seem that this ought not to have extended so far as to give the source of the gospel in the Baptism of Infants in a German translation.)

It remains to speak of the learned historical introduction to the work, and of the notes contained in it and following it on "the result of the revisions."

Beginning with a concise sketch of the way in which by the beginning of the sixteenth century the Roman rite had come to prevail throughout the West, of the groups of books in which it was contained, and the sacramentaries in which we can to some extent trace its history, the author shows that "the course of things in England was parallel to what it was elsewhere and the resulting situation was the same." The position held by the Use of Sarum is noticed as testified by the fact that before the year 1545 the Missal of that Use had been printed in 48 editions, the Portuis in 48, and the Primer in about 170. Mention is made of the so-called Gallican use in its Ambrosian and its Mozarabic forms, and of the liturgy of the orthodox East in the Byzantine service-books. The movements for liturgical reform are noted, with special mention of the Breviary of Quifiones, of which more than a hundred editions were published within thirty years; and the German substitutes, involving presently the use of the vernacular, are treated quite fully. Then along lines which are sufficiently familiar, the English reforms are traced from the publication of the Great Bible and Marshall's

Primer to the Book of Common Prayer of 1549; and sufficiently full attention is given to the successive revisions until that of 1661. Of special value is section VIII, with its consideration of the "principal sources" — really all the sources — from which the book of 1549 was compiled, biblical and traditional and reformational, and this latter along the three lines of continental Catholic, Anglican, and Lutheran—though, as the author says, there is no Lutheranism in the book.

It may be well to mention the points in which the general character of the new rite is noted, namely: The books are reduced to three — the Bible, the Psalter, and the one volume of breviary, processional, missal, and manual; the whole is in English; rite and ceremony are simplified; there are no metrical hymns; all benedictions of things, "except of course of the matter of some of the sacraments," are omitted; invocations of saints and allusion to their merits and intercession are excluded; and, as matters of form, the book is printed almost entirely in black and there is no musical notation. A table exhibits the relation of the Divine Service (matins and evensong) of the first book to the traditional service and to contemporary reforms; and in another table the relation of the "Mass" in the same first book to the traditional order and to some Lutheran orders is shown. Section IX on the ordination-book of 1550 is very instructive, with accounts of traditional rites and Bucer's proposed substitute for them. The ritual products of the reign of Elizabeth, the slight changes under James I., and the extensive revision after the Restoration are all treated in a careful way, the antecedents and the results being as thoroughly studied and discussed as the limitations of the work allow.

The Notes, which are printed as parts of the Introduction, and not as conspicuously as their importance would warrant, consist of a great number of paragraphs, each referred to its page in the four-column "synopsis." They have a wide range of history, explanation, comparison, and criticism, and must all be read by any one who would appreciate their varying value. Some examples may be given as in a way illustrating all. Under the year 1549, with a reference to pp. 200 sq. of the text, is a full scheme of the Introits, with a study of the principles on which they were selected, very curious, not to say ingenious. Presently we find, "p. 220, Collect; see *Journal of Theol. Studies* xiii, p. 562"; and turning to page 220, we find that it is the Collect for Christmas Day; but we are not edified. After a while, we are told by a reference to p. 604 (in the other volume) that the Collect for St. Mary Magdalene's

day is "perhaps the worst in the book"; again, referring to the Nicene Creed on p. 648, we have several interesting notices of variations between the originals and the translation, including the omission of "holy" already mentioned. There soon follows an instructive note on the offertory. A long note on the several forms in which the institution of the Eucharist is recorded or recited shows careful study and is of great value; but presently we are rather startled by the expression of an opinion that the blessing — "The peace of God," etc. — "is an anticlimax after communion, and no doubt came into use just because the people had not as a rule communicated in the Mass." The notes on the book of 1661 call attention to "the originally unauthorized insertion of the musical colon in *Te Deum*, to enable it to be sung to a chant, in spite of its structure"; and the remark is ventured that if "all kneeling," before the collects at morning prayer, is intended to include the priest, "it is obviously ridiculous"; while the placing of a prayer for the Sovereign before the collect for the day in the Communion Office is called an "unhappy transference," "a good instance of the profound lack of appreciation, on the part of the Carolines, of the liturgical precedents which on occasion they were fond of invoking."

The intention and purpose of this work, and hardly less their execution, have called for an extended notice, in which perhaps what seem defects and causes of disappointment have been more fully mentioned than have the marks of wide and thorough scholarship furnished very generously with references. But to those who can handle the volumes, verify their historical statements, and judge the opinions expressed in them, they will bring a wealth of special learning not easily exhaustible and not for many a year to be again gathered. A complete index to such a work would be a practical impossibility; but there ought to be a full table of contents for the introduction.

The Appendix treats of two observances which the editor holds to appertain to the integrity of the English rite, though not contained in the Book of Common Prayer — The Bidding of the Bedes and the Rogation Procession; but of these we have not the space to write.

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THE OFFICES OF BAPTISM AND CONFIRMATION. The Cambridge Liturgical Handbooks Series. T. THOMPSON. Cambridge University Press. 1914. Pp. x, 253. 6s.

This little book aims to give the history of baptism and confirmation, together with the theological ideas underlying them. It details, for example, the preparation required in the early centuries for baptism, the times at which it was administered, the form of its administration, the attendant ceremonies, the various meanings attached to it. It traces the differences in these respects among the Eastern and Western liturgies. The student is helped by abundant references to original sources, by tables comparing the different liturgies in parallel columns, by an excellent bibliography, and by a judicious index.

FREDERIC PALMER.

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THE FREER GOSPELS (Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature related to the New Testament. First Series, Volume II. Part 3). EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. The University of Chicago Press. 1914.

THE BIXBY GOSPELS (The same, Part 4). EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. 1915.

To Professor Goodspeed of Chicago has fallen by right of competence and interest the honorable task of examining such New Testament Greek manuscripts as have found their home in this country and in Canada. In former years he has published careful collations of the Gospel manuscript belonging to the Newberry Library, Chicago, and of that in the possession of the University of Toronto. To these are now added a collation of the Freer Gospels (W), of which a superb fac-simile had previously been published by Professor Sanders of Michigan, who has devoted years to the study of the Freer manuscripts. The collation is made with the text of Westcott and Hort, is undoubtedly of the highest accuracy, and will be of much and permanent use to scholars, for they are sure to occupy themselves in the future with this remarkable copy of the Gospels.

The other collation is of a less notable manuscript—an illuminated copy of the Gospels (Gregory, 703) which came from Athos and was purchased from Quaritch in London by Mr. W. K. Bixby of St. Louis. It is an eleventh-century codex, presenting a text of the ordinary type, but with some interesting features. It is well worth while to publish descriptions and collations of such a manu-

script, and American scholars are in duty bound to examine all the copies of the Gospels in this country, no matter how late. The collation is here made, as it ought to be in all such cases, with the *Textus Receptus*.

One or two formal criticisms may be permitted. It would be convenient to have at least the name of the Gospel, if not the chapter and verse, indicated at the top of each page; and to include the accents, capitals, etc., of the printed edition with which the collation is made is a piece of extra labor that is merely puzzling and not helpful to the user. It is also an inconvenience in a scientific work not to have the date of publication on the title-page.

J. H. ROPES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE ETHICS OF CONFUCIUS. THE SAYINGS OF THE MASTER AND HIS DISCIPLES UPON THE CONDUCT OF THE "SUPERIOR MAN." MILES MEANDER DAWSON. With a Foreword by WU TING FANG. G. Putnam's Sons. 1915. Pp. xxii, 323. \$1.50.

This book is worthy of recommendation to Occidental students of the Confucian ethics, as it gives a general survey of the doctrines of the Chinese sage through ample quotations from the different canonical books of Confucianism, which are linked together by the author's explanations. He did well in arranging the topics to be explained according to the so-called "eight principles" in the "Great Learning," one of the Confucian canonical books. These principles enable us to understand that self-realization (or "self-development" as the present author put it) is not the sole aim of Confucian learning, but necessarily leads us to enter into the work of universal realization of virtue, which is to be effected primarily through universal education and proper government.

Apparently the author had not a good command of the Chinese language and has had to depend in his study of the subject on English translations. Some of his misconceptions and oversights were certainly due to this cause. Dr. Legge's translations, which seem to have been the author's main source of knowledge, fail in many cases to give the precise meanings of the original texts, and they scarcely give any of the hints which are so necessary with respect to those points which are subjects of much discussion among Confucian scholars. The very term "superior man," for instance, which the author attaches to the title of his book, stands in Legge's translations for two different Chinese terms, each of which has two

different meanings. Each of the Chinese terms stands, on the one hand, for a man of virtue, and on the other for a man of rank. The distinction becomes quite obscured through the indiscriminate translation of Dr. Legge. The same is true as regards the Chinese phrase which sometimes stands for the heavenly investiture of a sovereign, and at other times for a heavenly mission, a heavenly decree, or fate. Toward the end of his life, Confucius said, "At my fiftieth year I was convinced of my heavenly mission (to illumine the truth and bring peace and welfare to the people)." He came to this conviction as the result of his conviction of his perfect self-realization, and it was the occasion for his immediately devoting himself to the task of universal realization. It marks the turning-point in his life. Without knowing this, we should be at a loss to understand his firm, unshaken faith in Heaven, to which he gave frequent expression, as we find recorded in the *Analects*. Dr. Legge translated the phrase by the term "decrees of Heaven," and the real meaning of the utterance of Confucius has thereby been lost. Naturally our author was not able to understand the original meaning of the Chinese phrase. What is equally vital is Dr. Legge's way of translating the ideal of Confucius, which is expressed in Chinese by the ideograph "*jen*." Dr. Legge gave four different translations for this single term — good, benevolence, virtue, and perfect virtue. So far as the respective texts are concerned, his translations of "*jen*" by these different terms are to be accepted as correct. They, however, are liable to conceal from the reader the fact that Confucius spoke of different shades or phases of his ideal in all these different cases. Mr. Dawson has consequently not observed this fact. His attention was not duly attracted to the Confucian ideal and he only treated it casually. The doctrines of Confucius are remarkable in that they lay emphasis on the concordance between Heaven and man. On this concordance rests the system of his ethical and political doctrines, and the very key-note to this concordance is to be found in his ideal, i.e. "*jen*." "*Jen*" is primarily the principle of love or benevolence. Benevolence is the basic virtue of Heaven and is implanted in human nature. It becomes perfect virtue in man through an *a posteriori* realization, and in this stage of perfect realization man becomes one with Heaven in virtue. This idea forms a necessary and sufficient condition for a comprehension of the true meaning of the Confucian doctrines. In close relation with "*jen*" there is another principle, called "*yi*" in Chinese, which Dr. Legge has translated by the English term "righteousness." This principle is often spoken of by Confucius and plays a very prominent part in

the doctrines of Mencius. It is the principle regulating human conduct under the different conditions of life. It is the principle which marks a sharp distinction between the Confucian principle of love and the theory of communistic love propounded by Micius. When a man confronts two incompatible courses of conduct and is obliged to sacrifice one for the sake of the other, it is this principle which strongly compels him to adhere to that course of conduct with which the welfare and interest of a higher entity are concerned. It is this principle that makes up the strong and inflexible character of man. All these shades of the principle have become obscured through translation, so that they do not awaken the present author to a proper understanding of the principle. The author often uses the expression "art of living" (pp. 6-12, etc.), and by its use he intends to indicate his opinion that the Confucian ethics form a doctrine of purposive response, of the adaptation of means to ends, etc. This way of looking at the Confucian ethics seems to represent it as a rather mechanical method of living — a defect from which later Confucianism was not always free. As taught by Confucius and Mencius, however, it was not a mechanical method of living. Here the principle of "*yi*," or righteousness, as Dr. Legge puts it, comes into play. It enables man to adapt himself to a course of conduct appropriate to the circumstances in which he is situated. While the principle of "*jen*" is the principle of uniformity, that of "*yi*" is the principle of diversity. Through different ways of adaptation or response under different conditions, man is enabled to attain the highest ideal, i.e., the perfect realization of virtue. The present author is undoubtedly handicapped by his dependence on translations, and has consequently failed to arrive at a proper appreciation of these points.

What is most conspicuous in the book is the author's view that Confucius did not teach a religion (Introduction, p. i). The reviewer is delighted to find an Occidental scholar who has come to this view. Though based on profound religious convictions, the doctrines of Confucius are strictly ethical and political, as the author clearly states. Most Occidental scholars confuse what the reviewer designates "pre-Confucian thought" with the doctrines of Confucius himself, and representing both indiscriminately by the term Confucianism, regard the latter as a system of religion. That the present author explicitly declares the doctrines of Confucius to be ethical and political is quite remarkable in face of the fact of his being a member of the Confucian Society in China and of his relation with Dr. Ch'en Huan Chang. The Society was started soon

after the establishment of the Republic by Dr. Ch'en, a Chinese scholar who received the degree of Ph.D. at Columbia University. The Society intended to represent the doctrines of Confucius as a religion and to have them established as the State religion of China. The movement which was organized for the purpose called forth a reactionary movement among Chinese Christians, Buddhists, and others. At last a presidential mandate was issued, in which President Yuan Shi K'ai explicitly stated that the Republic should have no State religion and that the doctrines of Confucius should be respected as formerly in the light of ethical and political precepts. To interpret the doctrines of Confucius as a system of religion is not permissible, however divergent the interpretations of Confucianism by later Chinese or Japanese scholars may be.

Another good feature of the book is that it gives a clear statement of the fact that Confucius praised above all other attitudes of mind that which considers only the thing to be done, not the reward for it (p. 69). In an apparent contradiction with this stands the author's statement to the effect that Confucius does not deem an act good or bad according as the motive is virtuous or evil, but that an act is to be judged by its effect and a motive by its result (p. 45). According to the former view, the Confucian ethics would seem to be strict rigorism, while according to the latter, it would seem to be utilitarian. This point would have been cleared up, if the author had referred to the contrast between the principles of "*jen*" and "*yi*." As the principle of love or benevolence, "*jen*" is utilitarian, because it makes universal realization and the consequent welfare of the people the ultimate aim of the superior man. As the principle of righteousness, "*yi*" commands that the first consideration of the superior man should be the following of the right path, independent of any motive of personal gain, profit, or interest. The latter emphasizes the execution of duty out of the pure, disinterested motive of complying with the command of duty. The following of the right path is to be accompanied by the resultant welfare of the higher entity, with which the personal interest of the actor is closely interwoven. The superior man, however, does not follow the right path with his own private interest in view. He who does so is the "mean man" (p. 71). When, however, the following of the right path happens to bring upon him a calamity or mishap, the superior man does not fail to ponder over the matter. It may be due to some shortcoming on his part or to causes beyond his control. If he finds fault with himself, the superior man hastens to "rectify the purpose," while if he be convinced that the calamity is not due to

any shortcoming on his part, the superior man acquiesces in what he deems the decree of Heaven. The fact that Confucius recognized one's virtue even in one's faults (see the quotation on p. 75, which is erroneously explained as bearing on righteousness) speaks very strongly in favor of the view that Confucius laid greater stress on motives than on results. The principle of righteousness is spoken of in sharp contrast with personal profit or gain, as is shown by the quotation on p. 71.

Among the author's comments on the Confucian conception of Heaven those which pertain to the idea of a personal God (p. 293) are worthy of special mention. On account of the lack of materials available for the author in the form of translations, he was not able to explain by quotations the various ideas which enter in the formation of the idea of a personal God. It is surprising that he has overlooked the theory of the heavenly investiture of the sovereign, which is so prominent in the Books of Poetry and of History and in the Works of Mencius. This theory has been the reason for the revolutionary dynastic changes which have been so frequent in China. The Confucian theory of Providence, which the author explains on p. 288, is incomplete without a reference to this doctrine. The author states Confucius's views on prayer very well (p. 287), when he says that Confucius commended and practised prayer continually offered by means of a virtuous and useful life. In other words, Confucius rejected prayer in the usual sense of the term. He could not have believed in oracles, though the author tries to show us that he did.

The theory of "beneficent government" in contra-distinction to military rule, which the author explains in Chapter V, is of special interest to the Occidental reader. This kind of government, which Confucianism regarded as the ideal one, is a combination of communistic and individualistic principles, as the author eloquently explains. Most of the matters which he discusses in this connection can only be properly understood by a reference to the ancient systems of land-tenure and the village-community, with which these matters were closely interwoven. The writer might well have referred to Dr. Ch'en's *Economic Principles of the Confucian School*, but perhaps the exigencies of space prevented him from doing so.

The author's comments and quotations concerning the family as the foundation of society and its proper regulation as the basis for government (p. 173) and of military equipment (p. 207) will be especially interesting to the American reader. The doctrine of obedience based on love and respect, which plays so great a

part in the Confucian views of the relations of men as members of a family or of a State, will be of value to the citizens of America, where we hear so much of a lack of obedience and respect. One of the sayings of Confucius to the effect that "to lead an uneducated people to war is to throw them away" (p. 207) will be a good lesson both to the advocates of preparedness and to the pacifists.

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ST. PAUL AND CHRISTIANITY. ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, D.D. John Murray. 1913. Pp. xv, 214. 5s.

The author of this book tells us that his purpose is "to examine the opinions of St. Paul in relation to certain salient points in his teaching, to discuss the genesis of those opinions, and to investigate the relation of his thought to contemporary Christian teaching" (p. 2); but he makes no attempt to present the Apostle's thought in complete or systematic form. With a few rather unimportant reservations, Dr. Headlam accepts as genuine the thirteen Epistles traditionally ascribed to Paul, though he admits that most critical scholars would not agree with him in this wholesale acceptance of the Pauline corpus. The Book of Acts he uses as a wholly veracious account of what was done and believed by the early Christians.

Christian teaching, as Dr. Headlam presents it, is a thoroughly consistent body of doctrine. One might indeed say that it is like a fabric of uniform texture and one color. What Jesus taught Paul received, and in general the Apostolic Church agreed with Paul; and the teachings of the Christian Church are "the development of the principles which Christ taught" (p. 93). With this complacent and easy-going view of Christian doctrine the twentieth-century believer would have to accept with hearty approval every part of the traditional theology on the ground that the whole system bears the sanction of the mind of Christ. Fortunately, however, an impartial study of Christian origins shows beyond the possibility of denial that variety rather than uniformity was the outstanding characteristic of the apostolic age, and saves us from the fatal error of finding the articles of the historic creeds in the teaching of Jesus and Paul.

Dr. Headlam rightly emphasizes the significance of Paul's personal religious experience, but he greatly underestimates the originality of the apostle. For example, we are told that the christology of the

Pauline Epistles is not the product of Paul's mind, but that it goes back to the teaching of Christ, to the expectations of the Jews, and to the memories of the earliest disciples (p. 69 f.). This judgment comes dangerously near containing the maximum of error in the minimum of space. Paul's influence on Christian thought is traced to two sources — his rabbinical training and the reality of his Christianity. The exegesis and theological categories of the Jewish schools are present in the apostle's letters because they belonged to his *Weltanschauung*, but they are by no means the heart of Paulinism. It was Paul's personal religious experience that shaped his thinking and gave vitality to his message. This truth we cannot easily over-emphasize, and in so far as Dr. Headlam's conservative treatment of Paul and Christianity contributes to this end it is to be commended.

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THE BOOKS OF THE APOCRYPHA. Their Origin, Teaching, and Contents. W. O. E. OESTERLEY. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1914. Pp. 554. \$3.00.

The purpose of this book is to encourage the reading of the Apocrypha, and to give the information needed to make the reading intelligent. Part I, the Prolegomena, treats, with undue repetitions, of such subjects as Greek influence on Judaism and its literature, the work of the scribes, their editing of the canon and their writing of other books, the character of the Pharisaic and Sadducean parties, and the movement, in part distinct from both, which expressed itself in the apocalypses. Part II is Introduction proper, and discusses the usual problems of the date, authorship, composition, contents, and purpose of the books of our English Apocrypha.

Whether the task itself which the author thus sets himself is well defined is a question. From the historian's point of view the Apocrypha is almost — though not quite — an accidental selection from the extra-canonical literature of Judaism. That these books passed over from the Greek Old Testament to the Old Latin, and so to the Vulgate, indicates something as to their age and currency and influence; but there are other books, such as Enoch, the Psalms of Solomon, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the Apocalypse of Baruch, IV Maccabees, which are more important to the New Testament student than some of the books of the Apocrypha. It is desirable that these also should be accessible and their reading

encouraged. Such books are touched upon briefly and superficially in the Prolegomena of the present work. All the more ought a clear account to be given of the origin of the Apocrypha as a collection, and of its place and use in the Christian church, Catholic and Protestant. This we miss in the present work.

Accepting, however, the writer's limitation of his task, the question remains as to the quality of the performance. One cannot escape the impression that this large and rather expensive book has been hastily put together. The author can hardly have read it through in its present form. On page 83 f., for example, we read: "Jewish belief on this subject [immortality] has already been dealt with in Part I, chap. ix, f." The reference is to a much later passage, chap. xii, pp. 288 ff. The higher critic will infer that pages 80-86 were once a part of the treatment of the Book of Wisdom, in Part II.

More serious are certain inconsistencies in the treatment of Sadduceeism and the Book of Sirach. The most distinctive feature of Oesterley's book is his acceptance in large measure of the views of Leszynsky's *Die Sadduzäer*, 1912. On the basis of this treatment he concludes that the original mark of the Sadducee was a conservative adherence to the written Law, and the rejection of the authority of the oral traditions of the Pharisees. Sadduceeism was not primarily a political party, and was not, in general, hellenizing or worldly and irreligious in its tendency. It was the party of "the Torah as traditionally interpreted"; this meant that Sadduceeism gained a partial triumph, and that Rabbinical Judaism was a synthesis of Pharisaic and Sadducean elements. Another main distinction of the Sadducees was their expectation of a Messiah of priestly instead of Davidic descent. Further, they urged a solar against the Pharisaic lunar calendar. They rejected the doctrine of resurrection, but only as an unwarranted addition to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which they accepted from Hellenism. They did not deny angels, since that would be to depart from the Pentateuch, but only the theory that the pious dead became angels. Yet they were the party of enlightenment, and in some undefined sense not inconsistent with their fundamental loyalty to the Law, they were friendly to Hellenistic culture.

In spite of this conception of the Sadducees Oesterley still holds the usual view that Jesus son of Sirach, before Sadduceeism proper, was a man of the Sadducean tendency, and that I Maccabees is a Sadducean history. But Leszynsky is followed in ascribing other books to the same party—Enoch 72-82, and possibly other parts of that apocalypse; the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, because

of its Levitical Messiah, "written by a Sadducee for the purpose of making peace with the Pharisees"; the Book of Jubilees, because of its strict legalism. Leszynsky is not followed in his ascription of the Assumption of Moses to the Sadducees. Tobit is regarded as a mixture of the three tendencies, Pharisaic, Sadducean, and Apocalyptic.

These positions, if not hastily adopted, are certainly insufficiently argued, and are not carried through consistently. That Sirach is Sadducean in character is uniformly affirmed; but Sirach "combated the rising influence of Greek thought and culture" (p. 327), whereas the Sadducees and their forebears in pre-Maccabean times were friendly to Hellenistic culture even to the point of disloyalty to their nation and religion (pp. 154-156). Again we read of Sirach in one place that "there is no mention of angels or demons in the book" (p. 340); in another that "in two passages there is a distinct mention of angels, viz. 42 16 (17), 43 26" (p. 300). Both of these contradictory observations are made to prove the Sadducean character of Sirach. So as to a future life, we are told of his "dreamy belief or non-belief," seen in such passages as 10 4, 38 16-23, and that no passages occur "which show the slightest advance on the teaching which these contain" (p. 337); while elsewhere it is inferred from 22 11, 30 17, etc. "that the annihilation of the spirit as well as the body is evidently not contemplated" (p. 288). Again these divergent views are both declared to be Sadducean.

These obvious inconsistencies appear to be due to the partial adoption of Leszynsky's position, and to the failure to eliminate survivals of the influence of Cowley, from whose article in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* Oesterley concludes, in his *Ecclesiasticus* (Cambridge Bible, p. xxvi f.), that the Zadokites are to be distinguished as the conservative priestly party from the Sadducees, the party of sympathizers with foreign ideas, who rejected distinctively Jewish beliefs. The Sadducees cannot have been both the party of conservative adherence to the Law and the party represented by the extreme Hellenizers of the pre-Maccabean days. Oesterley seems to waver between these two definitions, neither of which, perhaps, is quite correct, certainly neither a correct characterization of the Book of Sirach. In general he puts too much emphasis on the question which of the several books is Pharisaic and which Sadducean; though it is occasionally pointed out that a writer may very well be neither the one nor the other.

The effort to distinguish foreign elements from native Jewish developments in the religion of these books, to discover Persian

influence on the one side and Greek on the other, might well have been more thorough. The striking fact about the Judaism of this period is that it is everywhere in contact with Greek culture, differently in Palestine and in the Dispersion, differently in different times and circumstances; maintaining itself against Hellenism by various kinds of exclusiveness or revolt, spiritual or physical; and again assimilating Hellenistic ideas in various manners and measures. But in Mr. Oesterley's book we miss a clear and decisive grasp of this central problem. His treatment, for example, of the doctrine of a future life is not illuminating, although it is a subject in regard to which the fundamental differences between Greek and Hebrew ways of thinking and also their interactions are relatively easy to trace. The Hebrew mind is represented as first coming, under Greek influence, to such a belief in immortality of the soul as is expressed in Enoch 102-104, and then as being led logically forward "to the fuller doctrine of the resurrection of the body" (pp. 107-109). Was Enoch 103, then, written before Daniel 12? We even read of "the doctrine of resurrection for which Judaism was indebted to Hellenism" (p. 39). The discussion of the Book of Wisdom also (pp. 80-87, 298-300, 470 ff.) is deficient in insight and discrimination as to the relation between Jewish and Hellenic modes of thought.

There is, as every one knows, one book with which all other books on the Judaism of the time of Christ must be compared, if their existence is to be justified—Schürer's *History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*. This discusses substantially all the subjects treated by Oesterley and others no less important. Besides, and first of all, it is a detailed history of Palestine from 175 B.C. to 135 A.D. Its five volumes in English cost but little more than twice as much as the book before us, and contain four or five times as many words, and, let us say, forty or fifty times as much information. It is true that the English Schürer is not from the last edition, and also that the translation of the first two volumes is marred by numerous errors. Nevertheless, as it stands, it is far better than any other work in English on the history, the inner life, and the literature of the Judaism of this period. One who has Schürer will not need Oesterley.

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THE IDEALISTIC REACTION AGAINST SCIENCE. Professor ALIOTTA, Royal University of Padua. Translated by Agnes McCaskill. Macmillan & Co. 1914. Pp. xxii, 483. \$3.00.

The author tells us that "this work must be regarded as a new edition rather than a mere translation" of his book, *La Reazione idealistica contro la scienza*, published in Italy in 1912, since he has "subjected the whole of it to a process of revision with a view to improving it and adapting it to the British public." A more descriptive title for the book would be "The Reaction against Intellectualism." Even this title suggests a scope narrower than that which the book really has. It is in fact a critical summary of present tendencies in philosophy and in science, with special reference to the attacks upon the traditional intellectualism. These attacks have emanated from a variety of sources, and give to the thought of the present a general and distinctive character. It is not against the ideal of exact science merely that this movement is directed, but against philosophical rationalism as well; and idealism is by no means the only, or even the chief factor in this movement. The author defines intellectualism as follows: "By the term 'intellectualism,' taken in the widest sense of the word, we shall understand those epistemological systems which assign an autonomous value to the cognitive function." The reaction to intellectualism comprises all those views which would "make the value of science and of knowledge in general depend upon the ends of other functions of the mind, and rank will and imagination above intellect." As to the author himself, he exemplifies a reaction against this reaction. So far as this leading issue is concerned, he sides with intellectualism, and is therefore opposed to what he regards as the "predominant characteristic" of contemporary philosophy.

Anti-intellectualism first becomes a conscious motive among the pragmatists and Bergsonians. The fundamental error which Bergson commits is his attempt to derive intelligence from something else, such as æsthetic or practical activity. The world of the intellect, says Professor Aliotta, is an anomaly either from the standpoint of æstheticism or from that of moralism. The only way to account for it is to regard it as original and irreducible. But it is more than that; it is the indispensable ground of any world. Pragmatism, as exemplified by James and Dewey, does not, according to our author, succeed in getting away from those appeals to fact and to the principle of contradiction which have always been distinctive

of the cognitive as opposed to the practical faculties. The voluntaristic idealists, or "absolute pragmatists," as Professor Royce proposes to call them, are discussed in the present book under the somewhat misleading title, "The Philosophy of Values and the Historic Method." The essential contention of this group of thinkers is that such practical categories as "ought" or "ideal," are prior to the category of existence owing to the normative or purposive character of the act of judgment. Professor Aliotta argues both for the possibility of knowing existence without the act of judgment, and for a realistic interpretation of judgment itself. The philosophy of Royce, in which "the reaction from intellectualism reaches its speculative acme," is evidently greatly admired by the author; but he rejects it, not only on account of its voluntarism but on account of its pantheistic inclusion of the finite consciousness within the Divine Mind.

So far the author has dealt with those assaults upon the intellect that have emanated from philosophical sources. In Part II he deals with similar tendencies in science; in particular with the disposition among scientists to regard the logical and mathematical apparatus with which they work as conventional and arbitrary. It is not mere utility that dictates the formal factor in science, so our author contends, but the independent and incontrovertible motive of rationality. Science, in so far as it brings facts under laws and systems, partially achieves that which philosophy carries to completion — the discovery, namely, of that rational order which is "the necessary postulate of all knowledge." Nevertheless Professor Aliotta dissents from the "logical realists," like Mr. Russell, who would give a thoroughly objective status to the truths of the intellect. He very properly contends that a logical realism implies the "external" theory of relations, according to which relations are distinct and separable entities capable of doing their own relating. But this view lacks, he thinks, that "synthetic principle," "that organic unity of thought and reality which alone can render knowledge intelligible." In short, Professor Aliotta belongs to that numerous group of thinkers who regard the unity of the conscious self as more "intelligible" than the unity composed by two terms and a relation; and who propose, therefore, to explain all order and connection in the world by attributing it to "thought."

In this fundamental respect the author is unmistakably an idealist. But he terms his philosophy "a form of spiritualistic realism," because of his insistence upon the independence both of nature on the mind of man, and of the human mind on that of God. This

resembles the view which has been known in England and America as "Personal Idealism," and is represented by Howison, Sturt, and others. It also has important points of resemblance to the pluralism of Leibniz, and to the more recent pluralism of James Ward. All of these philosophies would agree with Professor Aliotta's fundamental contention that "we have immediate assurance of our subjective life, an assurance which cannot be shaken by sceptical doubt." All would agree that this individual and internal subjectivity must ever remain external to any other subject, and so be incapable of being absorbed in any one absolute mind.

The most prominent note in the present book is its insistence upon the priority of thought over will. When we know, says our author, "the mind recognizes objects and relations whose existence does not depend at all upon its volition." He also concedes that in all knowledge there is an acknowledgment of the objects' independence. He hastens to add that this does not imply their independence of all consciousness but only of the individual consciousness. So our author attempts that compromise between realism and subjectivism which is characteristic of those who style themselves "objective idealists." But he attempts it in a novel manner. Instead of supposing that in knowledge the mind divests itself of its individuality, and unites itself with an absolute mind which creates and constitutes its object, he supposes that the mind recognizes as objective and independent a certain set of laws and categories which are the *end* or *goal* of nature. The mind is justified in imposing its own necessities of thought upon nature, because these necessities, and the mind which recognizes them, are the "end towards which the becoming of things tends." To a logical realist all of this elaborate speculation is gratuitous. The mind does not first give expression to certain ideals of rationality that spring from within, and then, discovering the miracle that nature also respects these ideals, solemnly conclude that there must be some complicity on the part of nature. The logical realist finds the laws and categories in nature to start with; and since they never belonged to the mind, the fact that nature obeys them does not prove any determination of nature by mind.

This book has many merits. Its style is exceptionally good, and the thought is clear. The author's own view is not wholly convincing, and does not always strike the reader as rigorous in its reasoning. It is eclectic rather than radical and clean cut. But as an exposition of the variety of contemporary philosophies it is of distinguished excellence. There is no other book on present

tendencies so cosmopolitan in its scope and so scrupulously fair in its representation of conflicting views.

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HENRI BERGSON: A STUDY IN RADICAL EVOLUTION. EMIL CARL WILM, Ph.D., LL.D. Sturgis & Walton Co., New York. 1914. Pp. xviii, 193.

Of its kind this is an excellent little book. Professor Wilm has successfully achieved, I should say, the task which he has set himself, viz., to give "a brief and comparatively non-technical statement of Bergson's philosophy which shall be intelligible to the general reader who wishes to know something of this much-talked-of philosopher" (Preface, p. xi). It is always hard for a professor to write, and for another professor to judge, a book intended for a non-professorial audience; but among popular expositions of Bergson I should rank this book by the side of Dr. Wildon Carr's well-known little volume. Where Dr. Carr, however, writes with the enthusiastic zeal of a prophet, Professor Wilm writes with a calm detachment which makes for perspective and critical balance. He has a deft touch in exposition, and the happy knack of apposite quotation both from philosophy and poetry. Nothing could be more felicitous than the illustration of Bergson's intuition from Browning's *Paracelsus* (p. 80).

The book consists of an introductory section, followed by twelve expository and four critical sections. The expository sections deal with such topics as Change and Duration, Bergson's criticism of the Intellect at work in the conceptual analyses of Psychology and Physics, Intuition as the true method of Metaphysics, Evolution and Creation, Mechanism and Design, Freedom. That hardly any use should have been made of Bergson's most technical work, *Matière et Mémoire*, is due, no doubt, to the non-technical aim of the book. Otherwise the exposition is, within its self-imposed limits, accurate. There is only one point on which I am tempted to dissent strongly from Professor Wilm's interpretation. It appears to me that he altogether overshoots the mark when, in discussing Bergson's account of intuition as intellectual sympathy, as a viewing of the object "from within" instead of "from without," he suggests that Bergson's position is "distinctly reminiscent" of that of Leibniz's Monadology (p. 72). The pluralism of discrete, self-contained monads is as foreign, I should say, to the monism of Bergson's *élan vital*, as the suggestion that Bergson's intuition reflects the inner life of objects in the same way in which each Leibnizian monad

reflects the entire world because it is the world in miniature. There are no doubt ambiguous passages in Bergson which *prima facie* justify Professor Wilm's statement that "intuition appears to involve an ascription to nature of a psychical life similar to our own" (p. 71). But when one follows the main drift of Bergson's thought, it is clearly seen to be always focussed on the difference between the "outside" view of the intellect, which decomposes the continuous and ever-changing flux of creative life into a rigid pattern of static concepts, and the "inside" view of intuition, which experiences (and lives) life directly as it really is. The problem is everywhere to intuit the *élan vital*. The distinction of self and object-other-than-self is here strictly irrelevant. When it is said that intuition is most easily practised on "one's own" inner life, the meaning is, I take it, that the inadequacy of concepts is most easily realized in Psychology. But once it has been seen there, one's eyes are opened to it everywhere. There is now no question of reflecting within the inner life of one's own self the inner life of some object other than one's self, for such a statement still retains the fatal distinctions proper to the intellect. Emancipated from the intellect, experience coincides again with the cosmic *élan vital* itself, for which, as such, there is no self and no not-self, no inner and no outer.

Professor Wilm, by the way, is quite right in holding that James misinterpreted Bergson in claiming him as a fellow-apostle of "sensation, that flesh-bound thing which rationalism has always loaded with abuse." The most interesting point in the critical sections is, to my mind, the enquiry how far Bergson's philosophy might supply the framework for "a truly modern theology." I do not myself discover in Bergson's view of evolution any provision for creative novelities which can fairly be said to be "ideally demanded" (p. 143). Indeed, the absence of any "ideal demands" is for me precisely the chief defect of Bergson's conception of creation. But Professor Wilm's discussion of Death and Immortality in section xvii seems to me sane and frank.

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